

A
TREATISE
OF THE
PASSIONS
AND
FACULTIES
OF THE
SOULE of MAN;

With the severall Dignities and
Corruptions thereunto belonging.

By EDWARD REYNOLDS, D.D.

JUVENAL. Sat. I.

*Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ira, Voluptas.
Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago Libelli.*

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TO
HER HIGHNESSE
THE PRINCESSE
ELIZABETH,
PRINCESSE PALATINE OF
THE RHINE, DUTCHESSE OF
BAVARIA,&c. ANDELDEST
Daughter to her Majesty the
Queen of BOHEMIA.

May it please your Highness;



That the great Philosopher
hath observed of Mens Bo-
dies, is upon so much stron-
ger Reasons, true of their
Minds, by how much our
Intellectual Maturitie is
more lingring and sluggish then our Natu-
ral, That the too Early Conceptions and
Issues of them do usually prove but weak,

*Aristot. polit.
lib. 7. cap. 16.*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

and unusefull. And we shall seldom finde but that those venturous Blossoms, whose over-hasty obedience to the early Spring doth anticipate their proper season, and put forth too soon, do afterwards for their former boldness suffer from the injury of severer weather, except at least some happy shelter, or more benigne influence redeem them from danger. The like infelicity I finde my self obnoxious unto at this time. For I know not out of what disposition of minde, whether out of Love of Learning (for Love is venturous, and conceives difficult things easier then they are) or whether out of a Resolution to take some accompt from my self of those few years wherein I had been then planted in the happiest of all soils, the Schools of Learning; whether upon these, or any other Inducement so it hath hapned, that I long since have taken boldness in the Minority of my Studies to write this ensuing Treatise: That before I adventured on the endeavour of knowing other things, I might first try whether I knew
my

*Amorem dixit
Plato Πάγρ
ἔρω φησιν.
æ. Rhodig.
li. 15. ca. 15.*

The Epistle Dedicatory.

my self ; Lest I should justly incur the Censure, which that sower Philosopher past upon Gramarians ; that they were better acquainted with the evils of *Ulysses*, then with their own. This hasty resolution having produced so untimely an issue, it happened by some accident to be like *Moses* in his Infancy, exposed to the seas. Where I made no other account, but that its own weakness would there have revenged my former boldness, and betrayed it unto perishing. But as he then, so this now, hath had the marvellous felicity to light on the view, and fall under the compassion of a very Gracious Princess. For so far hath your highness vouchsafed (having happened on the sight of this *Treatate*) to express favour thereunto, as not onely to spend hours in it, and require a Transcript of it, but further to recommend it by your Gracious judgement unto publick view. In which particular I was not to advise with mine own opinion, being to express my humblest acknowledgement to your Highness.

*Dingines apud
Laertium. l. 6.*

This

The Epistle Dedicatory.

This onely Petition I shall accompany it withal unto your Highness feet, That since it is a Blossom which put forth so much too soon, it may therefore obtain the gracious influence of your Highness favour to prote& it from that severity abroad which it otherwise justly feareth.

God Almighty make your Highness as great a Mirrour of his continual Mercies, as he hath both of his Graces and of Learning.

Your Highness

most humble Servant,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.



A P R E F A C E

To the READER.

HAVING been moved to give way unto the publication of this Philosophical Miscellany the Fruit of my younger Studies, I conceive it needful to prevent one obvious prejudice under which I may labour. For it may haply seem undecent in me, having adventured to publish some few, though weak Discourses in Arguments Divine, that I should now suffer the Blossoms of my youth to look abroad, and run the hazard of publick censure. Whereunto when I shall have given a short answer, I shall rest something the more confident of a candid construction.

And here I might first alledge the honour which God himself hath been pleased to give unto inferiour and Natural knowiedge. In the first Creation, when he gave unto man the Dominion over other Creatures for his use, he gave him likewise the contemplation and knowledge of them, for his Makers Glory, and his own Delights (for God brought them unto him to give them names.) And as the holy Scriptures are all over full of the Mysteries of Gods Wisdom in Natural things, so are there some special passages there- of written^a as it were purposely on that Argument

And

Job cap. 38.

39 40. 41.

Psal. 104, 147.

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And we finde that Moses and Solomon have there. in testimony given unto them, not onely of their Divine, but of their Humane and natural Knowledge likewise.

And if we look into the Ancient Christian Churches, or into these of latter times, we shall finde that very many Ecclesiasticall persons have not denied unto the world, their Philosophical and Poetical labours, either whole and alone, or mixed, and directed to Theological Ends, as we finde in the writings of Clements Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Eusebius Casariensis, Saint Augustines Books De Civitate Dei, and others, Venerable Bede, Isidore Hispalensis, Synesius, Sidonius, Apollinaris, Honorius Augustodunensis, &c. In the Hexamerons of Saint Basil, Nyssen, Ambrose, and the Books of those who have written more directly upon some parts of the Argument of this present Treatise, as Gregory Nyssen, Lactantius, Nemefius, Procopius, Gazæus, Damascen, and others. And in later times, besides the Schoolmen, and those vast labours of many of that side, in Dialectical, Physical, and Metaphysical writings, we might instance in very many of the Reformed Churches abroad, some of whose younger labours have seen the light: As also in Oratory, Logical, Moral, Historical, Mathematical, Miscellanions writings of many learned Divines of our own Church: under the Protection of which great Examples I shall use the Apologie which Quintilian ^b dēstateth unto me, Vel Error honestus est magnos Duces sequentibus: That it is no uncomely, but a pardonable Error, which hath great Examples

^b Lib. I. cap. 5.

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Examples to excuse it. In which respect I finde my self chiefly subject to this Infelicity, that I am constrained to follow such Examples, as little children do their Fathers, Non æquis passibus, at a very great distance.

And truly when I again consider the excellent use and subordination of humane learning unto learning Divine (it being hardly possible, without it, to understand sundry passages of holy Scripture, depending upon the property of words and Idioms, or upon the customs, Rites, Proverbs, forms, usages, Laws, Offices, Antiquities of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman Monarchies, as might be shewed in sundry particulars, and were a labour most worthy the industry of some able learned Pen:) when I consider that the spoils of Egypt were by God allowed to enrich Israel, and the spoils of the Gentiles reserved by David for the building of the Temple: That a Gentile by legall purification and Marriage, might become an Israelite: That the Crown of Rabbath was put upon the head of David, and the Sword of Goliath used to slay himself: That the Gold and Myrrh, and Frankincense of the Wisemen of the East, was offered unto Christ; when I finde the Apostle convincing the Jews out of their Law, and the Philosophers out of their Maxims. And that every gift, as well as every creature of God is good, and may be sanctified for the use and delight of Man; I then conclude with my self, That this Morall and Philosophicall Glasse of the humane Soul may be of some service even unto the Tabernacle as the Looking glasses of the Israelitish women were unto the Altar.

c Est quidem de communibus sensibus sapere in dei rebus, sed in Testimonium veri, non in Adjutorium falsi. Tert. de Resur. carn. c. 3 vid. etiam Apol. ca. 47. & Clem. Alex. Stilo. l. 1. p. 203. A. 207. A. E. 214 A. B. 218 219. 223. 227. 233. 234. & l. 6. p. 465. 467 469 500. Justin Martyr. Apol. 1. Aug. Conf. l. 1. c. 13 Christus unus Dominus sui esse intelligi & iudicari, quos invenerit veritatem. Aug. de Doct. Chr. l. 2 c. 18 39. 42. "Οσα τὰ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν ἡμεῖς τὸ θεοῦ ἀποκρίνομεθα. Justin Apol. 1 Vid. Aug. de Civ. Dei. l. 18. c. 52 Greg. Nazian. Orat. 1. d. Exod. 12 35 41 Ciron 29 b Deut. 21. 12 c 2 Sam. 12 30 Vil Pet. A. ad doct. l. 1. Tit. 8. S. 2. 4.

1 Sam. 17 21. & Mar. 2. 17. f. A. 9. 8. 4. 17. 23. 29. g. Iam. 1. 7 i Tim. 4. b Ex. 31. 8.

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Nor can I but a little wonder at the melancholy fancy of Saint Hierom, who conceiving himself in a vision beaten by an Angel for being a Ciceronian, did for ever after promise to abjure the Reading of secular Authors; Though I find^d himself both justifying the excellent use of that kind of Learning, and acknowledging that conceited vision of his to have been but a Dreame.

It is true indeed that in regard of the bewitching danger from humane learning, and the two great aptness in the minds of men to surfeit, and be intemperate in the use of it; Some of the Ancients have sometimes interdicted the Reading^a of such Authors unto Christian men; But this calleth upon us for watchfulness in our studies, not for negligence, for the Apostle will tell us, that to the pure all things are pure, and even of harmfull things when they are prepared; and their malignancy by Art corrected, doth the skilfull Physician make an excellent use. If then we be carefull to moderate, and Regulate our Affections, to take heed of the pride and inflation of secular learning, not to admire Philosophy, to the prejudice of Evangelicall knowledge, as if without the revealed light of the Gospel salvation might be found, in the way of Paganisme; if we suffer not these leane Kine to devour the fat ones, nor the River Jordan to be lost in the dead Sea; I mean Piety to be swallowed up of prophane Studies; and the knowledg of the Scriptures (which alone would make any man conversant in all other kinde of Learning with much greater felicity, and success) to be undervalued, and not rather, the more admired, as a rich Jewell compared with Glasse: In this case,
and

c De Cupid.
Virginis. ad
Eustathium.

d Epist ad
Magen. Orat.
Ep. ad Pam-
mach. de Obi-
tu Pauline.
Apolog. d'overj
Ruffin. l. 1.

a Vid notat
Cocrodi Rit-
terbusii in Ipsi
Pelus ep 56 l. 1
Tertul. de pra
scrip. c. 7. d
idololat. c. 10
contr. Marc. l. 2.
c. 16.

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and with such care as this, there is no doubt, but secular Studies prepared and corrected from Pride and Prophaness, may be to the Church, as the Gibeonites were to the Congregation of Israel, for Hewers of Wood, and Drawers of Water; otherwise we may say of them, as Cato Major to his Son, of the Gracian Arts and learning, ^b Quindocunque ista Gens suas literas dabit, omnia corrumpet.

b Plin l. 29. c. 1
Vid. notas
Xylandri in
Poutarch. Cato
Rom. Sect. 13.

Nor have I upon these Considerations onely adventured on the publication of this Tract, but because withall, in the reviving of it, I found very many Touches upon Theologicoll Arguments, and some passages wholly of that Nature. Yea, all the Materiall parts of the Treatise do so nearly concern the knowledge of our selves, and the Direction of our lives, as that they may be all esteemed Borderers upon that Profession.

In the perusing and fashioning of it for the Press, I have found that true in writing, which I had formerly found true in Building: That it is almost as chargeable to repair, and set right an old house as to erect a new one. For I was willing in the most material parts of it, so to lop off Luxuriances of Style, and to supply the defects of Matter, as that with candid, favourable, and ingenuous Judgements, it might receive some tolerable acceptation. In hope whereof I rest,

Thine in all Christian service,

EDWARD REYNOLDS.

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A
TREATISE
 OF THE
 PASSIONS and FACULTIES
 of the
 SOUL of M A M.

CHAP. I.

*Of the dependance of the Soul, in
 her operations upon the Body.*



T hath been a just Complaint of Learned Men, that usually we are more curious in our inquiries after things New then Excellent; and that the very nearness of worthy Objects, hath at once made them both dispised and unknown. Thus like children, with an idle diligence, and fruitless Curiosty, we turn over this

B

great

*Cic. de Div. l. 2.
 Plin. lib. 1.
 ep 20.*

*Cic. de Nat.
Deor. lib. 2.*

*Sen. qu. Nat.
lib. 7. c. 1.*

*Sen. de Be. ef.
lib. 6. c. 23.*

Great Book of Nature, without perusing those ordinary Characters, wherein is exprest the greatest power of the Worker, and excellency of the Work; fixing our admiration onely on those Pictures and unusual Novelties, which though for their rareness they are more strange, yet for their nature are less worthy. Every Comet or burning Meteor strikes more wonder into the beholder, then those glorious Lamps of Nature, with their admirable Motions and Order, in which the Heathen have acknowledged a Divinenesse. Let a Childe be born but with six fingers, or have a part more then usuall, we rather wonder at One superfluous, then at All naturall. *Sol spectatorem nisi cum deficit non habet, nemo observat Lunam nisi laborantem, adeo naturale est magis nova, quam magna mirari:* None looketh with wonder on the Sunne, but in an Eclipse; no eye gazeth on the Moon, but in her Travel: so natural it is with men, to admire rather things New then Common. Whereas indeed things are fit for study and observation, though never so common, in regard of the perfection of their nature, and usefulness of their knowledge. In which respect, the plain Counsel of the Oracle was one of the wisest which was ever given to man, To study and to know himself; because, by reason of his own nearnesse to himself, he is usually of himself most unknown and neglected. And yet if we consider how in him it hath pleased God to stamp a more notable Character of his own Image, and to make him, amongst all his Works,

Works, one of the most perfect Models of created excellency, we cannot but acknowledge him to be one, though of the least, yet of the fittest Volumes, in this great variety of Nature to be acquainted withal. Intending therefore, according to my weaknesse, to take some view of the inside, and more noble Characters of this Book, it will not be needfull for me to gaze upon the Cover, to insist on the materials or sensitive conditions of the humane nature, or to commend him in his Anatomy : though even in that respect the Psalmist tells us, that he is fearfully and wonderfully made : for we commonly see, that as most kindes of Plants or Trees exceed us in vegetation and fertility ; so, many sorts of beasts have a greater activity and exquisitenesse in their senses than we. And the reason thereof is, because Nature ayming at a superiour and more excellent end, is in those lower faculties lesse intent and elaborate. It shall suffice therefore, onely to lay a ground-work in these lower faculties, for the better notice of mans greater perfections, which have ever some connexion and dependance on them. For whereas the principal acts of Mans Soul are either of Reason and Discourse, 'proceeding from his understanding, or of Action and Mortality, from his Will ; both these, in the present condition of mans estate, have their dependance on the Organs and faculties of the Body, which in the one preceede, in the other follow: To the one, they are as Porters, to let in and convey ; to the other as Messengers,

Sen Ep 76.

sengers, to perform and execute : To the one, the whole Body is an evil Eye, through which it seeth ; to the other a Hand by which it worketh.

Concerning the ministry therefore of the Body unto the Soul, we shall thus resolve, That the Reasonable part of Man, in that condition of subsistence which now it hath, depends in all its ordinary and natural operations, upon the happy or disordered temperature of those vital Qualities, out of whose apt and regular commixion the good estate of the Body is framed and composed. For though these Ministerial parts have not any over-ruling, yet they have a disturbing power, to hurt and hinder the operations of the Soul : Whence we finde, that sundry diseases of the Body do oftentimes weaken, yea, sometimes quite extirpate the deepest impression and most fixed habits of the minde. For, as wheresoever there is a locomotive facultie, though there be the principal cause of all motion and activity ; yet if the subordinate instruments, the bones and sinews be disjoynted, shrunk, or any other wayes indisposed for the exercise of that power, there can be no actual motion : Or as in the Body Politick, the Prince (whom *Seneca* calleth the Soul of the Common-wealth) receiveth either true or false intelligence from abroad, according as is the fidelity or negligence of those instruments, whom *Xenophon* termeth the Eyes and Ears of Kings : In like manner, the Soul of man bring not an absolute

Solinus de quodam refert, quod accepto vulnere in occipitio ad tantam devenit ignorantiam ut nesciret se habuisse nomen. Honorius Augustinus duncos. de Phil. soph. Mus. li. 4. c. 24.

Sen. de Clem. lib. 1. cap. 4. Xenop. Cyrop. lib. 8. & Arist. Polit. lib. 3. cap. 12.

solute independent worker, but receiving all her objects by conveyance from these bodily instruments, which *Cicero* calleth the Messengers to the Soul, if they out of any indisposition shall be weakened, the soul must continue like a *Rasa Tabula*, without any acquired or introduced habits. The Soul hath not immediately from it self that strange weakness, which is observed in many men, but onely as it is disabled by Earthy and sluggish Organs; which being out of order, are more burthensome then serviceable thereunto.

There are observable in the souls of men, considered in themselves, and in reference one to another, two defects; an imperfection, and an inequality of operation: the former of these I doe not so ascribe to that bodily weakness, whereby the Soul is any way oppressed, as if I conceived no internal darknesse in the faculties themselves; since the fall of man working in him a general corruption, did amongst the rest infatuate the minde, and as it were smother the soul with ignorance; so that the outward ineptitude of bodily instruments, is onely a furtherance and improvement of that Native imperfection. But for the inequality and difference of mens understandings in their severall operations, notwithstanding it be questioned in the Schools, Whether the Souls of men have not originally in their Nature degrees of perfection and weaknesse, whence these severall degrees of operation may proceed; yet nevertheless that
being

being granted, I suppose, that principally it proceeds from the variety, tempers, and dispositions in the instrumental faculties of the Body; by the help whereof, the Soul in this estate worketh: for I cannot perceive it possible, that there should have been, if man had continued in his innocency, (whercin our Bodies should have had an exact constitution, free from those distempers to which now by sinne they are lyable) such remarkable differences between mens apprehensions, as we now see there are: for there should have been in all men a great facility to apprehend the mysteries of Nature, and to acquire knowledge (as we see in *Adam*) which now we finde in a large measure granted to some, and to others quite denied. And yet in that perfect estate (according to the opinion of those who now maintain it) there would have been found a substantial and internal inequality amongst the Souls of men: and therefore principally this variety comes from the sundry constitutions of mens Bodies; in some, yeelding enablement, for quicknesse of Apprehension; in others, pressing down and entangling the Understanding; in some, disposing the Minde unto one object; in some, unto another; according as the *impetus* and force of their natural affections carryeth them. And therefore *Aristotle* in his *Politicks* ascribeth the inequality which he observes between the *Asiatick* and *European* Wits, unto the several Climates and temperature of the Regions in which they

they lived; according whereunto, the Complexions and Constitutions of their Bodies onely could be alter'd; the Soul being in it self, according to the same Philosopher, impassible from any corporal Agent. And to the same purpose again he saith, That if an old man had a young mans eye, his sight would be as sharp and as distinct as a young mans is; implying the diversity of Perception to be grounded onely on the diversity of bodily instruments, by which it is exercised. And therefore he elsewhere observes (I shall not trouble my self to examine upon what ground) that men of soft and tender skins have greatest quicknesse of wit; and on the contrary, *Duri Carne, inepti mente*: thereby intimating, that there is no more significant and lively expression of a vigorous or heavie Soul, then a happy, or ill-ordered Body; wherein we may sundry times read the abilities of the Minde, and the inclinations of the Will: So then it is manifest, that this weaknesse of apprehension in the Souls of men, doth not come from any immediate and proper darknesse belonging unto them; but onely from the co-existence which they have with a Body ill-disposed for assistance and information. For he who is carried in a Coach (as the Body is *vehiculum anime*) though he be of himself more nimble and active, must yet receive such motion as that affords; and Water which is conveyed through Pipes and Aqueducts, though its motion by it self would have been otherwise,

Arist de Anima
lib 3.

De Anima,
lib. 2.

wife, must yet then be limited by the posture and proportion of the Vessels through which it passeth.

CHAP. II.

In what causes the dependance of the Soul on the Body, is lessened by Faith, Custom, Education, Occasion,



But yet this dependance on the Body is not so necessary and immutable, but that it may admit of variation, and the soul be in some cases vindicated from the impression of the body: And this first in extraordinary; and next, in more common actions. In actions extraordinary, as those pious and religious operations of the Soul, Assent, Faith, Invocation, and many others; wherein the soul is carried beyond the sphere of sense, and transported unto more raised operations: For to believe and know, that there are laid up for pious and holy endeavours *those joyes which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard*, and to have some glimpses and fore-taste of them, which *S. Paul* calleth the *Earnest*, and *first fruits of the spirit*; what is this, but to leave sense behinde us, and to our run

our

our bodies: And therefore it is that *Evangelicall Mysteries* were not at the first urged by disputes of Secular learning, but were sacredly infused, not perswading by fleshly wisdom, but by a spirituall and heavenly call drawing to the beliefe of them. *Evangelicall truths* do as much transcend the *Natural Reason*, as *spiritual goodnesse* doth the *Natural will* of Man. That one *Nature* should be in three *Persons*, and two *Natures* in One *Person*: That the *Invisible God* should be manifest in the flesh, and a pure *Virgin* bring forth a sonne. These are *Mysteries* above the reach of humane, yea, even of a *Angelicall* disquisition, ^b*Sarah* laughed when *Abraham* believed, and *Reason* expected that the *Apostle* should have fallen down dead, when *Faith* shook the *Viper* into the fire:

There is a great difference between the manner of yielding our Assent unto naturall and supernatural verities. The principles of the one are engrafted, and sutable to the native Seeds, and originall Notions of *Reason Naturall*. But the principles of the other are *Revealed*, and without such Revelation could never have beene sifted out by our Implanted light, or by any humane disquisition beene discovered. For the *Gaspell* being a *supernatural Science*, the Principles thereof must needs transcend the reach of *Natural faculties*, till raised and enabled by *Divine Grace*. And then indeed *Reason* is an excellent *Instrument* to use those principles of *faith* unto our further proficiency in sacred Knowledge, which, without *Divine Revelation* proposing the Object, and

1 Cor. 2. 4. 5. 6.
11.

Heb. 2. 1.

Δεῖ γὰρ τοῦ
τῶν τῶν ἐκκλῆ
σιας ἑστιν

μὴ λογισθῆναι
ἀνθρώπων

ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοῦ
θεοῦ, ἀπὸ τοῦ

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Greg. Na. 2.
Orat. 3.
Euseb. de præ-
parat. Evang.
lib. 1. c. 1. 2.
Serm. 1. Thera.
Theodoret.
pent.
1 Cor. 2. 7.

Divine Grace disposing the Faculty, it could never have either known or used.

And from hence I suppose did arise that usu-
all calumny of the Philosophers against the
Christians, that they taught their followers no-
thing but an illiterate and naked *Beliefe*. Though
indeed, the *Revelation* of Divine Mysteries, and
the *Grace* of God being presupposed, there is no
such height of Rationall Evidence and Demon-
stration in all the writings of Philosophers, as in
the Gospel.

But to return; this freedom from Bodily Re-
straint, hath according to the Schoolmen, those
Raptures and *Exstasies*, which raise and ravish the
Soule with the sweetnesse of extraordinary con-
templations, wherein a man is as it were carried
out of himself, and transported ^a *Extra connatura-*
lem Apprehensionem, beyond the usuall bounds of
sense and common Apprehension.

Now for the Exemption of the more ordinary
Actions of the Soule from the Predominancy
of the Body, It is chiefly wrought by these three
meanes, *Education*, *Custom*, and *Occasion*. For the
Rule of ^b *Aristotle*, though in Agents purely Na-
turall it hold true, yet in Voluntary Agents it is
not constant, That things which proceed from
Nature are unalterable by *Custom*. For we may
usually observe that the Culture of the Mind as
of the ^c Earth doth deliver it from the barren-
nesse of it's Nature.

And therefore when ^d *Zophyrus* the Physiogno-
mist did ^e conjecture of the disposition of

Socrates

^a Aquin. 12.
qu. 28. Art. 3.
^b 22. qu. 175
art. c. 4.
^c Ethic. lib. 2.
c. 1 & 10 c. 9.
^c In udy vaxh
tu xosa xaxh
Sed de vaxh
xaxh xaxh
Eurip. Hecub.
Exerceatque fre-
quens cellerem
atque imperat
arum, Virgil.
d Maxim. Tyri-
us dissert. 12.
^e Euseb. de præ-
Evang. 1. 5 c. 9
Theodoret. Ser.
4. Cic. Tuscul.
qu. 1. 4. in finem
de 1. de fato

Socrates contrary to that which men beleaved of him, and thereupon was derided as an ignorant pretender, *Socrates* himself did acquit the man from that imputation, confessing that he had rightly judged of his naturall inclinations which onely the study of Philosophy had alter'd and over ruled.

Thus as Hard Bones being steeped in Vinegar and Ashes (as ^a *Plutarch* notes) doe lose their Nature, and grow so soft, that they may be cut with a thred, So ^b the toughest, and most unbended Natures by early and prudent discipline may be much Rectified, though still indeed, like Simples of a strong and predominant relish in a compounded Medicine, they will give a tincture to all other super-induced qualities.

Socrates himself, notwithstanding the great mastery which he professed to have gotten over the vicious propensions of his Nature, could not yet alwaies bee so faithfull to his morall principles, as not to relapse, and betray the loosenesse of his disposition. And that not only in Anger and passions, charged upon him by his best friends ^c *Aristoxenus* and *Porphyrius*; but also in unnaturall obscenities, the usuall sinne (as the ^d *Apostle* notes. and as ^e *Plutarch* confesseth) even of their great Philosophers. Whence that of the Poet.

Now for *Occasion*, that alters the naturall Inclination of the Will and Affections. For so we see that the Bias of mens Delires are often turned, by reason of some sudden emergent Occurrences,

^a Plut. in virtutis ad felicitatem sufficiat.
^b Πλατωναρχία τῇ φύσει διδασκαλία.
Democrit apud *Theodoret* Sermon.
^c 4. *Therapeut.*
Διασπέρου τὸ λογικὸν (ὡς διὰ τὰς αἰσθητικῶν πραγμάτων πᾶσι νόμιμα. *Diog.* Laert. 7.
^d Ἡ χημείων δὲ οὗτοι ἢ τῶνος, ἢ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως.
^e ἢ καὶ τῶν γενομένων ἐργῶν.
Plutarch μαχόμενοι τοῖς. *En ip.* *Hecub.* 865.
Vid Sen de Ira l. 2. c. 12.
^c *Cyri*l. *Alex.* contr. *Julian* l. 6.
Theodoret, *Sermon* 12 de virtute *Athina*.
^d *Rom* 1. 25. 26
^a *Plutarch*.
ὅτι πᾶσι δὲ αὐτοῖς. *Inter Socraticos* notissima fassa *Cinador*. *Iuvenal* *Leg*o partem sententia *Attica* *Socratem* corruptorem. *Adolescentium* pronuntiatam. *Tertul.* *Apolog.* c. 4.

Una salus vultu
natum sperare
alium.

1 Sam 4 6 7 8

Justin.

contrary to the standing temper and complexion of the Body. Thus we read sometimes of men in War; who notwithstanding of themselves timorous and sluggish, yet being deprived of all possibility of flight, and hope of mercy if they should be conquered, have strangely gained by their despair, and gotten great and prosperous Victories by forc'd and unnatural Fortitude. An example wherof we have in the *Philistines*, who being sorely terrified with the Ark of the Lord in the Camp of *Israel*, resolved thereupon to quit themselves like men and fight. Nor could the band of the *Scythian* slaves, who endeavoured to shake off their servile condition, be removed from that insolence, till the sight of Rods and Staves, and other instruments of Feare, had driven them back into their nature again.

CHAP.

· CHAP. III.

*Of the Memory, and some few causes
of the weaknesse thereof.*

NOW for these inward Senses, which are commonly accounted three, (though extending themselves unto sundry operations of differing qualities) I take the two later, to wit; Memory, and Fancie or Imagination, to have a more excellent degree of perfection in man; as being indeed the principall Store-houses and Treasuries of the operations of the Soule. Where by Memory, I understand, not the faculty, as it is common to beasts with men, and importeth nothing but the simple retention, and conservation of some species, formerly treasur'd up by the conveyance of the outward sense: but as it is *Consort & co-operatrix Rationis*, as *Hugo* speaks, a joynt-worker in the operations of Reason; Which the *Latines* call *Reminiscencia*, or *Recordatio*; including some acts of the Vnderstanding: Which is a reviewing, or (as we speak) a calling to mind of former objects, by discourse, or rationally searching for them; which is made by *Aristotle* to be the remote ground of all Arts: For (saith he) Memory is the ground of Experience, and Experience the Mother of Art: The dignity hereof in man, is seen, both by perfecting the Vnder-

*lib. de spirit.
& anima.*

Metaph. lib. 1.

*Sen. Contro.
lib. 1. in Proe-
mium.*

*Plin. lib. 7.
c. 24.*

*Quintil. lib. 11,
c. 2.*

*Polit. Ep. l. 12.
ad Pic. Mirand.*

standing, in matter of Learning and Discourse, (wherein some men have attained unto almost a miraculous felicity; as *Seneca* the elder confesseth of himself, who could immediatly recite two thousand words, in the same order as they had beene spoken before to him; and *Cyrus*, of whom *Zenophon* testifieth, that he could salute all the Souldiers in his Army by their Names; and *Mithridates*, who being King over twenty two Countries, did speak so many Languages without an Interpreter; and *Politian* in his Epistles telleth of *Fabius Ursinus*, a Child but of a eleven years of age, in whom there was so rare a mixture of Invention and Memory, that he could unto five or six severall persons, at the same time, dictate the matter and words of so many severall Epistles, some serious, some jocular, all of different Arguments, returning after every short period, from the last to the first, and so in order; and in the conclusion, every Epistle should be so close, proper and coherent within it self, as if it alone had been intended:) As also by affording speciall assistance for the direction and discreet managing of our actions, conforming them either unto Precepts and Rules in Morality, or unto Principles of Wisedome and publick prudence, gathered from Historicall observations; while the Mind, by the help of Memory, being as it were conversant with Ages past, and furnished with examples for any service and imployment, doth by mature application, weighing particulars, comparing times, circumstances,

stances, and passages of affairs together, enable it self with the more hope and resolution, to passe successefully through any enterprize or difficulty: for, *qui credit sperat*, he that beleeveth, and is acquainted with the happy issue of other mens resolutions, will with the lesse anxiety or discouragment goe on in his own.

The principall Corruptions which I conceive of the Memory, are first, too much slightnesse and shallownesse of observation; when out of an impatiency of staying long, or making any profound enquiry into one object, and out of a gluttonous curiosiry to feed on many, the greedinesse of the appetite weakneth the digestion, (for so some have called the Memory, the Belly of the Soule) and an eagernesse to take in, makes uncarefull to retaine. And this is a reason, why many men wander over all Arts and Sciences, without gaining reall improvement, or solidity in any: They make not any solemn Journey to a particular Coast, and head of Learning, but view all as it were in *Transitu*; having no sooner begun to settle on one, but they are in haste to visit another. But such men as these (except endowed with an incredible and usuall felicity of dispatch) are no more able to finde the use, or search the bottom of any Learning, then he who rides Post, is to make a Description and Map of his Journeys: who, though by much imployment, he may toyle and sweat more in travelling from place to place; yet he is farre less able to discover the nature of the Countreys,

treys, temperature of the Aire, Character of the people, Commodities of the Earth, than he, who though not so violent in the motion, is yet more constant in his abode : and though his haste be lesse eager, yet his observations are more serious. *Omnis festinatio caeca est*, saith *Seneca* ; Precipitancy and unstableness, as well in the motions of the Wit as of the Body, dazleth and disableth the eyes : And it is true in the Minde, as in the Stomack ; too quick digestion doth alwayes more distemper than nourish, and breedeth nothing but Crudities in Learning : Nor can I call that so much Study, as agitation and restlessness of the Minde; which is as impatient of true seled labour, as it is of quiet. Now, the reason why such a temper of Minde as this, is corruptive to the Memory, is first, because Memory is alwaies joyned with some measure of Love; and wee most of all remember that, which we most respect : *Omnia quae currant meminerunt* ; There where the Treasure is, the Minde will be also : There therefore, where our Love is most constant, our Memories will be most faithfull. So, that sudden vanishing, and broken desires, which like the appetite of sick men, are for the time violent, but give presently over; as they argue an eager Love for the present, of that we pursue, and by consequence, a *fastidium* and disteste of that which we soon forsake : so doe they necessarily inferre weaknesse on the Memory, by how much they make our hopes the stronger. For, as *Seneca* speaks, *Caduca memoria*

Arist. Rhet.
lib. 2 c. 12.

De Bonis, lib. 3.
c. 3.

futura

futuro iminentium; Men strongly bent upon things future, have but weak memories of things past.

Secondly, the body of any one Homogeneall Learning, hath this excellent property in it, that all the parts of it doe by mutuall service relate to, and communicate strength and lustre each to other: so that he who goes through with any Science; doth from every new Branch and Conclusion which he meets with, receive a greater clearnesse and more strong impression of his former degrees of Knowledge. Now then, that man who out of impatency of that Restraint, cannot endure to goe through an Art, to search into the Root, to observe the knittings and dependencies of the parts amongst themselves, to see by what passages Truth is derived from the Principles, to this or to other Branches; must needs be so much the more forgetfull of what he knowes, by how much he is ignorant of those other parts whereunto it referreth.

Other causes there are of weaknesse in the Memorie; as namely, a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon *Plato* telleth us, that the use of Letters, in gathering *Adversaria* and Collections, is a hindrance to the Memory; because those things which wee have deposited to our Desks, wee are the more secure and carelesse to retaine in our Minds. And on the other Extreme, a too great confidence in it, and thereupon an over-burthening it with multitude of Notions; whereby as it sheds much over, so

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it is withall indisposed for the ready use of what it retaines; it falling out in a huddle and tumultuary heap of thoughts, as in any other throng, that we can never so easily find out, or order and dispose what we desire to use, but are confounded in our own store. But I forbear to insist on these, because I hasten to the higher and more noble part of Man.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Fancie : Its offices to the Will and Reason, Volubility of Thoughts, Fictions, Errors, Levity, Fixednesse.

NOW for the Imag'nation, the dignity thereof consists, either in the office, or in the latitude of it: Its office, is to be assistant both to the Understanding and the Will; its assistance to the Understanding, is principally in matter of Invention, readily to supply it with variety of objects whereon to work; as also to quicken and raise the Minde with a kinde of heat and raptury proportionable in the inferior part of the Soule, to that which in the superior, Philosophers call Extasie; whereby it is possessed with such a strong delight in its proper object, as makes the motions thereof towards

wards it, to be restless and impatient : and of this, is that of the Poet ;

Est Deus in nobis agitante calescimus ipso :

By Divine Raptures we aspire,
And are inflam'd with noble fire.

Μακρόδ' ὁ
Συγκάτορ καὶ
ἀπαιτοῦν ἡντι-
νός ἐστ' ὁμοῦν,
Ἀπὸ, Problem.
Soll. 30.

The office of the *Imagination* to the *Will*, is to quicken, allure, and sharpen its desire towards some convenient object : for it often commeth to passe, that some plausible *Fancie* doth more prevaile with tender Wills, then a severe and fullen Argument, and hath more powerfull insinuations to *perswade*, then the peremptoriness of Reason hath to *command*. And the reason hereof is, because *liberty* being naturall unto mans *Will*, that course must needs most of all gaine upon it, which doth offer least force unto its *liberty* : Which is done rather by an Argument of delight, then of constraint ; and best of all, when a ratioll and convincing Argument is so sweetned and tempered, to the delight of the hearer, that he shall be content to entertaine Truth, for the very beauty and attire of it ; so that you shall not know, whether it were the weight of the Reason that over-rul'd, or the elegancie that enticed him. A man can be well pleased, to look with delight on the picture of his enemy, when it is drawn with a skilfull and curious hand. And therefore in that great work of mens *conversion* unto God he is said to *allure*

Hosea. 2. 14.
 2 Cor. 5. 17.
 Can. 5. 10. 16
 Hag. 2. 7.
 Rom. 11. 12.
 Ephes. 3. 8.
 1 Tim. 1. 15.

them, and to *speak comfortably* unto them, to *beseech*, and to *perswade* them; to set forth Christ to the Soule, as *altogether lovely*, as the *fairest of ten thousand*, as the *desire of the Nations*, as the *Riches of the World*, that men might be inflamed to love the beauty of Holinesse. That which must perswade the Will, must not only have a *truth*, but a *worthinesse* in it: in which respect, the Principles of Knowledge are called ἀξιωματα, *worthy* or *honorable speeches*: and the Gospell is not only called λογος πισος, a *true saying*; but λογος αξιος, a *worthy saying*; and in that respect, fitted for acceptation. It is true of the Will which Seneca hath observed of Princes; *Apud Reges etiam quæ profunt ita tamen ut delectent sua denda sunt*: That unto them even things profitable must bee represented with the face rather of delight then of necessity; even as a Physicians, when they minister a very wholesome Potion:

— *Præus oras pocula circum
 Contingunt dulci mollis flavoque liquore.*

That they their Parents may both please and cure,
 With mixed-sweets their pallets they allure.

And hence is that observation, that the first Reformers and drawers of men into Civill society, and the practise of Vertue, wrought upon the Will by the ministry rather of the *Fancie*, then of rigid *Reason*; not driving them thereunto by punctuall Arguments, but alluring them by the sweet-

Cucret. lib. 3.
 Plut. de Educat.
 liberorum.

sweetnesse of Eloquence ; not pressing the necessity of Morality , by naked inferences , but rather secretly instilling it into the Will , that it might at last finde it self reformed , and yet hardly perceive how it came to be so. And this was done by those Musically, Poetically, and Mythologicall persuasions ; whereby men in their discourses , did as it were paint Vertues and Vices ; giving unto spirituall things Bodies and Beauties, such as might best affect the Imagination : Yea, God himself hath been pleased to honor this way of setting out higher Notions , in that we finde some roome in the holy Scripture for Mythologies ; as that of the Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes, and Poeticall Numbers and Raptures , whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth ; and doe condescend unto humane frailties. And another reason hereof is, because the desires of men are fixed as well on pleasant as on profitable objects ; so that those inducements must needs have most Authority, which have that happy mixture of *utile & dulce* together, not only pressing necessity upon the Understanding, but pointing as it were and deciphering delight to the Fancy. And this reason Scaliger gives in his Inquiry , how false Things, such as Plato his *Elixium*, Homers Fictions, Orpheus his Musick, should delight wise men : *Propterea quod exuperant vulgares limitis veritatis*, saith he ; because they are not exacted to the rigor and strictnesse of Reason , nor grounded on the severity of

Judg. 18, 14, 12
Hosea 12, 11.

Scalig: Subtil.
307. 12.

Truth, but are (as I may so speak) the Creation of the Fancy, having a kinde of delightfull liberty in them, wherewith they refresh and doe as it were open and unbinde the Thoughts; which otherwise, by a continuall pressure in exacter and more massie reasonings, would easily tyre and despaire.

Concerning the Latitude of this Faculty, it hath therein a double prerogative above others; one, in the multiplicity of Operations; another in the framing of objects. To the former of these, I reduce the Thoughts; which, by reason of their quicknesse and volubility, and withall, their continuall interchanges and successions, are the most numberlesse operations of the Soule of man: where, by Thoughts, I understand those springings and glances of the heart, grounded on the sudden representation of sundry different objects; for when the Minde begins once to be fixt, and standing, I call that rather Meditation then Thought. This multiplicity of Thoughts is grounded first upon the abundance of their Objects; and next, upon the quicknesse and activity of Apprehension; that is the matter this the forme of those Thoughts which I now speak of. The abundance of Objects is seene in this, that it includes all the varieties of *species* belonging to the Faculties, as that knowledge which the Schools call *Philosophia prima*, doth within its own limits draw in, in some sort, all the severall objects of particular Sciences. There are Thoughts belonging unto the Will
flying

flying and pursuing Thoughts, Wishings, and Loathings; and there are Thoughts belonging to the Understanding, assenting and dissenting Thoughts, Beliefe and dis-opinion: There are Thoughts likewise proceeding from Anger, fiery and revengefull Thoughts; from Envie, knowing and repining Thoughts; from Joy, sweet and refreshing Thoughts; from Conscience, comforting and affrightfull Thoughts; and so in all other faculties. And for the quicknesse of Working, the motions of the thoughts shew it, in the concurrence of these two things, suddenesse of journey, and vastnesse of way, while like Lightning they are able to reach from one end of Heaven unto another, and in one light and imperceptible excursion, leave almost no part of the Universe untravelled. Now, of these two grounds of multiplicity in Thoughts, the former, namely, the abundance of Objects, is *ab extrinseco*, and dispersed over things, (though they are not otherwise the Objects of Thought, then as the Mind reflecteth on the *Phantasmata* or Images of them in this facultie) but the latter, which is the quicknesse of Apprehension, though it may seeme to be the most peculiar work of Reason, yet the Imagination hath indeed the greatest interest in it: For, though the Act of Apprehending be the proper work of the Understanding, yet the forme and quality of that Act (which properly makes it a Thought in that strict sense, wherein here I take it) namely, the lightnesse, volubility, and suddenesse thereof,

Vid. A. Gell.
lib 9. c. 1.
Aug. de Civ.
Dei, lib. 9 c. 1.

of, proceeds from the immediate restlesnesse of the Imagination, as is plain, by the continuall varietie of Dreams and other Fancies, wherein the Faculty is the principall worker. The next thing, is the Latitude of Imagination, in framing of Objects ; wherein it hath a property of boldnesse beyond other faculties : For Reason, and all other powers, have their fixed and determined limits in Nature ; and therefore they alwayes frame themselves to the truth of things, yeelding assent to nothing but what they finde : But the Imagination is a Faculty boundlesse, and impatient of any imposed limits, save those which it self maketh. And hence it is, that in matter of perswasion and insinuation, Poetry, Mythology, and Eloquence (the Arts of rationall Fancie) have ever (as was observ'd) beene more forcible then those which have been rigorously grounded on Nature and Reason ; it being (as *Scaliger* observes) the naturall infinitenesse of mans Soule, *Aspernari certorum finium prescriptionem*, to disdain any bounds and confines in her operations.

Now, the liberty of the Imagination in this particular, is three-fold ; Creation, as I may so speak, and now making of Objects ; Composition, or new mixing them ; and Translation, or new placing them : unto some of which three, will be reduced all Poeticall Fictions, fabulous Transmutations, high Metaphors, and Rhetoricall Allegories, things of excellent use, and ornament in speech.

Now,

Now, for the Corruptions and Diseases of this Facultie, I conceive the principall to be these three, Error, Levitie, and dull fixedness: The Error of the Imagination may be taken both actively, and passively; the Error which it produceth, and the Error which it suffereth. That the Fancie is fruitfull in producing Error, is as manifest as it is difficult to shew the manner how it doth it. Hence, those strange and yet strong delusions, whereby the Minds of melancholly men (in whom this Facultie hath the most deep and piercing operation) hath been peremptorily possessed: Hence, those vanishing and shadowie Assurances, Hopes, Feares, Ioyes, Visions, which the dreames of men (the immediate issues of this Facultie) doe produce: Hence those gasty Apparitions, dreadfull sounds, black Thoughts, Tremblings, and horrors, which the strong working of Imagination doth present unto, or produce in men, disquieted either with the ugliness of their Sinnes, or heaviness of their Natures, making them to feare where no feare is: which, whether it be done by affecting onely the Fancie, or by the impression of such formes and shapies upon the Spirits, which goe unto the outward senses as may thereby affect them with the same Images (not by reception from without, but by impression and transfusion from within) it is manifest; not onely by various relations, but by continuall experience, what strong and strange effects those distempers have produced:

E

Neither

*Aug. Epist. 72.
ad. Nebriz.*

*Arist. Prob.
Sect. 10 paraph
12. Plin. li. 7.
c. 12.*

*Peucer. de Te
nas. copia.*

*Aug. in Gen.
quest. 93.*

*Vid G finium
in Arist. Eth.
lib. 7. c. 5. &
Witt. de Pre
stig. Dem. l. 2.
c. 24. 25. 26. &
l. 3. c. 21.*

*Fran. Mirand.
l. de Imag. c. 8
Aug. de Civ.
Dei l. 18. c. 18.
de divin. De-
mon. c. 5. 6.*

Neither are we to conceive this impossible when we see as admirable effects in another kind wrought by the same facultie, and, as is probable, by the same meanes; I meane, the impression of likeness of an infant in the Wombe, unto the parents, or some other, who shall worke a stronger conceit in the Fancie: Or if this be not ascribed unto the working of this power, but rather to a secret reall vertue intrinsecall unto the Seed of the Parents (as many do affirme) yet that other effect of stamping on the Body the Images and Colours of some things, which had made any strong and violent immutation on the Fancie, must needs be hereunto ascribed: As we see commeth often to pass, in the longing of Women; and in her, who having the picture of an *Ethiopian* in her Chamber, brought forth a black Child; and in the course which *Jacob* took, in putting *speckled Rods* before the Cattrell, when they were to conceive, that the fancie of them might make their Lambes to be ring-straked and speckled.

The Errors which are in the Fancie, are usually of the same nature with those that are wrought by it: Such was the Error of that man, which would not be perswaded, but that he had on his head a great pair of Hornes, and for that reason would not move forth nor uncover his face to any. And the causes of these Errors are by *Francis Mirandola* ascribed first to the varietie of tempers in the Body, with the predominancie of those humours which give complexion there-
unto;

unto; secondly, to the *imposture* of the Sences: thirdly, to the government of the *Will*, (though that, as is granted, hath least power over this Faculty) and lastly, to the ministry of *evil Angels*, who can easily cast into the Fancie strange and false *species* with such subletie, as shall easily gaine them plausible credit and admittance. And of this, we find an expresse example (as I conceive) in that evill spirit, who promised to be a lying spirit in the mouth of *Abahs* Prophets. For the *visions* of such men being for the most part *imaginariis*, the impression of that lying and deceitfull perswasion was, in all probability, made upon the *Imagination*. For, notwithstanding I confess, that prophets had events by divers meanes revealed unto them. as by *true Voices*, by reall *asceses* of *Angels*, and by immediate *illapse* of Truth into the Understanding; yet because those two wayes, by *Visions* and by *Dreames*, were (for ought can be observ'd) the most usuall meanes of Revelation, it is not unlikely, that the Devill (who in such things strives for the better advancement of his own ends, to imitate Gods manner of working) did by this manner of imposture on the *Imagination*, seek to possess the false Prophets, and to delude the King.

And here, by the way, from the three former, we may take occasion to observe the miserie of mans corrupted Nature; wherein those Faculties which were originally ordained for mutuall assistance, do now exercise a mutuall imposture:

Numb. 12. 6.
Joel. 2. 28.

and as man did joyne with a fellow-creature to dishonor, and if it had been possible, to deceive his maker; so in the Faculties of man, we may discover a joynt conspiracie in the working of their own overthrow and reproach, and a secret joy, in one to be deluded by another.

The next *Corruption* which I observed, is the *Levity* and too much *Volubilitie* of this Power, proceeding from the over-hastie obtrusion of the *species*. For, notwithstanding I grant the quickness of its operations to be one principall part of the excellencie thereof; yet I thereby understand the *Power*, not the *Infirmities*; the *Nature*, not the *Disease* of that Facultie; the *abilitie* of having speedy recourse unto varietie of Objects, treasured up in the *Memorie*; or of apprehending new, with dexterity; not that *floating* and *inconstant* humour whereby it makes many need less excursions upon impertinent things, and thereby interrupteth the course of the more needfull and present operation of the Soule. For, since it may fall out, that unto the same Facultie, from diversitie of occasions, contrarie operations may prove arguments of worth; a restraint unto one manner of working, is an argument of weakeness and defect, in that it straitneth and defendeth the power of those advantages which it might receive by a timely application of the other: There may be a time, when the *Fancie* may have libertie to expatiate; but again, some object will require a more fixed and permanent act. And therefore,

to have a vanishing and lightning Fancie, that knoweth not how to stay and fasten upon any particular, but as an hanging of Divers Colours, shall in one view present unto the Vnderstanding an heape of *species*, and so distract its intention, argues not sufficiency, but weakness and distemper in this Faculty.

The last Corruption observed, is in the other extreame; I meane, that heaviness and sluggish fixedness, whereby it is disabled from being serviceable to the Vnderstanding, in those actions which require dispatch, Variety, and suddenness of execution: from which peremptorie adhesion and too violent intention of the Fancie on some particular objects, doth many times arise not onely a dulness of minde, a *Syncope*, and kinde of benumbedness of the Soule, but oftentimes madness, distraction, and torment: Many examples of which kind of depravation of the Phantasie in melancholie men, we every where meet withall; some thinking themselves turned into Wolves, Horses or other Beasts; others: pleasing themselves with Conceits of great Wealth and Principleities; some, framing to themselves Feares, and others hopes; being all but the delusions and waking dreames of a distempered Fancie.

*Hic ego saepe Lupum fieri & se condere Sylvis
Mœrim, saepe animas imis exire sepulcris,
Atque satas alio vidi traducere menses:*

*Arist. Prob.
Self 29.*

*Lucian. in Lucio five Acino.
Apul in Asino.
Plin. li 7. c. 22.
Olaus. Magnus
d. Region. Septentrion. l. 18.
c. 45. 46. 47.
Vicius de Præstigiis l. 3. c. 21.
Thrasylus omnes ad litus
Pyreum appellentes naves
suas credidit.
apud Athen.*

Virg. Eclog. 8.

Here often I have seen this *Mæris* worke
Himself into a Wolfe and in Woods lurke;
Oft have I seen him raise up ghosts from Hell,
And growing Corne translate by Magick Spell.

And upon this over strong working and stay
of the Fancie on some one or other object, it hath
oftentimes come to pass, that some men, out of
depth of contemplation on some difficulties of
Learning (as is reported of *Aristotle*, in his medi-
tation on the cause of the ebbing and flowing of the
Sea) others, out of some strong and predominant
passion, as Love, Feare, Despair, drawing all the
intention of the Minde unto them, have attempted
such strange practises on themselves, and others, as
could not proceed but from a smothered and in-
tangled Reason. And thus much briefly shall suf-
fice, touching the honour of mans common and
inferiour Faculties.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

*Of Passions, their nature, and distribution;
of the Motions of Naturall Creatures
guided by a knowledge without them; and
of Rationall Creatures, guided by a know-
ledge within them : of Passions Mentall,
Sensitive, and Rationall.*

I Now proceed unto the Soule of Man : of which , I must speake in a double reference; either according to its motions and impressions which it makes on the Body, and receiveth from it ; or according to those more immanent perfections which it hath within it selfe : under the former of these, come to be considered the Passions of Mans Minde, with the more notable perfections and corruptions (as far as my weakness can discover) which the Soul and Body contracteth from them.

Passions are nothing else, but those naturall, perfective and unstrained motions of the Creatures unto that advancement of their Natures, which they are by the Wisdome, Power, and Providence of their Creator, in their own severall Spheres, and according to the proportion of their Capacities, ordained to receive, by a regular inclination to those objects, whose goodness beareth

beareth a naturall conveniencie or Vertue of satisfaction unto them ; or by an antipathie and averfation from those, which bearing a contrarietic to the good they desire, must needs be noxious and destructive, and by consequent, odious to their natures. This being the proprietie of all unconstrained self-motions, it followeth, that the root and ground of all Passions, is principally the good ; and secondarily, or by consequent, the evill of things : as one beareth with it *rationem convenientia*, a quieting and satisfactorie ; the other, *rationem disconvenientia* a disturbing and destroying nature :

This being premised touching the nature and generall effence of Passions, the division of them must be then grounded ; because (as Philosophie teacheth us) Faculties and Operations receive their essentiall distinctions from their objects, and those severall respects wherewith they in order to the Facultie are qualified. Now since all appetite (being a blind Power) is dependant upon the direction of some knowledge ; from the diversitie of Knowledge in, or annexed unto things, may be gathered the prime distinction of Passions.

Knowledge, in respect of created Agents, may be considered either as dis-joyn'd and extrinsecall to the things moved, or as intrinsecall and united thereunto ; both which serve as a Law and Rule, to regulate the inclinations of each nature, that they might not swerve into disordered and confused, or into idle and vaine motions ; but

but might ever worke towards that fined end, which God hath appointed them to moove unto.

Passions which proceed from Knowledge severed and extrinsecall, are those motions of meerely naturall Agents, which are guided to their generall or perticular ends, by the Wisdom and Power of Him that made them. And this it is which causeth that peremptorie and uniforme orders, observed by these kind of Agents in their naturall course, never either swarving or desisting there-from, so farre as the condition of the matter and subject whereon they worke permiteth them; because they are all governed by an immutable, most wise, and most constant Law, proceeding from a Will with which there is no variableness nor shadow of changing. And therefore we finde those aberrations and irregularities of Nature, wherein it swerveth from this Law onely, or at least principally in these inferior things; wherein partly from the deficiency and languishing of secondarie Agents, and partly from the excesses, defects, mutabilitie, and the like exigences of matter, wee finde sundry times error and enormitie in their severall workes and ends: Which, whether it be to set forth the beautie of regular operations, which by deformitie and confusion will appeare more beautiful; or whether the originall thereof be divine malediction, which for the sinne of man hee pleaseth to lay upon his fellow creatures, which were all created for his comfort and service,

(which Saint Paul calleth the *vanity of the Creature*) it proceedeth certainly from the Will and Power of that Law-giver (who is onely able) for Reasons best knowne to his owne Wisdom, to dispence sometimes with that otherwise unalterable Law, which he gave all his creatures to observe. So that all the Miracles which ever God hath been pleased to worke, for the conversion of men unto the Faith, or confirmation in it, were but so many exceptions and dispensations from that generall Law.

But, as I said, those irregularities and deviations before spoken of, are scene principally in inferiour things. The Earth, being the principall Creature that did beare the Curse of Mans Fall, which made (if we will beleve that relation, though I rather suppose it to be fictitious) the Heathen Philosopher, upon observation of that wonderfull Eclipse of the Sunne at the Passion of our Saviour, to crie out; *Ant Deus Natura patitur, ant Mundi machina dissolvetur*; either the God of Nature suffereth, or the Frame of Nature dissolveth: Either something hindereth that universall Power, which sustaineth and animateth all the Creatures, or he doth at least willingly deraine that vertue and the vigour of that Law; without execution whereof, there cannot but follow a laxation of the whole Frame: which particular I have the rather observed, to note, that the more rayed and heavenly a Nature is, the more stable and constant likewise it is, to every Divine Law imposed on it.

Now

Now this naturall Passion which I speake of, is called by sundry Names amongst Philosophers, the *Law*, the *Equitie*, the *Weight*, the *Instinct*, the *Bond*, the *Love*, the *Covenant* and *League* of naturall things, in order to the conservation of themselves, propagation of their kind, perfection, and order of the Universe, service of Man, and glory of the Creator: which are the alone ends of all naturall Agents.

By all which we are given to understand, that when at any time the ordinarie course of Nature is intermitted, when any creature forsakes its native motion, and falleth into confusion and disorder, there is then admitted a breach of a Law, or as *Aristotle* calls it *ἀνίστηναι* an error, (which *Saint James* telleth us *ἀνομία* an iniquitie of Nature) also a certaine levi ie, unusefulnessse, and emptinesse of true worth, which I call in *Saint Pauls* phrase, the *vanitie of the Creature*: thirdly, loosenesse, decay, and dissolution; and thereupon discord and unserviceableness towards the other parts with which it should jointly conspire for the glory of the whole.

These are the inconveniences that follow Nature; how much greater are those which follow *Reasons* disobedience: for all this, touching the Passions of Nature, I have observed onely to give light unto those of Reason; there being the same proportion of government in them all: saving that, what in things destitute of all knowledge, is guided by the Law-giver him'selfe, is in the rest performed by a knowledge conjoyn'd, and

intrinsecall to the Worker : and this is either *Mentall*, or *Sensitive*, or *Rationall*; from all which, arise sundry degrees of Motions or Passions : *Mentall* Passions are those high, pure, and abstracted delights, or other the like agitations of the supreme part of the understanding, which *Aristotle* calleth *Nōs*, the *Latines*, *Mens*, or *Apex anima*; which are the most simple actions of the Mind, wherein is the least intermixture or commerce with inferior and earthy faculties. Which Motions are grounded first on an *extraordinarie Knowledge*; either of *Vision* and *Revelation*, or of an exquisite naturall *Apprehension*; both which are beyond compasse of usuall Industrie, here to attaine unto : The former of these, I call with the Schoole-men, *Extasie* and *Rapture*; such as *Saint Paul's* was (for so himselfe calleth it) *Novi hominem raptum*; and such as was the Passions of the Mind, in the Prophets and holy men of God; when they were inspired with such heavenly Revelations, as did slide into the Soule with that lustre and abundance of Light, that they could not but ravish it with ineffable and glorious delight. And such, no doubt, is that *joy unspeakable*, and *Peace past understanding*, which the Apostle makes to be the *fruits of the Spirit of God*, in those hearts wherein hee lodgeth; whereby the purest and most abstracted part of the Soul, the *Mind*, is lifted up to some glimpses and apprehensions of that future Glory, which in Heaven doth fill the Spirits of Men with ineffable Light. And for the later Branch, *Aristotle* hath placed his

his greatest felicitie in the *contemplation* of the highest and divineſt Truths; which he makes to be the object of that ſupreame part of the Soule. And it was the ſpeech of the Philoſopher *Heraclitus* to the ſame purpoſe, that *Anima ſicca eſt ſapientiſſima* (which toucheth ſomething upon that of *Ariſtotele*, That Melancholy complexions are uſually the wiſeſt, for that Temper is the dryeſt of all the reſt) That a mind not ſteeped in the humours of carnall and groſſe affectionſ, nor drench'd in the waves of a diſquiet Fancie, but more rayſed and ſoaring to its originall by divine *contemplations*, is alwaies endued with the greater wiſdome.

Another Knowledge from whence the Paſſions of this Facultie are rayſed in Man, is that light of *Naturall Principles*, which the Schooles call *Syntereſis*; unto which, the cuſtodie of all *practicall Truths* being committed, they therence worke in the *Conſcience* motions of Joy, Love, Peace, Fear, Horror, Deſpaire, and the like ſpirituall Paſſions, according as the Soule, out of thoſe generall Principles, ſhall gather unto its owne particulars, any either delightfull or diſquieting Concluſions.

Senſitive Paſſions are thoſe motions of Perſecutions or flight, which are groundod on the *Fancie*, *Memory*, and Apprehenſions of the *common Senſe*: which we ſee in *brute beaſts*; as in the feare of Hares or Sheepe, the fierceneſſ of Wolves, the anger or flatterie of Dogs, and the like: So *Homer* deſcribeth the joy of *Ulyſſes* his

Ariſt. de hiſt.
Animal. l. 1. c.
1. l. 9. per totum.

Dog which after his so long absence, remembered him at his returne.

Id. ff. 5.

Ομῶν μὲν ὁ ὄγ' ἔσκιε καὶ ἔατα κλέβεται ἀμφοῖν.

For wanton joy to see his Master neare,
He wau'd his flattering taylor, and tojs'd each eare.

Seneca d. Ira
lib. 1. c. 3.

Now these motions in brute creatures, if wee will beleeve *Seneca*, are not affections, but certaine characters & impressions *ad similitudinem passionum* like unto Passions in men; which hee calleth *Impetus* the risings, forces, and impulsions of nature, upon the view of such objects as are apt to strike any impressions upon it.

I come therefore to those *middle Passions* which I call'd *Rationall*; not *formally*, as if they were in themselves Acts of Reason, or barely immateriall motions of the soule; but by way of *participation* and *dependance* by reason of their immediate subordination in man unto the government of the *Will* and *Vnderstanding*, and not barely of the *Fancie*, as in other creatures. And for calling *Passion* thus govern'd, *Reasonable*, I have the warrant of *Aristotle*: who, though the *sensitive Appetite* in man be of it selfe unreasonable, (and therefore by him contradivided to the *Rationall* powers of the Soule) yet by reason of that *obedience* which it oweth to the Dictates of the *Vnderstanding*, whereunto Nature hath ordain'd it to be subject and conformable (though Corruption have much slackned and

and unknit that Bond) hee justly affirmeth it to be in some sort a Reasonable Facultie, not intrinsically in it selfe, but by way of participation and influence from Reason.

Now Passion thus considered, is divided according to the severall references it hath unto its object; which is principally, the Good, and secondarily, the Evill of things; and ei her considered after a sundry manner: for they may be taken ei her barely and alone, or under the consideration of some difficultie and danger accompanying them. And both these againe are to be determin'd with some particular condition of union or distance to the subject; for all objects offend or delight the Facultie, by vertue of their union therunto; and therefore, according as things are united or distant, so do they occasion Passions of a different nature in the Mind. The object then may bee considered simply in its own nature, as it precisely abstracteth from all other circumstances, including onely the naturall conveniencie or disconveniencie which it beareth to the Facultie: and so the passions are, in respect of Good, Love; in respect of Evill, Hatred: which are the two radicall, fundamentall, and most transcendent Passions of all the rest: and therefore well called *Pondera* and *Impetus animi*, the weight and force, and (as I may so speake) the first springings and out-goings of the Soul. Secondly, the object, may be considered, as absent from the subject, in regard of reall union (though never without that which the

the Schooles call *unio objectiva*, union of Apprehension in the Understanding) without which there can be no Passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be good, Desire; if Evill, Flight, and Abomination. Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a reall contract or union with the Facultie; and so it worketh, if Good, Delight, and Pleasure; if Evill, Griefe and Sorrow. Againe, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficultie and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the naturall strength of the power; which implyeth, in respect of Good, an Impossibilitie to be attained, and so it worketh Despaire; and in respect of Evill, an Improbabilitie of being avoided, and so it worketh Feare: or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power, or at least, those aids which it calleth in; in which regard, Good is presented as attainable, and so it worketh Hope: and Evill is presented, either as avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh Boldnesse to breake thorough it; or as Requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh Anger, to revenge it. Thus have wee the nature and distribution of those severall Passions which wee are to enquire after: of all which, or at least, those which are most naturall, and least coincident with one another. I shall in the proceeding of my Discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of Mans Nature: But first, I shall speake something of the generalitie of Passions: and what dignities

dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Humane Passions in general: their use, Natural, Moral, Civil: their subordination unto, Or Rebellion against right Reason.

Now Passions may be the subject of a three-fold discourse; *Natural, Moral,* and *Civil*. In their *Natural* consideration, we should observe in them, their essential *Properties*, their *Ebbes and Flowes*, their *Springings and Decays*, the manner of their several *Impressions* the *Physical Effects* which are wrought by them, and the like.

In their *Moral* consideration, we might likewise search, how the *Indifferency* of them is altered into Good or Evil, by vertue of the Dominion of right Reason, or of the violence of their own motions; what their Ministry is in Vertuous, and what their Power and Independance in Irregular actions; how they are raised, suppressed, slackned, and governed according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion.

In their *Civil* respect, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and

impressed; and how, and on what occasions it is fit to gather and fortifie, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish; or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantageous; what use may be made of each mans particular Age, Nature, Propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the Character and dispositions of those, whom we are to deal withall.

And this *Civil* use of *Passion*, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of *Aristotle*, in the second book of his *Rhetoricks*; unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth; because in matter of *Action*, and of *Judicature*, *Affection* in some sort is an *Auditor* or *Judge*, as he speaks. But it seemeth strange, that a Man of so vast sufficiencie and judgment; and who had, as we may well conjecture, an ambition to knit every Science into an entire Body, which in other mens Labours lay broken and scattered; should yet in his Books *De Anima* over-passe the discovery of their Nature, Essence, Operations and properties; and in his Books of *Moral* Philosophie, should not remember to acquaint us with the Indifferencie, Irregularitie, Subordination, Rebellion, Conspiracie, Discords, Causes, Effects and Consequence of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and daily use in our Life, and of necessary and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right Reason.

Touching Passions in order unto Civil or Judiciary

diciary affairs, I shall not make any observation: either of the other I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and asunder, but in a brief and confused collection of some few particulars.

The order which I shall observe in setting down the honour and corruption of them in general (which Method shall in part be kept in their Particular) shall be this; first, according to the *Antecedents* of their *Motion*, and *Acts*; secondly, according to the *Acts* themselves; and thirdly, according to the *Consequents* of them.

First, touching the *Antecedents* to the Act of *Passion*, they are either the *Outward* motives thereunto, as namely, the *Objects* unto which it is carried, and the *Causes* whereby it is produced: or the *Inward* Root and Principles of the Act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, *Passion* is then said commendable, when it is direct and natural. And the Corruption is, when it is carried to an undue *Object*, or proceedeth from an indirect *Cause*: but these are more observable in the particulars, and therefore thither I refer their distinct handling.

For the third, the Dignitie of *Passion* chiefly consists in a *Consonancie* and *Obedience* to the Prescription of *Reason*: for there is in *mans* *Faculties* a natural *subordination*, whereby the actions of the inferiour receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now *Appetite* was in *Beasts* onely made to be governed by a *sen-*

sistive Knowledge : But in *Man*, Sense ought not to have any *commanding* or moving Power, but onely *Instrumental*, Ministerial and Conveying, in respect of the *Object*. The Action of *Sense* was not from the first institution ordained to touch the *Affection*, but to present it self primarily to the *Understanding* ; upon whose determination and conduct, the *Passions* were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its Ministers, in the execution of all such Duties as it should deem any way expedient for the benefit of mans nature : so that herein consists a great part of mans infelicity by the *Fall* ; that albeit his *Understanding* it self be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect *Good* to the inferior parts ; yet that small portion of light which it yet retaineth for the government of our Actions, is become uneffectual, as being able onely to convince, but not to reform.

The *Corruption* then of *Passion* in this respect, is the *independance* thereof upon its true *Principle* : when it strayeth not to look for, but anticipates and prevents the discourses of *Reason* ; relying onely on the judgement of *Sense*, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the Prophet : *Man being in honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the * Beasts that perish*. For, as in the body (to use the similitude of *Aristotle*) if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yeeld obedience unto the Government of the motive Faculty ; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another :

Αὐτὸ ὁ ἡνίο-
χος ἐπὶ τῶν
καὶ ἀγνοεῖ
καὶ ἀρετὰς τε
καὶ σιπρόται.
Iheodor. Ser. 5.
de Natur. hom.

Psal. 49. 20.
* Οὐκ ἐστὶν μάλ-
λον ἢ ἀνθρώ-
ποι, &c.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 4.
Ἀργαλεώτατα
ἐστὶν, in Pro-
trep. & Tatian.
orat. ad Grac.
Ethio. l. 1. c. 13.

ther : So it is in the *Minde* of Man, when that Natural continuity and *union* of Faculties, whereby one was made in operation *dependant* on another, is once dissolved ; when *Affections* are dis-joynted from *Reason*, and cast off the reins whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmony in the motion thereof which is required to the weale of Mans Nature.

It is prodigious to see an *Instrument* (such as all *Appetite* should be) to be the *first* and *self-mover* in its own actions ; whence cannot in the *Minde* of Man but follow great danger : it being all one, as if a wagoner should commit himself to the wilde and unswayed fancy of his horses ; or, as if a blinde man, who hath not the power of directing his own feet, should be permitted to run head-long, without wit or moderation, having no Guide to direct him. For as Fire, though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and usefull while it abides in the place ordained for it ; yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most merciless and over-running : So *Passions*, though of excellent service in Man, for the heating and enlivening of Vertue, for adding spirits and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with an happier issue then they could alone have attained unto ; yet if once they flye out beyond their bounds, and become subject onely to their own Laws, and encroach upon Reasons right, there is no thing more tumultuous and tyranical. As *Bias* said of the Tongue, that it was the best and the worst

*Vid. Plutarch.
lib. de virtute
moral.*

*Plutarch de
Audit.*

worst part of the Sacrifice, so may we of the Affections; *Nec meliores unquam Servos, nec Dominos sentit Natura deteriores*, They are the best Servants, but the worst masters which our Nature can have. Like the winds, which being moderate, carry the ship; but drown it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in Mans little Common-wealth, as in greater States, That there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the publick Good, then those who are best qualified for service and employment; if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon publick ruines. And indeed it is universally true, Things most usefull and excellent in their Regularity, are most dangerous in their abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the exercise of Passion: of Stoical Apathie: of Permanency, Defect, Excess, with the Cure thereof.



He next consideration of *passion* was according to the Exercise of their *Act*: which we may consider, either according to the general *Substance*, or according to some particular *Accidents*, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether Good,

Good, as being nothing else but natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conservation of the Creature. For, notwithstanding natural Motion may haply argue some kinde of imperfection in the state of the thing moving; as supposing it some way deprived of that wherein it should rest it self (which makes *Aristotle* conclude, that the noblest act of the understanding, *Knowledge* and clear vision, is rather the *Rest* then the *Motion* of that Facultie) yet I say, it alwayes implyeth more natural Perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth: for as Fire, the perfectest of Elements, and Heaven, the perfectest of Bodies; so the soul of man, the perfectest of forms, hath the most vehement motion.

And in this consideration (so it be alwayes Motion Natural, governed and dependent on right Reason) I finde not any Corruption, though I finde an Error and abuse; that I mean, which maketh Passion in general to be *Aegritudo Animi*, a Sickness and Perturbation, and would therefore reduce the minde to a senseless *Aparchie*, condemning all life of Passion, as Waves which serve on ly to toss and trouble Reason. An Opinion, which while it goeth about to give unto man an absolute government over himself, leaveth scarce any thing in him, which he may command and govern.

For although there be in the Will over the Body an Imperium; yet in Rigour, this is not so much to be termed Command, as Employment; the Body being rather the Instrument, then the Servant of the

Intellectus
quies intellectu-
bus Arist.
Physic. l. 7. c. 4.
Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.
ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ
καταρα, &c.
Clem. Alexand.
Strom. lib. 4.
Ἡ ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ
ὁν τὸ λυγρὸν
ἰσχυρὸν. Κινῶ-
μενος τὸ πνεῦμα
ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς
καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς
διαφανέειαι
δουλοῦν.
Arist. Probl.
sect. 30. qu. 14.
Animi commo-
tio aversa à
recta Ratione,
& contra Na-
turam, Cic.
Oppon. ἀντι-
θέτου, καὶ πα-
ρὰ φύσιν τοῦ
λόγου κινήσις,
Zen. apud Lac-
tium.

the Soul; and the power which the Will hath over it, is not so much the command of a master over his workman, as of the workman over his Tools: The chief subjects to the *Will* are the *Affections*, in the right governing whereof, is manifested its greatest power.

The strength of every thing is exercised by *Opposition*: We see not the violence of a River till it meet with a Bridge; and the force of the Winde sheweth it self most, when it is most resisted: So the power of the Will is most seen in repairing the breaches, and settling the mutinies, wherewith untamed *Affections* disquiet the peace of mans nature; since *excess* and disorder in things otherwise of so great use requireth amendment, not extirpation; and we make straight a crooked thing, we do not break it. And therefore, as he in *Tacitus* spake well to *Otho*, when he was about to kill himself, *Majore animo tolerari adversa quam relinqui*; That it was more valour to bear, then put off afflictions with courage: so there is more honour, in having the *Affections* subdued, then in having none at all; the business of a wise man, is not to be without them, but to be *above* them. And therefore our Saviour himself sometimes loved, sometimes rejoyced, sometimes wept, sometimes desired, sometime mourned and grieved; but these were not *Passions* that violently and immoderately troubled him; but he, as he saw fit, did with them trouble himself. His *Reason* excited, directed, moderated, repressed them, according to the rule of perfect clear, and undisturbed judgement.

Hist. lib. 2.

Heb. 2. 17.

Heb. 4. 15.

& 5. 2.

Mark 10. 21.

Luke 10. 21.

John 11. 35.

Luke 22. 15.

Mark 3. 5.

Mat. 26. 37, 38

In which respect, the *Passions* of *Christ* are by Divines called rather *Propassions*, that is to say, Beginnings of *Passions*, then *Passions* themselves; in as much as, they never proceeded beyond their due measure, nor transported the *Mind* to undecencie or excesse; but had both their rising and originall from Reason, and also their measure, bounds, continuance limited by Reason. The *Passions* of sinfull men are many times like the tossings of the Sea, which bringeth up mire and dirt; but the *Passions* of *Christ* were like the shaking of pure Water in a cleane Vessell, which though it be thereby troubled, yet it is not fouled at all.

Hieron in
Math. 26.
Magist. Sent,
lib. 3. dist. 15.
Aquin par. 3.
q. 15. art. 4.

Iſa. 57. 20.

The *Stoicks* themselves confessed, that wise men might be affected with a sudden perturbations of Feare or Sorrow; but did not like weak men yeeld unto them, or sinke under them; but were still unshaken in their resolutions and judgments, like *Aeneas* in *Virgill*.

a Laſant l. 6.
c. 14. Aug. de
Civ. Dei. l. 9. c. 4.
l. 14. c. 9. Aul
Gell. l. 19. c. 1.
Cic. Tusc. q. 1. 4.
Sen. Ep. 85. &
de Ira. l. 2. c. 3.
b Aquin 12.
q. 24 art. 2. 3.
Cic. de fin. l. 4.
c Τα ταυτη
παυτα εναπρ-
εισμετα α. τ. Ju-
λις τ. μαλδα-
κας & εναυον.
Clem. Alex.
Strom lib 2. &
vid. in Padag.
lib 2. cap. 13.
Vid Senep 57.
85. & 115.
Diog Laert. in
Zenon. l. 7.

Mens immota manet, lacryma voluntur inanes.
He wept indeed, but in his stable mind
You could no shakings or distempers finde.

b And therefore indeed, this controversie between the *Peripateticks* and *Stoicks*, was rather a strife of Words, then a difference of judgements, because they did not agree in the Subject of the Question; the one, making *Passions* to be *Naturall*; the other, *Preternaturall*, and disorderly motions. For the *Peripateticks* confessed, That wise men ought to be fix'd and immoveable in their vertuous resolutions, and not to be at all by hopes or feares

a Arist. Ethic.
lib. 2. cap. 1.
b 'Εὐσταθίου
πρὸς δ' αὖτο
Ethic. l. 1. c. 10.
c Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 6.
d Plutarch.
contr. Stoicos.

Plutarch. lib. de
vitioso pudore.

a deterred or diverted from them: but as a Dye, to be b *four-square*; and which way ever they be cast, to fall upon a sure and firme bottome. Which is the same with that severe and unmovable constancie of Mind in Vertue, in defence whereof the Stoicks banished *Affections* from wise men: not intending thereby to make men like c *Caneus* in the Poet, such as could not be violated with any force (for they acknowledge subjection to the first motions of Passion) but onely to shew, that the wisdom of Vertue should so compose and consolidate the Mind, and settle it in such stabilitie, that it should not at all be bended from the Right, by any sensitive perturbations or impulsions. As they then who pull down houses adjoyning unto *Temples*, doe yet suffer that part of them to stand still, which are continued to the *Temple*: so in the demolishing of inordinate *Passions*, we must take heed, that we offer not violence to so much of them, as is contiguous unto *Right Reason*; whereunto so long as they are conformable, they are the most vigorous instruments, both for the expression, and improvement, and derivation of Vertue on others, of any in Mans Nature.

Now concerning the *accidents* or maner of these *Acts* which are from *Passion*, it may be considered either in regard of the *Quantitie & Extention*, or of the *Qualitie & Intention* of the *Act*. And both these may be considered two manner of wayes: for the *Quantitie* of *Passions*, we may consider that, as the *Quantitie* of *Bodies*, which is either *Continued* or *Severed*: by *Quantitie Continued*, I understand the manner

manner of a *Passions Permanency* and *durance*; by *Severed*, I meane the manner of its *multiplicitie* and *reiteration*; from both which, it hath the denomination of *good* or *bad*, as the *object* whereunto it is carried, hath a greater or lesse relation to the *Facultie*. For some *objects* are *simple*, and without any limitation, convenient or noxious; and towards these, may be allowed both a more *durable* and a more *multiplied Passion*: others are *good* or *evill* only, with some *circumstances of time, Place, Person, occasion* or the like; which therefore require both fewer and lesse *habitual motions*. The same may be said of the *Qualitie* of them; wherein they are sometimes too *remisse*, sometimes againe too *excessive* and *exorbitant*, according to varietie of *conditions*.

Concerning all these, I shall observe this one general Rule; the *Permanency* or *vanishing*, the *multiplicity* or *rarenesse*; the *excesse* or *defect* of any *Passion*, is to be grounded on, and regulated by the nature only of its *object*, as it beares reference to such or such a *person*; but never by the private *humour*, *prejudice*, *complexion*, *habit*, *custom*, or other like *qualifications* of the *Mind* it self. To see a man of a *soft* and *gentle nature* overpasse some *small indignitie* without *notice* or *feeling*; or to see a man of an *hot* and *eager temper* transported with an *extreamer* and more during *Passion*, upon the *sense* of some *greater injury*, more notably touching him in his *honestie* or *good Name*; is not in either of these, any great matter of commendation; because, though the nature of the *object* did in both warrant the *qualitie* of the *Passion*; yet in those *persons* they both proceeded

ded out of *humour* and *complexion*, and not out of serious consideration of the *injuries* themselves, by which onely the *Passion* is to be regulated.

Of these two *extreames*, the *defect* is not so commonly seen, as that which is in the *excesse*; And therefore we will here a litle observe, what course may be taken for the allaying of this *vehemency* of our *Affections*, whereby they disturbe the quiet, and darken the serenitie of mans *Mind*. And this is done either by *opposing contrary Passion to contrary*, which is *Aristotles* rule, who advileth, in the bringing of *Passions* from an *extream* to a *mediocritie*, to incline and bend them towards the other *extreme*; as Husbandmen use to doe those Trees which are crooked, or as dim and weake eyes do see the light best, when it is broken in a shadow: or else it is done, by *scattering* and *distracting* of them; and that not onely by the power of *Reason*, but sometimes also by a cautelous *admixture* of *Passions* amongst themselves, thereby interrupting their free current. For, as usually the *Affections* of the *Mind* are bred one of another, (as the Powder in the Pan of a Gun will quickly set on fire that in the Barrell) as Grief by Anger, (*Circumspexit eos cum ira condolescens*, He looked on them with anger, being grieved) and Feare by Love;

Res est solliciti plena Timoris amor.

The things to which our heart Love beares,
Are objects of our carefull Feares.

and Desire by Feare; as in him of whome *Tacitus* speakes, *Fingebat & metum, quo magis concupisceret*,
that

Ethic. l. 2 c. 9,
lib. 10. c. 1.

Mat. 3. 3.

Hist. lib. 1.

that to justify his *Desires*, he pretended his *Fears*: So likewise are some *Passions* stopt, or at least bridled and moderated by others; *amor foras mittit timorem*, Perfect love casts out fear. It faring in this as *Plutarch* hath noted in the hunting of Beasts, that they are then easiest taken, when they who hunt them, put on the skins of Beasts. As we see, the light and heat of the sun shining upon fire, is apt to discourage it and to put it out. And this was that which made *Saul*, when he was possessed with those strong fits of *Melancholy*, working in him *Fury*, griefe, & horror, to have recourse unto such a *Remedy* as is most forcible for the producing of other *Passions* of a lighter nature; and so by consequence, for expelling those. Thus, as we see in the Body *Military* (as *Tacitus* hath observed) *Unus tumultus est alterius remedium*. That one tumult is the cure of another; and in the Body *Naturall*, some *Diseases* are expelled by others: so likewise in the *Mind* *Passions*; as they mutually generate, so they mutually weaken each other. It often falleth out, that the voluntary admission of one losse, is the prevention of a greater: as when a *Merchant* casteth out his ware, to prevent a *shipwrack* and in a *publike* *Fire* men pull downe some *houses* untoucht, to prevent the spreading of the flame: Thus it is in the *passion* of the *Mind*; when any of them are *excessive*, the way to *remit* them, is by admitting some further *perturbation* from others, and so *distracting* the *forces* of the former: Whether the *Passions* we admit, be *contrarie*; as when a *dead* *palsie* is cured with a *burning* *feaver*, and *Souldiers* sup-

Job 4.18.

Plut. orat. 1.
de fortitud.
Alexandri.

Hist. lib. 2.

presse

Iliad v. 121.

Press the feare of Death, by the shame of Baseness?

Ἄλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ δέδωκεν ἔργασι
 Λίσσῃ καὶ νέεσσιν.

Iliad. i. 300.

O fearefull Grecians, in your minds recount
 To what great shame this baseness will amount :
 and the hatred of their Generall by the love of
 their Countrey ; as Ulysses perswaded Achilles :

Ἐὖ τοι Ἀτρεΐδης ἰδὲ ἀμύμονα κλέεθι μάλλον,
 Ἄυτὸς καὶ τὸ δόει· σὺ δ' ἄλλος ὥρ παραχαΐεις
 Τηγεύῃους ἐλέαιρε καὶ Σκαύον &c.

Though Agamemnon and his gifts you hate,
 Yet look with pity on the wofull state
 Of all the other Grecians in the Campe,
 Who on your Name will divine honour stampe,
 When you this glory st all to them afford,
 To save them from the rage of Hectors Sword.

Or whether they be Passions of a different, but not
 of a repugnant nature ; & then the effect is wrought
 by revoking some of the spirits, which were other-
 wise all implōid in the service of one Passion to at-
 tend on them ; and by that means also, by diver-
 ting the intention of the Mind from one deep Chan-
 nell into many cross and broken Streames ; as men
 are wont to stop one flux of blood, by making of
 another ; and to use frictions to the feet, to call a-
 way and divert the humors which pain the head.

Which dissipation and scattering of Passion, as it is
 wrought principally by this mutuall confounding
 of them amongst themselves, so in some particu-
 lar cases likewise, two other ways, namely, by com-
 munion in divers subjects, & extention on divers ob-
 jects. For the first we see in matter of Griefe, the
 Mind

Calores calo-
 ribus onerando
 deprimimus, &
 sanguinis fluxum
 defusa venula
 remittimus.

Tertull.

b Clem. Alex.
 Pedag. l. 2 c. 8.

Mind doth receive (as it were) some lightnesse and comfort, when it finds it self *generative* unto others, and produces *sympathy* in them: For hereby it is (as it were) disburthened, and cannot but find that easier, to the sustaining whereof it hath the assistance of anothers shoulders. And therefore they were good (though common) observations.

Cura leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. And Ille dolet verè, qui sine teste dolet.

Our tongues can lighter Cares repeat,
When silence swallows up the great:
He grives indeed, who on his friend
Vntestified teares doth spend.

That *Grief* commonly is the most heavy, which hath fewest *vents* by which to *diffuse* it self: which I take it, will be one occasion of the heaviness of infernall torment; because their *Griefe* shall not be any whit *transient*, to work *comiseration* in any *spectator*, but altogether *immanent* and *reflexive* upon it self.

Thus likewise we see (to instance in that other particular branch, of *diffusing* the *passions* on *divers objects*) how the multitude of these, if they be *Heterogeneall* and *unsubordinate*, doth oftentimes remit a *Passion*: for example, in *Love*; I take it, that that man who hath a *more generall love*, hath a *less vehement Love*; and the *spreading* of *Affection*, is the *weakening* of it. (I mean stil in things not absolute *subordinate*; for, a man may love a Wife more with Children, then without them, because they are the Seals and Pledges of that *Love*) as a River, when it is cut into many lesser streams, runs weaker & shalower: And this, I conceive, is the reason, why *Solomon*, when he

φιλικαὶ δὲ μὲν
 ὁμοῖαι ἐν πολλοῖς
 ἀδελφοῖς.
 Plut. de Amic.
 multitud.
 Anacharsis
 apud Laert. l. 1.

Iliad. l. 479.
 Plutarch de
 multitudine Amic.

commendeth a *strong Love*, giveth it but a *single object*; there is a friend neerer then a brother, one in whom the rayes of this *affection*, like the Sun-beames in a glasse, being more united, might withall be the more fervent. I remember not, that I ever read of *wonderfull Love* amongst men, which went beyond *Couples*; which also *Aristotle & Plutarch* have observed. And therefore we see, in that state there is or should be greater *affection*, wherein is the least *community*: *conjugal Love*, as it is most *single*, so it is usually the *strongest*; and in the Issues and Blessings thereof there is scarce any more powerfull Epithite to win *Love*, then *Unigenitus*, an only son.

Καὶ μὲ φίλῃς ὥσπερ τὸ πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ.
 Μῦθον Πλάτωνα.

*He lov'd me as one loves the onely Son
 Of's old age, born to great Possession.*

Insomuch, that even in *God* himselfe (to whom these *Passions* are but by an *Anthropopathy* attributed) that more generall *Love* of his *Providence* and *Preservation*, (which is common to all his *Creatures*) is (if I may so speake) of a lower degree (though not in respect of any intention or remission in his Will, but onely the effects thereof towards the things themselves) then that more *speciall love* of *adoption*, which he extendeth onely to those whom he vouchsafeth to make one in him who was *Unigenitus* and *Dilectus* from everlasting.

I do not then (by the way) condemn all *strong* and *united Passions*; but only I observe how those, which hereby grow *exorbitant*, & work prejudice to the soul may by a *seasonable distracting* of them, be reduc'd to

a wholesome temper : for as it is noted , that amongst men , those who have bodies most obnoxious to daily maladies , are commonly more secure from any mortall danger , then those who though free from any generall distempers , doe yet finde the surprize of one more violent ; so is it with mens Passions. Those who have a nature readie , upon sundry occasions to break forth into them , doe commonly finde them lesse virulent and morose , then those who have not their Passions so volatile , and ready to spread themselves on divers objects , but exercising their intentions more earnestly upon one.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the effects of Passions, how they sharpen Vertue: Of vitious Concupisense; of their blinding, diverting, distracting and precipitating of Reason, and of their distemperring the Body.



He last consideration of Passions , was according to the Consequents of their A& , which are the ends and effects thereof ; both which I conclude in one ; because the naturall end of all operative qualities , is the effects which they are appointed by their own , or a superior Vertue to produce.

Acad. quest. lib.
4. Inscul. qu. 1. 4

Plutarch. lib de
virt. mort.

Ethic. 1. 2. c. 3.

Now, though in the particulars there be several perfections conferred both on the operations of the Will, and of the Understanding, from Passions; yet I cannot thinke on any other general effect which belongeth equally unto them all, but that onely which *Tully* hath observed out of the *Peripateticks* of Anger, that they are the sharpeners and (to keep his phrase) the Whetstones of Vertue, which make it more operative and fruitful: For Passion stirring up the Spirits, and quickning the Fancy, hath thereby a direct influence upon the Habits and Manners of the Minde; which being in this estate constrained to fetch all her Motions from Imagination, produceth them with the same clearness and vigour as they are there represented. And therefore *Aristotle* speaking of these two Elements and Principles of all Passion, Pleasure and Grief, (one of which all others whatsoever partake of) makes them the Rules of all our Actions, by which they are all governed, and according to the measure whereof, they retain their several portions of Goodness. Thus Anger, Zeal, Shame, Grief, Love, are in their several orders the Whetstones whereon true Fortitude sharpeneth its sword, for men are never more neglectful and prodigal of their blood, then when they are thorowly pierced with a sense of injuries, or grieved with a loss of their own or their Countreys Honour: So the Poet saith of *Mezentius*, when *Aeneas* had slain *Lausus* his son.

Astus

— *Æstus ingens*

*Imo in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu,
Et furibiles agitur Amor, & conscia virtus.*

Æneid. lib. 10.

A noble shame boil'd in his lowest brest,
Rage mixt with Grief, suffer'd him not to rest;
Love and a conscious Valour set him on,
And kindled furious Resolution.

So, Love and Compassion are the inciters of
Bounty, Hope, the stay and anchor of Patience,
keeping the Minde, amidst perils and casualties,
from floating and sinking; Fear the sharpener
of Industry; and Caution an antidote in all our
actions against Violence, Rashness, and Indiscre-
tion. *Atinus* said unto *Turnus*, when in rage
he hasten'd to combat with *Æneas*:

— *Quantum ipse feroci*

*Virtute exuperas, tanto me impensius æquum est
Consulere, atq; omnes merentem expendere casus.*

Æneid. lib. 12.

The more undaunted Courage doth you move,
'Tis fit my serious Fears shew the more Love;
In mature Counsels, and in weighing all
The various dangers and events may fall.

Those imputations therefore which *Tully* and
Seneca, and other Stoical Philosophers, make a-
gainst Passions, are but light and empty, when
they call them diseases and perturbations of the
Minde; which requireth in all its actions both
I 2 health

health and serenity, a strong and a clear judgement; both which properties, they say, are impaired by the distempers of Passion; For it is absurd to think, that all manner of rest is either healthfull or clear; or on the other side, all motion diseased and troublesome: for, what water more sweet then that of a Spring, or what more thick or loathsome, then that which standeth in a puddle, corrupting it self? As in the Winde or Seas, (to which two, Passions are commonly compared) a middle temper between a quiet Calm and a violent Tempest, is most serviceable for the passage between Countreys; so the agitations of Passion, as long as they serve onely to drive forward, but not to drown Vertue; as long as they keep their dependence on Reason, and runne only in that Channel, where-with they are thereby bounded; are of excellent service, in all the travell of mans life, and such as without which, the growth, successe, and dispatch of Vertue would be much impaired.

For the corrupt effects of Passion in generall, they are many more, because there may be a multiplicity as well of Evill as of Error, when there is but a unity of Goodnesse or of Truth. And those effects may be either in respect of themselves, one amongst another, or in reference to the Understanding, Will, or Body. The effects of them amongst themselves, is in their mutual generating and nourishing of each other; as Fear is wrought by love, and Anger by Griefe; *Dolor excitat*

excitat iras ; as a Lion, when wounded, is most raging.

— *Fixumque latronis*
Impavidum frangit telum, & fremit ore cruento.

With bloodie mouth, and an undaunted heart,
Breaks and tears from his wound the fastned dart.

Which effect of Passions, I have before touch-
ed upon ; neither is it alwaies a corrupt effect ,
but onely then , wheo there is in the Passion ge-
nerative some distemper. Secondly, in respect
of the *Understanding* and *Will* , (both which I
comprise under one name of *Reason*) I conceive
the Corruptions to be principally these four :
Imposure , or *Seduction* : *Alienation* , or with-
drawing ; *Distraction* , or *Confounding* : and
Precipitancie , or an *Headlong* transporting of
Reason.

Now concerning these , we are first to remem-
ber , that there is in every Man a native and
Originall strugling between *Appetite* and *Rea-
son* ; which yet proceedeth from Corruption ,
and the *Fall* of man , not from *Nature entire* :
For, from the Law of Creation , there was no
formall *Opposition* , but a *Subordination* between
Spirit and *Sence* ; Man having it in his own
power, to excite, continue, remit, lay down
his Passions , as Reason should dictate unto
him. And therefore (notwithstanding the O-
perations of *Appetite* are common unto Men
and Beasts) yet may we not grant , that they
have

Æneid. l. 12.

*Vide Aquin. 12 :
qu. 77. art. 1. 2.*

*Plutarch. de
virtute: Moral.
Aristot. Ethic.
lib. 1. cap. 13.
Plat. apud The-
odor. Serin. S. de
Nat. Hom. Im-
perat Animus
corpori & pare-
tur Imperat A-
nimus sibi, &c
resistit. Aug.
Conf. l. 8. c. 9. 10.
Aug. Civ. Dei, l.
14. c. 64. 23, 24
25.*

Affectus in ho-
mine erant in
potestate ejus
tripliciter
quantum ad ex-
citationem, du-
rationem, inten-
tionem, & re-
missionem, Per.
in Gen. li. 4.

have the same manner of being educed and govern-
ed in both these.

For, as the Operations of the *vegetative Soul*, though common to Beasts, Men, and Plants, are yet in either of these severally so restrained, as that they are truly said to be proper and peculiar works of that superficial form unto which they are annexed: so likewise the *Sensitive Appetite*, though generally it be common to Men and Beasts, yet in Man it was ordained to proceed naturally from the government of *Reason*; and therefore may properly be called an *Humane Appetite*, as being determined, restrained and made conformable unto Mans Nature: so that as long as Man continued entire and incorrupt, there was a sweet harmony between all his Faculties, and such an happy subordination of them each to other, as that every Motion of the inferiour power was directed and governed; and therefore might truly and properly be attributed to the superiour: But, when once man had tasted of that murdering Fruit, and poysoned him and all his Posterity; then began those swellings, and inward Rebellions, which made him as lame in his Natural, as dead in his Spiritual Condition. Whence *Passions* are become, now in the state of *Corruption*, Beastly and Sensual, which were before, by *Creation*, Reasonable and Humane: For, *Man being in Honour, was without Understanding, and is become as the Beasts, that perish.*

But

But to return : We are (as I said) to remember, that there is in man, by reason of his generall *Corruption*, such a distemper wrought, as that there is not only *crookednesse* in, but *dissention* also, and fighting between his parts : And, though the Light of our *Reason* be by Man's Fall much dimmed and decayed ; yet the remainders thereof are so adverse to our unruly *Appetite*, as that it laboureth against us, as the Philistines against *Samson*, (or rather indeed, as *Dalilah* ; for *Samsons* eyes were truly put out, before ever the Philistines were upon him) ; it laboureth ; I say, to deprive us of those Reliques of Sight which we yet retain.

And this is that first corrupt *Effect*, which I call * *Imposture*, or Occæcation ; whereby *Passion* reigning in the lower parts, and being impatient altogether, of resistance or controul, laboureth to muffle *Reason*, and to obliterate those Principles and originall Truths, whereby their unrulinesse might be restrained. And hence it is, that every man, when he hath given place to the violence of *Appetite*, laboureth next to encline and prepare his *Minde* for *Assent*, and to get *Reason* on the same side with *passion*. * *Disobedience* is ever cavilling, and *contentious* ; and he who will not work the Righteousnesse of God, will be sure to dispute against it, and to stumble at it. And therefore the Apostle telleth us, that *Repentance*, and putting away of Lusts, is the only pre-

* Tanta est vis voluptatum, ut & ignorantiam protelet in occasionem, & conscientiam corrumpat in dissimulationem. Tert. de Spectat. cap. 1. Arist. Rhet. li. 1. c. 3. Quint. l. c. 2. * Τοῦτο δὲ δαίμων σου τὸν διὰ πρᾶξιν κρείττει. Prov. 10. 8. Eccles. 5. 2. 2 Tim. 2. 25. Jam. 1. 19. 20. 21. 1 Pet. 2. 8. Joh. 3. 20.

preparation to *Acknowledge the truth* : For, so long as any man resolves to hold fast his sinne, he will ever reject the Truth that opposeth it, and bribe *Reason* to say something for it.

And the Reasons hereof are these Two ; a *Love of our Passions*, and a *Love of our Ease*. For the former, it is the speech of *Aristotle*, *Κακία ἐσθλαρτικὴ ἀρχή*, That evill and inordinate Motions have a power in them to *Corrupt Principles of Reason*, and to make a man commit that, which in Rhetorick is with *Aristotle*, absurd; but in Divinity, with Saint *Peter*, damnable; τὸν κανόνα στρεβλὸν ποιεῖν to *pervert and make crooked* that, which should be the *Rule and Judge* in our actions. For *Passion*, in opposition to *Reason*, is like an *Humour*, which falling from the Head to the *Eyes*, darkneth the sight thereof: or, as some *Concave Glasses*, which present the *Species* of things to the *Eye*; not as they in themselves, but, with those *Inversions, Depressions*, and other the like deformities, which the indisposition of the Glasse frameth them unto: or, as it is said of *Polypus*, that he changed himself alwaies into the colour of the *Rock* in which he hides; and, as they feign of *Proteus*.

— Πρώτιστα λέων γ' ὅτε' ἦν ῥύειτο,

Ἀὐτὰρ ἔπειτα δελφίνου, καὶ πέρδαλις, ἥδε μέγας ἵππος.

*He made himself a Lyon, and anon
Became a Boor, a Panther, a Dragon.*

So likewise, the *Understanding* being once invaded by *Passion*, is brought to change into divers shapes, and to judge of things not according to their naked and natural truth, but according as it findes them bear in the *Fansie* those impressions of *Pleasure*, which are most agreeable to corrupted Nature.

And another Reason why we seek to warrant and to maintain a *Passion*, when we have given way unto it, is the love of our *Ease*: For every man, though he can be content to delight in the pleasure of a corrupt *Passion*; yet that part of it, which hath the sting in it, is unpleasant: and therefore there is required the hand of *Reason*, by Apologies, Pleadings, and Blandishments, either to mollifie the *Passion*, that it shall not pierce, or to harden and arm the *subject*, that it may not be sensible of it.

And that this Deceit and *Excaciation* is a proper work of *Passion*, (besides our own daily experience) this one Argument might sufficiently prove; namely, the Practice of *Hereticks*: who proposing to themselves either Gain, or any other Carnal and corrupt End; did thereupon presently (as the Apostle notes) vent the perverse Disputes of their own corrupt Mindes, and make all Truth an

K

Hand-

*Agrotantes
Medici alios
Medicos ad se
vocant, & Ma-
gistri palastæ
alios Magistros
ὡς οὐ δυνά-
μειναι κρινεῖν τὸ
ἀλγεῖν, διὰ τὸ
κρινεῖν παρὰ τὸ
δυνατὸν, καὶ ἐν-
παρῆσθαι οὐτε.
Arist. Polit.
lib. 3. cap. 16:*

*Tertul. contra.
Va'ent. cap. 4.*

Tim. 6. 5.

Textus de Fuga
Isid. Pelut. l. 1.
ep. 102.

Herod Thalia.
Ænead. lib. 2.

Hand-maid and Lacquey to their own Lusts. And proportionably thereunto, their custom hath been, *Præsuadere quam docere*; to creep upon the Affections of Men, and get footing there, before ever they would adventure the entertainment of their false Doctrines: and as it is said of GOD, that he first accepted *Abel*, and then his Sacrifice; so do they labour first, to work an approbation of their persons in the hearts of Men; whence, in the second place, their perverse Conceits do finde the easier access to their Understandings.

For, when silly and unstable Mindes shall once be brought to such a Prejudice, as to have the Persons of Men in Admiration; when they shall see an Impostor come unto them, as a *Man* that had wholly renounced the World; like *Zopyrus* or *Synon*, clothed and deformed with seeming Poverty and Repentance; drawing in and out his breath with no other motions, then sighes; pretending to bring nothing but the plentiful promises of Salvation, Tears in his Eyes, Oyle and Honey in his *Mouth*, and the most exquisite Picture of true Holiness, which it is possible for the Art or Hypocrisie of mans Invention to draw out: How can the Understanding of weak and simple people choose (especially being before framed unto belief, by those two Credulous Qualities, of *Ignorance* and *Fear*) but be made inclinable to receive, not onely

onely willingly, but with greediness also, whatsoever poysonous Doctrine, under pretence of wholefom and saving physick, such a subtil Impostor shall administer unto them? Such a great force there is in voluntary Humility, neglecting of the body, and other the like pretended pious Frauds, to insinuate and take possession of weak and credulous Natures; with whom haply, more real, serious, and spiritual Arguments, coming with less pomp and ostentation, would not prevail.

— *Captique dolis, lachrymisque coactis*
Quos neque Tydides nec Larissæus Achilles.
Non anni domuere decem, non mille carina.

They are surpriz'd by *frauds* and forced tears,
 In whom their greatest foes could work no fears;
 Whom ten years war not won, nor thousand ships
 Are snar'd and conquer'd by perjurious lips.

The second manner of *Corruption*, which *Passion* useth on the Understanding and Will, was *Alienating* or withdrawing of Reason from the serious examination of those *Pleasures*, wherewith it desireth to possess the *Minde*, without controule: That when it cannot so far prevaile, as to blinde and seduce Reason: getting the allowance and *Affirmative Consent*

thereof, it may yet at least so far invcagle it, is to with-hold it from any *Negative Determination*, and to keep off the *Minde* from a serious and impartial consideration of what *Appetite* desireth: for fear lest it should be convinced of sin, and so finde the lesse sweetness in it.

2 Pet. 3 5.

Rem. 1. 18

And this is the Reason of that affected and *Voluntary Ignorance*, which Saint *Peter* speaks of; whereby *Mindes* prepossessed with a love of Inordinate courses, do withhold and diver Reason, and forbear to examine that Truth, which indeed they know; as fearing, as lest thereby they should be deterred from those Vices, which they resolve to follow. Which is the same with that excellent *Metaphor* in *St. Paul*; who saith, *The wrath of God was revealed from Heaven, on all ungodliness and unrighteousnes of men, τῶν τὴν ἀληθῆαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατεχούσων*, which hold or detain the Truth in *Unrighteousnes*: that is, which imprison and keep in that *το γνωσθὲν Θεοῦ*, as the Apostle interpreteth himself in the next verse; all those Notions of Divine Truth, touching the omnipotency and Justice of God, which were by the fingers of Nature written within them, to de'er them from, or (if not) to make them, inexcuseable, in those unnatural pollutions wherein they wallowed. Thus *Media* in the Poet :

Καὶ μὰ Δαίμ' μερῶς δρᾶν μέλλο κενά,
Ουκὼς δὲ κρεῖστων τῶν ἐμῶν βλεψύματιν.

*I know 'tis wicked that I go about,
But Passion hath put all my Reason out.*

Eurip. Med. cap.
Vid. Clem.
Alex. Strom. l. 2.
p. 284. Edit.
Heins.

And therefore, that Maxime of the Stoical Philosopher, out of *Plato*, is false; Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἄκυστα στερῆται τῆς ἀληθείας, That all men are unwillingly deprived of Truth; since, as *Aristotle* hath observed, directly agreeable to the phrase of *St. Peter*, there is Ἀγνοία ἐκ προαιρέσεως, an elected or *Voluntary Ignorance*, which for their securities sake, men nourish themselves in.

Arria. Epist. lib. 1. cap. 1.
Aristot. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1.
Malunt nescire quia jam ode-
rant. Tertul.
Apol. cap. 1.
Βούλη τῇ Ἀγ-
νοίᾳ.
Justin. lib. qu.
Cy. Rep. qu. 140.
Ψαδιστικουστον.
Clem. Alex.

And that there should be such an *Alienation* of the *Minde* from Truth, when the Fancie and Heart are hot with *Passion*, cannot be any great wonder: For, the *Soul* is of a limited and *determined Activity* in the Body; insomuch, that it cannot with perspicuitie and diligence give attendance unto divers Objects. And therefore, when a *Passion* in its fulnesse, both of a violence and delight, doth take it up, the more clear and naked brightness of Truth is suspended and changed: so that as the Sun and Moon at their rising and setting, seem far greater then at other times, by reason of thick Vapours which are then interposed: so, the *Minde* looking upon things through the *Mists* and Troubles of *Passion*, cannot possibly judge
of

of them, in their own proper and immediate Truth, but according to that magnitude or colour, which they are framed into, by prejudice and distemper.

But then, Thirdly, If *Reason* will neither be deluded, nor won over to the patronage of *Evil*, nor diverted from the knowledge and notice of *Good*; then doth *Passion* strive to confound and distract the Apprehensions thereof, that they may not with any firmeness or efficacy of Discourse, interrupt the current of such irregular and head-strong Motions. And this is a most inward and proper effect of *Passion*: For, as things presented to the *Minde*, in the nakedness and simplicity of their owne Truth, do gain a more firm Assent unto them, and a more fixed intuition on them; So, on the contrary, those things which come mixt and troubled, dividing the intention of the *Minde* between *Truth* and *Passion*, cannot obtaine any settled or satisfactory Resolution from the Discourses of *Reason*.

And this is the Cause of that *Reluctancy* between the *Knowledge* and *Desires* of *Incontinent Men*, and others of the like Nature: For, as *Aristotle* observes of them, they are but *ἡμιπρόννοι*, *Half-Evil*, as not sinning with that full and plenary Consent of *Will*, but *Præter Electionem*, as he speaks; so I may more truly say of them, that they have but an *Half Knowledge*, not any distinct and applicative

Ethic l. 7. c. 10.
In confinio concupiscentia & poenitentia aspera & tumultuosa gaudia.
Plutarch. lib. Philosoph. cum princip.

plicative Apprehension of Truth, but a confused and broken conceit of things in their Generality: Not much unlike unto Night-talkers, who cannot be said to be thoroughly asleep, nor perfectly awaked, but to be in a middle kinde of inordinate temper between both; or (as *Aristotle* himself gives the similitude) it is like a *Stage Player*, whose Knowledge is expresse and clear enough, but the things which it is conversant about, are not personal and particular to those men, but belonging unto others whom they personate: So, the Principles of such men are in the general, Good and True; but they are never brought down so low, as if they did concern a mans own particular Weale or Woe, nor thoroughly weighed with an assuming, applying, concluding Conscience; but like the Notion of a Drunken or sleeping man, are choaked and smothered with the Mists of *Passion*.

Ethic. l. 7. c. 3.

And this third Corruption is that, which *Aristotle*, in the particular of *Incontinency*, calleth *Αἴσθησις*, the *Weakness* and disability of Reason, to keep close to her own Principles and Resolutions: Whereunto exactly agreeth that of the Prophet; *How weak is thy heart, seeing thou doest all these things, the works of an imperious Whorish Woman*: And elswhere, Whoredom and Wine are said to *take away the heart*. So *Hector* describes lascivious *Paris*:

Ethic. l. 7. c. 7.

Ezek. 16. 30.

Hos. 4. 11.

Iliad γ 45.

Καλον,
 "Εἶς ἔτ' ἀλλ' ἔκ ἐστ' βίη φρεσίν δ' ἐ' ἑπὶς ἀλλή.

*Thy face hath beauty in't, but in thy brest
 There doth no strength nor resolution rest.*

Jer. 50. 38.
 Plal. 132. 8.
 Ecclef. 9. 3.
 Luke 6. 11.

The last Effect (which I shall but name) is that which *Aristotle* calleth *Προωπεία*, *Rashness* or *Precipitancie*; which is the most tyrannical Violence which *Passion* useth; when, in spite of all the Dictates of *Reason*, it furiously over-ruleth the *Will*, to determine and allow of any thing, which it pleaseth to put in practise: and like a Torrent, carrieth all before it: or as the Prophets speaks, *rusheth like an Horse into the Battel*: So *Lust* and *Anger* are sometimes in the Scripture called *Madness*: because it transporteth the Soul beyond all bounds of Wisdom or Counsel, and by the Dictates of *Reason* takes occasion to become more outrageous, *Ipsaque praesidia occupat*, feeds like Wild-fire upon those remedies, which should remove it: As she said in the Poet:

Sene. Medea.

*Lewis est dolor, qui capere concilium potest,
 Libet ire contra.*

That's but light grief, which counsel can abate:
 Mine swels, and all advice resolves to hate.

The

The Corrupt effects which passion worketh in the last place on the Body, are divers, according to the particular nature of the passions; sometimes too sudden and violent, sometimes too heavy oppression of the heart; or other sudden perturbation of the spirits. Thus old *Ely* died, with sudden grief; *Diodorus*, with shame; *Sophocles*, *Chilo* the *Lacedæmonian*, and others, with joy; Nature being not able to bear that great and sudden immutation, which these Passions made in the Body. The causes and manner of which concitation, I refer (as being inquiries not so directly pertinent to the present purpose) unto Natural Philosophers and Physicians. And from the generallity of Passions, I proceed unto the consideration of some particulars, according to the order of their former division: In all which, I shall forbear this long Method of the Antecedents, Concomitants, and Consequents of their acts, (many particulars whereof being in the same nature in all Passions, will require to be observed onely in one or two, and so proportionally conceived in the rest) and shall insist principally in those particulars which I handle on the causes and effects of them; as being considerations, wherein commonly they are most serviceable or prejudicial to our Nature.

CHAP. IX.

*Of the affection of Love, of Love natural,
of general communion, of Love rational,
the object and general cause thereof.*

NOW the two first and fundamental Passions of all the rest, are Love and Hatred. Concerning the Passion of Love, we will therein consider first its object, and its causes; both which being of a like nature, (for every moral object is a cause, though not every cause an object) will fall into one.

Love then consists in a kinde of expansion or egress of the heart and spirits to the object loved, or to that whereby it is drawn and attracted, whatsoever therefore hath such an attractive power, is in that respect the object and general cause of Love. Now, as in Nature, so in the Affections likewise, we may observe from their objects a double attraction: The first, is that natural or impressed sympathy of things, whereby one doth inwardly incline to an union with the other, by reason of some secret vertues and occult qualities disposing either subject to that mutual friendship, as between Iron and the Loadstone: The other, is that common and more discernable attraction which every thing receives from those natures or places, whereon they are ordained, and directed by the Wisdom and

Provi-

Providence of the first Cause, to depend both in respect of the perfection and conservation of their being. For, as God in his Temple, the Church, so is He in his Palace, (if I may so call it) the World, a God of order, disposing every thing in Number, Weight, and Measure, so sweetly, as that is all harmonious, (from which harmony the Philosophers have concluded a Divine Providence) and so powerfully, as that all things depend on his Government, without violence, breach, or variation.

And this Order and Wisdom is seen chiefly in that sweet subordination of things each to other, and happy inclination of all to their particular ends, till all be reduced finally unto him who is the Fountain, whence issue all the streams of their limited being, and the fulness of which, all his creatures have received. Which the Poet, though something too Poetically, seemeth to have expressed:

*Principio Calum ac Terras camposq; liquentes
Lucentemq; globum Luna Titaniaq; Anstra
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per Artus
Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.*

(Lights,

Heaven, Earth, and Seas, with all those glorious
Which beautifie the Day, and rule the nights,
A Divine inward Vigour, like a Soul,
Diffus'd through ev'ry joynt of this great *whole,
Doth vegetate, and with a constant force,
Guideth each Nature through its fixed course.

L 2

And

*Arian. Epist.
lib. 1. c. 6.*

*Aeneid. lib. 6.
Vet. Crinit lib.
6. c. 12.*

**Græci enim
τὸ πᾶν ὁ-
νοῦσι*

And such is the natural motion of each thing to its own Sphere and Center ; where is both the most proper place of its consisting, and with all the greatest freedom from forrein injurie or violence.

But we must herewithall, take notice of the general care of the Creator ; whereby he hath fastned on all creatures, not onely this private desire to satisfie the demands of their own nature, but hath also stampd upon them a general charity and feeling of Communion, as they are sociable parts of the Universe or common Body ; wherein cannot possible be admitted by reason of that necessary mutual connexion between the parts thereof) any confusion or divulsion, without immediate danger to all the members. And therefore God hath inclined the nature of these necessary agents, so to work out of their discord the perfect harmony of the whole, that if by any casualty it falls out, that the Body of Nature be like to suffer any rupture, deformity, or any other contumely, though haply occasioned by the uniform and natural motions of the particulars ; they then must prevent such damage and reproach, by a relinquishing and forgetting of their own natures, and by acquainting themselves with motions ; whereunto considered in their own determinate qualities, they have an essentiall reluctancie. Which propertie and sense of Nature in common, the Apostle hath excellently set down, *1 Corinth. 12.* where he renders this reason of all, that there might be no

Schism

Schism in the Body, which likewise he divinely applyeth in the mysticall sence, that all the several *gifts of the Spirit* to the church, should dive to one common end, as they were all derived from one common Fountain; and should never be used, without that knitting quality of *Love*, to which he elsewhere properly ascribeth the building, concinnation, and perfecting of the *Saints*.

1 Cor. 8. 1.
Ephes. 4. 12.

Now, as it hath pleased the infinite Wisdom of God to guide and moderate, by his own immediate direction, the motions of necessarie agents, after the manner declared to their particular, or to the general end, (which motion may therefore, as I before observed, be called the Natural Passion of things) so hath it given unto Man a reasonable Soul, to be as it were his Vice-gerent in all the motions of Mans little World.

To apply then these proportions in Nature to the affection of Love in Man, we shall finde first a secret, which I will call Natural; and next, a Manifest, which I call a Moral and more discursive attraction. The first of these, is that Natural Sympathie wrought between the affection and the object, in the first meeting of them, without any Passion of the person, till farther inquirie after the disposition of the object; which comes immediately from the outward, natural, and sensitive Vertues thereof, whether in shape, feature, beauty, motion, speech, behaviour, all which coming under the sphere of

of Sense, I include under the name of Judiciary Physiognomy : which is not a bare delight in the outward qualities ; but a farther presumption of the judgment ; concluding thence, a lovely disposition of that soul, which animateth and quickeneth these outward Graces.

Ethic.lib.8.

And indeed, if it be true which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* tells us, That similitude is the ground of Love ; and if there be no natural Love stronger then that which is between the Body and the Soul, we may well ground some good presumption of similitude in the qualities of the Soul with those lovely impressions of Nature which we finde in the Body, and may by the same reason collect a mutual discoverie, by which we acknowledge a mutual sympathy between them. And therefore it was no ill counsel (though not alwayes to be heeded) *Cave tibi ab iis quos natura signavit*, to take heed of such who like *Cain* have any mark of notorious deformitie set upon them by Nature. And therefore *Homer* speaking of the garrulous, impudent, envious, and reviling qualities of *Thersites*, fits him with a Body answerable to such a Minde.

Iliad β 217.

αἰόχλις ὃς ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἰλίου ἦλθε
 φόλκῳ ἔλω χαλδὸς δ' ἔτερον πῶδα, τὸ δὲ οἱ ὤμω
 Κύρτω δὲ πρὶν ἢ θῆσιν συνοχωκοτε αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ θε
 φόξῳ ἔυν καφαλλὴ φεδνὴ δὲ ἐπινερότελα γὰρ

*The most ill-shapen man that to Troy came,
 With eye distorted, and in each foot lame,*

Hij

*His shoulders crooked, to his brest shrunk down,
A sharp wyre head, here and there paicht with down.*

But yet therein, though it be injurious for a man out of too much austerity of minde, to reject the judgement of sense, and to quarrel with this natural instinct; yet it is fit, that in this case, considering the deceitfulness of things, and what a divers habit, Education or Hypocrisie hath wrought in many, between the out and inside of their Natures, that we should, I say, bring a fearfull judgement; like the love of *Bias* the Philosopher, which may easily, upon good warrant and assurance, alter it self: otherwise, when a thing is thoroughly known to be lovely, our hearts may boldly quiet and repose themselves in it.

But here likewise we must observe that proportion of Nature, That if our affection cannot stand in private toward one particular, without damage and inconvenience to the publick Body, Politick or Ecclesiastical, whereof we are members, the general must ever be esteemed more deer and precious. A scandal to the body, and a Schism from the whole, is more dangerous and unnatural, then any private Divisions: for, if there be a wound or swelling in one part of the Body, the parts adjoyning will be content to submit themselves unto pain, for the recovery of that; and rather then it shall perish, suffer any trouble which may conduce to the relief thereof.

And

And this is the Love of fellow members, among themselves. But then; if any part be so far corrupted, as that it doth more easie derive its contagion upon others, then admit of any succour from them, so that by the continuance thereof in the Body, the whole is endangered; or if the whole Body be ready to perish by famine; then doth the sense of community so swallow up that other more private respect, as that the members will be even cruel among themselves, to the cutting and devouring each of other, that thereby the safety of the whole may be procured. And therefore, the Fable of the faction between the Belly and the Members, was wisely applied by *Menenius Agripa*, in a Rebellion amongst the people of *Rome*; to shew how unnatural a thing it is, and how pernicious to the parts themselves, to nourish their own private Discontents, when the Weal-publick is together therewithal endangered.

CHAP. X.

Of the Rule of true Love: the Love of God and our selves: similitude to these, the cause of Love in other things: of Love of Concupiscence: how Love begetteth Love; and how presence with, and absence from the object, doth upon different respects exercise and increase Love.



From this generall and fundamentall cause of Love, proceed some others, speciall and particular, whereof the first and principal is a *similitude* and resemblance between the thing loved, and that which is the Naturall Rule of Love.

Now, the Rule of all Love, is by divine Truth prescribed to be *God*, and a *Mans selfe*; so that, what beareth similitude to these, is the proper and right Object of our Affection. To speake therefore a word or two of these.

The Master Wheele, or first Mover in all the Regular Motions of this Passion, is the *Love of God*, grounded on the right *knowledge* of Him; whereby the Soule being ravished with the apprehension of his infinite *Goodnesse*, is earnestly drawne and * *called out*, as it were, to desire an *Union, Vision*, and participation of his Glory and Presence; yeelding up it selfe unto Him, (for

M

by

Arist. Probl. self. 10. self. 31.

* Καλῶς ἑστὶ τὸ ἔλκεν.

* Amor non
nisi donum a-
mantis in Ama-
tam. Guiliel-
Paris de legi-
bus, c. 19.

by * *Love* a man giveth himsele to the thing which he loves) and conforming all its Affections and Actions to his Will.

And this *Love* is then *Regular*, when it takes up all the *kinds* of *Love*, and all the *degrees* of *Love*. For we love God, *Amore amicitia*, for the *Goodness* and *Excellency* which is in himsele, as being most *lovely*; and *Amore desiderii*, with a desire of being united unto him, as the *Fountain* of all our *blessedness*; and *Amore complacentia*, with a love of joy and *delight* in him; when the Soule goes to God, like *Noahs Dove* to the *Arke*, and with infinite *sweetness* and *securitie* reposeth it selfe in him; and lastly, *Amore Benevolentia*, with an endeavour (so far as a poor Creature can to an infinite Creator, for our good extendeth not unto him) to bring all praise, service, and honour unto him.

And thus we are to love him above all things; first, *Appretiative*, setting an higher price upon his *Glory* and *Command*, than upon any other thing besides; all *Dung*, in comparison. Secondly, *Intensive*, with the greatest force and intention of our Spirit, setting no bounds or measure to our Love of him: Thirdly, *Adequate*, as the compleat, perfect, and adequate object of all our Love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore, the Wise-man speaking of the Love and Feare of God, tells us, that it is *Totum Hominis*, the *Whole of Man*. Other Objects are severally fitted, unto severall Faculties; Beautie to the Eye, Musick to the Eare, Meat to the Palate, Learn-

Learning to the Mind; none of these can satisfie the Facultie, unto which it belongs not. And even to their proper Faculties, they bring *Vanitie* and *Vexation* with them: *Vanitie*, because they are *empty*, and do *deceive*; and because they are *mortall*, and will *decay*: *Vexation*, in the Getting, for that is with Labour; in the keeping, for that is with feare; in the multiplying, for that is with Care; in the enjoying, for if we but taste, we are vexed with desiring it; if we surfeit, we are vexed with loathing it. God only is *Totum Hominis*, fitted to all the wants of an immortall Soule. *Fullnesse*, to make us *perfectly* happy. *Immortality*, to make us *perpetually* happy: after whom we hunger with desire, and are not griped: on whom we feast with delight, and are not cloyed. He therefore is to be *loved*, not with a divided, but a *Whole Heart*. To love any Creature either *without God*, or *above God* is *Cupiditas*, *Lust*, (which is the *fo male* of every sin, whereby wee turn from God to other things) but to love the *Creatures under God*, in their right order: and for God, to their right end, (for hee made all things for himselfe) this is *Charitas*, true and regular Love.

Math. 22. 37.

Vi. d. August. de
Doct. Christi. l. 1
c. 22. & l. 3 c.
10 & de Trini-
tat. l. 8 ca. 3.
& l. 9 c. 8.

Now, the Image and likenesse of God (not to speake of that Eternall and Essentiall Character of his fathers brightnesse) is in his Word, and in his Works: the one, being the manifestation of his Will: and the other, of his Power and Wisdom. Our love to his Word, is our search of it: as being the onely Glasse, wherein we see the Won-

ders and deepe things of God: our *Beleeve* of it, *All*, and *Onely*: acknowledging in it, the fullness of its *Truth*, and of its *sufficiency*: and our *Obedience* to it, submitting our selves, with purpose of heart, unto the rule and guidance of it.

Touching the *Wokes of God*; there are two chiefe things whereunto the affection of Man is by the Creatures *attracted*, and wherewith it desires an *Union*, namely, the *Truth* and *Goodnesse* of them: for by these onely, may all the diuerse Faculties of Mans Soule be exercised and delighted: The Love of both which, is then only *Regular*, when it is *limited*, in regard of the quantity and quality of the act: *Humble*, in the manner of pursuance, without swelling and curiosity: and lastly, *subordinate* unto that great Love of God, whose Image we can no further truly love in this Creature, then as we are thereby directed to a farther love of Him.

I come now unto that other *Rule of Love*, wherein *Aristotle* hath placed the nature thereof, *A mans selfe*, or that unity and proportion which the thing *loved* beareth unto the party *Loving*, which in one place, he calleth *ἰσότης*, *Equality*; in another, *ἰσότης*, *Identity*; in another, *ὁμοιότης*, *Similitude*; in another, *κοινωνία*, *Communion*: all Relative terms, which referre unto the party *loving*!

The Root of every mans love unto *himselfe* is that *unity* and *identity* which he hath with *himselfe*; it being naturall to every thing, to take delight in the simplicity of its owne being: because the

Εἶναι αὐτὸς
ὁ φιλῶ, *Arist*
ib. 9 cap. 9.
Ethic. lib 8.
ap. 9. 12.
Lib. 9. cap. 39.

the more *simple* and *One* it is, the more it is like the *Fountain* of its being; and therefore hath the more perfection in it. And this love of Man unto *himselfe*, if *subordinate* unto the love of God, and governed thereby, is *Debitum natura*, a necessary Debt; and such, as the neglect whereof, is a trespass against Nature.

Now then, as we love our *selves*, for the *unity* which we have in our selves; so, wheresoever we find any *similitude* to our selves, or character of our selves; either in *Nature* or *Habits*, upon that also do the beames of this Affection extend. Now, a thing may represent our selves, first, in *Substance*: as the Husband and Wife are said to be *one flesh*, and Children are branches and portions of their Parents: Secondly, in *Qualities* or *Accidents*: as *one man* resembleth another in *Naturall*: and *one friend* another in *Habituall* Qualities: as *Face answereth to Face in Water*, so the heart of Man to Man.

With respect unto this double *Similitude*, there is a double *Love*: the one, *Naturall*: the other acquired, or *Habituall*: the former is common with Men unto other Creatures: Thus in *Ælian*, *Plutarch*, and others, we read of the *Naturall* affection of Elephants: which seeing their young fallen into a deep Pit, will leape downe after them, though it be present death: and of the marvellous *cunning* and *valour* which many other Birds and Beasts use to provide for the safety of their Brood, exposing and offering themselves to danger, that they may be delivered:

Aristot. Ethic.
lib. 9. cap. 4.8.

Arist. Magnor.
Mor. l. 1. c. 34.

Ælian. lib. de
Anim. 2. c. 25.
Lib. 2. c. 25.
Lib. 6 c 9
Lib. 9. c. 8.
Lib. 11. c. 38.
Plutarch. de
Solert. Anim.
de Amore.
Aristot. Hist.
Anim. lib 9.
c 4.8.

Sophocles in
Electra & ibi
 Scholiast. p. 127
Thokiff. de
Repub. lib. 8. c.
 1. Sect. 19.

Yea, the *Pelican* (if we beleeve the story doth feed her young ones, when they have been bitten with Serpents, with her own blood to recover them againe: which Embleme *Iohn* the second, King of *Portugall* is said to have chosen, whereby to expresse his *Love* to his subjects. And *Homer* elegantly expresseth the care of a Bird feeding her young ones.

Iliad. 1.
 324.

ἀπὸ τῆσι νεοσσόισι προσφέρουσι
 Μάσα ἢ ἐπεὶ κιλᾶβησι, κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ.

*She brings her young ones what meat she can find,
 When she her selfe with hunger's almost pin'd.*

And the like affection, another Poet hath expressed in the most cruell of all the Beasts, the *Tyger*.

Statius. Theb.
lib. 10.

— *Sic Aspra Tygris*
Fatibus abreptis Scythico deserta sub Antro
Accubat, & lepedi lambit vestigia lecti.

— The *Tyger* (which most thirsts for blood)
 Seeing her selfe robd of her tender brood,
 Lies down lamenting in her *Scythian* Den,
 And licks the prints where her lost whelps hap (lyen.

Ælian 1. de
animal. 2. cap.
 40.

And this kind of *Pietie* we finde *Reciprocall*, returning from the young ones upward: so the young *Lyons* are said to feed and provide for their old ones; which is also observed of *Eagles*, *Storkes* and other creatures. And hence wee read

read of νόμοι πατριτικοί, *Laws*, which receive their denomination from the *Stork*, providing that children should nourish and take care of their Parents in their distresse. And for men, so great is the power of naturall affection, that Parents desire nothing more, than to be excelled by their children; even vicious men (as *Seneca* somewhere speaketh) desire that their sons may be vertuous, and vertuous men that they may be more worthy and happy than themselves, as *Hector* prayed for his son.

by lib. 3. c. 23.
& lib. 9. c. 1.
& lib. 10. c. 16.
Plutarch. de
solert. animal.
Aristoph. in
lib. 10. c. 23 &
lib. 8. c. 57.

Καὶ ποτὲ τις εἴπῃσι πατρὸς δ' ὄγ' πολλὸν ἀμείνων.

Let it be said, here's a brave Son indeed,
Who doth his noble Father far exceed.

Iliad. 1. 480.

And *Aeneas* to *Ascanius*.

Disce puer virtutem ex me, verosque labores,
Fortunam ex aliis, —

Aenead. lib. 12

Virtue and Patience learne my son of me,
But may thy fortunes better Patterns see.

And therefore *unnaturalness* of affection is reckoned up by the *Apostle* amongst the foulest of sinnes, when like *Israel* the nature of them groweth wilde and brutish, as the *Philosopher* calleth such men *Megeides*, men of savage and fierce dispositions. And therefore in the *Scripture* an unnaturall man is called *Onagar homo*, a wilde-

2 Tim. 3. 3.

while asse man, *Gen. 16. 12. Ioh. 11, 12.* but a mecke and tender Spirited man is called *Ovis homo*, a Sheepe-man, or a man of a sociable and comed disposition, *Ezek. 36. 37. 38.* And amongst the *Thebans* there was a Law made, which appointed a Capitall penalty upon those unnatu all men, who should cast out and expose their children unto ruine.

And as this kind of Love ariseth from *Propinquity of Nature*, so another there is growing out of *Similitude of Manners*. All flesh, as *Hyracides* speaks, will resort to their like, and every man will keep company with such, as he is himselfe; as we see learned men hold correspondency with those that are learned, and good with those that are good: no man that excelleth in any quality, shall ever want Friends; because every man, that either hath or liketh that Quality, will love it in any other man, and him for it. For by the same reason that a man by the study or practice of any good things labourereth to commend himselfe to his owne judgement, and to the love of others; he is engaged (unlesse hee will be false to his owne grounds) to love any other whom hee observeth to study, and practice the same thing. For how can I expect, that that in me should reape Love from others, which in others reape nothing but *Envy* from me? And upon this reason it is, that a man can hardly permit an other to love that, which he himselfe hateth; because we are too apt to make our Judgements or Passions the rule of another mans, and to dislike that

Alia 1 ar.
11. 1. 2. 6. 7.

Eccl. 13. 17.
Ανὴρ δὲ ἄνδρος
ἄνδρυν ὁ μισοῖ
τοῦτε ἀνένανδ.
For suis vitia,
an aliter in-
dic s. Homerum
quam quod est
et vitis pra-
stantissimis
Achilli & V-
yssi in Julius.
Ibid. 2.
Id. Aristot.
Pro 10. 9. 51
πρὸς ὅτι πρ-
τις φίλος μὴ
μακρὸν δὲ μὴ
μακρὸν &c.
Theod. Idil 9.
φίλια ἐν μόνος
συνδύει δὲ διὰ
τῶν ὁμοειδή.
Stoici apud
Diog. Laert. in
Zenon l. 7
Maxim. Tyrus
dissert. 4.

in him, which we do not allow in our selves : Which unruly affection, the Poet hath excellently described in *Achilles*, when his friend mediated a reconciliation between him and *Agamemnon*.

Οὐ δὲ πὶ σέ γ' ἔχῃ
Τὸν φιλεῖν, ἵνα μὴ μοῖ ἀπεχθῆαι φιλέωπ.
Καλὸν τεῖ σὺν ἐμοὶ ἢ κηδεῖν ὅς κε μὲ κηδῆν.

Iliad 1.610.

*It is not courteous, that where I hate, you
Should love, except you'd have me hate you too :
But take this rule, If you'll be thought my friend,
The man that offends me, does you offend.*

So much naturally are men in love with their owne likenesse, that many times they can be content to have their very deformities imitated : and therefore, the chief art of flatterers, is to commend and imitate every thing of him, of whom they would make a prey.

*Plutarch. de
sular. et
Amicis.*

It is true, that in some cases, *similitude* is the cause of *Envy* ; But this is onely then, when first the quality wherein men agree, is a litigating and contentious quality : in which case the meeting of such men in one disposition, is but like the meeting of two rough Streams which makes them run with the more noise : Therefore, a wise and a meek tempered man shall sooner win and hold the Love of an angry man, then he who is like unto him in that distemper ; because such a man (though indeed he be Conqueror, in regard of his Wisdom) yet by
N his

his Patience he seemeth to yield : and there is nothing which a mans Passion loves so much as Victory. Whereas between Anger and Anger there must needs be fighting of Affections, which is the remotest temper from *Love*.

Secondly, when by accident the quality wherein men agree, doth any other way inconvenience them, either in point of credit, usefulness, or profit. For as the Stars, though they agree in light, yet *Validiorum exortu exilia obscurantur*, those that are small, suffer losse by the brightness of others : So amongst men agreeing in the same abilities, one many times proveth a prejudice and disadvantage unto the other, as the Poet said,

Plin. Panyg.

Hesiod.

Καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ χθονεῖ, καὶ τέκτονι πέκτων.

*The potter's often angry with his mates.
One neighbour-Architect the other hates.*

And therefore as the Sun and Moon agree best in their light when they are farthest asunder, so in these Arts which maintain life or credit, men usually agree best at a distance, because thereby the one doth the lesse damage or darken the other,

Δὲ μὲ συμ-
μαρτυροῦν. ἀλλὰ
μὲ χεῖρα μὴ
Vid A Geil.
lib. 1. cap 3.

Now this *Naturall* and *Habituall Love* is then regular, when *subordinate* to that greater, our Love of God, and when governed by the dictates of a rightly-informed *Reason*, which amongst many others, are these three.

First, That our *Love* carry its right respect, and no sinister or by-end with it: That we love a friend for himself, and not with indirect ends, onely upon our own benefit: For, as the^a Philosopher speaks, true *Love* is a *benevolent* Affection willing good unto another for his own sake, *Hominum Charitas*, saith *Cicero*, *gratuita est*. True *Love* is *free*, and without self respects: whereas to shroud our own private aimes under the name of Friendship, *Non est amicitia sed mercatura*, is onely to make a Trade and Merchandize of one another.

a Rhet. l.4 c.4.

De Nat. deor l.1

Senece Epist. 9

Secondly, That our *Love* be *serene*, not mudded with error and Prejudice: in the most able men that are, God is pleased to leave some wants and weakneses, that they may the better know themselves, be acquainted with divine bounty in what they have, and their necessary use of others in what they want. And therefore it was a seasonable increpation of *Polydamus* to *Hector*.

Ἄλλ' ὅ γδ' εἰς πάντ' ἐπισαδαι βροτῶν πεφυκεν, &c.
Eurip. Rhes.
106.

Οὐνεκα τοὶ περιδῶκε Θεὸς πολεμῆια ἔργα,
Τῦνεκα καὶ βέλῃ ἐθέλει περιδμεναι ἄλλον.
Ἄλλ' ὅπως ἅμα πάντα δυνήσεται, &c.

Ill iad. v 700 de
Vid Plutarch.
de Anim. Tran-
quil. Cicero ad
Atticum. l. 14.
ep. 14.

Because thou canst in war all men out-do,
Wilt thou presume thou canst in Counsel too?
One brefts too narrow to contain all Arts;
God distributes his gifts in several parts.

In this case therefore our care must be, To discern between the abilities and infirmities of
N 2 men.

Quintil l.c.2.
G l.10 c.2.

Plutarch de
Adulat.

1 Tim.5-8.
Gal 6.10.

men; that our Honour and Love of the *Person* render not his *weaknesses* beautiful to us, nor work in us an unhappie diligence in the imitation of them. *Vix enim dici potest quanto libentius imitatur eos, quibus favemus*; Love is very apt to transport us so far, as to make us imitate the errors of whom we love. Like unskilful Painters, who not being able to reach the *beauty* of the face, expresse only the *wrinkles* and blemishes of it.

Thirdly, that our Love keep in all the *kinds* thereof its due proportion, both for the *nature* of them, being towards some a *love of Reverence*, towards others of *friendship*, towards others of *Compassion*, towards others of *Counsel* and *Bounty*; as also for their severall *degrees of intention*, which are to be more or lesse according to the *Natural*, *Moral*, or *Divine* obligations which we finde in the Persons loved. For though we must love *All men as Our selves*, yet that infers not an *Equality*, but a *Fidelity* and *Sincerity* of love; Since even within Our selves, there is no man but loves his *Head*, and his *Heart*, and other vital parts, with a closer Affection then those which are but fleshly and integral, and more easily repairable. And therefore the Apostle limitteth the *μεγιστα*, the greatest *degree* of our Love upon two objects; those of our *own house*, and those of the *household of faith*; not excluding others, but preferring these.

I shall end this particular with naming one *Species* of Love more (for all this hitherto hath been *Amor Amicitia*, a Love of a Person for him-

himself) and it is that which the Schools call *Amor Concupiscentia*, a love of *Concupiscence* or a *Circular love*, that which begins and ends in a *Mans self*, when his Affections having gone forth to some object, doth again return home, and loves it not *directly* for any *absolute* goodnesse which it hath in it self, but as it is *conducibile* and bears a relation of *Connivence* to him that loves it. For though all affection of Love (as *Aristotle* observed) be *Circular*; in as much as the *Object* first moves the *Appetite*, and then the *Appetite* moves to the *Object*, and so the motion ceaseth where it began (which is a Circle;) which also by the way shews us in an Embleme the firmness and strength which *Love* works amongst men; because, of all Forms and *Fabricks*, those which are *Circular* are the strongest; as we see in *Arches* wherein every part doth mutually touch and clasp in that which is nex it:) Yet in this *Love* which I here speak of, there is a greater *Circle*; in that, after all this, there is another *Regressive* from the *Object* to the *Appetite*, applying the goodnesse thereof unto the same, and loving it only for the commodity and benefit, which the minde is likely to receive from it.

Another subordinate and less principal cause of *Love*, may be *Love* it self; I mean in another man: for as it is natural, according to *Aristotle* to praise, so sure it is to love, *φιλανθρωπος*, men of loving and good natures: and so he maketh just, beneficent and pleasant, *ὅπως τις σφδρα φιλοφίλος*, men that are true lovers of their own friends to be

Ethic. l. 8. ca. 1.
li 9 ca. 1.

be the proper objects of Love. And herein is that partly verified, that *Love is strong as death*. For as that grave which buries a dead man, doth likewise bury all his Enemies (it being unnaturall to hate the dead, whom we cannot hurt : for the utmost harm that malice can do, is to kill. And therefore it is noted as a prodigious hatred between the two emulous brothers of *Thebes*, *Ateocles* and *Polynices*.

*Nec furtilis post fata modus, flammaque rebelles
Seditione rogi.*——

Statim Thebaid

Their furies were not bounded by their fate;
Ones funeral-flame the others flame did hate.)

Even so likewise a mans Love hath a power to bury his Enemies, and to draw unto it self the most backward and differing affections ; for being of a Transient nature, and carrying forth it self into the Person beloved, it usually (according to the condition of other naturall Agents) worketh semblable and alike affections unto it self. For besides that hereby an Adversary is convinced of nourishing an injurious and undeserved enmity, he is moreover mollified and shamed by his own witness, his Conscience telling him that it is odious and inhumane to repay love with hatred. Insomuch that upon this iuducement, *Saul*, the patern of raging and unreasonable envie, was sometimes brought to relent, and accuse himself. And this is the occasion

*Pessimam causam meam hodierna pietas fecit
provisus nocens,
quicumque visus
eum bono, viri
est nocens. Senec
in Thyeste.*

sion (as I take) of that speech of Solomon : If
thine enemy hunger, give him bread to eat; if he
thirst, give him water to drink; for thou shalt heap
coles of fire upon his head. Which, though per-
haps with earthly and base mindes, it hath a pro-
perty of hardning and confirming them in their
hatred; yet, with mindes ingenious and noble, it
hath a clean contrary effect, to melt and purge
them. And so the Apostle telleth us, that we love
God because he loved us first; and Mary Magda-
lene having had much forgiven her; did therefore
love Christ much. And therefore the Poets counsel
is good :

Prov. 25. 21.

Nimis durum est
animus. quidile-
tionem, si nolle
bat impendere.
nolite repende. e.
Aug. de Catech.
Rudib. c. 4.

1 Job 4. 19.
Luke. 7. 47.

Στῆργετε τὸς φιλέοντας ἰν' αὐ φιλεᾶτε φιλήτε.

If for thy Love thy self wouldst loved be,
Shew love to those that do shew love to thee.

Theocrit.

/in' ut amaris ?
and, Martial.

The next two Causes which I conceive of
Love, I will joyn in one : namely, the absence
from, and contrarily, the presence with the thing
loved : both which in a different respect, do ex-
ercise Love. And therefore, first, I like not that
speech of Aristotle, and though distance of place
do not dissolve the root and habit, yet it doth the
exercise and acts of Love; except he meant it (as
I suppose he doth) of the transient acts thereof,
whereby each friend doth the office of Love and
Beneficence to another. For, as in naturall bodies
there is not only a Complacencie or Delight in
their proper place, when they enjoy it; but an in-
nate

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5.

a *Animus amare
referetur, sicut
corpus pondere*
Aug. de Civit.
Dei. l. 11. c. 28.
*Pondus meum a-
mor meus, eo fe-
ror quocunque
feror. Confess.*
lib. 13. cap. 9. &
Epist. 89.
b *Plutarch, sym-
pos. l. 7. q. 7.*
Aeneid. l. 4.

τὸς ἐν πολλῇ
διασπασίᾳ
ὅπως ἀναγα-
γῆν ἐν συνδύνῳ,
in 1 Cor. 10. 30.

nate propension and *motion* thereunto, when they are *absent* from it; so in the minde of man (whose ^a *Love is his Weight*) there is not only a *Love of Delight* in the *fruition*, but a *Love* likewise of *De- sire* in the *privation* of a *Good*, which, the more it wanteth, the more it fixeth it self upon it: ^b as some things do naturally attract fire at a distance. Thus the Poet expresseth the love of *Dido* to *Aeneas*.

Illum absens absentem auditque videtque.

When night had severed them apart,
She heard and saw him in her heart.

And it is the wonder of *Love* (as *Saint Chry- sostome* speaketh) to collect and knit together in one, things far seperated from each other. Where- in stands the *Mystery* of the *Communion* of the *Church* on Earth, both with it self, in all the dis- persed members of it, and with *Christ* the Head, and that other part of it which *triumpheth* in Hea- ven. So that herein, *Divine* love hath the same kinde of vertue with *Divine Faith*; that as this is the *being* and *subsisting* of things to come, and distant in *Time*, so that is the *Union* and knitting of things *absent*, and distant in *Place*.

But then, much more doth *Presence* to the goodnesse of an object loved, encrease and exer- cise our *Love*; because it gives us a more com- plear sight of it, and union unto it. And there- fore *Saint John* speaks of a *Perfection*, and *Saint*

^a *Joh. 4. 18.*

Paul

Paul of a Perpetuity of our Love unto God, grounded on the fulness of the *Beatifical Vision*, when we shall be *for ever with the Lord*; whereas now, *seeing onely in a glass darkly*, as we know, so likewise we love but in part onely. And Aristotle makes Mutual conversation and Sociery, one of the greatest bonds of Love; because thereby is a more immediate exercise; and from thence, a greater increase of Affection.

As living Creatures, so Affections are nourished after the same manner as they are produced. Now it is necessary, for the first working of Love, that the Object have som manner of Presence with the Affection, either by a Knowledge of Vision, or of Faith. And therefore Saint Paul saith, If they had known they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory; their ignorance and hatred of Him went both together: *Simul ut desinunt ignorare, cessant & odire*; as soon, saith Tertullian, as they ceased to be ignorant of Christ, they ceased to hate Him: And usually, in the Phrase of the Scripture, Knowledge and Love are identical. So then, all Love proceeding from Knowledge, and all Knowledge presupposing some presence of the thing known, it appeareth, that the presence of the Object begetteth, and therefore, by proportion, it nourisheth this Affection.

The last Cause or inducement to this Passion, (which I will but name) is an Aggregate of divers Beautifull and Amiable Qualities in the Object; as namely, *Sympathy, Justice, Industrie, Temperance, Ingenuitie, Facilitie, Pleasantness*, and

1 Cor 13. 8.

Ethic. lib. 8. c. 5

Plut. de Invidia & Odio. Arist. Polit. l. 1. c. 7.

1 Cor. 1. 8.

Apolog l. c. 1.

2 Tim. 2. 19:

Mat. 7. 23.

John 9. 21.

Plal. 1. 6.

Eccl. 37. 18.

Rom. 8. 29.

Rhetor. l. i. c. 4

Innocency of Wit, *Meekness*, *Yeeldingness*, *Patience*, *Sweetness* of behaviour and disposition, without *Clofeness*, *Suspition*, *Intermeddling*, *Inquisitiveness*, *Morosity*, *Contempt*, *Dissention*; in all which, men are either *Injust*, or *pugnaces*, do either wrong us, or cross us: Which two the Philosopher make the general Opposites of *Love*: On which I shall forbear to insist, as also upon the circumstances of the act of this *Passion* it self, in the quantity and quality thereof, and shall proceed in brief to the *Consequents* or *Effects* of this *Passion*.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Effects of Love, Union to the Object, Stay and Immoracion of the Mind upon it, Rest in it, Zeal, Strength and Tenderneſs towards it, Condeſcention unto it, Liquefaction and Languishing for it.



He first which I shall observe, is *Union*, occasioned both by the *love* which we have to a thing for its *own sake*, and likewise, for the *love* of *our selves*, that there may be a greater mutual interest each in other. Where ever *Love* is, it stirreth up an endeavour, to carry the heart unto the thing which it *lovet*: *Where the Treasure is,*

is, there the heart will be. Hence none are said to love God. But those that are some way united unto him. And therefore, as *Gods first love* to man, was in making man like himself; so his second great *love*, was in making himself like man. Hence we read so often of that *mystical* inhabitation of *Christ* in his *Church*, of that more peculiar *Union* and presence with the people, of a *Spiritual Implantation* into him by *Faith*, of those neer relations of *Filiation* and *Fraternity*, of mutual interest each in other, *I am my beloveds, and my beloved is mine*; importing an inseparable *Union* of the *Church* to *Christ*. And this may be the reason of that order in *Saint Pauls* solemn Benediction, The *Grace* of *Christ*, the *Love* of *God*, and the *Communion* of the *Spirit*: for, as the *Grace* of *Christ* onely taketh away that enmity which was between sinners and God, and is the onely means of our reconciliation unto him; so the *Love* of *God* is the onely *Bond* of that *Communion*, which we have with him and his holy *Spirit*.

Union is of diverse sorts. One, such whereby diverse things are made *simply one*, either by the *conversion* of one into the other, or by the *composition*, or *constitution* of a third out of the things united, as of mixt bodies out of united Elements, or of the whole substance out of the essential parts: Another, such whereby things united are made one *after a sort*, either by an *accidental aggregation*, as divers stones make *one heap*, or by an *orderly* and artificial *distribution*, as divers materials make *one house*. Or by either a *natural* or *moral*

Arist. Rhetor.
lib. 2 cap. 4.
Diogen. Laert.
in Zenon. l. 7.

Amor Hedera
Plutarch. de
Aud. Scal. de
subtilitate
Arist. Polit.
lib. 2. c. 4.
Vel praesentem
desideramus.
Plin. Paneg.

Odys. II. 54.

inclination and sympathy which one thing beareth unto another. And of this sort is that *union* which ariseth out of *love*, tending first unto a mutual *similitude* and conformity in the same desires; and next unto a mutual *possession*, fruition, and propriety, whereby the minde loving, longeth to be seised of the thing which it loveth, & cannot endure to be deprived of it. So *Moses* prayed, *I beseech thee shew me thy glory*: for the *vision* of God is the *possession* of him; and so *David*, *My soul thirsteth for God, when shall I come and appear before him*. And this is the foundation of all *sorrow*, when the soul is dispossessed of that which it *loved*, and wherein it rested. And this *desire of possession* is so great, that *Love* contenteth it self not with the *Presence*, but even then putteth out its indeavor unto a nearer, and more *real union*, as if it would become *really One* with the thing which it *loveth*; which is seen in *embracings*, kisses in the exiliency and egress of the spirits, in the expansion of the heart, in the simplicity and naturalness of all mutual carriages, as if a present friend were not yet present enough. Which kinde of expressions of *love* are thus elegantly described by *Homer* when *Eumais* saw *Telemachus* safely returned home from Sea.

Ταφῶν δ' ἀνέροσιν συβώτης,
Ἐκ δ' ἀρχῇ οἱ χερῶν πίνων ἄσπια, τοῖς ἐπονέτο
Κρινὰς αἰθοπα οἶνον, ὃ δ' ἄνθη' ἥλυθ' ἀνακλῖθ.
Κύσσε δὲ μιν κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀμφὶ σάβη καλὰ
Χείρας τ' ἀμφοτέρωσιν, θυλερὸν δ' οἱ ἔκπεπε δάκρυ.

Eumais

*Eumæus all amaz'd sprung to the door,
The pots of wine which his hands mixt before
Did both fall from them : he run on to meet,
And with full welcoms his young master greet.
He kist his head, hands, eyes, and his tears kept
Time with his kisses, as he kist he wept.*

The like elegant description we have of the love of *Penelope* when *Ulysses* after his return was perfectly known unto her.

Δεχύσασα δ' ἔπειτα ἰθὺς δεξιῶν, ἀμφὶ δ' ἤχεας
Διερῇ βάλ' Ὀδυσσεύϊ, χερσὶ δ' ἔκυσ'.

Odyss. 4. 208.

*She wept and ran strait on, her hands she spread.
And claps'd about his neck, and kist his head.*

Love hath in *moral* and *divine* things the same effect which *fire* hath in *natural*, to congregate homogeneous, or things of the same kinde, and to separate heterogeneous, or things differing : as we see in the Love of God, the deeper that is, the more is the spiritual part of man collected together, and raised from the earth. And therefore in heaven, where love shall be perfect, all things shall be harmonious and homogeneous, not in regard of natural properties, but in a pure and unmixed spiritualness of affection, in a perfect unity of minds and motions.

From the union of love proceeds another secret effect, namely, a resting of the minde in the thing loved

Gerson de My-
ster. Theol.

loveth. In which respect the Philosopher calleth knowledge the *rest* of the understanding. And this can onely be total and perfect in the Union of the soul with God, the chiefeſt good thereof. Whence ſome have made the threefold *Appetite* in man, Concupiſcible, Rational and Ir-aſcible, to have their final perfection and quiet by a diſtinct union to the Three Perſons in the Trinitie: for the *concupiſcible* power is carried *ad bonum*, to good, which they ſay is the Attribute of the *holy Spirit*; the rational *ad verum*, to that which is *true*, which is the Attribute of the *ſon*; and the Ir-aſcible *ad arduum*, to power, which is the Attribute of the *Father*. But to let that paſs for a ſpiders web (curious, but thin) certain it is, that God onely is that *end*, who can fully accompliſh the perfection, and terminate the deſires of thoſe creatures, whom he made after a peculiar manner to know and enjoy him. But proportionably, there ariſeth from the *Union* unto any other *Object* of Love a *ſatiating* and *quieting* of the Faculty; which in a word, is then onely (in *Objects* of inferiour order and goodneſs) regular, when the *Object* is *natural*, and the *action limited*. Diſproportion and Enormitie are the two Corruptions in this particular.

A third Effect, which I ſhall obſerve of Love, is *Stay*, and Immoration of the Minde upon the *Object loved*, and a *diverting* of it from all others: as we obſerve in *Eumais*, when he ſaw *Telemachus*, he threw away the buſineſs which he was about before: And the Woman of *Samaria*, be-
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ing transported with the love of Christ, left her Pitcher, which she brought to the Well, that she might go and call others unto his Doctrine: And Mary left the thought of entertaining Christ at the Table, out of an extraordinarie desire to entertain him in her heart; and this effect the Poet hath excellently expressed in *Dido*; who having before shewed a marvellous Princely wisdom and sedulity in fortifying her new Kingdom, and viewing the works her self, (as he had before described) as soon as she was once transported by the love of *Aeneas*, then all stood still on a sudden.

*Non caepa assurgunt turre, non arma juvenus
Exerces; portusve, aut propugnacula bello
Tuta parant; pendent opera interrupta* —

Aenead. l. 4.

The Towers long since begun rose up no more,
And Arms did rust, which ere-while brave youth
No Ports, no Sconces, no defence went on, (wore.
But all their works hangs broken, and half done.

Thus as *Plutarch* hath observed, the Images of things in the fancies of other men, are like words written in water, which suddenly vanish; but the Impressions which love makes, are as it were written with an hot iron, which leaveth fixed and abiding prints in the Memory.

Love and Knowledge have mutual sharpening and casuality each on other: for as Knowledge doth generate Love, so Love doth nourish and exercise

ercise Knowledge. The reason whereof is that unseparable union, which is in all things between the *Truth* and *Good* of them: for it being the property of *Truth* to unite and apply *Goodness* (nothing being apprehended as Good, unless that Goodness be apprehended as *true*) the more Appetite enjoyeth of this, the deeper inquiry doth it make, and the more compleat union doth it seek with that: the Heart and the Treasure can seldom be severed; the Eagles will alwayes resort to the body; *Dauids* Love gave length and perpetuity to his meditation, even all the day.

And herein, methinks, may consist another proportion between the strength of *Love* and *Death*; for as in *Death* nature doth collect and draw in those spirits, which before lay scattered in the outward parts, to guard and arm the heart in its greatest conflict; uniting all those languishing forces which are left, to testifie the natural love which each living creature beareth to its own conservation: so doth *Love* draw and unite those Spirits which administer either to the Fancie or Appetite, to serve onely for the nourishing of that Affection, and for gazing upon that treasure whereunto the Heart is wholly attracted. Which Spirits, being of a limited power and influence, do therefore with the same force, whereby they carry the minde to the consideration of one thing, withdraw it from all other that are heterogeneous; no determinated power of the Soul being able to impart a sufficient activity unto diverse

verse independing operations, when the force of it is exhausted by one so strong; and there being a sympathy, and as it were a league between the faculties of the soul, all covenanting not to obscure or hinder the Predominant Impressions of one another. And therefore as in *Rome* when a Dictator was created, all other Authority was for that time suspended; so when any strong *Love* hath taken possession of the soul, it gives a Superfedeas and stop unto all other employments. It is therefore prescribed as a Remedy against inordinate *Love*.

Plutarch. in
Amatorio.

Pabula Amoris

Absterere sibi, atque aliò convertere mentem.

Lucreti apud
Petr. Crinit.
lib. 16 cap. 4.

To draw away the fuel from this fire,
And turn the minde upon some new desire.

For Love is *Otiolorum Negotium*, as *Diogenes* spake, the businesse oftentimes of men that want employments.

Σχολάζοντων
ἀχολία. Dioge-
nes apud Laert.
l. 6.
Laert. lib. 6.

Another effect of Love is Jealousie or Zeal. Whereby is not meant that suspicion, inquisitive, quick-sighted quality of finding out the blemishes, and discovering the Imperfections of one another (for it is the property of true Love to think none Evill.) but only a provident and sollicitous feare, lest some or other evill should either disturb the peace, or violate the purity of what we love: like that of *Jab* towards his sonnes; and of the *Apostle* towards his Corinthians, I

Job. i. 5.

2 Cor. 11. 2.

am jealous over you with a godly jealousy: So Penelope in the Poet was jealous of the safety of Ulysses.

Ovid. Epist.

*In te fugebam violentos Troas ituros,
Nimine in Hectoris pallida semper eram.*

*How oft, my deare Ulysses, did I see
In my sad thoughts proud Trojans rust on thee?
And when great Hector's name but touch'd mine
My cheeks drew paleness from my paler fears. (ears*

Joh. 2. 17.

ἐὸν τὸ ζῆλον λίσαν

Cant. 1. 8.

Rev. 3. 15.

Plutarch de A-
more prole.

Zeale is a compounded affection, or a mixture of Love and Anger, so that it ever putteth forth it self to remove any thing which is contrary to the thing we love; as we see in Christ, whose zeal or holy anger whipped away the buyers and sellers out of the Temple. In which respect it is said that the Zeal of Gods house did consume him. As water when it boyleth, (from which metaphor the word Zeal is borrowed) doth in the boyling consume; or as the candle wasteth it self with burning. In which respect likewise it is said, *that much water cannot quench Love*. It is like Lime, the more water you cast upon it, the hotter it growes. And therefore the sinne of Laodicea, which was contrary to Zeal, is compared unto *lukewarm water*, which doth not boyle, and so cannot worke out the scum or corruption which is in it:

And from hence it is that Love makes *Weake things strong*; and turneth Cowardice into Valour, and Meeknesse into Anger, and Shame into Bold-

Boldnesse, and will not conceive any thing too hard to undertake. The fearfull Hen, which hath nothing but flight to defend her self from the Dog, or the Serpent, will venture with courage against the strongest creatures to defend her little Chickens. Thus Zeal and love of God made *Moses* forget his meeknesse; and his Anger was so strong, that it brake the Tables of the Law, and made the People drink the Idol which they had made. And this is wittily expressed by *Seneca*, that *Magnus dolor iratus amor est*, a great griefe is nothing else but Love displeased, and made angrie. It transporteth nature beyond its bounds or abilities, putteth such a Force and vigour into it, as that it will venture on any difficulties, as *Mary Magdalen* would in the strength of her love undertake to carry away the dead body of *Christ* (as she conceived of him) not considering the weight of that, or her own weakness. It hath a constraining vertue in it, and makes a man do that which is beyond his power, as the *Corinthians*, when they were poore in estate, were yet rich in *Liberality*. It makes a man impatient to be unacquainted with the estate of an absent friend, whom we therefore suspect not sufficiently guarded from danger, because destitute of the helpe which our presence might afford him. In one word, it makes the wounds and staines of the thing loved to redound to the grief and trouble of him that loveth it. He that is not jealous for the credit, security, and honor of what he pretendeth affection to, loves nothing

Num. 12. 11.
Exod 3. 19.

Senec. in Herc.
Oet.

Vid Plutarch.
Amatorium.

Non pariar me
quicquam nesci-
re de e. quem a-
meur. "lin. Epist

Πρόθεσις τῆς
 φιλοστοργίας
 αἰσθητικῆς.
 Euripi.
 Helen.

but himsele in those pretenses.

Another Effect of *Love* is *Condescension* to things below us, that we may please or profit those whom we love. It teacheth a man to deny his own judgment, and to do that which a looker on might happily esteem weakness or Indecency; out of a fervent desire to express affection to the thing beloved. Thus *Dauids* great *Love* to the *Arke* of Gods presence did transport him to leaping and dancing, and other such familiar expressions of joy (for which *Michal* out of pride despised him in her heart) and was contented by that, which she esteemed baseness, to honour God: herein expressing the *love* of him to mankind, who was both his *Lord* and his *Son*; who emptied, and humbled, and denied himself for our sakes, not considering his own worthiness, but our want; nor what was honourable for him to do, but what was necessary for us to be done. *Quicquid Deo indignum, mihi expedit*; whatever was unworthy of him, was expedient for us. Thus Parents out of love to their children do lisse, and play, and fit their speech and dalliances to the Age and Infirmities of their children. Therefore *Themistocles* being found playing and riding on a Reed with his little boy, desired his friend not to censure him for it, till he himself was a father of Children.

The last Effect which I shall observe of this Passion is that which I call *Liquefaction* or *Languor*, a melting, as it were, of the heart, to receive the more easie impressions from the thing which

Plutarch. Apothegm Lacon.

Vid. Plutarch.
 Sympotic. l. 5.
 4. 7.

it loveth, and a decay of the spirits, by reason of that intensive fixing of them thereon, and of the painful and lingring expectation of the heart to enjoy it. Love is of all other the inmost and most visceral Affection. And therefore called by the Apostle, *Bowels of Love*. And we read of the yearning of *Josephs bowels* over *Benjamin* his mothers son, and of the true mother over her childe. *Incaluerunt viscera*, they felt a fervour and agitation of their bowels, which the more vehement it is, doth work the more sodain and sensible decay and languishing of spirits. So *Amnon* our of wanton and incestuous Love, is said to grow lean from day to day, and to have been sick with vexation for his sister *Thamar*.

And in spiritual love we find the like expression of the Spouse; *Stay me with flaggons, comfort me with apples, for I am sick with love*: Wine to exhilarate, apples to refresh those spirits, which were, as it were, melted away, and wasted by an extreme out-let of Love. And for this reason the Object of our love is said to *overcome us*, and to *Burn the heart*, as with *Coals of Juniper*; and the like expressions of wounding and burning the Poet useth;

— — — *Est mollis flamma medullas
Interea, & tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.*

A welcome soft flame in her bones did rest,
And a close wound liv'd in her bleeding brest.

Now

ὡς τῶν
νεφρῶν ἔγω σὺν
δυσκοι τῶν
ὡς τῶν
ἐγὼ, &c.
Th: o. r: Idill. 2

Gen. 43.

1 Reg 3. 26.

2 Sam. 13.

Cant. 2. 5.

Canr. 6. 9.
& 8. 6.


Aenead.

Now the cause of this *Langor*, which love worketh, is in *Sensitive* Objects, and earnest desire to *enjoy* them; in *Spiritual* Objects, an earnest desire to *increase* them. In the former, Want kindleth love, but Fruition worketh wearinesse and satiety: In the other, Fruition increaseth love, and makes us the more greedy for those things which when we wanted, we did not desire. In earthly things the desire at a *distance* promiseth much pleasure, but taste & experience disappointeth expectation. In heavenly things, eating and drinking doth renew the *Appetite*, and the greater the experience the stronger the desire: as the more acquaintance *Moses* had with God, the more he did desire to see his glory. And so much may suffice for the first of the Passions, Love, which is the fountaine and foundation of all the rest.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Passion of Hatred, the Fundamentals Cause or Object thereof Evil, how far forth Evils are willed by God, may be declined by men: Of Gods secret and revealed Will.



The next in order is *Hatred*, of which the Schoole men make two kinds; an *Hatred of Abomination* or loathing; which consists in a pure aversion or flight of the Appetite from something apprehended as *Evil*, arising from a dissonancy and repugnancy between their Natures; and an *Hatred of enmity*, which is not a flying but rather a pursuing *Hatred*, and hath ever some *Love* joyned with it, namely a Love of any Evil which we desire may befall the person or thing which we hate.

I shal not distinctly handle these asunder, but shal observe the dignities and corruptions of the Passion in generall, as it implies a common *disconvenience*, and naturall *Unconformitie* between the Object and the Appetite.

The Object then of all *Hatred* is *Evil*; and all evil implying an opposition to Good, admits of so many severall respects as there are kinds of opposition.

And

A Treatise of the Passions

And there is first an *Evil of Contrariety*, such as is in the qualities of Water unto Fire, or a Wolfe unto a Sheep, occasioned by that *Destructive* Efficiency which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an *Evil of Privation*, which we hate formally and for it self, as implying nothing but a *Defect* and absence of *Good*.

Thirdly, an *Evil of Contradiction* in the *not being* of any creature, opposed to its being. For *being* and *Immortality* is that which *Aristotle* makes one of the principal objects of *Love*; Annihilation then, or not being is the chiefest Evil of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an *Evil of Relation*; for as things in their own simple natures *evil*, may have in them a *relative Goodness*, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security of men: So things in their absolute being *good*, may have in them a *relative or comparative evil*, and in that sense be by consequence hated; as our Saviour intimates, *He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me*; when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the Love of Christ, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the Law, if a mans dearest brother or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from God unto Idolatry, he was not to conceal, pity, or spare him, but his own hand was to be first upon him. And thus the Poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of

of *Aeneas* toward *Dido*, who being inflamed with Love of him, would have kept him from the expedition unto which by divine guidance he supposed himself to be directed.

— *Quanquam lenire dolorem
Solando cupit & dictis avertere curas,
(Multa gemoens magnoq; animum labefactus amore)
Fussa tamen Divum exequitur* —

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,
And on her pensive soul to breath some ease,
(Himself with mutual love made faint) yet still
His purposes were fixt t'obey Gods will.

So then we see what qualification is required in the object of a just *Hatred*, that it be evil, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature; and the Passion is ever then irregular when it declineth from this rule.

But here, in as much as it is evident that the being of some evil comes under the Will of God; (*Is there any Evil in a City and the Lord hath not done it*) and our Will is to be conformable unto his; it may seem that it ought to fall under our Will too, and by consequence to be rather loved than hated by us, since we pray for the fulfilling of Gods Will.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those *Evils* which he thus *willeth*, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe how

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for the Will of God is to be the rule of our will; whence will arise the clear apprehension of that truth which is now set down, that the unalterable *Object* of mans *Hatred* is all manner of *Evil*, not only that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and misery.

First then for the Will of God, we may boldly say what himself hath sworn, that he will not the death or destruction of a sinner; and by consequence neither any other evil of his Creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy: he is not delighted in the ruine, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groans of any thing which himself created: But he is said to will those Evils as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious *Power* over all the *Creatures*, and of his glorious *Justice* on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left onely to the Wisdom of God himself to know and ordain the best means for glorifying of himself in and by his creatures, we are not hence to assume any warrant for willing evil unto ourselves or others, but then onely when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the Apostle did conditionally wish evil unto himself, if thereby the glory of Gods mercy towards his Country-men the Jews might be the more advanced.

Secondly, It is no good Argument, *God will it* the inflicting of such an *evil*, therefore it is unlawful for my will to decline it: For first the Will of God, whereby he determineth to work this

this or that evil on particular Subjects, is a part of his *secret Counsel*. Now the *Revealed*, and not the *Hidden Will* of God is the rule of our Wills and Actions: Whence it cometh to pass, that it is made a part of our necessary obedience unto God in our wishes or averfations to go a cross way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure in my sick bed it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken; yet for me herein to second the Will of God by an execution thereof upon my self, or by a neglect of those ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his Mercy, that I might fulfill his Will. Peradventure in my flight a sword will overtake me, yet I have the warrant of my Saviours example and precept to turn my back rather than my conscience in persecution; always reserved, that though I will that which God willeth, yet my will be ever *subordinated* unto his. We owe *submission* to the *will* of Gods *Purpose* and Counsel, and we owe *conformity* to the *will* of his *Precept* and Command; we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to work himself, and we must conform to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore

Secondly, Though the Will of God were in this case known, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it be to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the Wisdom and Purpose of God hath made inevitable; for as the promises and de-

crees of Good things from God do not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our prophane-ness in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidable-ness of a future evil (as death intended upon us by God) put any necessity on our nature to deny it self, or to love its own distresses.

Of which that we may be the more sure, we may observe it in him, who as he was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same natural inclinations and aversations with us; so was he of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him, yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the Scripture saith, was by the *hand and Counsel of God before determined*.) a seeming Reluctancy and withdrawing from the Divine Decree. He knew it was not his Fathers Will; and yet, *Father, if thou be willing, let this cup pass from me*: he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an *Oportet*, a necessity upon it, and yet a second and a third time again, *Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me*. Consider it as the *Destruction* of his Temple, and *Anguish* of Nature, which he could (not being in all things like unto us) but love; and then *Transseat*, let it pass: but consider it as the *necessary means* of procuring precious blessings for mankind, and of fulfilling the eternal Decree of his Fathers Love, and then, *Not as I, but as thou wilt*.

The same may be applied in any manner of humane

mane evils, notwithstanding we are with an armed *patience* to sustain them, or with an obedient *submission* unto Divine pleasure to wait for them; yet in regard of that *pressure* of nature, which they bring with them (on which the God of nature hath imprinted a natural desire of its own quiet and integrity) so far forth all *Evill*, not onely may, but must be hated by every Regular Will, upon pain of violating the Law of its Creation.

And indeed, in all this there is not any deviation from the *Will* of God, intending that which we abhor: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himself, or any good thing of his own making; so neither doth it stand with the goodness of God to hate his Creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but onely in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousness, whereunto he in the dispensation of his Wisdom and Justice hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the Wisdom of God in this ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertain those natural desires of a straightned minde after deliverance from those evils, were to be in *Solomons* phrase too *Righteous*, and out of a purpose to answer the ends of Gods Wisdom, to cross the Law of his Creation.

So then it is evident that the *Object* and *fundamental cause* of *Hatred*, is all and only *Evil*: which (however in respect of the *Existence* of it, it be

in some cases *good*; for as it is in the *power* of *God* to bring out of confusion order, light out of darkness, his own honour out of mans shame; so is it his *providence* likewise to turn unto the great good of many men those things which in themselves do only hurt them.) Yet I say, this notwithstanding as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created Law and in-bred love, which each thing beareth to its own perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated.

As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of God, blessings, as health, peace, prosperity, good success, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should be moderated, occasions of much evil and dangers; so that their Table is become their snare, (as the experience of those later Roman Ages proveth, wherein their victories over men had made them in luxurie and vileness so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt war with God.) Notwithstanding I say all this; yet for as much as these things are such as do quiet, satisfie, and bear convenience unto mans nature, they are therefore justly with thankfulness by our selves received, and out of love desired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the Object or general fundamental cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which do arise from it.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other Causes of Hatred, Secret Antipathy, Difficulty of procuring a Good commanded, Injury, base Fears, Disparity of Desires, a fixed jealous Fancy.

THE first which I shall note, is a secret and hidden Antipathy which is in the natures of some things one against another. As Vultures are killed with sweet smells, and Horse-flies with ointments; the Locust will die at the sight of the Polypus, and the Serpent will rather flye into the fire, then come near the boughes of a wilde Ash: Some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some Creatures mingle together; the feathers of the Eagle will not mix with the feathers of others Fowles. So *Homer* noteth of the Lyon, that he feareth fire; and the Elephant maulcates his meat, if a Mouse have touched it. A world more of particulars there are which Naturalists have observed of this kinde: from which natural Antipathy it cometh, that things which never before saw that which is contrary to them, do at the very first sight flye from it, as from an enemy to their nature, nor will they ever be brought by discipline to trust one another.

Arist. Hist. Anim. l. 9. c. 44. See Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 8. c. 49. l. 10. l. 9. c. 62. l. 10. c. 37. 74. l. 16. c. 13. l. 20. in proem. l. 22. c. 20. l. 24. c. 1. Ælia: 2 de Animal. l. 3. c. 7. l. 4. c. 5. l. 5. c. 48. 50. l. 6. c. 22. 45. 46. Plutarch. Symp. l. 2. 47.

Plutarch. de Odio & Invid

Iliad λ. 22.

— Οὐκ ἔστι λήϊος καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὄρνια πρῶτα
 Οὐδὲ λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες ὁμόφρονα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν
 Ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ φρονέουσιν διαμπερές ἀμύλοισιν.

*Lions with men will ne're make faithful truce,
 Nor can you any way the Wolfe induce
 To love the Lamb; they study with fixt hate,
 The one the other how to violate.*

And the like kind of strange *Hatred* we may sometimes finde amongst men; one mans disposition so much disagreeing from anothers, that though there never passed any injuries or occasions of difference between them, yet they cannot but have minds averse from one another; which the Epigrammatist hath wittily expressed.

Martiall.

*Non amo te Sabidi, nec possum dicere quare,
 Hoc tantum possum dicere, Non amo te.*

I love thee not, yet cannot say for what;
 This onely I can say, I love thee not.

Another cause working *Hatred* of a thing in the mindes of men, is the *difficulty* and conceited impossibility of obtaining it, if it be a good thing which we either do or ought to desire; which the Casuists call *Acedia*, being a grief of the appetite looking on a *Difficult Good*, as if it were evil because difficult; from whence ariseth a

Torpor

a Torpor and Supine neglect of all the meanes which might help us to it. Thus wicked and resolved sinners conceiving happines as unacquirable by them, do grow to the hating of it, to entertaine rancorous affections against those which perswade them to seek it, to envy and maligne all such as they find carefull to obtaine it; to proceed unto licentious resolutions of rejecting all hopes or thoughts of it, and to divert their minds towards such more obvious and easie delight, as will be gotten with less labour; thus *Difficulty* rendereth *good things* *hatefull*; as *Israel* in the wilderness despised the pleasant Land, because there were sons of *Anak* in it.

Vid. Arist. Ethic lib. 9. c. 4.

And this is one great cause of the different affections of men toward severall courses of life; one man being of dull and sluggish apprehensions hateth Learning, another by nature quick, and of noble intellectualls, wholly applyeth himself unto it: the *difficulty* perswading the one to *despise* the *goodness*, and the *goodness* inducing the other to *conquer* the *difficulties* of it: so one man looking unto the *pain* of a vertuous life, contemnes the *reward*; and another looking unto the *Reward* endures the *pain*. And we shall usually find it true, that either *Laziness*, fearing disappointment, or *Love* being disappointed and meeting with difficulties which it cannot conquer, doth both beget a kind of Hatred and dislike of that which did either *deterre* them from seeking it, or *deceive* them when they sought it. As she, who while there was any Hope, did sollicite *A-*

R

neas

Æneid. 4.

Arist. politic.
lib. 7. c. 7.
Frater no pri-
mi maderunt
sanguine muri.
Lucan: l. 1.

Plutarch. de
amore frat.

Eurip. Medea

neas with her teares and importunities, when he was quite gone, did follow him with her imprecations.

There is no *Malice* growes ranker then that which ariseth out of the corruption of Love; as no darkness is more formidable then that of an Eclipse, which assaults the very vessels of Light, nor any taste more unsavory then of sweet things when they are corrupted. The more naturall the *Union*, the more impossible the *Re-union*. Things joyned with them, being broken asunder may be glewed again; but if a mans Arm be broken off, it can never be joyned on again: So those hatreds are most incurable, which arise out of the greatest and most naturall Love.

δεινὴ ὡς ὀργή, δυσίατος πέλει,
ὅταν φίλοι φίλοισι συμβάλωσ' ἔριν.

When Love of friends is turn'd to wrath, be sure
That wrath is deep, and scarce admits a Cure.

Another very usuall, but most evill cause of *Hatred* is *Injurie*, when a man because he hath done another wrong, doth from thence resolve to Hate him. Too many examples whereof there are in Writings both sacred and prophane: *Iosephs* Mistress first wronged him in assaulting his chastity, and then *Hated* him, and caused him to be cast into prison. *Amnon* first abused his sister *Tamar*, and then *hated* her worse then before he loved her. *Phadæa* having solicited *Hippolitus* her

her husbands son unto incest; being denied, did after accuse him to his father, and procure his ruine. And *Aristotle* proposeth it as a probleme, Why they who corrupt and violate the chastity of a y, do after hate them? and gives this reason of it, because they ever after look on them, as guilty of that shame and sadnesse, which in the sinne they contracted. This cause of Hatred *Seneca* and *Tacitus* have both observed as a thing usuall with proud and insolent men, first to hurt then to hate.

And the reason is first, because injury is the way to make a man, who is wronged, an enemy; and the proper affection which respecteth an Enemy is Hatred. Again, he who is wronged, if equall or above him that hath done the wrong, is then feared: and *Oderunt quos metuunt*, it is usuall to hate those whom we feare: if inferiour, yet the memory and sight of him doth upbraid with guilt, and affect with an unwilling and unwelcome review of the sinne, whereby he was wronged; and Pride scorns reproof, and loves not to be under him in Guilt, whom it over-tops in Power: for Innocence doth alwaies give a kind of superiority unto the person that is wronged; besides Hatred is a kind of Apology for wrong. For if a man can perswade him to hate him whom he hath injured, hee will begin to believe that he deserved the injury which was offered unto him; every man being naturally willing to find the first inducement un:o his sinne, rather in another than himself.

Probl. Sest. 44
Sest. II.

Proprium hu-
mani ingenii
odisse quos læ-
serit. Tacit. vit.
Agri. & Senec.
de Ira. l. 2. c. 33

The next cause (which I shall observe) is Feare, I mean slavish Feare; for as Love excludeth Feare, so Feare begetteth Hatred; and it is ever scene, *Qui terribiles sunt, timent*, they that terrific others doe feare them, as well knowing that they are themselves hated: for as *Aristotle* speaketh, *Nemo quem metuit, amat*, no man loves him whom he feares: which is the same with that of Saint *Iohn*, *Love casteth out Feare*: not a Reverend, submissive, awfull feare; not a cautelous, vigilant and obedient feare; not a feare of *Admiration*, nor a feare of *Subjection*; but a feare of *slavery* and of *Rebellion*, all flashes of horror, all the tossings and shipwracks of a torn mind, all the tremblings of a tormented spirit; briefly, all evill and hurtfull feare. And this I believe is one principall reason of that malice and contempt of Godlines, which shewes it selfe in the lives of Atheisticall and desperately wicked men, which as it ariseth out of the corruption of nature so is it marvelously enraged by the fearefull expectation of that fiery vengeance which their pale and guilty consciences do already preoccupate; for as their conscience dictates, that they deserve to be hated by God so their stubbornnesse and malice concludes that they will hate him again; *Let us eate and drink for to morrow we shall dye.*

There may be a double root of this feare, outward and inward. The outward is the cruelty and oppression which we suffer from the Potent, and thereupon the less avoidable malice of the person hated: (as it was the speech of *Caligula*, *Oderint*

rint dum metuant.) And herein our Aversation (if it observe that generall rule of goodness in passions subordination to reason and Piety) is not only allowable, but naturall, while it extends it selfe no further then the evill which we wrongfully suffer, For I cannot but think that the spittle and scourges, the thorns and buffets, the reed and knees of those mocking and blasphemous Jews were so many drops of that full Cup, which He, who knew no sinne, was so deeply desirous to have passe from him.

But the next, the *inward* root of Feare is the guilt and burthen of an uncleane and uncovered Conscience, for Pollution and weaknesse when it is naked, must needs bee fearfull. And therefore that inference of *Adam* had truth in it, *I was afraid because I was naked*: for having disrobed himselfe of Originall righteousness, he was thereupon afraid of the curse and summons of an offended justice. Now from this feare may arise a double hatred; an hatred of a mans own Conscience: for an evill man *ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν οὐδικῶς ἔχει*, as the Philosopher speaks, is not a friend unto himselfe, but flies and labours to run away from himselfe, and is never in so bad company, as when he is alone, because then hee keeps company with his owne Conscience.

Which is the reason why some mens hatred of themselves hath proceeded so far, as to make themselves the Instruments of that small measure of Annihilation, which they are capable of. Wherein notwithstanding they discover, how

*Ethic. lib. 9. c. 4.
δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔστι φίλος
ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἀποφεύγει
ἑαυτόν. ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν
οὐδικῶς ἔχει. Sch. last. in
Sophocl. & dip.
Tyr.*

far their fury should extend against themselves if they were as omnipotent to effect, as they are ready to desire it : for he that hates a thing would if he were able, pursue it even unto not being. There is no man but hath a naturall hatred of Toads, Serpents, Vipers, and the like venomous Creatures. And yet that man which hates them most, if his Conscience be naked and let loose to flye upon him, if that worm that never dyes (unlesse killed with our Saviours blood) begin thorowly to sting and gnawhim, would thinke himselfe a wise Merchant, if he could exchange beings with the worst of these. The Worme and Viper of conscience is of all the creatures the most ugly and hatefull. A wicked man when he doth distinctly know himself, doth love every thing, save God, better than himself.

(Juvenal,

— -- *Diri conscia facti.*

*Mens habet attonnitos & surdo verberare cedit,
Oculum quatiente animo tortore flagellum.*

The mind being conscious of some dire offence, Fills them with feares, a Torturer from thence Shakerth, and with redoubled blowes doth urge The unheard lashes of an hidden scourge.

Nor can I esteem this a corrupt, though it be a miserable passion; foras a bad man is to himself the worst, so is he by consequence the hatefullest of all Creatures.

The second *Hatred*, which may arise from that

Fear

Fear which is caused by a secret *guilt* of minde, is of all other most corrupt and rancorous, namely an hatred of the Au. hours or executioners of Justice; of the equity and justnesse of whose proceeding, we are from within convinced; such as is the malice and blasphemy of Malefactours against the Judge, and of Devils and damned men against God and his righteous judgements, which yet they cannot but acknowledge that they most worthily do cadure: for it is the nature of proud and stubborn creatures (as was before observed) *Odisse quos laferint*, first to wrong God and then to hate him.

Another particular cause of this passion may be a *Disparity* of affections and Desires: for notwithstanding there be many times *Hatred* where there is *Similitude* (as those beasts and birds commonly hate one another, which feed upon the same common meat, as the Philosopher observeth) and sundry men hate their own vices in others, as if they had not the trade of sinne enough to themselves, except they begot a Monopoly, and might ingross it; yet this ever proceeds from an apprehension of some ensuing inconveniences which are likely to follow there-from, as hath been formerly noted: So that in that very similitude of *Natures*, there is a disagreement of *ends*, each one respecting his owne private benefit.

Hist. Animal.

Now the *Corruptions* herein are to be attended according to the Nature of that *disparity* whereon the passion is grounded; which sometimes is

Morall.

Morall, wherein it is laudable to hate the vicious courses, in which any man differs from us, or we our selves from the right rule of life; so that the passion redound not from the quality to the person, nor break out into an endeavour of his disgrace and ruine, except it be in such a case when our own dignity or safety, which we are bound more to regard, being assaulted, is in danger to be betrayed, unless prevented by such a speedy remedy. Sometimes this *Disparity* may be in actions *Civill*, and with respect to society: and when as the opposition which hatred discovereth, may be principally seen in two things; *Opposition* of a mans *Hopes*, and of his *Parts* and abilities, by crossing the one, and undervaluing the other: so corruption may easily proceed from two violent and unreasonable grounds, *Ambition* and *Selflove* the one pursuing its hopes, the other reflecting upon its worth. And to this particular may be reduced, that *Hatred* which ariseth out of a *parity* of *Desire*, as amongst *Competitors* for the same dignity, or *Corrivalls* for the same Love, or Professors of the same Art, either by reason of *Covetousness*, or *Envy*, or *Ambition*, a greedy desire of their owne, or a discontented sight of anothers good.

Malem hic
primus esse,
quàm Roma se
cundus. Cæsar
de oppidulo
quodam dum
Alpes transiret
Plutarch.

*Nec quenquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem.
Pompeiusve, parem*——

Thus two great Rulers do each other hate,
Cæsar no Better brooks, *Pompey* no mate.

And

And these are very unfit affections for society, when private love of men to themselves shall devour the love which they owe unto their Country. More noble was the behaviour of *Themistocles* and *Aristides*, who when they were ever employed in the publike service of State, left all their private enmities in the borders of their own Country, and did not resume them till they returned, and became private men again.

Plutarch. de
gerund. Rep.

The last cause which I shall observe of *Hatred*, may be a *seised* and permanent *Intuition* of the object, a penetrating, jealous, and interpreting fancy: because by this means a redoubled search and review doth generate a kinde of habitual detestation; it being the nature of Evil commonly to shew worse at the second or third view. And that first, because the former Act doth work a prejudice, and thereby the after apprehension comes not naked, but with a fore-stalled resolution of finding Evil therein: and next, because from a serious and fastened search into the Object, the Faculty gaineth a greater acquaintance with it, and by consequence a more vehement dislike of it, the former knowledge being a master and light unto the later. But light and wandering fancies (though they may be more sudden in the apprehension of *Evill*, and by consequence liable to an oftner *Anger*, yet by reason of the volubility of the minde joyned with an infirmity and exercise of memory, they) are for this cause the lesse subject to deep and rooted hatred.

^a Zeph. 2. 14.
Esa. 34. 11, 14.

^b Mat. 18. 28.
^c Herod. l. de

Neura in Mel-
pom. Plin. l. 8
c. 22.

Virgil. Eclog.
Compon. Mela

de situ orbis l. 2.

Wierus de pra-
estig. demon. l. 3

cap. 21.

Aug. de Civ.
Dei l. 18. c. 17.

Olaus mag. de
Reg. Septentr.

lib. 18. cap. 45.
46. 47.

Luci. in Asino.
d Dan. 5. 21.

^e Cicer. de Ami-
cit. 4. lib. 4.

Is. u. 4. 1. 1. 1.

Suidas in Ti-
mor. Plutarch

in Alcibiade
4. Antonio.

Laert. in Timo-
ne Turneb. Ad-

versar lib. 24.
cap. 33.

^f Socr. l. 4. c. 18.
Theodoret. l. 4.

c. 25.

^g Rom. lib. 5.
cap. 22.

^h Aristot. polit.
lib. 1. cap. 1.

Unto this Head may be referred that *Hatred* which ariseth from excessive *Melancholy*, which maketh men sullen, morose, solitary, averse from all society, and Haters of the light, delighting only like the ^a Shreek-Owl, or the Bittern in desolate places, and ^b Monuments of the dead. This is that which is called ^c *λυκαθροπία*, when men fancy themselves transformed into Wolves and Dogs, and accordingly hate all Humane society. Which seemeth to have been the distemper of ^d *Nebuchadnezzar*, when he was thrust out from men, and did eat grass with the beasts. ^e *Timon* the Athenian was upon this ground branded with the name of *μισάνθρωπος*, the *Man-Hater*, because he kept company with no man, but only with *Alcibiades*, whereof he gave this only account, because he thought that man was born to do a great deal of mischief. And we read even in the ^f Histories of the Church, of men so marvellously averse from all converse or correspondence with men, that they have for their whole lives long, some of sixty, others of ninety years, immured themselves in Cels and silence, not affording to look on the faces of their nearest kindred, when they travelled far to visit them. So far can the opinion of the minde, actuated and furthered by the melancholy of the body, transport men even out of humane disposition, which the ^g Philosopher telleth us is naturally a lover of Society, and therefore he saith that such men are usually given to contention, the sign and the fruit of hatred.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the *Quality* and *Quantity* of *Hatred*,
and how in either respects, it is to be
regulated.



Proceed now unto the consideration of this Passion in the *Quantity* and *Quality* of its Acts; which must be observed according to the *evill* of the Object: for if that be *unchangeable*, there is required a continual *Permanency* of the Passion in regard of the disposition of the mind: or if it be *importunate* and assaulting, there is required a more frequent *repetition* of the Act. The same likewise is to be said of the *quality* of it; for if the evill be of an intense and more invincible nature, our Hatred must arm us the more; if more low and remiss, the Passion may be the more negligent.

Here then is a fourfold direction of the *Quantities* and *Qualities* of our Hatred, and it will hold proportion in the other passions. First, the unalterableness of the Evil, warrants the continuance of our hatred. Secondly, the Importunity and Insinuation of it, warrants the Reiteration of our hatred. Thirdly, and fourthly, the greatness and the Remission of it requires a proportionable intention and moderation of hatred.

We may instance for the three former in sin, so much the worst of Evils, by how much it is a remotion from the best of goods.

First, Then *Sin* is in its own formall and abstracted nature, *Unchangeable*, though not in respect of the subject, in whom it dwelleth; for a Creature now bad, may by the mercy of God be repaired and restored again; but this is not by a changing, but by a forsaking of Evill, by a removing of it, not by a new moulding it into another frame. Sin then remaineth in its own Nature unchangeable and always evill, and the reason is, because it is a Transgression of a *perpetual Law*, and a Remotion from an *unalterable Will*; Sin then is to be hated with a continual and peremptory hatred. But in other things there is according to the nature of their evils required a conditonal and more flexible dislike, they being evils that have, either some good annexed unto them; or such as are of a mutable nature. And therefore we see that in most things the variety of Circumstances doth alter the good or evill of them, and so makes the passions thereabout conversant alterable likewise. Otherwise men may naturally deprive themselves of those contents and advantages, which they might receive by seasonable use of such indifferent things as they formerly for inconveniences now removed, did dislike. And in *Morality* likewise much dammage might be inferred, both to private persons and to the publike by nourishing such private enmities, and being peremptory in continuing those former

mer differences, which, though haply then entertained upon reasonable grounds, may yet afterwards prove so much the more harmful, by how much the more danger is to be feared from the distemper of a grown and strong, than of a vanishing and lighter passion.

Secondly, Again, as no evil is altogether so unchangeable as *Sin*, so is there nothing so much to be opposed with a *Multiplicity* and Reiteration of our hatred in regard of its *importunity* and insinuation, that as there is an impudence in the assault, so there may be a proportionable resolution in the withstanding of it: Some *Evils* there may be, which require only a present and not a customary exercise of this passion. Present I say when the Object is offensive, and not customary; because as the Object so the Passion likewise may be unusual. Sin only is of all other evils the most urging and active, furnished with an infinite number of stratagems and plausible impostures to insinuate into natures (though best armed against such assaults;) and therefore here only are necessary such reiterated acts, as may keepe us ever on our guard, that wee be not unprepared for a surprize.

Thirdly, Then for the *Quantity* of an Evil, because that is not in any thing so *intense* as in *Sin*, whether wee consider it in its owne Nature, as a Rebellion against the highest good, or in its effects; either in regard of the diffusion of it, it being an overspreading pollution, or of the vastness of it, both in Guilt and Punishment: In

these respects our *Hatred* of it cannot be too deep or rooted: whereas other evils are not so intense in their nature, nor so diffusive in their extension, nor so destructive in their Consequents; and and therefore do not require an unlimited Passion, but one governed according to the Exigence of Circumstances.

And here I shall take notice of one, or two particulars touching the manner of corruption in this particular. As first, when a man shall apply his *Hatred of Prosecution*, or ill-willing against that Evil, which is the proper object only of *Aversion*: for some things there are only of conditional evils, which hurt not by their own absolute being, but by their particular use or presence, which being offensive only in their application, requires a particular forbearance, not any further violence to their natures.

Secondly, a Corruption in regard of Intention, is either when the passion admits not of any admixtion of Love, when yet the object admits of an admixtion of good; or when the hatred is absolute against onely relative Evils. There is not any man, betwixt whose natural faculties and some particular courses or objects, there is not some manner of antipathy and disproportion, (it being the Providence of divine dispensations so variously to frame and order mens fancies) as that no man shall have an Independance or self-sufficiency, nor say unto the other members, I have no need of you; but there should be such a mutual ministry and assistance amongst men, as whereby

whereby might be ever upheld those essential vertues of humane society, *Unity* and *Charity*, no man being able to live without the aid of others; nor to upbraid others with his own service. Now in this case, if any man who either out of the narrowness and incapacity, or out of the reluctancy and antipathy of his own mind, is indisposed for some courses of life or study, shall presently fall to a professed vilifying of them, or to an undervaluing of Persons, who with a more particular affection delight in them, or to a desire of the not being of them, as things utterly unuseful, because he sees not what use himself can have of them; he doth herein discover as much absurdity in so peremptory a dislike, as a blinde man should do in wishing the Sun put out, not considering that he himself receiveth benefit at the second hand from that very light, the beauty whereof he hath no immediate acquaintance withall.

For as too excessively to dote on the fancy of any particular thing, may prove harmful, as appeareth in the Poetical Fable of *Midas*, whose unsatiable desire to have every thing that he touch'd turned to gold, starved him with hunger; and so what he out of too excessive love made his Idol, became his ruine; (as many men need none other enemy to undo them than their own desires.) So on the other side, the extream *Hatred* of any thing may be equally inconvenient; as we see intimated in that other Fable of the servants, who when they had, out of an extream malice a-

gainst

gainst the poor Cock, at whose early crow their covetous master every day roused them unto their labour, killed him, and so (as they thought) gotten a good advantage to their laziness, were every day by the vigilancy of their master (whose Covetousness now began to crow earlier than his Cock) called from their sleep sooner than they were before; till at length they began to wish for that which the rashness and indiscretion of their hatred had made away. And therefore when we go about any thing out of the dictates of Passion, it is a great point of Wisdom, first, to consider whether we our selves may not afterwards be the first men, who shall with it undoe again.

C H A P.

CHAP. IX.

Of the good and evil Effects of Hatred.

Cantelousness and Wisdom to profit by that we Hate, with Confidence, Victory, Reformation Hatred is General against the whole kind, Cunning, Dissimulation, Cruelty, running over to Persons Innocent, violating Religion, Envie, Rejoycing at Evil. Crooked Suspicion. Contempt. Contumely



Now proceed to the Consequents or Effects of this Passion: And first, for the useful and profitable Effects thereof, which may be these:

First, A *Cantelousness* and fruitful *wisdom* for our own welfare, to prevent danger, and to reap benefit from that which is at enmity with us. For we shall observe in many evils, that no man is brought within the danger, who is not at first drawn into the love of them. All inordinate corruptions then most deperately wound the Soul, when they beguile and entangle it. But the greatest use of this *Cantion*, is to learn how to benefit by the *Hatred* of others; and as learned Physicians do, to make an Antidore of Poyson. For as many venomous

T

creatures

Quid de Contumacia observat Plutarch. lib. de sera numinis vindicta.

Venenum aliquando pro remedio fuit. Sen. de Benef. l. 2. c. 18.

Plutarch. de capiend. ex hostibus utilit. C. xl. Rodig. Ant. q. l. 2. l. 5. cap. 17.

Flo us, lib. 2.

1 Sam. 13. 20.

creatures are by Art used to cure the wounds, and repair the injuries which themselves had made (Natural Attraction, as it were calling home that poison which injury and violence had misplaced :) so the malice and venome of an enemy may by wisdom be converted into a Medicine, and by managing, become a benefit, which was by him intended for an injury. Or to use the excellent Similitude of *Plutarch*: As healthy and strong Beasts do eat and concoct Serpents, whereas weak stomachs do nauseate at Delicates: so wise men do exceedingly profit by the hatred of their enemies, whereas fools are corrupted with the love of their friends; and an *injury* doth one man more good then a *courtesie* doth another. As Winde and Thunder when they trouble the Air do withall purge it; whereas a long Calm doth dispose it to putrification: or as the same Whetstone that takes away from a weapon, doth likewise sharpen it; so a wise man can make use of the detraction of an enemy, to grow the brighter and the better by it. And therefore when *Cato* advised that *Carthage* should be utterly destroyed, *Scipio Nasica* perswaded the contrary upon these reasons, That it was needfull for *Rome* to have alwayes some enemies, which by a kinde of *Antiperistasis* might strengthen and keep alive its vertue, which otherwise by security might be in danger of languishing, and degenerate into luxury. For as the Israelites, when there was no Smith among them, did sharpen their instruments with the Philistines; so indeed an enemy doth

doth serve to quicken and put an edge upon those vertues, which by lying unexercised might contract rust and du'ness; and many times, when the reasons of the thing it self, will not perswade, the giving advantage to an enemy, or of gratifying him, will over-rule a man, lest hereby he give his foes matter of insultation.

Hoc Ithacus velit & magno mercentur Atrida.

*This make our foes rejoyce : they would have bought
With a great price those crimes we do for nought.*

Thus as a Sink by an house, makes all the house the cleaner, because the *Sordes* are cast into that : Or as they observe that Roses and Violets are sweetest, which grow near unto Garlick and other strong sented Herbs, because these draw away any fetid or obnoxious nourishment: so the eye and neerness of an enemy serveth by exciting *Caution* and diligence, to make a mans life more fruitfull and orderly then otherwise it would have been, that we may take away occasion from them that would speak reproachfully. And thus *Hector* sharply reproving the cowardice of his brother *Paris* (who had been the onely cause of the War and Calamity) when he fled from *Menelaus*, draweth his rebuke from hence, and telleth him that he was.

Πατρί μὲν τιμήα πολέων τε παντί τε δόμον
Δυσμενέων μὲν χερσίν,

Iliad. 7. 51.

To father, City, People, loss and blame;
Joy to his foes, and to himself a shame.

Rhetor. l. 2 c. 4:

Secondly, Hatred worketh *Confidence* and some Presumption and good assurance of our own, or some assisting strength against evils. Which ariseth first out of the former: for *cautelousness* or Furniture against the onset of evil, cannot but make the minde more resolute in its own defence, then if it were left naked without assistance. Again, of all others, this is one of the most confident *Passions*, because it moves not out of sudden perturbations, but is usually seconded and backt with reason, as Philosophers observe; and ever the more *Counsel*, the more *confidence*. Besides, being a deep and severe Passion, it proportionably calleth out the more strength to execute its purposes. There is no Passion that intendeth so much evil to another, as *Hatred*: *Anger*, would onely bring *Trouble*; but *Hatred*, *Mischief*: *Anger* would onely *punish* and retaliate, but *Hatred* would *destroy*: for as the Philosopher notes, it seeketh the *not being* of what it *hates*. A man may be *angry* with his Friend, but he *hates* none but an Enemy; and no man can *will* so much hurt to his Friend, as to his Enemy. Now the more hurt a Passion doth intend, the more strength it must call out to execute that intention; and ever the more strength, the more confidence.

Thirdly, it worketh some manner of *Victory* over the evil hated: For, *Oanim semper sequitur ex animi*

animi elatione, as Scaliger out of Aristotle hath observed, it ever ariseth out of pride and heighth of minde, *κατὰ χείρ διόρται ὑβρίζοντες*, injury ever comes from some strength, and is a kinde of Victory. For so far forth as one is able to hurt another, he is above him. And this effect holds principally true in mortal and practick courses; wherein I think it is a generall Rule. He in some measure loves an evil, who is overcome by it: for conquest in this nature is on the will, which never chuseth an object till it love it. There onely we can have perfect conquest of sin, where will be a perfect hatred of it. Here, in the best, there is but an incomplete restoration of Gods Image: the body of nature and the body of sin are born, and must die together.

Fourthly, it hath a good effect in regard of the evil hated in Reasonable creatures, namely, the reformation of the person in whom the evil was. For as countenance and encouragement is the fosterer, so hatred and contempt serveth sometimes as Physick to purge out an evil. And the reason is, because a great part of that goodness, which is apprehended to be in sin, by those that pursue it, is other mens approbation. Opinion puts value upon many uncurrant Coins, which passe rather because they are received, then because they are warrantable. And therefore if a man naturally desirous of Credit, see his courses generally disliked, he can hardly so unnature himself, as still to feed on those vanities which he seeth do provoke others unto loathing; though I confesse,

fesse, it is not a perswasion of mens, but of Gods hatred of sin, which doth work a genuine and thorow Reformation.

I now proceed to observe those Effects, which are corrupt and hurtfull : and here we may observe.

First the Rule of *Aristotle*, whose maxime it is, that *Hatred* is alwayes *ὑπὸς τὴν γὰρ* against the whole kind of its object : so then all the actions and effects of this Passion are corrupt, which are not general, but admit of private Reservations and Indulgences. For since the nature and extent of the Passion is ever considered with reference to its object, there must needs be irregularity in that affection, when it is conversant about an uniform nature with a various and differing motion. And this is manifestly true in that, which I made the principal object of a right hatred, *Sin*. In which, though there is no man which findes not himself more obnoxious and open to one kinde then another (it being the long experienced policy of the Devil to observe the divers conditions of mens Natures, Constitutions, Callings, and Employments; and from them to proportion the quality of his insinuations upon the will) insomuch that a man may herein haply deceive himself with an opinion of loathing some evils, with which, either his other occasions suffer him not to take acquaintance, or the difficulty in compassing disgrace in practising, or other prejudices perswade to a casual dislike thereof; yet I say it is certain, that if a mans hatred of *Sin* be

not *ὁπὸς τοῦ γένους* an *Universal* and transcendent Hatred against all sin, even those which his personal relations make more proper unto him, if he doth still retain some privy exceptions, some reserved and covered delights, be his pretences to others, or his persuasions to himself what they will; this is rather a personated, then a true hatred, a meteor of the brain, then an affection of the Soul. For as in good, so in the ill of things, notwithstanding there seem to be many contrarieties and dissimilitudes (as *Seneca* saith) *Scelera dissident*, that sins do disagree; yet indeed there is in that very Contrariety such an Agreement against God, (as in *Herod & Pilate* against *Christ*) as admits not of any, in order unto God, but a gathered and united Passion. And hence is that of *St. James*, *He that offendeth in one, is guilty of all*; because in that one, he contemneth that Original Authority which forbad all. There are no terms of consistence between Love and Hatred divided upon the same uniform Object. It is not the material and blinde performance of some good work, or a servile and constrained obedience to the more bright and convicting parts of the Law, that can any more argue either our true love to the precept, or our hatred to the Sin, then a voluntary patience under the hand of a Chirurgeon can prove, either that we delight in our own pain, or abhor our own flesh. It is not Gods Witness within us, but his Word without us; not the tyranny of conscience, but the goodness of the Law, that doth kindly and genuinely

Plutarch Apr.
theg. Lacon.

genuinely restrain the violence, and stop the eruptions of our defiled nature. Or though perhaps Fear may prevent the exercise and sproutings, nothing but Love can pluck up the root of sin. A *Lacedemonian* endeavouring to make a dead carcass stand upright as formerly it had done while it was alive, and not effecting it, concluded that outward means would avail little, except there were something within to support it. It is certainly so in Actions as it is in Bodies: *Fear*, as an outward prop, may help a while to keep them up; but *Love* is the inward form and life of them, without which they will quickly faint and fall again.

Vide Senec.
Epist. 103.

Secondly, Another evil effect of Hatred, is a close and cunning *Disimulation* in suppressing of it, and palliating it with pretences of fairness and plausibility, till it have a full advantage to put forth it self. For by this means is the passion strengthened, and the person whom it respects, weakened: this by incantelousness and *Credulity*; (for common Charity, when it sees no signes of malice, will not easily suspect it) that by restraint and suppression; for any thing, the more united, the more weighty it is: and as Winde, so Passions, the closer is pent, the more strength it gathereth. *Plutarch* compareth it unto fire raked under ashes, and reserved until another day, when we have some use of it. Which dispositon the Historian hath often observed in *Tiberius* (whose principal verue was *Disimulation*) who being offended in the Senate with some words

words spoken by *Haterius* and *Scamrus*; the Historians observation upon it is this: *In Hatevium statim inuectus, Scamrum, cui implacabilis irascebatur, silentio tramisit.* The one he rebuked; but the other, whom he more implacably hated, he passed by with silence. And elsewhere upon a like occasion, *Qua in presens civiliter habuit, sed in animo revolvente iras, etiamsi impetus affectionis languerat, memoria valebat.* Though he seemed to take what was spoken, curteously; yet he laid it up in his minde: And though the heat of Passion by being suppressed, did languish, the memory and grudge remained strong still. In which words, the Historian hath expressed that excellent description of the same quality in *Homer.*

Κρείσσον ᾧ βασιλεὺς ὅτε χόσται ἀνδρὶ χροῖς,
ἔπειρ ᾧ τε χλοῖα καὶ ἀντήμα καταπίη.
Ἀλλὰ ᾧ καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κόπον ὄφρα πλέσῃ
ἐν στήθεσιν ἔοισιν.

Low men with a Kings wrath are quite opprest:
For though he seem the same day to digest
The heat of's passion; yet he still reserves
Close Anger in his brest, till fit time serves.

Whereunto agreeth that of the Tragœdian.

Ira qua tegitur, nocet.
Profecta perdunt odia vindicta locum.

Tac. Annal. l. i.

Annal. l. 4.
Statuit reponere
odium donec im-
petus fame &
favor exercitus
langueret. De
Domitian. in
vita. Agric.

Iliad. χ. 81.
Diog. Laert. l. 7:
Μῆνις ὀργῆς
καί τοι.
Δὴνὰ τεχνῶν
ἀνθρώπων.

Senec. Traged
Medea.

Anger that's hid, gives surer blowes ;
But profest hate doth revenge lose.

And therefore *Hannibal* was wont to say, that he was more afraid of *Fabius* when he did nothing, then of *Marcellus* when he did fight ; of the one mans closeness, then of the others boldness.

And the reason why of all the Passions this of *Hatred* can thus smother and suppress it self, is, because it doth not affect the heart with trouble or sadness (which Affection the soul loves not long to hold fast) but with a perverse joy and delight in pondering the contrivances of *Revenge* (which the Philosopher and the Poet have placed among the Objects of Delight.)

Now of all the ways whereby this Passion is suppressed, the most hateful to God and man is, when men do palliate and shrowd their malice under pretences of Love, and praise men unto ruine. Like the Panthar, which with his sweet breath allureth other Creatures to come unto him, and when they are come, devoureth them. *Pessimum inimicorum genus laudantes*, of all kinde of Enemies those are the worst, which as the Prophet speaks, do break mens heads with oil, and make a poison of their own meries to kill them with praises, as *Achilles* spake in the Poet.

Aristot. de Ju-
venal.
Vindicta malum
quo non jucun-
dum ullum.

Ælian. de Ani-
mal. l. 5. c. 40.

Tacit. vit. Agri.
Ἐχθρῶν αἰδω-
εἶ δὲ ἐγὼ καὶ ἐν
ὀνήστια. Scyth.
in Ajac.

Iliad. 313.
Salust. in Catil.

Ἐχθρὸς δὲ μοι αἶνέῃ ὁμῶς αἰδῶ πύλῃσιν

Ὅς καὶ ἔτερον μὴν κεύθεῖ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν αἰδῶ δὲ βαλῆαι.

That

*That man's as odious to me as hell gates,
Who with his mouth speaks fair, with his heart hates*

And it was wicked counsel which *Theognis* gave to his *Cyrnus*, amongst so many sage and moral precepts, like a dead flye in a pot of ointment.

Εὐκώπλεε ἢ ἔχθρὸν ὅταν δ' ὑποχίρειτο ἔλδῃ,
κτεῖλαι νιν, πείρασιν μηδ' ἑμὴν δέμνῃτο.

*Fawn on thy Fo, till he be in thy will,
Then, without Reasons, give revenge her fill.*

It is a quality of all others most distant from nobleness and ingenuity of minde; for generous spirits will acknowledge with honour and love the vertues of their enemies; as *Fabritius Lucinus*, when many were Competitors for the Consulship, gave his suffrage to *Cornelius Ruffinus*, the worthiest of the Company, though he were his bitter enemy: and *Cesar* caused the demolished statues of *Pompey* to be erected again, not suffering the honor of so brave a Commander (though his enemy) to bleed and languish under his eye. Whereupon *Cicero* told him, that in restoring the statues of *Pompey*, he had fastned and made sure his own. And *Publius Scipio* made none other use of his enmity with *Tiberius Graccus*, then to dispose his Daughter to him in Marriage, because at that time when he was sure to judge with least favour and partiality, he found him to be a

Ἐχθρὸς δ' ἄνθρωπος ἀλλὰ γενναῖος.
Soph. ib.
A. Gellius, l. 4. c. 8.

Plutarch. Jac. apud ex his-
tus unil.
Homer Il. 18.
Ὀδυσσεύς ἄνθρωπος γενναῖος.
Theogn.
ἐν τῇ πόλει.

Aul. Gell. l. 12 cap. 8.
Liv. lib. 38.

Elms Spartian.
in Hadrian.

* μῦθος ὀνδύ-
μιζ ἢ χαλῶς
εἶναι πνι μέλα
περὶ τινὸς
καὶ ἀδελφῶν
Diog. Laert. l. 7.
* Clem. Alex.
Padag. l. 1 c. 8.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. l. 5.
C. l. 1.

Iliad. χ. 346.

Sueton. Tit. er.
c. 19.

vertuous and deserving man. And the Emperour *Adrian*, to shew that he esteemed *Hatred*, retained a base and unprincely disposition, as soon as he came to the Empire, he laid aside all his former enmities, inſomuch, as then meeting one who had been his capital enemy, he ſaid unto him, *Evaſiſti*, thou art now eſcaped from my diſpleaſure.

Thirdly, Another evil effect of Hatred is *Cruelty*, for it * ſeeketh (as I noted out of the Philoſopher) the *Not-being* of that which it hates: and therefore among the Egyptians, a * fiſh was the Hieroglyphick of Hatred, becauſe of all creatures, they do moſt devour one another. And thus *Achilles* in the Poet expreſſeth his hatred of *Heſtor*, when he beſought him to beſtow upon his dead body an honourable burial.

Ἄς ὃς πῶς αὐτὸν με μόνον καὶ τοὺς ἀνείν
οἷα' ἀποταμνόμενον χυτὰς ἐδμεναι.

I would my mind would give me leave to gnaw
Thy fleſh in morſels, and to eat it raw.

And the like expreſſions we find of the cruelty
of *Tiberius*, a man full of rancour.

*Fastidit vinum, quia jam ſitit iſte Cruorem,
Tam bibit hunc auidè, quam bibit antè mernm.*

He loaths all wine for blood, and now with more
Greedy delight drinks this then that before.

Hatred

Hatred contenteth not it self with the death of an Enemy, but is many times prodigious in the manner of it, and after out-lives that which it hateth, insulting with pride and indignities over the dead body which cannot complain, nor otherwise, but by its own loathsomeness, revenge it self. *Caligula*, that monster of men, when he commanded any to be slain, gave this charge with it, *ita feri ut se mori sentiat*, that he should perish with such lingering blows, as that he might feel himself to die. And he often commanded aged men to stand by and look upon the slaughter of their children, and after would force them unto mirth and feasting, for fear of their others which were left alive: for, to have mourned for one, would have forfeited the others. And for indignities offered unto dead bodies, there is nothing which more frequently occurreth. The Philistims cut off the head of *Saul*, and sent it in Triumph up and down their Country. And the Historian notes of *Otho*, that he never looked with more insatiable delight upon any spectacle, then the head of *Piso* his enemy. So when the Grecians saw the dead body of *Hector*, every man (as the Poet describes it) did bestow a stab and a contempt upon it. But above all, most hateful was the cruelty of *Marc. Antonius* and his wife *Fulvia*, shewed on the dead body of *Cicero* the glory of the Roman eloquence: they cut off his head and his hands, setting them, in contempt, where he was wont to deliver those excellent Orations; from whence they took it to their Table, and

Ful-

Seneca de Calig.
lib. in Liber.
cap. 61.

ib. in Calig.

Seneca de Ira.
lib. 2. cap. 33.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅταν, εἰ
θάνατος καταπύει
τὸν ἐχθρὸν καὶ
ἐὰν μιστὸν κυ-
ρῇ. Soph. Ajax.
Tacit. h. p. l. 1.

Capita hostium
in conio præfigi
solita Apud
Jult. lib. 14
Virg. Aeneid.
Ἐχέειν δὲ νεκρῶς
θυσίων ἀνέρι
ἐχθρῶς, &c.
Eurip.
Hercul. furens.

*Pet. Crinit. l. 1.
c. 8.*

*Plutarch. in
Cicerone.*

*Sext. Titius
quod habuit
imaginem L.
Saturnini domi
sue condemna-
tus. Cic. pro
Rabinio.*

*Tacit. Annal.
lib 3, 6.*

*Suet. Tib. c. 61.
Annal. l. 15.
Plutarch. de
cap ex host util.
Q. Curt. l. 7.*

*Plutarch. de A-
dulat. & Amic.
Pluta. ch. in
Aristid.*

Fulvia cursing it, and Spitting upon it, pulled out the tongue (which all ages have admired) out of the mouth, and picked it full of holes with her needle or bodkin; to shew that malice would ever do mischief to a man in his noblest and highest treasure: as we have in that desperate Italian, who having his enemy in his mercy, first made him (in hope to escape) to renounce his Religion and Salvation, and then presently slew him; that, as far as was in his power, he might kill his soul as well as his body,

But yet further; *Hatred* doth not content it self to be *Cruel* to the person hated, but runneth over from him unto others that have any relation to him, though never so innocent: As we see in *Haman*, who though only displeased with the neglect of *Mordecai*, thought scorn to lay hands on him alone, and therefore plotted the ruine of all the Jews. And it is noted by Historians, that when *Sejanus* fell, the storm lighted on his Family and Friends, as well as on himself: as is also observed in the punishment of the Conspiracy against *Nero*, detected by *Millichus*. And *Themistocles* (though innocent) was like to have suffered in a crimination of Treason, onely for being a friend unto *Pausanias*. Yea, so overflowing is this Quality, that it will sometimes strike a friend, rather then not reach an enemy. It was a wicked profession of *Darius*, *Pereat cum inimico amicus*, Let my friend rather perish with mine enemy, then mine enemy escape by my friend. And hence it is observed of *Aristides*, that he was wont to propose

pose such advises as he knew did conduce unto publick weal, by some other men, and not from himself, lest *Themistocles*, out of hatred of his person, should have withstood and impeded a general good. But *Ajax* in the Poet went yet higher.

Ἐχθρὸν ὀλέσσει ———
τελὸς δάνομαι κ' αὐτῷ.

Sophoc in Ajax.

*So I may slay mine Enemy,
Let the same ruine swallow me.*

And the principal reasons of this overflowing of *Hatred*, are *Fear* and *Cowardice*: for he who hateth the Father, and sheweth cruelty unto him, doth usually fear the Son, lest he rise up in his Father's quarrel: And hence is that Maxime of cruel policy,

Forsan futurum
ultor extincti
patris. Sen.
Troas.

Νήπιόν δὲ πατέρα κτείνων, ταῖδας κατακτείνει.

*That man's unwise, who doth the Father slay,
And leaves the Sons, his quarrel to repay.*

*Stasianus apud
Clem. Alex.
Strom. 6.
Hom. Odys. γ.
307.
Odium etiam
timor spirat.
Tert. Apol. c. 26.
Ulcus animi ex
molestie nostri
consuetum
Am. Marcol. 27.
Cy. Arist. Rhet.
lib. 2.*

For we know *Orestes* revenged his Fathers quarrel and blood upon *Aegisthus*.

And besides, *Cruelty* doth usually proceed from *Cowardice*, as *Amianus Marcellinus* hath observed; and fearful men, when they have any advantage to be cruel, do seldom hold any measure therein, as being ever in doubt, if they leave
any

Senec. de Ira,
lib. x. c. 13.

Maxime morti-
feri esse solent
morsus morien-
tium bestiarum.
Florus, l. 2 c. 15

Suet. Tiber. c. 61

Tacit. Annal.
l. 5.

Pet. Crinit. l. 7.
c. 13.

any fire unquenched, that themselves shall be burned with it. And therefore we never read of any Emperours which were more cruel, then those who were most fearful and effeminate; as *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Nero*, *Commodus*, &c. As they say, that wounded beasts, when they dye, bite hardest; their fear and despair making them furious: So there is no Wrath or Cruelty to that which proceeds from *Weakness*, when it hath either jealousy, or advantage, or despair, to set it on. Yea, so violent it is, that it hath transported men unto *prophaneness*, and made them violate Nature and Religion. As we see in the cruelty of *Tiberius* toward the family of *Sejanus*, who because it was an unheard and prodigious thing for a little tender Virgin to be strangled, gave command that the daughter of that late Favourite, should first be deflowred, that so she might be the fitter to be slain. And *Boniface* the eighth Pope of that name, being, according to the Ceremony of that Church, on Ashwednesday to sprinkle ashes on the heads of such Bishops as kneeled at his feet, and in some serious manner to minde them of their mortalities; when *Prochetus* Bishop of *Geneva*, whom he bitterly hated, tendered himself at his feet to receive this Ceremony, he threw the ashes in his eyes, with this benediction, *A Gibelline thou art, and as a Gibelline thou shalt die*: so powerful was his malice, to prophane the rites of his Religion! Yea, so far will hatred proceed in this desperate contempt of God, that, if we may believe so prodigious a vil-
lany

lany, it hath sometimes turned the very cup of the Lord into a cup of poyson : as it is reported of Pope *Victor* the third, that he was poysoned in the Chalice at the Communion. Neither have there been wanting Examples of desperate men, who have made the most holy parts of Religion, Vowes, and Sacraments, the Scales and Pledges of their conspiracies in Malice : as once *Cataline* and his associates did animate themselves in their bloody purposes, with drinking the blood of a flaine Childe.

*Martin. apud
Plotin. in vit.
Pont 3.*

*Salust in Cat.
Florus lib. 4.
Don. lib. 37.
Plut. in licen.
dy in Publicola.*

Now of all *Hatreds*, there are none more furious and unnaturall then those which arise out of contrarieties in *Religion* ; because as a Stone, the higher the place is from whence it falls, doth give the more dangerous blow : no wounds so mortall, as that of a Thunderbolt : so of all other those *Hatreds* which make pretences unto Heaven, and which arise from motives of the highest Nature, are ever most desperate and mortall, And therefore our Saviour tels us, that in this case men would forget all the bonds of naturall Obligation ; insomuch that the *Father would deliver his own Childe*, and the *Children their Parents unto death* : As we finde that the bloody Hatred of *Cain* against *Abel* arose from the different acceptance of their Sacrifices. Neither is it any wonder if that enmity grow excessive, which hath Zeale to kindle it, and pretence of *Religion* to warrant it : For when that which should restraine and set limits to a Passion, is made a party to ingage it, and fewell to foment it, no wonder if a Passion

*Modum tenere
in eo difficile est
quod bonum
esse crediderunt
Senec. Ep. 23
Plut. de Isid. &
Ofred. Inuysal.*

which hath no bounds from Religion, do impose none upon it selfe. And this occasion of mutuall *Hatred*, we finde observed even in the ridiculous superstitions of Egypt, when one Towne would kill and eat the flesh of another in zeale to the Sheep, or Calves, or Dragons, which they did severally worship.

— *Summus utriusq;*

*Inde furor vulgo quod Numina vicinorum
Odit uterq; locus.*

bate:

This caus'd their rage, this made their great de-
One Town did worship what the next did hate.

*Arist. Rhetor.
lib. 2. cap. 10.
Plut. de Odio
& Invidia.*

*Alian. de Ani-
mal lib. 3. c. 7.
Rhet. 14. c. 18.*

Another dangerous effect of *Hatred* is *Envy* and *Malignitie* at the sight of anothers happiness: and therefore *Envy* is called an *Evill Eye*, because all the diseases of the *Eye* make it offend with any thing that is light and shineth: as Vermine doe ever devoure the purest Corne, and Moaths eat into the finest Cloth, and the Cantharides blast the sweetest Flowres: So doth *Envy* ever gnaw that which is most beautifull in another whom it hath; and as the Vulture, draweth sickness from a perfume. For such is the condition of a rankorous Nature, as of a raw and angry wound, which feels as great paine in the good of a Chirurgions, as in the ill offices of an Enemies hand: it can equally draw nourishment unto this Passion from the good and ill of whom it hates: yea and commonly greater too from the good then from the ill. For, *Odiorum asriores causa*

causa quando iniqua: When *Hatred* is built upon a bad foundation, it commonly raiseth it selfe the higher. And the reason is, because in Passions of this Nature, the less we have from the Object, the more we have from our selves; and what is defective to make up our malice in the demerit of him whom we hate, is supplied by the rising of our own stomach: as we see in the body, that thin and empty nourishment will more often swell it, then that which is substantiall.

And therefore I think there are not any Examples of more implacable *Hatred*, then those that are by *Envy* grounded on *Merit*. As *Tacitus* observes between the passages of *Domitian* and *Agricola*, that nothing did so much strengthen the Emperors hatred against that worthy Man, as the generall report of his honorable behaviour and actions in those military services, wherein he had been employed: and the same likewise he intimates in the affections of *Tiberius* and *Piso* towards *Germanicus*.

Tacitus.

It is wisely therefore observed by the Historian, That men of vast and various employments, have usually the unhappiness of *Envy* attending them; which therefore they have sometimes declined by retiring and withdrawing themselves from continuall addresses, as a wise mariner, who (as he speaks) doth *aliquantulum remittere Clavum ob magnum fluctus vim*. And thus we mind the honour *Dauids* merits procured him, was the foundation of that implacable *Hatred* of *Saul* towards him. For as in naturall moti-

Plutar. lib. de Rep. gerenda.

tion, that which comes from the farthest extreme, is most swift and violent : so in the motions of the Minde, the further off we fetch the reason of our *Hatred*, the more venomous and implacable it is.

And here we may observe the mutuall and interchangeable services, which corrupt affections exercise amongst themselves : For as Philosophy observes in the generation of those cold Meteors which are drawn to the middle region of the Aire, they are first by the coldness of the place congealed, and afterward doe by the like impressions fortifie and intend the same quality in the Region : so here *Hatred* first generates *Envy*; and this againe doth recipocally encrease *Hatred*, and both joyne in mischief. So much the more hurtful to the Soule, wherein they are, then to the Enemy whom they respect, by how much they are more near and inward thereunto : for certainly a malignant humour doth most hurt where it harboureth.

From this followeth another evill Effect, which I will but name, being of the same Nature with *Envy*; and it is that which Philosophers call *ὀμυχαραγμία*, a rejoycing at the calamity of him whom we hate, a quality like that of those who are reported to have * been nourished with poyson. For as in Love there is a mutuall partaking of the same Loves and Sorrowes (for where the will and affections are one, the senses are in some sort likewise) so *Hatred* ever worketh contrarietie of affections : That which worketh Griefe

ὀμυχαραγμία
 ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὴ
 τῶν οὐκ ἰσχυρῶν.
 Laer. in Zen.
 lib. 7.
 Plutarch. de
 Curiosit.
 Arist. Ethic.
 lib. 2. cap. 7.
 Mag. Mor.
 cap. 28.
 Prov. 17. 5.
 24. 17.
 * Caelius Rhod.
 Antiq. lib.
 lib. 6. cap. 35.

Griefe unto the one, doth worke Joy unto the other. And therefore *Thales* being asked how a Man might be cheerfull and beare up in afflictions, answered: If he can see his Enemies in worse case then himself. The Poet hath given us the Character of such kinde of Men:

Pectora felle virent, Lingua est suffusa veneno:
Risus abest, nisi quem visum fecere Dolores.

(none flow:

Their breasts with gall, their tongues with ve-
They laugh not, till they see men brought to woe.

And therefore they are elegantly compared by the Philosopher unto Cupping Glasses, which draw only the vitious humors of the body unto them; and unto Flies that are overcome with the spirits of Wine, but nourished with the froth. Like those Wormes which receive their Life from the Corruption of the Dead; and surely the Prince of Devils may well have his Name given him from * Flies, because he taketh most pleasure in the ulcers and wounds of men, as Flies ever resort unto Sores.

Another corrupt Effect of *Hatred* is a sinister and crooked suspicion, whereby with an envious and criticall Eye we search into the actions and purposes of another; and according as is the sharpeness of our owne wits, or the course of our owne behaviour and practices, we attribute unto them such ends as were haply never framed but in the forge of our owne braines: Evill men
being

Diog. Laert. l. 1.

* Beelzebub.
Math. 12. 14.
Βααζιβουλ,
ve. tant 7.
2. Reg. 1. 3.
Ἀππιμ
apud Pausan.
lib. 5. & Clem.
Alex. in Pro-
trept.
Myrodem vo-
cat. Plin. l. 29.
cap. 6.

being herein like Vultures, which can receive none but a soule Sent. It is numbred amongst one of the noble Attributes of Love, that it *Thinketh none Evill*, and certainly, there is not a fouler quality against Brotherly Love, then that which (for the satisfying of it selfe with but the 'maginarie Evill of him whom it disliketh) will venture to finde out in every action some close impiety, and pierce into the reserved and hidden passages of the heart : like him in the Philosopher, who thought where ever he went, that he saw his owne Picture walk before him. And therefore we see how *Agrippina* when she would not discover any shew of *Fear* or *Hatred* towards her Sonne *Nero*, who had at the first plottted her death on the Sea : and that sayling, sent the second time *Anicetus* the Centurion to make sure worke, did in both these practises decline all shew of suspicion, and not acknowledge either the Engine or the Murther to be directed by him. *Solum Insidiarum remedium aspiciens, si non intelligeretur.* Supposing the only remedies of these plots to be, if she seemed not to understand them. For ill meanings do not love to be found out : As the same Historian telleth us of *Tiberius*, *Acrius accepit accludi qua premeret* : He hated that man who would venture to dive into his thoughts. And certainly there is not any crooked *Suspition* which is not rooted in *Hatred*. For as to think the worst of our own Actions, is a signe of *Hatred* to our sinnes (for I thinke no man loves his sinnes who dares search them :) so

Tacit. Annal,
lib. 14.

con-

contrariwise to have an humour of casting the worst glosses upon the Actions of another Man where there is no palpable dissimulation, argues as great a want of Love. We search for evill in our selves to *expell* it; but we search for evill in another to *find* it. There is scarce a more hatefull quality in the eyes of God or Man, then that of the Herodians, to lie in wait to catch an innocent man, and then to accuse him.

Another effect which proceedeth from corrupt *Hatred*, is proud and insolent carriage, whereby we contemn the quality, or undervalue and vilifie the Merit of a person. For though the Apostle hath in this respect of Pride and Swelling, opposed Knowledge unto Love: *Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth*; yet the opposition holdeth not there onely: For there is *Timor Cordis*, as well as *Tumor Cerebri*; as well a stubborne as a learned Pride, a Pride against the person, as against the weakness of our Brother: a Pride whereby wee will not stoope to a yeelding and reconciliation with him, as whereby wee will not stoope to the Capacitie and Edification of him, that is the swelling of Malice, and this of Knowledge. And hence it is that *Hatred* (as *Aristotle* hath excellently observed) when it is simple and alone (though that seldome fall out) is without the admixtion of any Griefe. And the reason I take it is, because Griefe is either for the Evill of another, and so it is ever the Effect of Love: or for the Evill which lyeth upon our selves, and so is the cause of Humi-

Rhet. 1. 2. c. 4.

Humilitie; neither of which are agreeable with Hatred, whose property ever it is to conceive in it self some worth and excellency, by which it is drawn to a Contempt and Insolence towards another Man. And therefore as it was Pride in Men and Angels, which wrought the first Hatred between God and them; so the most proper and unseparable Effect of this hatred ever since is Pride:

Prov. 10. 12.

The last Corruption of this Passion is *Impatience, Contention and Fury*, as the wise Man telleth us, *Hatred stirreth up strife*. And therefore that worthy Effect of Love, which is contrary to this of Hatred, is called *Μακροθυμία*, and *Longanimitas*, Long-suffering, to signifie some length, distance, and remotion between a Mans Minde and his Passion. But hatred, being of a fierce Nature, is so farr from admitting any Peace, or yeelding to conditions of parley, that (as hath been observed out of *Aristotle*) it rests not satisfied with the Misery, but desires (if it be possible) the utter overthrow of an Enemy.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the affection of Desire What it is. The severall kinds of it, Naturall, Rationall, Spirituall. Intemperate, Vnnaturall, Morbid Desires. The Object of them Good, pleasant, as possible, as absent either in whole, or in degrees of perfection or continuance. The most Generall Ineternall cause Vacuity, Indigence. Other causes, Admiration, Greatnesse of minde, Curiosity.

THE next Passions in order of Nature to these two are *Desire* and *Abomination*; which because they differ not much otherwise from Love and Hatred, then the Act from the Habit, or then a man sitting from himself walking, Desire being but the motion, and exercise, as delight is the Quiet and Repose of our Love, I shall therefore the more briefly passe it over. *Desire* is the wing of the Soule whereby it moveth, and is carried to the thing which it loveth, as the *Eagle to the Carcass* in the Scripture proverb, to feed it self upon it; and to be satisfied with it. For as the Appetite of the Eagle is attended with sharpnesse of sight to discover its prey, with swiftnesse of wing to hasten unto it, and with strength to seize upon

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it:

Iob 39. 20.
Mich. 2. 28.
Haba. 1. 8.

Plutar. Nat.
Quest. cap. 26.

Rom. 7. 18. 19.
Josh. 24. 17.

Neh. 1. 11.
Isa. 26. 8.
Psalm. 3. 20.

it: So according to the proportion of the Soul's love unto its obj^t, doth it command and call together both the Wisdome and Powers of the whole man to direct unto; and to promote the procuring of it. And the very best characters and trust lineaments which can be drawne of the mindes of men, are to be taken from their *Desires*, rather then from their *Practices*. As Physicians often judge of the Diseases of sick men by their Appetites. Ill men dare not doe so much evill as they desire, for feare of shame or punishment: Good men cannot do so much good as they desire, for want of Power and Provisions of vertue. Besides, *Practices* may be over-ruled by ends, but *Desires* are alwayes genuine and naturall; for no man can be constrained to will that which he doth not love; And therefore in the Scripture good men have had most confidence in approving themselves unto God by their affections, and the inward longings of their Souls after him, as being the purest and most unfeigned issues of Love, and such as have least Proximity and danger of infection from foreigne and secular ends. Saint Paul himself was much better a *willing*, then at *performing*; and Saint Peter who failed in his promise of *Doing*, dares appaale to Christs owne Omniscience for the truth of his *Loving*. What ever other defects may attend our actions, this is an inseparable character of a pious soule, that it *desires to fear Gods Name*, and according to the prevalency of that Affection hath its conversation in heaven too. In which regard *Christ* is called

led the *Desire of all Nations*, both because where he is he draweth all the hearts and desires of his people unto him, and also doth by his grace most fully answer and satisfie all the desires that are presented before him: as it is said of one of the Roman Emperors, *Neminem unquam demisit tristem*, he never sends any discontented out of his presence.

Hag. 2. 9.
Joh. 12. 32.
Psal. 107. 6.

The desires of the Soul are of three sorts, according to the three degrees of perfection which belong unto man, *Naturall*, *Rational*, *Spiritual*.

Naturall Desires respect *τα ἀναγκαῖα*, things of simple *Necessity* to the Being, Preservation, and Integrity of Nature, as the desires which things have to their proper *nourishment* and *place*, *ad conservationem individui*, for preserving themselves and to *propagation*, and increase *ad conservationem speciei* for preserving of their kinde.

Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. cap. 6.

Rational Desires are such as respect *αἰσθητὰ καὶ αὐτὰ*, such things as are *Elegible* in themselves, and the proper objects of *right Reason*; such as *Felicity*, the common *End* of all rational Appetitions; *Virtue* the way, and *Eternall good things*: as Health, Strength, Credit, Dignity, Prosperity, the *Ornaments* of humane life.

Spiritual Desires respect *τὰ ἐπερὰν, τὰ πνευματικά, τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, heavenly and spirituall things, the *things of God*, *Things which are above*, The knowledg whereof we have not by Philosophical, but by Apostolical discovery, by the *Spirit of God*, who onely searcheth the deep things of God.

Heb. 9. 13.
1 Cor. 13. 13.
Col. 3. 1.

Prov. 31. 6.

1 Tim. 5. 23.

Gal. 104. 15.

* Vid Socr. li

4 cap. 18.

Euseb. l. 4. c. 38

ib. 5 c. 17.

Iren l. 1. ca. 34.

Tertul. a. vers.

Psychic. 15.

Epiph. To. 2 l. 1.

Vid Gul Siuc.

Antiq. Comm.

li. 3. cap. 7. 8.

Clem. Al. p. d.

li. 2. ca. 12.

Hierol. 2. adv.

Jovinian.

Megareses ob.

sonant, quasi

crastina die mor-

ituri. Tert.

Apol. ca. 39.

Dieg. Laert. l. 1.

The *Urrups* desires con rary unto these are either *Vicious* or *Morbid*. *Vicious* are again of two sorts: First, *Intemperate* and incontinent Desires which erre not in the substance or nature of the thing desired, but only *ὁ τῶ πῶς*, as the Philosopher speaks, in the *measure* and *manner* of Desiring them. It is lawfull to drink Wine, and a Man may erre (as *Timothy* did) in an over*rigorous severity to Nature, when health or needfull refreshment requireth it: For our flesh is to be subdued to *reason*, not to *infirmities*, that it may be a *servant* to the Soule, but not a *burden*. But if we let wine be *ἐκδοτικόν*, as the Heathen call it, to take a freedome against us, like *Cham* to mock us, and discover our nakednesse, and make us servants unto it, If we doe not only *eat* Hony, but *surfer* on it; If we must have meat like *Israel* in the Wilderness, not only for our *Need*, but for our *Lust*; If we eat and drink so long that we are good for nothing, but either to lie down and sleep, or to rise up and play, to live to day, and dye to morrow; If we make our belly the grave of our Soule, and the dungeon of our Reason, and let our *Intestina* as well morally as naturally farre exceed the length of the whole man besides; This is in the Apostles phrase, to be *lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God*; and it is an intemperate excess against naturall desires which will ever end in pain. It was a witty speech of *Anacharsis* the Philosopher, that the Vine beareth three sorts of Grapes: The first of *Delights*: the second of *Excesse*: The third of *Sorrow*. If we let our *Delight* steal us

into

into *Excesse*, and become a mocker, our *Excesse* will quickly betray us unto *Sorrow*, (as *Dalilah* did *Samson* to the *Philistines*) and let us know that after *Wine* hath mocked, it can rage too. Like the head of the *Polyphus*, which is sweet to the *Pa-*
late, but after cause h troublesome sleeps, and frightfull dreames.

Secondly, there are brutish and unnaturall *De-*
sires, which the Philosopher calleth *μεταδοδεις*, fer-
rine and inhumane, instancing in those barba-
rous Countries, where they use to eat mens flesh
and raw meet; and in the woman who ripped
up Women with child, that she might eat
their young ones: Unto which head I refer those
which the Apostle calls *παιδεμας, & παθημας*,
vile and dishonorable Affections and passions of
Lust, wherein forsaking the guidance of Nature,
they dishonor their bodies amongst themselves, &
gave themselves over, as St *Jude* speaketh, unto
strange flesh; also incestuous and promiscuous
Lusts, going with naked and painted Bodies, as
the ancient *Brittaines* offering of men and chil-
dren in sacrifices, eating of the bodies of friends
that died, burning of the living with the dead,
and other like savage and barbarous practices,
wherein we finde how farre naturall corruption
improved with ignorance and want of Educa-
tion or Religion, can imbrute the manners of
Men.

Lastly, there are *morbid Desires*, growing out of
some distemper of Minde or Body, called by the
Philosopher *ποσημας, τωδεις*, as those of children, which

Prov. 20. 1:
Plur. de Audi-
tione.

Ethic. l. 7 c. 6.

Rom. 1. 26.
1 Thes. 4. 5:
Jud. ver. 7.
Vid Eusebide
prop. Evang.
lib. 1. c. 4.
Hieron. lib 2.
cont. Jovin.

Theodorete Serm
57 e Legib.
Cael. Rodigin.
Antiq lib 13
cap. 21, 28.
Plin. l. 5. c. 17
30 & l. 7. c. 2.

Ethic. 1. 7. c. 6

Cœl. Rodig. lib
3 cap. 15.
Vid Stephan.
de Gecum in
vice xi'ora.

De bono & in
unde. vid. Phi-
lofoph. Rhet. 1. 1.

Gen. 3. 6.

κατολιν τις τῶ
καλῶν τῶν ἐν
τοῦτον τῶν
Damasen. de
orthodox. 1. c. 1
2. cap. 22.

eat coales or dire, and the strange and depraved longings of women with child, called *πῖς* or *Pica*, from the Bird of that name, because the inconstant and various appetences of Nature, so misguided by vicious humours, is well resembled by the strange mixture of white and black feathers that Bird.

Having considered the severall kindes both of regular and corrupt *Desires*: I shall content my self with a very brieve inquiry into the causes and effects of this Passion,

The causes moving it are *Externall, ex parte objecti*, in the object; or *Ineternall, ex parte subiecti*, in the minde. The *Object* is any thing apprehended *sub ratione Boni & Jucundi*, as good and pleasant. For upon those inducements did Satan first stirre the desire of *Eve* towards the forbidden fruit. *She saw that it was good for food, and pleasant to the eye.*

Now the Qualification of these to distinguish the formall reason of their being objects to our desires, from that wherein they are objects of our love, is first that they be possible: For *Desire* being the motion and endeavour of the Soule towards that good which it loveth, and wherein it seeketh to delight, take away the possibility of such delight, and this would be *motus in vacuo*, like that of *Noah's Dove* that found no place for her feet to rest on. Hope is the whet-stone, and wheele of Industry; if that faile, how ever a man may waste and pine away his thoughts in empty *Velleities*, and imaginary wishes, he can never put
for h

forth nor address: his endeavours towards an impossible good. Though an old man may wish himself young again, yet no man was ever so besotted as to endeavour it. And this distinction between vanishing *Wishes* and serious *Desires* is of great consequence to be attended in all the motions of the Soule, morall or sacred, in as much as those *Desires* onely which are active and industrious, purposely addressing themselves to the prosecution of that which they apprehend as acquirable, do commend the Soule from whence they issue, for vertuous and pious.

Concupiscunt etiam et quæ non possunt.
Senec. de Ira l. 1. c. 3.
ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸν ἀδύνατον.
Arist. Ethic. lib. 3 c. 4.
Vid. de volitione & velleitate, Aquin. 1. 2 qu. 13. art. 4. & Valent. Tom. 2. disp. 2 qu. 8. p. 2

Secondly, the object of the *Desires*, *quæ tale*, is apprehended as *Absent* and *distant*, in as much as presence worketh delight rather then desire. The things we have we enjoy, we do not covet; we rest in them, we do not move toward them. Yet not alwaies *Absent quoad totum*, but *quoad gradus*, not in the whole, but in the parts and degrees of it: for the presence of a good thing doth in some sort quicken the desires toward the same thing so far forth as it is capable of *improvement* and augmentation.

As we see in externall riches of the body, none desire them more eagerly then those that possess them; and the more vertuous the Soule of man is, the more is the heart enlarged in the Appetition of a greater measure; as the putting in of some water into a Pump, doth draw forth more. No man is so importunate in praying, *Lord help mine unbelieve*, as he that can say, *Lord, I beleeve*. Thus even *present* things may be desired in order

Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit
Et minus banc optat qui non habet, Juvenal. Sat. 14.
Arist. lib. 1. Politic. c. 6.
Plutarch lib. de Cupida divitiis.
Senec. ep. 73.
Marc. 9. 24.

to improvement, and further degrees of them : as many times a man hath a better stomach to his meat after he hath begun to eat, then when he first sat down unto it. Again, things present may be the Object of our *Desires* unto *Continuance*, as he that delighteth in a good which he hath, desireth the continuance of that Delight. And therefore *Life*, even while it is possessed it is desired, because the possession of it doth not cause the Appetite to nauseate or surfer upon it. Few men there are who Desire not old Age, not as it is old Age and importeth decay, decrepidnesse, and defects of Nature : For a young man doth not desire to be old now ; but as it implyeth the longer and fuller possession of Life : For a man being conscious to himself ; first of his own insufficiency to make himself happy from and within himself ; and next of the immortality of his nature : as upon the former reason he is busied in sending abroad his *Desires* (as the Purveyors and Caterers of the Soule) to bring in such things as may promote *perfection* : so those very *Desires* having succeeded do farther endeavour the satisfaction of Nature, by moving towards the *perpetuity* of what they have procured. It was a sordid and brutish wish of *Philoxenus* in the Philosopher, who wished that he had the throat of a Crane or Vulture, that the pleasure of his taste might last the longer it being the wisdom of Nature, intending the chiefe perfections of Man to his Soule, to make his bodily pleasures the shorter.) But surely the Soule of man having a reach

Arist. Ethic. li.

2. cap 12

Idem l 3 c. 3.

Problem.

§ 28. quest. 7

Suidas in Phi-

loxenum.

Ælian var. hist.

10. ca. 9.

Tolæmæ Jēty

τοστιδου ἐφ-

ηδ ἂν ἔχουσα

ἡν ἔχουσα

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as far as Immortality may justly desire, as well the *perpetuity* as the presence of those good things wherein standeth her proper perfection. And therefore it was excellent counsel of *An-
tisthenes* the Philosopher, That a man should lay up such provisions, as in a Shipwrack might swim out with him, such treasure as will passe and be currant in another World, and will follow us thither, which as the Apostle speaks, is to lay up a good foundation against the time to come.

The *Internal Causes* moving *Desire*, in regard of the subject or minde of man, may be different according to the different kindes of Desires spoken of before. The most general which respecteth them all is a *vacuity*, *indigence*, and self-insufficiency of the Soul: For having not within it self enough either to preserve it, or to content it, it is forced to go out of it self for supplies, for wheresoever God hath implanted sensitive and rational affections, he hath been pleased to carry them from themselves, and to direct them abroad for their satisfaction; by that means preserving the Soul in humility, and leading it as by Degrees up unto himself. Every creature though it have its life in its own possession; yet the preservation of it, it fetcheth from some things without. The excellentest creatures are beholding to the meaner, both for their nourishment, and for their knowledge. And therefore of all graces, God hath chosen *faith* and *repentance*, and the chief means of carrying us to him, because these two do most

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carry

ἀναγκηστικὴ
τῇ ἐνδύας ἢ
φύξιν ἐνδυ-
μια.
Arist. Ethic,
lib. 3. cap. 11,
ἐν τῇ ἐνδύας
ἐνδυμια.
Clem. Alex.
Str. l. 17.

*Si quid deerit
id a nobis petie-
rimus Sen. Ep.
119. Vid. Plu.
Caelius Rhod.
1. 14. cap. 7.*

Judg. 9. 9, 15.

Job 7. 1, 2, 3.

*τὰ μέγιστα ὀλ-
γοῦντα δὲ
μικρὰ πλεονέ-
χου. Arist. de
Generatio Ani-
mal. 4. c. 4.*

carry us out of our selves, and most acquaint us with insufficiencies, *Repentance* teaching a man to abhor himself, and *Faith* to deny himself,

Now because *Emptiness* is the cause of *Appetence*, we shall hereupon finde, that the fullest and most contented men, are ever freest from vaste desires. The more the minde of any man is in *weight*, the more it is in *rest* too. As they say, that in Rivers, ships go slower in the Winter, but withall they carry the greater burthens: So many times men of lesse urgent and importunate Appetitions and motions of minde, are more furnished and better ballanced within. In *Fothams* Parable the Bramble was more ambitious then the Vine, or the Olive. And the Vine we see which is of all other *Arbor desiderii*, the tree of Desire, is weakest, and cannot stand without another to support it. Therefore we shall finde that mens Desires are strongest, when their constitutions are weakest, and their condition lowest; as we see in servants that labour, women that breed, and sick men that long, whose whole life in that time is but a change and Miscellany of desires. Thus we see little children will reach at every thing which is before them, being wholly destitute of internal furniture. Vacuity is ever sucking and attractive, and will make even dull and heavy things rise upward. Eager and greedy, various and swarming Appetitions are usually the signs either of a childish or a sick Temper of minde; as the Naturalists observe, that the least creatures are the greatest breeders: a Mouse bringeth

bringeth more young ones then an Elephant.

Onely here wee must distinguish both of contentment and of Desires. There may be a double *Contentment*, the one arising out of *sluggishness* and narrowness of mind; when men out of an unwillingness to put themselves to the paines of gaining more, rest satisfied with what they have; and had rather have a poor quiet then a Treasure with labour. As they say of the Fig-tree, though it be least beautiful of other Trees (for it alone beareth no flowers) yet withall it is free from Thunder. And as the Historian said of some men, that they are *sola socoreta Innocentes*, do men no hurt, onely because it would cost them paines to do it: so may we of these, that they are beholding to their torpid and sluggish constitution, for the contentment which they profess to have. And this doth not regulate inordinate desires, but onely lay them asleep, as even an hungry man when he sleepeth, hath his hunger-sleep with him.

Another contentment there is arising out of *wisdome* and practical learning (as the Apostles tells us, that it is a matter of learning to be contented) when the heart being established and made steady with grace and solid materials within (as a Ship with Ballast) is lesse tossed with lower affections: as *Saul* cared not for his Asses when he heard of a Kingdom.

— *Grata post munus ariste*

Contingunt homines veteris fastidia quercus.

Z 2

When

*Vivunt, non
quomodo volunt.
sed quomodo ce-
perunt: Sen. de
Tran. c. 2.
Plur. Sympof.
l. 5. quest 9.*

Tacit.

*Phil. 4. 11, 12.
Heb. 13. 9.
Namque labant
curva iusto sine
pondere naues;
Perq; mare in-
stabilis nimis
levitate ferun-
tur. Ov. Met.
l. 2. Juven.
Sat. 14. Plin
l. 7. cap. 56.
Struck l. c. 8.
fol. 165.*

When men had once discover'd better corn,
They loath'd their masse, and oken bread did scorn.

Plu'. de Solert.
Animal.

And this kind of contentment doth not stupifie
loose desires, but change them, as the Cats *Unum
magnum* was more worth to her then all the varie-
ty of shifts which the Fox did boast of; and one
Sun doth more comfort us in the day, than many
thousand Stars in the night.

Sapiens est di-
vitiarum natu-
ralium questor
accerrimus.
Sen. ep. 119.

Again, Desires are either of things *excellent*, as
the vertuous and spiritual desires of the Soul,
whereby men move towards God; and these do
neither load the heart, nor cloy it, but much rather
open and enlarge it for more. No man was so well
acquainted with God as *Moses*, who yet was the
more importunate to know him better, *I beseech
thee shew me thy glory*: nor any man more acquaint-
ed with Christ than Saint *Paul*, who yet desired to
be dissolved, and to be with Christ neerer.

Exod. 33. 18.

Phil. 1. 23.

Aristot. Ethic.
lib. 7. cap. 6.

Other Desires are of *middle things*, τὰ μετ' ἑξέω,
as the Philosopher calls them; such as Wealth,
Profit, Victory, Honour, which are not good in
themselves, but as they are managed. And these
Desires though not extinguished, yet are very
much asswaged, and moderated by the weight
and wisdom of solid contentment. He was the
wisest man then alive, and who knew all the
quintessence, and what ever was desireable in the
Creature, who said, *Da mihi panem Staturi mei*,
Give me the Bread of my allowance; ὅσον τῆς χορίας
ἀνάγκης παρ' ἡμῶν ἀπαιτεῖ, so much as the quality of my

Prov. 30. 8.

Theophylact.

my place and state requireth, w^{ch} is that which our Saviour limiteth our desires unto; ἀρτος ἐπιβσιος & σιτομίτηλον, our portion and *dimensum*, ἐφῆμενος τρεφῆ, in St. James, daily food; and was pleased to answer that wise king in that his request, and to give us a record and catalogue of his daily bread.

Another cause of *Desire* may be *Admiration*; A strange thing though monstrous and deformed, calleth the eyes of every man unto it. Rarity is a marvellous *Lenocinium*, and inticer of desire, *æstiva nives, hyberna rosa*, as the Panegyrist spake, Snow in the Summer, and Roses in the Winter; the Birds of this Country, and the Root of another; dainties hardly procured without the shipwracks of men, to feed the gluttony rather of the eye then of the belly; these are the delights of the curiosities of men. The same fruits when they are worse but rarer, have a far greater value set upon them, then when exposed by their commonness unto every mans purchase; and it was a wise complaint of old *Cato*; That it went ill with the City, when a Fish was sold for more then an Ox. We see Desires do not put forth themselves more freely in any then in Children; I think the chief Reason of it is the same which the Philosopher giveth of their memories; because every thing to them is new and strange, for strange things as they make stronger impressions upon the *Retentive*, so they do upon the *Appetitive* faculties. And therefore we finde *Herod* who cared nothing at all for the Doctrine of Christ, because it was holy and divine, had yet a great Desire

Τρεφῆ ἡμῶν
ος, Suidas.

Luke 12. 42.

Jam. 2. 15.

Job 23. 12.

1 Kings 4. 22.

Vide Waser, de

mensuris l. 2.

c. 3. & Angel.

Caninum de

pane quorid. ad

calcem; Infr.

Syria Stuck.

Convival l. 1

cap. 22

Plur. Apoth.

Rher. lib. 2.

Luke 23. 8.

Aristippus Athenas navigavit Socratem invisurus.

Plutarch de Curios. 1 Reg. 10.

Plato Aegyptum, Italiam, Siciliam perijt Philosophia

causa. Vid. Theo

Oraz. 1 de fide

Zeph. 1. 8.

Græc. ἱστορία

Arist. Tom. 2.

Oraz. de pace

poster. Grecia

Græcia. Thucydides vid.

Cal. Rho. 1. 10.

6. 25.

Acts 17. 21.

Plut. in Solon.

de Curiosit.

lib. 1. Cod

quæ res exportari non debent

Arist. Tom. 3.

Oraz. 2.

Ælius Spart.

in piscen Nig.

desire to have seen his miracles, because they were wonderful. And men have travelled far to see those persons and things, the same whereof they have before admired, strange Learning, strange Birds and Beasts, strange Flowres and Roots, strange Fashions; yea, strange Sins too (which is the curiosity and corruption of Nature) are marvellous attractive, and beget emulation among men. *Nero* gave rewards to the inventors of strange Lusts. Even *Solomons* ships, (besides substantial Treasure) did bring home Apes and Peacocks. *Athens* which was the eye, the flour, and Epitome of *Greece* (to shew that this curiosity is the Disease, as well of Wits, as of Childhood) spent all their time and study in *inquiring after new things*. And for this cause it is (as I conceive) That wise Men have made Laws to interdict the transporting of their Countrey Fruits into other places, least the sight of them should kindle in strangers a Desire to be Masters of the Countries where they grew, as we see the Grapes and Figs of *Canaan* were used as Incentives unto the expedition of *Israel*. And hence *Plutarch* telleth us that the Word Sy-cophant is derived, to note originally such as detected those who surreptitiously transported Figs into other Countries. As on the other side we read, that the Athenians set up a pillar, wherein they published him to be an Enemy of the Citie, who should bring Gold out of *Media*, as an Instrument to corrupt them. And the Romane Governour commanded his souldiers

souldiers that they should not carry any Gold or Silver into the Field with them, least thereby they should be looked on by the Adversary, as the Persians by *Alexander*, rather as a prey, then a foe.

A third cause which I shall touch on of exciting Desires, is *height and greatnesse of minde*, which cannot well set bounds of measure unto it self, as *Seneca* said in another sence, *Magnitudo non habet certum modum*. Great minds have great ends, and those can never be advanced but with vast and various desires. A great Ship will not be carried with the Sail of Lyter. Nor can an Eagle flie with the wings of a Sparrow. *Alexander* was not so great in his Victories, as in his Desires, whom one world could not satisfie: nor *Pompey* in his Triumphs, as in his Ambition, to whom it was not enough to be Great, except he might be the Greatest.

Another cause of Desires may be Curiosity, which is nothing else but a desire of prying into, and lusting after the busineses of other Men, which is called by *Solomon*, *Ambulatio Anima*: The walking up and down of the Soul, as he elsewhere telleth us, that the *eyes of a fool is in the ends of the earth*: Such a man being like the Witches which *Plutarch* speaks of, that wear Eyes when they went abroad, but put them in a box when they came home: Or like the Falconers Hawks that are hooded in the house, and never suffered to use their eyes, but to the hurt of other Birds: like a man in a Dungeon, that sees nothing where

he

Ep. st. 43.

*Æstuat infelix
angusto limite
mundi. Ut Gy-
ara inclusus
scopulis, &c.
Juv. Saryr. 10.
Sen. de Benef.
l. 7. c. 7. p. 94.
& 119.
Ecclesi. 6. 9.
Prov. 17. 24.*

Plut. de Cur.

*Hoc se quisque
in do semper
fugit. Lucret
apud seu. de
tranquil. c. 2*

*Non horum te-
cum esse potes,
non omnia recte
ponere, &c.
Horat.*

1 Reg. 6. 4:

he is; but can see a great deal of light abroad at a little passage. So these kinde of men have vast desires of forreign knowledge, but wonderfully shun the acquaintance of themselves. As they say of a Swine, that he looks every way but *upward*, so we may of Pragmatists, that their eyes look all wayes but *inward*. Whereas the mindes of prudent men are like the Windows of *Solomons* Temple, broader inward then outward. As the Pillar that went before Israel in the Sea, whose light side was towards Israel, but the dark towards *Pharaoh*: Or as the Sun in an Eclipse, whose light is perfect inwards, though towards us it be darkned. A wise mans Eyes are in his head, whereas a fool hath *οὐρανίους* as it is in the *Proverbs*, his minde is in his heels onely to wander and gad abroad.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of other causes of Desire, Infirmary, Temerity, Mutability of Minde, Knowledge, Repentance, Hope. Of the effects of it in Generall, Labour, Languor. In speciall, of Rationall Desires, Bounty, Griefe, Wearines, Indignation against that which withstands it. Of vitious desires, Acceptation, Ingratitude, Envy, Greediness, Baseness of resolution.



Ther causes of Desires are *Infirmary, Rashnesse, and Mutability of Mind*, Which three I put in one, as having a neer Relation and dependance within themselves. For commonly impotent Appetions as those of Children, of sick, of incontinent Persons, are both Temerarious in precipitating the Minde, and anticipating the Dictates of Reason which should regulate or restrain them: as also mutable and wandering like the Bee from one Floure unto another; *Infirmary* not suffering a man to hold fast his Decrees, and *Temerity* not suffering him to resolve on any; and lastly, *Mutabilitie* making him weary of those things which weakness and rashness had unad-

Maximum in-
dicium est mala
mentis

fluctuatio, Sen.

Ep. 120. vid.

ep. 10 & de

Tranq. cap. 2.

ὡς περ παιδὸς

παθόντος ἐπιθυ-

μῆντος ἀνελ-

πεως δὲ καὶ παλίν-

πνυτας Aristid.

Tom. 2. Orat. 1.

Vid. etiam Plu-

tarch de Tranq.

lliad. ω

Lucret. lib. 3.

Jaſtor, Cr. ci. r.

agitor, ſtimulor.

verſor in amoris

ro'a, miſer exa-

nimor, ſeror, dif-

ſeror, diſtraher.

ſeripi. r. ita nut-

lam mentemani-

mi habeo. Ibi

ſem, ibi non ſum

ubi non ſum ibi

eſt animus. Ita

mibi ingenia

ſunt, quod lubet

non lubet jam id

continuo, &c.

Lucret. C. 11.

viſely transported him unto *Omnium Imperia* *animus in lubrico eſt*. Weake minds have ever wa-
vering and unfixed reſolutions. Like fickle and
haſteating ſtomacks, which long for many things
and can eat none: Like ſick bodies, *que mutationi-*
bus ut remediis utuntur, as Seneca ſpeaks, which roſs
from ſide to ſide, and thinke by changing of their
place they can leave their pain behind them. Like
Achilles in the Poer.

"ΑΛΛΟΤ' ἐπὶ πλευρᾷς κατεκείμετο δ' ἄρατε δ' αὖτε.
Ἴππιδ' ἀνέστη δ' ἄρ' ἔπειτα τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἔπειτα ἀνέστη.

Now he leans on his ſide, now ſupine lyes,
Then grow' leth on his face, and ſtrait doth riſe.

This Sickneſs and Inconſtancy of Deſires is
thus elegantly diſcribed by the old Poet *Lucre-*
tius.

— Ut nunc plerumq, videmus,
Quid ſibi quiſq; velit neſcire & querere ſemper.
Commutare locum, quaſi onus deponere poſſit.
Exit ſape foras magnis ex adibus ille,
Esſe domi quam perſaſum eſt ſubitoq; revertit.
Currit agens mannos advillam precipitanter
Auxilium teſtis quaſi ferre ardentibus inſtet.
Oſcitat extemplo tetigit cum limina Villa,
Aut abit in ſomnum gravis, atq; oblivia quarit.
Aut etiam properans Urbem petit, atq; reviſit.
Hoc ſe quiſq; modo fugit. At, quod ſcilicet ut ſit.
Effugere had potis eſt, ingratis haret & anget.

We see how troubled Mortals still enquire,
Yet ne're can find what'tis which they desire.
One changeth place, as if he could unload
And leave his weights behind him. Runs abroad,
Weary of a great Palace; strait turnes back,
And hath not found the thing which he did lack.
Wearied both here & there, he mounts his steed;
And runs to th'neighbor town with swifter speed
Than if he went to quench a fire. Being set
He gapes and sleeps and studies to forget
Why he came thither, haply turne his raine,
And to the City coasteth back againe.
Thus guilty Man doth study how to shun,
And scape himself, but ne're can get it done.
He bears the thing he flyes. What he would leave
Vnwelcome selfe unto it selfe doth cleave,
And cleaving doth torment. —

The more simple, One, and perfect Nature is
(as the Philosopher divinely noteth) the more it
delighteth in one and the same uniform operation.
Mutability is not pleasant in it selfe; but the delight
of it ariseth out of the *pravitie* and *defect* of
Nature

I might here insist on other more obvious cau-
ses of desire. As,

1 *Knowledge* and experience of the goodness of
that which we desire: as the Apostle also telleth us,
That Experience worketh Hope. And we use to
say, *Ignorantia nulla Cupido.* A man cannot desire that
of which he hath no Apprehension. Knowledge is
Appetites Taster.

Nihil tam occu-
patum tam mul-
tiforme tot ac-
tam variis mori-
bus concisum ac
laceratum quam
mala mens,
Quintil. lib. 12
cap. 1.
Non horam re-
cum esse potes,
non otia recte:
Ponere atque
ipsum vitas
fugitivum et
erro, Horat.
vid. Plutarch.
de Tranquil-
lit.

Εἰς ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι
πλήν ἑνός, ἀλλ' ἡ
αὐτὴ ποικίλη
ἡδυσία ἐστὶν τοῦ
ὁ θεὸς αὐτὴν μίαν
καὶ ἀπλήν
καίτοι ἡδυσίαν
Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. c. ult.

Tum denique
omnes nostra
intelligimus
bona.

Quumque in
potestate habuit
mens ea amissi-
mus, Plauti
captiv. c. 7. 12

2 Cor 7. 11.

2 Sorrow and Repentance for the Evils we
feele, the contrary whereunto we are the more
induced to desire. We never desire Health so
eagerly as when Sickness teacheth us to value
it: For as in Colours, so in Actions or Af-
fections, contraries doe set forth and sharpen
one another. And as *Labor Naturalis*, doth make
Man earnestly desire the Shadow, as *Iob* speaks:
so Sorrow which is *Labor Mentalis*, doth make
a Man earnestly thirst after that which can re-
move the thing which begets that sorrow. The
Apostle telleth us, *That Desire and Zeale are the
fruits of Godly Sorrow*. David never panted so ear-
nestly after Gods Favour and presence, as when
he felt what a Greif it was to be without it. For
in this case there is an apprehension of a double
goodness in the thing we desire, both a perfective
unto Nature Indigent, and as medicinal unto nature
wronged.

Lastly, *Hope of speeding in our Desires*: For the
stronger any mans perswasions are, the more
cheerfull and vigorous will be his endeavours to
succeed. But I shall content my selfe with the inti-
mation of these things. And in the next, very briefly
to run over some *Effects* and *Consequents* of this
Affection. Which are,

1 In regard of *Desires* at large, *Labour* and
Pained: For they are onely *Velleities* and not
Volitions: halfe and broken wishes, not whole
desires, which are not industrious, but waste
away in sluggish and empty speculations. The
Fisherman that will take the Fish, must be con-

α' οὐ δ' αὖτις
καταβύσσει πα-
νός τινος
ἀδ' ἡν, Aristip
apud Laert. l. 2

rented

tended to be dashed with the Water. And he that will expect to have his desires answered, must put as well his hands as his prayers unto them.

Ἀργὸς γὰρ ὕδρις Θεὸν ἔχων ἀνα σῶμα,
Βίον δὲνατ' αὖ ζῆμενεν ἀνευ πόνου.

*Who takes God in his mouth, but takes no paine,
By devout fasts shall never gather gaine.*

It was the just reproof of him in the Poet who was upbraided with comming to the fairs, but withdrew himselfe from the labour of other Men. Nature hath often made the roots of those Plants bitter, whose fruits are sweet, to teach us that D. light is the fruit of Labour. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *Desire* is usually accompanied with *Sorrow*.

Againe, *Desires* do commonly worke a *Languor* and fainting towards the thing desired, if they be either strong or hasty. For Hope deferred maketh the heart sick. As *Ahabs* eager desire of *Naboths* Vineyard, cist him upon his bed. And *David* expresseth his longings towards Gods Law; by the breaking and fainting of his Soule. *Cum expectatio longior est consenescit animus & debilitatur mens.* Delaied expectation weakeneth and withereth the mindes of Men. And therefore the Apostle expresseth strength of Desire by groaning, which is the Language of Sickness.

Eurip. Electra
Plutarch Instit
Lacōn ἐπι τῆς
τ' ἐμὸν εὐτοχεί
δὲν καὶ ζῆς
αὐτοῦ ἡμῶν, &c.
Eurip. Rhes.

Homer. Iliad.
§ 341, 348.
Eurip. Rhes. 323
Aristot. apud
Laert. lib. 5.

Arist. Eudemii
lib 2, cap. 10.
Prov. 13. 12.
1 Reg. 21. 4.
Ps. 119. 20 & 1.
Uq. et agri-
tudinem deside-
ravit, Ed. Lam.
pud. in Com.
Rom 8. 22.
2 Cor. 5. 2.

2 In regard of *Reasonable* and Spirituall Desires. The effects of this affection are :

1 *Large heartedness* and *Liberality*. That which a man earnestly desireth he will give much for and bestow much upon. As when Christ became the desire of all Nations they did dedicate all their desirable things unto him, as the *αἰνῶματα* and trophies of his mercifull triumph over them. One man adorns the Gospell with his power, another with his wit, another with his wealth, another with his wisdom.

Those Abilities of Nature, Art, or Industry, which were before armour of sinne, are then become the spoiles of Christ. *Antonius* out of the strength of his desires toward *Cleopatra*, bestowed many countries upon her.

2 *Griefe* for any losse or hazard of the thing desired. As the Seamans needle which is jogged and troubled, never leaves moving till it finde the North point again: *Flagrantia sunt animorum desideria cum solatia perdidierunt*, as the Orator spake. Desires burn hottest when they are in danger of disappointment.

3 *Weariness* and *Indignation* against any thing which standeth between Desire and the fruition of that which is desired. *Vehementior per metas & pericula exhibit*: That which resisteth increaseth it. As a River goes with more strength where it is hindred and withstood. The Church did venture blowes when she sought her Love, and like the Palme tree rose up above her pressures: *plures effugimur quoties metimur à vobis*, as

Tertullian

Phil. 3. 8, 9, 10.
 Mat. 13. 45.
 Hag. 2. 6, 7.
 Mat. 2. 11.
 Isa. 60. 5. 17.
 Psalm 68. 29.

*Plutarch in
 Anton.*

*Nazar. Orat.
 Panegy.*

*Senec. Epist. 75
 Ab abice se-
 vi. r ibit.
 Plutarch Sym-
 pos. 1. 4.
 A. Gell. 1. 3. c. 6*

*Tertul. Apolog.
 cap ult.*

Tertullian speaks to the Heathen. The more you mow us down, the thicker wee grow? the more wee suffer for him, the more we love and desire him. *Saint Paul* careth not for dissolution that he may goe to Christ, as a stone is contented to be broken in Peices, that it may move to its place.

Thirdly, For *Corrupt* and *vicious Desires*; their *Effects* are first, *Deception*, and haling of Reason as it were captive from determining, advising, or duly weighing the pravity and obliquity of them. So that the things which a man knows in *thesi*, and at large, in *hypothesi*; and as to his owne particular interest or inconvenience he doth not at all attend. He can say them, he cannot apply them. As he who acteth a part on a Stage, knowes the things which he speaks, but is not awhit affected with them. And the Philosopher giveth the reason of it, the very same which *S. James* δὲ γὰρ συμφύται, That reason which overcomes Lust must bee λογὸς ἐμφυτός. Reason ingrafted; or to the phrase of another Apostle, συγκεκραμμένον imixed and tempered with the Soul, and not only extrinsically irradiating it. And these kind of men are elegantly called by *Julius Pollux* ἐθελῶδες ἄνθρωποι, men willingly slavish, and ὑποταγμένοι subdued and brought under by their owne affections. As *Plutarch* saith of *Agiselaus* that he was ruled by *Lyfander* his servant, he having only the name, but the other the execution of his power. This slavery of mens minds under the ryranny of lustfull desires is thus described by the Satyrist.

James 1. 14.
ἐκαστην τῆ
λογισμὸν εἰδὼς
ὅτι σαῦλα
πράττει διὰ
παθόν.
Ethic. 1. 7 c. 2.
ἐκλεγετόν.
lb. cap 7. ult
Hof 4. 11.
περίλασιον
ἀνδρῶν
c. 3. ult. 6. 5 9
Vid. *Plaut.*
Afinar. act. 1.
Scen. 3. *Cicer.*
de Se estm.
James 1. 21.
Heb 4. 2.

Onomast lib. 3.
Cap. 7.

Plutarch. in
Lyfandro.

Perſius Sat 3.
Vid. Arrian.
Epiſt. l. 3 c 24

*Mane piger ſtertis? Surge, inquit Avaritia, eja
Surge: negas? Inſtat, ſurge inquit, non queo ſurge.
Ecquid agam rogitas? Ex ſaperdam adveho pento,
Caſtoreum, ſtupas, hebenum, thus, lubrica Co.*

What ſluggard ſnore ſo long? ſaies luſt, up riſe,
A wake, get out. Dar'ſt thou ſay nay? it cries
The ſame againe, up, riſe? I cannor. No?
Riſe though you cannor, when Ile have it ſo.
What muſt I do? what doe? up, wipe your eies;
See, here's a goodly Ship of Merchandiſe;
Shell fiſh, Caſtoreum, Flax, black Indian woods,
Frankinſence, Wines of Coos and other goods.

Thus ſordidly do vaine men ſell themſelves
and as it were, render up their Reason in to the
hands of vitious and greedy Affections, giving leave
to their ſoules to ſuffer a ſhipwrack in that
veſſell which bringeth goods into their Cellars,
and traffiquing their own judgment in exchange
for a ſhip of wars.

Sen. de Benef.
lib 3. cap. 3. c
l. 2. c. 27.

Secondly, Theſe kinde of *Deſires* make men
ungratefull and *forgetfull* of any kindneſſe which
hath already been done them. *Memoria minimum
tribuit; quiſquis ſpet plurimum.* As in buckets at a
well, the longer the line of the one is which
moves downward, the ſhorter is the line of the
other which riſeth upward; ſo the larger our De-
ſires are towards the future, the narrower our me-
mories are of things paſt. And uſually mens va-
luations of things are more in the performance,
then

then when they are performed. And the reason, is because as nature hath set our eyes forward, and not behinde us: so the appetites of men, for which the eyes are the principall factors, looke naturally before them, not to what they *Have*, but to what they *Hope*: The eye whereby we looke backward into our lives, is the eye of *Repentance*, we there either see our selves bad, or little. And a man is an unwelcome object unto himselfe in both these Relations. But the eye whereby we looke forward, is an eye of *Hope*, and *Desire*, and by that we are represented to our selves better and greater then we are already. Iron moves not upward except the Loadstone be very neere it; But it mooveth downward, though the Center be never so remote. So much stronger are the motions of *Desire*, then those of acknowledgement and retribution.

Besides the apprehensions of *Goodness* in a thing are much other in the *Desire* then in the *Review*: as usually the Sunne and the Moone looke bigger at their rising, then when they are come over our heads. *Desire* lookes on nothing in them but that which pleaseth. *Review* findes that in them which displeaseth. When we desire Wine we thinke onely on the sweetness, when we review it, we remember the headach. Besides what we desire is apprehended as the matter of our life, what is past, men apprehend as in the hand of death. *Quicquid retro est mors tenet*. As in our life, so in our delights, so much of them is dead as is over and gone. We love our food

B b when

Nam fera
maxima pars
invenit hunc
homines habent
quod sibi vo-
lunt, Dum id
impetrant Boni
sunt, sed id ubi
iam penes sese
habuunt, ex bo-
nis presumis &
fraudulentissimi
Plaut. Captiv
nihil aequè est
gratum adeptis
& concupiscen-
tibus. Plin. l.
2. Ep. 15.

Senec de Bre-
vit. vita &
Ep. 120.

when it is meate, we loathe it when it is excrement. When it goes into us we desire it, when it passeth through us we despise it. And the secret work of concoction, (which is as it were the Revivification of our meate,) doth distinguish that in them which the first Appetite took in a lump, and together.

And in truth in all secular and sublunary desires we shall ever finde that they are like the Apples of Sodom. *Qua contracta cinerescunt.* which have ashes hidden within their beauty, and death lurking under them. All the matter of our secular or sensitive Desires are just like the meates we eat, which go much more into excrement, then into nourishment and substance. Like the Cyprus tree which they say is very faire, but beares no fruit. Like the Egyptian Temples which are beautifull in *frontispicio*, but ridiculous in *penetrals*. And if we looke well on them, we shall finde, that as they are mortall themselves, so they come to us through mortality, it was a bold, but true observation of *Seneca*. *Mortalius vivimus.* We live by the deaths of other things. Our fullest Tables furnished with death, nothing but *fereta*, the *birds* of birds and beasts. Our richest garments the bowels and skinnies of other creatures, which worke out their owne lives to preserve ours. Silke is a grave to the worme that weaves it, before it is a garment for us. Our Offices and Honours seldome come to us but by the mortality of those that prepossessed them. And our mortality makes them the fitter objects of other mens Desires.

3. Their

Tertul. Apol.

cap. 201.

Phocion apud

Plutarch. A

popth. Clem.

Alex. Pad. lib.

3. cap. 3.

3. These Desires as they are forgetfull, so they are envious, and looke with an evill eye upon others competition, accounting their success our own damage. If a man should draw the genealogie of all the injuries and emulations of the world, we should finde the Roote of that great Tree to be nothing but lust. It was Desire and inordinate appetite by which the Devill perswaded our first parents to pick a quarrell with their Maker. *Whence come Warres and fightings*, saith Saint James, *but from lusts which warre in your members*. When a man hath warre within, no wonder if he have no peace without. He that cannot agree with himselfe, will disagree with all the world besides. The sea tosseth every thing which comes into it, not because it is wronged, but because it is unquiet. And a lustfull man will contend with every innocent man that prospers, not because this man doth him injury, but because he grudgeth this mans prosperity. As the sea representeth every stait thing that is put into it crooked, so lust every harmlesse thing perverse, and as Seneca speaks, hath *Odium sine inimico*, hatred without an Enemic. Greedy Desires are like a swollen and envious spleene, which sucks away substance from all the rest of the body.

Vid. Senec. de Ira. lib. 3. c. 31. Alienis gemitibus libenter; Emolumenta conquiris. Ammian; Marcell. lib. 31. Egregium Exemplum invidiæ et etiam Ecclesiastica excupitibus orta apud eundem Marcellinum inter Damasum & Viciſinum. lib. 27.

Epist. 105.

** Cælius Philodig. lib. c. 39. lib. 14. cap. 1.*

4. These Desires are *Hidropsicall*, and like a Beduvia in the stomacke which is not quenched, but engaged with that which feeds it. *Natural* desires being herein very like unto *natural* motions; the further they proceed, the stronger and

swifter

Laert. in An-
thars. lib. 1,
Senec. de Ben.
lib. 2. c. 27.
Nihil satis ma-
ritatis.
Imo morientii-
bus, ep. cap. 120.
Plin. li. 15. c. 23.

swifter they are. Like winds in a bladder, they ne-
ver fill the heart, but enlarge it. The Grecians
began their drinkings in little Cups, but proce-
ded unto flazons: and many times those Appe-
titions which begin in modesty go on unto im-
pudence, and the more our lives hasten to leave
the world, the more our lusts hasten to possess
it. As it is noted of the *Parthians*, that the more
they drinke, the more they thirst. And, which
is a marvellous illogicall stupidity, the more
continuall experience men have of the vanity of
the world, the more greedy experiments they
make to finde out solidity in it. Like your me-
lancholly searchers after the Philosophers Stone,
that never dote so much upon their project as
then when it hath deluded them, and never flat-
ter themselves with stronger hopes to be enrich-
ed by their Art, then when it hath brought them
unto beggary.

Lastly from hence it comes to pass that these
kindes of Desires are *Base*, and deject the minde
unto sordid and ignoble Resolutions. For *cui
nihil satis, nihil corpe*. He that hath never enough
will count nothing base whereby he may get
more. As the *Historian* saith of *Otho*, that he did
*Adorare vulgus, facere oscula, & omnia serviliter
pro Imperio*. Adore the people, dispencc and scatter
abroad his curtesies, crouch unto any servile
expressions, to advance his Ambitious designs.
Like *Anteus* in the Poets, fall to the earth, so
hee may grow the stronger by it. As *Zopyrus*
and *Pisistratus*, who wounded, mangled, de-
formed

Tacit. Hist. l. 1.

Hærodot. Tha-
lia. Plutarch. in
Solone.

formed themselves, that they might thereby insinuate, and gaine their ends. As the Scripture noteth of *Absolom*, and the Historian of *Julian*; that out of affectation of popularity, they stouped and delighted to converse with the lowest of the people. Which cunning humillity, or rather sordidness of Ambition, *Menelaus* in the Tragedy, hath thus elegantly objected in a contentious debate unto *Agamemnon*.

Ammian. Mar-
cel. lib. 25.

Οἷδ' οὐτ' ἐπὶ σάκεας ἀρχὴν Δαναΐδαις περὶς ἴλιον,
τῷ δουρεῖν μὴ ἔχ' ἡ χεῖρ' ὦν πᾶς ὁ βέλτερος δαίμων.
Ὡς τῶπιον ὅς τις ἀπὸς δειλίας προσηγγάγων,
καὶ δούρος ἔχων ἀλλότρου πᾶς δαίμων δυνάστην,
καὶ διδὼς πρὸς ὅσῃς ἐξῆς πᾶσι, καὶ εἰ μὴ τις δαίμων
τοῖς ἵπποις ζυγῶν περὶ τὸ φιλότιμον ὦν μέν, &c.

Entip. Iphig.

You know how you the Rule o're Grecians got,
In shew declining what in truth you sought.
How low, how plausible you apprehended
The hands of meanest men: How then you bended
To all you met: How your gates open flew,
And spake large welcome to the pop'lar Crew:
What sweetned words you gave even unto those
Who did decline; and huse to see you gloze.
How thus with Serpentine and guilefull Arts
You screw'd and wound your selfe into the hearts
O'th vulgar: And thus bought the power, which now
Makes you forget how t'een you us'd to bow.

CHAP. XXII.

Rules touching our desires. Desires of lower Objects must not be either hasty, or unbounded: such are unnaturall, turbid, unfruitfull, unthankfull: Desires of heavenly Objects fixed, permanent, industrious: Connexion of vertues, sluggish Desires.



Unto the things already delivered touching this affection, I shall here adde two or three Rules pertaining to the morall use, and managing of it. And they are, First, concerning Objects of an *Inferiour* and *Transitory* nature, that our Desires be neither *Hasty* and precipitate, nor *Kaske*, and unlimited. And in matters more *High* and *Noble*, that they be not either *wavering* and interrupted Desires, or *Lazie* and negligent Desires.

Prov. 28. 20.
21.

I. For the first of these, we have a rule in *Solomon*, concerning Riches, which will hold in all other Objects of an immoderate desire: *He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be without sin*, I may add, *Not without cares neither*: for we know the nature of all Earthly things, they have some thing of the Serpent in them, to *Deceive*, The way of riches and profit, is a thorny way; the way

way of Honour and Ambition, a slippery and giddy way: the way of carnall Pleasures, a deep and a fowle way, the way of learning it self (the noblest of all sublunary things) an involved and intricate way. And certainly he had need have better eyes then a blinde Passion, who in so ill ground will make good haste and good speed together. *In labyrintho properantes ipsa velocitas implicat.* He is not the likeliest man to get first out of a Maze, who runnes fastest. An over nimble *Desire* is like the stomacke of a sick man newly recovered, more greedy, then strong, and fuller of Appetite then digestion. Whence arise immature and unconcocted counsels, blinde and ungoverned Resolutions: like those monstrous people, which *Plinie* speakes of, whose feet go backward, and behinde their eyes. For when the minde of man is once possessed with conceit of *Contentment* to be found in worldly glories, when the insinuations and sweet enchantments of Honour, Profit, Pleasure, Power, and Satans *Hac omnia* hath once crept upon the affection, and lulled reason asleep, it is then sufficient that we know the end, which we desire; we have not the patience to inquire after the right way unto it: because it is the suspicion of our greedy *Desires*, that the true means are commonly the most tedious, and that honesty for the most part goes the farthest way about. And hence withall it usually commeth to pass, that these hasty and preposterous Appetitions do hinder ends, and intercept Advantages which slowness with maturity might have made use of.

As.

ἐν ὁδοῖς μὴ
σπουδαίον,
ὅθι το ἀπ' αὐτῶν
Laert. lib. 1.

Plutarch. in
Lacullo.

As the Romane Souldiers by their greediness on their prey, missed of taking *Mitbridates*, who otherwise could not have escaped them. And therefore it was wise counsell of *Nestor* in the Poet.

Iliad 70.

Μή τις γμὺ ἐνάρων ὀπιθελλόμενός, μέλειπιδεν
Μιμνέτω, ὡς κεν πλεῖ σφετέρων ὀπί νήας ἰκνῆται.
Ἄλλ' ἀδ' ὅς τις κτεῖνω μὲν ἔπει τὰ δ' ἔτι τὰ ἔκκλησι
Νεκρὸς ἀμπεδίον συλήσῃτε τεθνεώτας.

*Let none go lingering after spoile, and stay
To load himselfe with a too haſtꝝ prey.
But firſt leſſ kill: We are ſure after ſuch fight,
Carcaſſes being riſſled cannot bite.*

Senec. de
Tranq. l. 2.
Arian. Epiſt.
lib. 1. c. 26.

2: The next Rule to keepe this Paſſion in order with reference unto inferiour Objects is, that it be not an *infinite* and unlimited *Deſire*. Appetite ſhould answer our power to procure, and our ſtrength to beare and to digeſt. Wee ſhould not go about to ſwallow a Camell, when a Gnat doth make us ſtraine; Immoderate *Deſires* can neither be ſatiſfied, nor concocted. And this unboundedneſſ of *Deſires* we are to take heed of; for theſe reaſons.

Ariſt Polit. lib
1. cap. 6.
Senec. Ep. 16.
39. de benefic.
lib. 2. c. 27;

1. Firſt, for the *unnaturalneſſ* of it: for all *unnatural* and *unnecessary Deſires* are *infinite*, as the Philoſopher hath obſerved; As he that is out of his way may wander infinitely. An unlimited *Deſire* is onely there requiſite, where the Object

Object thereof is Infinite, and ordained to perfect Mans Nature; but not where it is onely a means appointed for his benefit and comfort. Wherein he ought therefore then to enjoy his Contentment, when it is sufficient not to fill his minde which is immortall; and therefore not able to bee replenished with any perishing happiness; nor to outreach the vastness of his opinion, which being Erronious is likewise Infinite, (For *Omnis Error immensus*, as *Seneca* speaks,) but then only when it affords such conveniences, as where-withall the seasonable and vertuous employments of Nature may with content be exercised. It is then a corrupt *Desire* which proceeds not from our Want, but from our Vice. As that is not a naturall thirst, but a disease and distemper of the Body, which can never be satisfied.

Now the miseries of *unnaturall Desires* are first, that they corrupt and expell those which are Naturall: as multitudes of strangers in a City, doe eat out the Natives; thus in luxurious Men, strange Love doth extinguish that which is Conjugall.

Secondly, they ever bring vexation to the minde with them. As immoderate laughter, so immoderate Lusts are never without paine and convulsions of Nature. Morbid *desires* of the Mind are like an Itch or Vicer in the Body, which is with the same nayles both angered and delighted, and hath no pleasure but with vexation.

Thirdly, they are ever attended with Repen-

Cc

tance,

*Extranea non
augent bonum,
sed cōdiunt.*
Sen. Epist. 66.

*Nunquam finem
invenit libido.*
Gicer. Tusc.
Malum infinitum.
Arist. Ethic.
lib. 2. cap. 6.
Polir. l. 3. c. 5.
Exiguum
natura opinio
immensarium,
Epic. apud
Sen.

1.
Plutarch. in
Gryllo, & de
Sanit. tuenda.

2.
Plur. de Sanit.
tuenda

Sen. de Tranq.
cap. 2.

3.

*Alterna inter
cupiditatem
nostram &
pœnitentiam
vices sunt.
Sen. de Orig.
sap. cap. 27.*

4.
*Sen. de Benef.
l. 3. c. 3.*

*Quod ministe-
rium fueras,
ars haberi.
Capta. Liv. l. 39
Ἀπλὸς ἢ τὸ
ἰδίῳ ὀρεῖται.
Eth. l. c. 12.*

5.
*Tacit. Annal.
lib. 16.*

Plut. de Tranq.

*Favorinus apud
Ælium Spart.
in. Adr.*

tance both because in promises they disappoint, and in performances they deceive; and when they make offers of pleasure, do expire in pains; as those delicacies which are sweet in the mouth, are many times heavy in the stomacke; and after they have pleased the Palat doe torment the bowels. The minde surfeits on nothing sooner than on unnaturall Desires

Fourthly, for this reason they are ever changing and making new experiments; as weak and wanton stomacks which are presently cloy'd with an uniform dyet, and must have not onely a painefull but a witty Cooke, whose inventions may be able with new varieties to gratifie and humour the niceness of their appetite. As Nero had an officer who was called *Elegantia Arbitrator*, the inventor of new Lusts for him.

Lastly, unlimited Desires are for the most part envious and malignant: For he who desires every thing, cannot chuse but repine to see another have that which himself wanteth. And therefore *Dionysius* the Tyrant did punish *Philoxenus* the Musitian, because he could sing, and *Plato* the Philosopher, because he could dispute better than himselfe: In which respect hee did wisely, who was contented not to be esteemed a better Orator than he who could command thirty legions.

Secondly, *unbounded Desires* do worke *Anxiety* and *Perturbation* of Minde; and by that means disappoint Nature of that proper end which this Passion was ordained unto; namely, to be a means of obtaining some further good; whereas those Desires

Desires which are in their executions Turbid, or in their countenance Permanent, are no more likely to leade unto some farther end, than either a misty and darke, or a winding and circular way is to bring a Man at last unto his journeyes end; whereof the one is dangerous, the other vaine. And together with this they doe distract our noble Cares, and quite avert our thoughts from more high and holy desires. *Martha* her *Many things* and *Martes One thing* will very hardly consist together.

Lastly, there is one Corruption more in these unlimited Desires, they make a man *unthankfull* for former benefits as first, because *Caduca memoria futuro imminentium*. It is a strong presumption that he seldome looks back upon what is past, who is earnest in pursuing some thing to come. It is *S. Pauls* Profession and Argument in a matter of greater consequence, *I forget those things which are behind, and reach forth unto those things which are before*. And secondly, though a man should looke backe; yet the thoughts of such a benefit would be but sleight and vanishing, because the Mind finding present content in the liberty of a roving desire, is marvellous unwilling to give permanent entertainment unto thoughts of another Nature, which likewise (were they entertained) would be rather thoughts of murmuring than of thankfulness: every such man being willing rather to conceive the benefit small, then to acknowledge the vice and vastness of his owne Desires.

Sen. de Benef.
lib. 3.

The next rule which I observed for the go-

vernment of these Passions, doe respect those *Higher* and more glorious Objects of Mans Felicity: And herein,

I Our *Desires* are not to be *Wavering* and Inconstant, but Resolute and full of Quicknesse and Perseverance: First, because though we be poore and shallow vessels: yet so narrow and almost shut up are those passages, by which wee should give admittance unto the matter of our true happiness; yea so full are we already of contrary qualites, as that our greatest vehemency will not be enough, either to empty our selves of the one, or to fill our selves with the other. And therefore the true *Desires* of this Nature are in the Scripture set forth by the most patheticall and strong similitudes of *Hunger* and *Thirst*; and those not common neither, but the panting of a tired Hart after the rivers of water, and the gaping of the dry ground after a seasonable shower. Secondly, every desirable Object the higher it goes, is never the more united within it self, and drives the faster unto an unity: It is the property of Errours to be at variance: whereas *Truth* is *One*, and all parts thereof doe mutually strengthen and give light unto each other. So likewise in things *Good*, the more noble, the more knit they are, *scilicet* *diffident*: It is for sinnes to be at variance amongst themselves. And those lower Goods of Riches, Pleasure, Nobility, Beauty, though they are not Incomparable; yet they have no naturall Connexion to each other; & have therefore the less power to draw a constant and continued Desire. But for nobler and immateriall

terial goods we see how the Philosopher hath observed a connexion between all his morall vertues, whereby a man that hath one, is naturally drawne to a desire of all the rest: for the minde being once acquainted with the sweetness of one, doth not only apprehend the same sweetness in the others, but besides findeth it self not sufficiently possess'd of that which it hath, unless it bee thereby drawne to procure the rest: all whose properties it is by an excellent mutuall service to give light and lustre, strength and validity, and in some sort greater Vnity unto each other.

And lastly, for the highest and divinest good; the truth of Religion, that is in it self most of all other, One: as being a Beam of that Light and Revelation of that Will, which is Vnity it self: And therefore though we distinguish the Creed into twelve Articles, yet Saint *Paul* calleth them all but *Mysteries*, one Faith, as having but one Lord for the Object and End of them. Now then where the parts of good are so united, as that the one draweth on the other, there is manifestly required, united desire to carry the soul thereunto.

Ephes. 4. 3.

II. The last Rule which I observed, was that our Desires ought not to be faint and sluggish, but industrious and painefull, both for the arming us to avoid and withstand all oppositions and difficulties, which we are every where likely to meet withall in the pursuit of our happiness; and also for the wise and discreet applying of the severall furtherances requisite thereunto. And indeed that is no True, which is not an Operative

Desire: a Velleity it may be, but a Will it is not. For what ever a man wil have, he will seek in the use of such meanes, as are proper to procure it. Children may wish for Mountaines of Gold, and *Balaam* may wish for an happy death, and an Atheist may wish for a soule as earthly in substance as in Affection; but these are all the ejaculations rather of a Speculative fancie, than of an industrious affection. True desires as they are right in regard of their object, so are they laborious in respect of their motion. And therefore those which are idle and impatient of any paines, which stand like the Carman in the Fable, crying to *Hercules* when his Waine stuck in the mud to helpe it out, without stretching out his owne hands to touch it, are first unnaturall desires, it being the formall property of this Passion to put the Soule upon some notion or other. And therefore we see wheresoever Nature hath given it, she hath given likewise some manner of motion or other to serve it. And secondly they are by consequence undutifull and disobedient Desires, in that they submit not themselves unto that Law which requireth that we manifest the life and strength of our Love by the quickness and operation of it in our Desires. And lastly, such Desires are unusefull and fruitless: for how can an object which standeth in a fixed distance from the Nature, which it should perfect, be procured by idle and standing affections? The desires of the sluggard (saith *Salomon*) slay him, because his hands refuse to labour. These affections must have

have life in them, which bring life after them: Dead desires are deadly desires.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affection of Joy or Delight. The severall Objects thereof, Corporall, Morall, Intellectuell, Divine.



He next Passions in order belonging to the Concupiscible Faculty, are those two, which are wrought by the Presence of, and Union to an Object; and that is, when either wee by our desire have reached the Ob-

ject, which worketh Joy and Delight: or when in our sight the Object hath overtaken us, which worketh Griefe and Sorrow. And these two doe beare the most inward relation thro and influence upon all our actions. Whereupon Aristotle in his Ethicks hath made them the foundation of our vertues, and rules of our working. And the reason is naturall, because the end of our motion is to attaine rest, and avoid perturbation. Now Delight is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet tranquillity of mind, which we receive from the Presence and Fruition of that good, whereunto our Desires have carried us. And therefore the Philosopher

Καταξομῆς καὶ
τὰς ἀρετὰς
ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης.
Ethic. l. 2. c. 3.

Cicer. Tusc. l. 4.
ἡδονὸς ἐπαρεῖς
Zeno. apud
Lacti l. 7.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 2.
κινῆσις τῆς ψυχῆς,
Rhetor. l. 1.
c. 11.

in:

* ἰδὼν μᾶλλον
ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ ὄντι
ἢ ἐν κινήσει.
Eub. l. 7 c ult.

*Qui sup'it in
tacito gaudeat
ille Sinu Tibul.
Vid. Damascen.
de Orthodox.
fide, lib. 2. cap.
13. & Nemes.
de Anima. c. 18*

* *Arbores necat
omnem Succum
auferendo, &c.
Plin l. 15. c. 34*

in one place call it a motion of the Sou'e with a sensible and felt instauration of Nature, yet else-where he as truly telleth us that it standeth rather in * rest than motion; as on the other side Griefe is the streightning and anguish of our minds wrought out of the sense and burden of some present Evill oppressing our Nature. Now these Passions are divers, according to the diversity of the Objects: which are either *Sensitive* and Bodily; and then Delight is called *Voluptas* Pleasure, being a Medicine supply against bodily indigence and defects: or *Intellectuall* and Divine, and then it is called *Gaudium* Joy, being a sweet and delightfull tranquillity of minde, resting in the fruition and possession of a good. So also is the other Passion of *Sadness* considered; which in respect of the Body is called a Sense of *Paine*; in respect of the Soule, a Sense of *Griefe*.

First then for the *Object* of our *Delight*; it is onely that which can yee'd some manner of satisfaction unto our nature, nor as it is a corrupt and cringing, but as it is an *Empty* and perfectible nature. Whatsoever then is either *Medicinall* for the Repairing, or *Natural* for the Conserving, or any way *helpfull* for the advancing of a Creature, is the only true and allowable object of its Delight. Other pleasures which eat out and undermine Nature, as water which by little & little insensibly consumeth the bank against which it beatech, or as * *Ivie* which seemeth to adorn the Tree unto which it cleaveth, but indeed sucketh out and stealeth away the sap thereof, may haply yield

some

some measure of vanishing content to mindes, which taste every thing with a corrupted palate; but certainly such sophisticall premises can never infer in the conclusion any other then a perfunctory and roasting content. And therefore Seneca is bold to finde an impropriety in Virgils Epithite, *Mala Gaudia*, joyes which issue from a polluted fountain; as not having in them that inseparable attribute of absolute Delight; which is to be unvariable. For how can a minde unlosse blinded with its own impostures, and intangled in the errors of a mis-led affection) receive any nourishing and solid content in that, which is in it self vanishing, and unto its Subject destructive? Whatsoever then may be delighted in, must have some one of the fore-named conditions, tending either to the *Restitution* of decayed nature, to the *preservation* of entire nature, or to the *Perfection* of Empty nature. And to the former and imperfecter sort of these. *Aristotle* refers all corporall and sensitive Pleasures (unto which he therefore granteth a secondary and accidental goodnesse) which he calleth *ιατρικῆ* the Medicines of an indigent nature; whereby the defects thereof are made up, and it selfe disburden'd of those cares which for the most part use to follow the want of them.

Herein then I observe a double corruption; an unnaturall and unlimited Delight. *Unnaturall*, I mean those accursed pleasures which were exercised by men given over to vile affections, and greedy in the pursuing of lusts, whose very names

D d

abhorre

Epist. 39.
Aug de Civit
Dei, l. 14 c. 8.

Ἀναπληρωσις
τις καὶ ἰατρικὴ
τῆς σαρκωτικῆς
ἐνδεΐας.
Nemef. c. 18
Ethic. l. 7. c. 14.
ἀγαθὰ μὲν
τὰ.

* Undesitum
ut quæ ad func-
ta pertinent
in Temp'is ve-
neris verè ren-
tur. vid. Plu-
tarch. Rom.
9. 23.

Ethic. I. 10. c. 7.

abhorre the light. *Unlimited Delights* are those which exceed the bounds of Nature, and the prime Institution of lawfull and indifferent things. For such is the condition of those, that if they repair not, and strengthen nature, * they weaken and disenable it; as in the body Luxury breeds diseases, and in the minde Curiosity breeds Errours.

Other objects there are of a wider nature than those, which concern the Body; and they are *both the Morall and Contemplative Actions* of the Minde; To both which *Aristotle* hath attributed principally this passion; but more specially to the latter, whose object is more pure and whose Acts lesse laborious, as residing in that part of the Soul, which is most elevate from sense: and therefore most of all capable of the purest, simplest, and unmixed Delights. Now every thing is the more free, clear, independent, spiritual, by how much it is the more unmixed. And these are the choicest perfections, whereby the Soul may be filled with joy. It is true indeed, that oftentimes the contemplations of the minde have annexed unto them both Grief and Anxiety; but this is never natural to the act of Knowledge, which is alwayes in its own verue an impression of Pleasure: But it ariseth either out of the sublimity of the Object, which dazleth the power; or out of the weaknesse and doubtings of the Understanding, which hath not a clear light thereof; or out of the admixtion and steeping them in the Humours of the Affections, whereby men mi-

nister.

nister unto themselves desperate thoughts or weak fears, or guilty griefs, or unlimited Desires, according as is the property of the Object joyned with their own private distempers: Thus we see the Intuition of Divine Truth in minds of defiled affections, worketh not that sweet effect which is naturall unto it to produce, but Doubtings, Terrours and Disquietings of Conscience; it being the property of the workers of Darknesse to be afraid of the word of Light. But of all these former objects of mans delight (because they are amongst *Salomons* Catalogue of things under the Sunne) none are here without vexation and vanities: For to let passe the lightning of an idle mirth, which indeed is madnesse and not joy. For *Seneca* telleth us that true joy is a serious and severe thing: and not to meddle with riches and other secular Delights, which have wings to flie from us, and thorns to prick us, even that highest naturall Delight of the Mind, Knowledge, and the heavenly eloquence of the Tongues of Angels (which a man would think were above the Sun, and therefore not obnoxious to *Salomons* vanity) would be in man, without the right corrective thereof, but a tinkling noise, yelding rather a windy Pleasure than a true Delight. The properties wherof is not to puffe up, but to replenish. And therefore it is, the prayer of Saint Paul, *The God of Peace fill you with all joy.* True heavenly joy, is a filling, a satiating joy: a joy unspeakable, with S. Peter; a Peace past understanding, with S. Paul. Nor doth this property of overflowing and swallowing the

John 3. 20.
Job 21. 14.
Isa. 30. 11.
2 Pet. 3. 5.

Eccles. 2. 2, 3.

Sophoc. Ajax.
Senec. Epist. 23

Rom. 15. 13.

Minde adde any degrees of offence or anxiety thereunto: for it is not the weaknesse of the soul, as it is of the body to receive hurt from the excellency of that which it delighteth in: nor doth the minde desire to subdue or conquer, but only to be united with its object.

And here the only corruption of our Delight is, the deficiency and imperfections of it. For though this blessed Light leaves not any man in the shadow of death, yet it takes him not quite out of the shadow of sin, by the darknesse whereof he is without much of that lustre and glory, which he shall then have, when the righteous shall shine like the Sun in the Firmament. Yet at the least our endeavours must be, that though our joy cannot be here a *replenishing joy*, yet it may be an *operative joy*, and so work out the measure of its own fulnesse. I have done with the several Objects of mans delight, Corporal, Morall, Intellectual and Divine.

C H A P. XX.

Of the Causes of Joy. The union of the Object to the Faculty, by Contemplation, Hope, Fruition, Changes by accident a cause of Delight.



Now proceed to speak of the more particular causes and effects of this Passion. Touching the former, not to meddle with those which are unnatural, belluine, and morbid (which the Philosopher hath given some instances of) The generall cause is the natural *goodness* of the Object, and the particulars under that. Any thing which hath a power to *unite* and make the present Object with the Faculty. And that is done (to speak onely of intellectuall Powers) three manner of wayes; by *Contemplation*, by *Confidence*, and by *Fruition*, by thinking of it in the Minde, by expecting of it in the Heart, and by enjoying it in the whole Man.

Contemplation addes unto the Soul a double Delight: First, from its own property, it being the proper and natural agitation of mans minde; insomuch that those things which we abhor to know experimentally, our curious and contemplative nature desires to know speculatively. And

*Arist. Ethic.
lib. 7. c. 6.*

*Arist. Rhet.
lib. 1. cap. 1.*

therefore the Devils first temptation was drawn from the knowledge as well of evill as good, for he knew that the minde of Man would receive content in the understanding of that, which in it's own nature had no perfection in it.

But then secondly, in the Object of true Delight, Contemplation ministreth a farther joy, in that it doth in some sort pre-unite our Souls and our Blessednesse together : and this is partly the reason why *Aristotle* so much advanceth his Contemplative before his practique Felicity : For though this in regard of its immediate reference unto Communion, be of a more spreading and diffusive Nature, yet certainly in that sweetnesse of content, that serenity of Soul, that exaltation of thoughts which we receive from those noble motions of the higher Minde, the other doth far in pleasure and satisfaction surpasse all active happines. And hence we see in the parts of Mans Body, those which are (if I may so speak) more contemplative, have precedence to those that are more practique. The parts of Vision are before the parts of Action, the right eye is preferred before the right hand. Thus we may observe in God himself (notwithstanding in him there can be neither accession nor intermission of Delight) yet by way of expression to us ward, he did not in the creation of the World so much joy in his *fiat*, as in his *vidit*; not so much when he gave his creatures their *Nature*, as when he saw their *Goodnesse*: Nature being the Object of *Power*, but Goodness the Object of *Delight*; and therefore the day of his

his rest was more holy than the dayes of his working, that being appointed for the Contemplation, as these were for the production of his creatures.

And as Contemplation by way of *Prescience*, when it looketh forward on good things hoped: So also by way of *Memory*, when it looketh backward and revieweth evill things escaped, doth minister matter of renewed joy. No Man looketh on the Sea with more comfort, then he who hath escaped a shipwrack. And therefore when *Israel* saw the *Egyptians* dead on the Sea-shore, the fear of whom had so much affrighted them before, they then sang a Song of Triumph. Past troubles doe season, and as it were ballast present Comforts, as the snow in Winter encrease the beauty of the Spring.

*Arist. Rhet.
l. 1. cap. 10.*

But in this particular of *Contemplation*, notwithstanding the excellency of it, there may be Corruption in the Excesse (For in those matters of Delight, except they be such as are disproportioned to our corrupt Nature, I mean divine things, we seldome erre in the other extreme.) And that is, when we do not divide our selves between our parts, and let every one execute his proper function, so to attend upon meer mentall notions, as to neglect the practical part of our Life, and withdrew our selves from the fellowship and regard of humane society, is as wicked in Religion, as it would be in Nature monstrous to see a fire burn without light, or shine without heat (aberrations from the supreme Law being
in

in divine things impious as they are in naturall prodigious.)

And therefore that vowed sequestration and voluntary banishment of Hermits and Votaries from humane society, under pretence of devoting themselves to Contemplation, and a fore enjoying of the Light of God, is towards him as unpleasing as it is in it self uncomfortable, for their very pattern which they pretend in such cases to imitate, was not only a burning lamp by the heat of his own Contemplations; but a shining lamp too, by the diffusing of his own Comforts to the refreshing of others.

A second cause of Delight is the sure Confidence of the Minde. Whereby upon strong and unerring grounds, it waiteth for the accomplishment of its desires: so that what ever doth encourage our Hope, doth therewithall strengthen and enlarge our Delight. *Spe gaudent* saith S. Paul, and *Sperantes gaudent* saith the Philosopher, Hope and Joy go both together: For where Hope is strong, it doth first divert and take off the Minde from poring upon our present wants, and withall ministreth tranquillity unto it from the evidence of a future better estate.

But heere we must take heed of a deep Corruption: For though I encline not to that opinion which denyeth Hope, all asswaging and mitigating force, in respect of evils, or any power to settle a floating Mind; yet to have an ungrounded Confidence, and either out of Presumption or Security to resolve upon uncertain and casuall events,

there

Rom. 12. 12.
Arist. Rh. 1.
l. 1. c. 11, 12.

there-hence to deduce Arguments of Comfort,
works but an empty and imaginary Delight, like
his in the Poet :

— *Petit ille dapes sub imagine somni,
Craque vana movet, dentemque indente fatigat.*

Who dreaming that he was a Guest
At his Imaginary Feast,
Did vainly glut upon a Thought,
Tyring each Jaw and Tooth for naught :
And when he fanci'd dainty meat,
Had nothing but a Dream to eat :

Or like the Musician in *Plutarch*, who having
pleased *Dionysius* with a little vanishing Musick,
was rewarded with a short and deceived Hope of
a great Reward. A presumptuous Delight though
it seem for the time to minister as good content
as that which is raised on a sounder bottome; yet
in the end will work such inconveniences as shall
altogether countervail and over-weigh the de-
ceipt of its former Joyes : For the Minde being
mollified and puffed up with windy and un-nou-
rishing comfort, is quite dis-abled to bear the
assault of some sudden evil, as having its forces
scattered by Security, which caution and fear
would have collected. For we know in Bodies,
Union strengthneth natural motion, and weakneth
violent; and in the Minde the collecting and uni-
ting of it doth both enable it for prosecution of
its owne ends, and for resisting all opposite force.

E e

It

Ovid Met.
Isai. 29. 8.
μη σὺ θάνῃς
λεμῶ πάντες
χρυσῶσιν ὀρε-
ποις.
Theoc. Idyl. 21.

Plut. de Audi.

It is therefore no comforting but a weakning Confidence, which is not provident and operative.

The third and most effectual cause of *Delight* is the *Fruition* of Good, and the *real Union* thereof unto the Minde : for all other things work delight no farther, then either as they look towards, or work towards this. And therefore if we mark it in all matter of pleasure and joy, the more the *Union* is the more is the *Delight*. (And *Union* is the highest degree of *Fruition* that can be) thus we see the presence of a Friend, yields more content then the absence, and the embraces, more then the presence : so in other outward Delights, those of *Incorporation*, are greater then those of *Adhesion*. As it is more natural to delight in our meats then in our garments ; the one being for an union inward to increase our strength ; the other outward onely to protect it. In the understanding likewise, those assents which are most cleer, are most pleasant, and perspicuity argues the perfecter union of the Object to the Faculty. And therefore we have *Speculum* and *Ænigma* put together by *S. Paul*, *We see as in a glass darkly*, where the weakness of our knowledge of God is attributed to this, that we see him not face to face with an immediate union unto his glory, but at a distance in the creature and in the word, the *glass* of *Nature* and of *Faith* (both which are in their kinde evidences of things not seen) we shall only there have a perfection of joy, where we shall have a consummate union, *in his presence* only is the *fulness of joy*.

Now

Now three things there are which belong unto a perfect fruition of a good thing : First, *Propriety* unto it, for a sick man doth not feel the joy of a sound mans health, nor a poor man of a rich mans mony. *Propriety* is that which makes all the emulation and contention amongst men, one man being agrieved to see another to have that which he either claimeth or covereth. Secondly, *Possession*. For a man can reap little comfort from that which is his own, if it be any way detained and with held from him, which was the cause of that great contention between *Agamemnon* and *Achilles*, and between the *Greeks* and *Trojans* because the one took away and detained that which was the others. Thirdly, *Accommodation*, to the end for which a thing was appointed : For a man may have any thing in his custody, and yet receive no comfort nor real delight from it, except he apply it unto those purposes for which it was instituted. It is not then the having of a good, but the using of it which makes it beneficial.

Now besides those natural causes of *Delight*, there is by accident one more; to wit, the *Change* and *Variety* of good things, which the diversity of our natures and inclinations, and the emptiness of such things as we seek Delight from, doth occasion : where Nature is simple and uncompounded, there one and the same operation is always pleasant; but where there is a mixed and various Nature, and diversity of Faculties, unto which do belong diversity of inclinations, there changes do minister Delight : as amongst lear-

Τὰ αὐτῶν πε-
ρι ἡδῆς διδ. 2.
ΦΙΛΟΤΕΛΕΙΣ.
Arist. Rhet. l. 2.
Pol. lib. 2. c. 3.
Ethic. l. 8. c. 12.

Arrian. Epiſt.
l. 1. c. 22.

Ethic. lib. 7.
cap. ult. lib. 10.
cap. 4.

and men, variety of studies; and with luxurious men, variety of pleasures.

And this the rather, because there are no subllary contentments, which bring not a * *Satiety* along with them, as hath been before observed. And therefore the same resolution which the Philosopher gives for the walking of the Body, when he enquireth the reason why in a journey the inequality of the wayes do lesse weary a man then when they are all plain and alike, we may give for the walking and wandring of the Desire (as *Solomon* calls it) to wit, that change and variety do refresh Nature, and are in stead of a rest unto it. * And therefore as I have before observed of *Nero*, the same hath *Tully* observed of *Xerxes*, that he propounded rewards to the inventors of new and changeable pleasures.

Hereunto may be added as a further cause of *Pleasure*. Whatsoever serveth to let out and to lessen Grief, as *Words*, ^b *Tears*, *Anger*, *Revenge*, because all these are a kind of Victory, then which nothing bringeth greater pleasure. And therefore *Homer* saith of *Revenge*, that it is sweeter then the dropping honey.

* *Gustatamigis*
quam *Pocata*
delectant.

Cic. Tusc. lib. 2.

Prob. Sest. 5.

quest. 1.

Vid. Senec. de

Tranq. c. 2, 3.

a *Quod etiam*
de Tiberio no-
tavit, *Sueton.*
cap. 43.

Qui hoc officio
surgebantur
dicti (ut vide-
tur) ab *Ælio*
Lampridio *Ve-*
luptarii in Alex.
Sever.

b *Κοιραν* η
χαρην αυτων
δυναται.


Xenoph. Helle-
nic. lib. 7.

Est quædam
etiam volendi
voluptas.

Plin. & Cic. de
sine l. 1.

Arist. Rhet.

lib. 1. cap. 11.



CHAP. XXI.

Of other Causes of Delight. Unexpectednesse of Good. Strength of Desire. Imagination. Imitation. Fitnesse and Accommodation Of the effects of this Passion. Reparation of Nature. Dilatation. Thirst in noble Objects, satiety in Base. Whetting of industry. A timorous unbelief.



Unto these more principal Causes of this Affection, I shall briefly adde these few which follow.

I The *suddenness* and *unexpectednesse* of a good thing causeth the greater Delight in it. For *Expectation* of a thing makes the Minde feed upon it before hand, as young Gallants who spend upon their estates before they come to them, and by that means make them the lesse when they come. As sometimes it happeneth with choice and delicate stomachs. That the sight and smell of their meat doth half cloy and satiate them before they have at all tasted any of it : so the long gazing upon that which we Desire by *Expectation* doth as it were defloure the Delight of it before fruition.. Whereas on the other side, as the Poet expresseth it.

Vix sum apud
me ita animus
commotus est
metu spe gau-
dio mirando
hoc tanto tan-
toque repenti-
no bono, Te-
rent. Andr. Al.

S. 4.
Tacitus quare-
lim animo meo
tum repentinum
tamque magnum
non concipiente
gaudium. Apul.
Afin. Aur. l. 11.

Sephocl. Antig

— ἡ ἔκτος καὶ παρ' ἐλπίδας χαρὰ,
 "Εοικεν ἄγχι μῆκος εἶδεν ἡδόν.

*No joy in greatness can compare with that,
 Which doth our hopes and thoughts anticipate.*

a Multis mor-
 tem attulit
 gaudium in-
 gens, iospira-
 rum interclusa
 anima, & vim
 magni novisq;
 morus non su-
 stinente.

A. Gell. l. 3. c. 1.
 lib. 3 cap. 1. &
 cap. 15.

b Sueton. in
 Aug. cap. 99.
 c Arist. Ethic.
 1004.

d Delectat
 quicquid est
 admirabile,
 Cic. patric.
 Orat.

e Proximorum
 in curio si lon-
 ginquā specta-
 mur. l. in. lib

8 Epist. 20.

f Vide Cl. m

Alex. Pedag.
 l. 2 c. 1.

Plin. l. 9 c. 34

g lib. 22 c. 2.

Pl. arch de tu-
 en. la. f. aritate.

c Vid. Ciceron.
 Tuscul. qu. 1 5.

So strong and violent hath been the immuta-
 tion which *sudden joy* hath wrought in the Bo-
 dy, a that many (as I have formerly noted) have
 been quite overwhelmed by it, and been made
 partakers of *Augustus* his wish, to enjoy an
βένθρασια and to dye pleasantly. And for this
 Reason it is that c new things, and such as we d ad-
 mire, and were e not before acquainted withal, do
 usually delight us, because they surprize us, repre-
 senting a kinde of strangeness unto the minde,
 whereby it is enlarged and enriched. For strange
 and new things have ever the greatest price
 set upon them. As I noted before of the Ro-
 man Luxury, that it gloryed in no Delicates but
 those which were brought out of f strange Coun-
 treys, and did first pose Nature, before either feed
 or adorn it.

2 *Strength of Desire*, doth on the other side
 enlarge the pleasure of fruition, because Nature
 ever delighteth most in those things which cost us
 dearest, and strong desires are ever painful.
 When g *Darius* in his flight drank muddy water,
 and *Proton* did eat dry bread, they both professed
 that they never felt greater pleasure: strength
 of Appetite marvellously encreasing the De-
 light

light in that which satisfied it. For want and Difficulty are great Preparations to a more feeling fruition, as Bees gather excellent Honey out of the bitterest herbs. And as we say, *Nulla sunt firmiora quam quæ ex dubiis facta sunt certa.* Those evidences are surest, which were made clear out of doubtful. So those pleasures are sweetest, *Quæ suaves sunt ex tristibus*, which have had wants and fears, and difficulties to provide a welcome for them. And therefore *b* Wrestlers and Fencers, and such like Masters of Game, were wont to use their hands unto heavy weights, that when in their Games they were to use them empty and naked, they might do it with the more expediteness and pleasure.

3 *Imagination* and Fancy, either in our selves or other Men, is many times, the foundation of Delight. *Diogenes* his sullen and Melancholly fancy took as much pleasure in his Tub and Staff, and water, as other men in their Palaces, and amplest provisions, And he in the Poet.

*Qui se credebat miros audire Tragados
In vacuo latus sessor Plausor quæ Theatro. —
Cum redit ad sese, pol me occidistis Amici
Non servastis ait, cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demptus per vim mentis gratissimus error.*

Who thought he heard rare Tragedies of wit,
And in an empty Theater did sit.
And give Applauses: but being heal'd, complains
Friends I'm not sav'd by this your love, but slain:
Rob'd

a Plutarch de
Tranquill.
b Quintil. lib. 5.
cap. 12.
c Quintil. lib.
11. cap. 2.
Si mihi tran-
quilla & plac-
ta omnia
fuissent, incre-
dibili qua
nunc fruor læ-
titiæ volup-
tate carnissem,
Cic. Orat. post
Reditum.
Max. Tyrinus.
Dissert. 33.
Plutarch. de
profect. virtu-
tem.

*H*orat. Epist.
lib. 2. Ep.

Robb'd of that sweet Delight I then did finde,
In the so grateful error of my Minde.

Fictas Fabulas
cum volup-
tate legimus,
Cic. de fin. l. 5.

Vid. Plutarch.
de Aud. Poet.
& Quintil.
lib. 2. cap. 23.

Hinc encomi-
um stultitiae,
pediculi febri-
um, &c.
Plaut. in Au.
lul. Horat. l. 1.
Sat. 9.

Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.
Plutarch. de
Aud. Poetis

Hence likewise it is that Men are delighted with Mythologies and Poeticall Fables, with Elegancies, Jests, Urbanity, and Flowers of wit, with Pageants, Poms, Triumphs, and publick Celebrities, because all these and other the like, are either the fruit or food of the Imagination.

4 Upon the same Reason we are marvellously Delighted with lively *Imitation*, as with those Arts which do curiously expresse the works and lineaments of Nature. Insomuch that the similitudes of those things doe wonderfully content us whose naturall Deformities wee abhorre. We are well pleas'd with *Homers* Description of *Thirsis*, and with *Sophocles* his expression of the Ulcer *Philoctetes*, with *Parmeno* his Imitation of the grunting of a Hog, and *Theodorus* his of the ratling of Wheels, with *Plautus* his description of a chargeable Wife, and *Horace* his of a garrulous companion, though the things themselves we should willingly decline.

5 Those things Delight every man which are οἰκεία τῇ φύσει, as the Philosopher speaks, *Suitably fitted*, and *accommodated* to his Genius and frame of Nature, as in the same Plant, the Bee feedeth on the Flower, the Bird on the Seed, the Sheep on the Blade, the Swine on the Root. So in the same Author one man observeth the Rationall, another the Historicall, a third the Elegant and more Rhetoricall passages, with speciall De-
light

light, according as they are best accommodated unto the Complexion of each minde. And I finde it observed out of *Hipocrates*, that even in the Body many times that kinde of meat which Nature receiveth with Complacency, and with a more particular Delight, though in it self it may be worse; yet proveth better nourishment unto that Body then such, as though better in it self, findeth yet a reluctancy and backwardness of Nature to close or correspond with it. The same seeds are not proper for the sand and for the clay, nor the same imployment of minde for men of various and different Constitutions. Nor is there I beleeve any thing which would more conduce to the generall advancement of Arts and Learning, then if every Mans Abilities were fixed and limited to their proper course, which his naturall sufficiency did more particularly lead him unto. For hereupon would grow a double Delight, and by consequence improvement (for every thing growes most when it is best pleased:) The one from Nature, the other from Custom and acquaintance, which conquereth and digesteth the difficulties of every thing we set about, and maketh them yet more naturall unto us. And therefore the Philosopher reckoning up many things that are pleasant to the mind, putteth these two in the first place. These things that are *Naturall*, and those that we are *accustomed* unto, wherein there is least violence offered unto the inclinations and impressions of Nature.

Touching the *Effects* of this Passion, I shall

F f

name

*Coel. Rhod. 2
lib. 5. cap. 34.
Nemes ex
videm dicitur eyes-
yala. tis xpi
pl'siv i'geous.
Arist. c. 18.*

*Ethic. I. 10. c. 9.
το κατὰ φύσιν
τὸ εὐδαιμόνιον
τὸ μὴ βλαπτικόν
ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν τῷ
μα εὖν.
Rhet. I. c. II.*

name but these few: First, the effects of *Corporall Delights* are only (as I observed out of *Aristotle*) *medicinall*, for repairing the breaches and ruines of our decayed Natures; for animating and refreshing our languishing spirits; for preserving our selves in a good ability to execute Offices of a higher Nature; for furnishing the World with a succession of men, which otherwise the greediness of mortality would in short time devour. These are true and intended ends of those Delights, and when they once transgress these bounds, they begin to * oppress Nature, weaken and distemper the body, clog the minde, and fill the whole man with satiety and loathing, which is the reason (as was even now noted) why men too violently carried away with them, are presently over cloyd with one kinde, and must have variety to keep out loathing: which *Tacitus* observes in that monster of women, *Messalina, facilitate adulterorum in fastidium versa ad incognitas libidines profuebat*; that loathing more easie and common sias, she betook her self to unnaturall lusts, and I verily think is particularly intended by *St. Paul, Rom. 1. 26.*

A second effect of Joy is *Opening and Dilatation* of the heart and countenance, expressing the serenity of the minde, whence it hath the name of *Laetitia*, as it were a broad and spreading passion. Now the reason of this motion occasioned by Joy, is the naturall desire, which man hath to be united to the thing wherein he delights, to make way and passage for its entrance into him. And hence we find in this Passion an exultation and

egress

* τὴν γὰρ ἰσο-
ρῶν ὅταν ἀν-
δρῶν ἄνδρῶν
ἡδονῇ ἐξω-
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἂν
ἐμμελῶς ἡ-
μεῖς ἔμελῶν,
Sophoc.

Plut in Gryllo
Annal. l. 11.

Laetitia amen-
tes latitudine.

egress of the spirits, discovering a kinde of looseness of Nature in her security, doing many things not out of resolution, but instinct and power transporting both minde and body to sudden and unpremeditated expressions of its own content: For of all Passions Joy can be the least dissembled or suppressed, *Nam gaudio Cogendi vis inest*, saith *Pliny*, it exerciseth a kind of welcome violence and tyranny upon a man, as we see in *Dauids* dancing before the Ark; and the lame mans walking, and leaping, and praising God, after he had been cured of his lameness. And this diffusion of the spirits sheweth both the haste and forwardness of Nature, in striving as it were to meet her Object, and make large room for its entertainment, as also to dispell and scatter all adverse humours that would hinder the ingress of it, and lastly to send forth newes as it were through the whole Providence of nature, that all the parts might beare a share in the common Comfort.

Panigr. ad Trajan.

Thirdly, those noble delights which arise from heavenly causes, doe withall cause a sweet thirst and longing in the Soule after more, as some colours doe both delight the sight and strengthen it: For while God is the object, there cannot be either the satiety to cloy the Soule, nor such a full comprehension as will leave no roome for more.

Plut. in Peric.

Thus they who delight in the fruition of God by grace, doe desire a more plentiful fruition of him in Glory; and they that delight in the sight of Gods Glory, doe still desire to be for ever so delighted. So that their Desire is without Anxiety;

because they are *satiated* with the thing which they do desire, and their *satiety* is without *loathing*; because still they desire the thing wherewith they are *satiated*; they desire without Griefe, because they are replenished; and they are replenished without weariness, because they desire still: they see God, and still they desire to see him: they enjoy God, and still they desire for ever to enjoy him: they love and praise God, and make it their immortall business still to love and praise him:

Et quem semper habent, semper habere volunt.

Whom they for ever have, with love yet higher
To have for ever, they do still desire:

* Aristid.
Tom 1 Orat in
Putea. *Æscul.*

* Divine Joy is like the water of *Esculapius* his Well, which they say is not capable of putrefaction.

Arist. *Ethic.*
l. 10. c. 5.
Polit. l. 8. c. 5.

* Plat de Hom.
AGell, l. 1. c. 11

Fourthly, Delight whetteth and intendeth the actions of the Soule towards the thing wherein it delighteth; it putteth forth more force, and more exactness in the doing of them, because it exonerateth the minde of all those dulling Indispositions which unfitted it for Action. And for this reason happily it is, that the Lacedemonians used * Musick in their Warres to refresh and delight Nature: For Joy is in stead of recreation to the Soule, it wonderfully disposeth for business. And those Actions which nature hath made necessary, it hath put pleasure in them, that thereby Men might be quickned and excited unto them;

* and

* and therefore Wise men have told us that pleasure is *Sal & condimentum vite*. The Sauce which seasoneth the Actions of men.

Lastly, because the Nature of man is usually more acquainted with sorrowes, then with pleasures, therefore whether out of *Conscience* of guilt, which deserves no joy; or out of *experience*, which useth to find but little joy in the World, or out of *fear* of our own aptness to mistake, or out of a *provident care* not to close or feed upon a Delight, till we are fully assured of our possession of it, and because usually the minde after shaking is more settled, whether for these or any other reasons, we see it usually come to pass, that vehement joy doth breed a kinde of jealousy and unbelief, that sure the thing we have is too good to be true? and that then when our eyes tell us, that they see it, they doe but dazle and deceive us, as *Quod nimis volumus hand facile credimus* :

*The thing which we desire should be,
We scarce believe when we do see.*

So *Jacob* when he heard that his son *Joseph* was alive, fainted, being astonished at so good newes, and could not believe it. And when God restored the Jewes out of Captivity, they could think no otherwise of it then as a dreame. And *Peter* when he was by the Angel delivered out of Prison, took it for a vision onely, and an apparition, and not for a truth.

Ff 3

And

* *Cicer. offic.*
lb. 1.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. l. 2.
Plant Capn.
Aff. 2. Sc. 4.
Quintil. lib. 5.
cap. 14.

Gen. 45. 26.
Psal. 120. 1.

Acts 12. 9.
Luke 24. 42.

And lastly, of the Disciples after Christs resurrection, when he manifested himselfe to them, it is said, *That for very joy they beleeved not*, their feares keeping back, as it were, and questioning the truth of their joyes, *Omnia tua timens*, not suffering them too hastily to believe what their eyes did see.

As in the Sea when a storme is over, there remaines still an inward working and volutation, which the Poet thus expresseth.

*Vt si quando ruit, debellataque rel quit
Eurus aquis, pax ipsa tumet, pontumque jacentem,
Ex animis jam volvit hyems —*

As when a mighty tempest doth now cease,
To trosse the roaring Billowes, even that peace
Doth swell and murmure, and the dying Wind
On the calm'd Sea leaves his own Prints behinde.

Even so in the Minde of man, when it's feares are blown over, and there is a calme upon it, there is still *a motus trepidationis*, and a kinde of sollicitous jealousie of what it enjoyes.

And this *unbelieve* of joy is admirably set forth in the Carriages of *Penelope*, when her Nurse and her Sonne endeavoured to assure her of the truth of *Vlysses* his returne after so many yeares absence by the Poet, in which doubting she still persisted, till by certain signes *Vlysses* himself made it appeare unto her, whereupon she excused it after this manner.

*Aenead. 4:
Majus gaudi-
um quam quod
universum ho-
mines caperent
vix satis credere
se quisque audisse
velut somni ve-
nam speciem.
Liv. lib. 33.
Odiss. x. 213.*

Ἄντ' ὅτ' ἤν' ὅτ' μὴ τὸ πρῶτον μὴ δὲ νῦν.

*My deare Ulysses let it not offend,
That when I saw you first, I did suspend
My love with my believe, since my faint breast
When first with those glad tidings it wa blest,
Trembled with doubts, lest by such forged lies
Some crafty false pretender might devise
To have ensnar'd me, and with these false sounds,
Defil'd my love, and multiply'd my wounds.*

CHAP. XXII.

*Of the Affection of Sorrow, the Object of it
evill, sensitive, intellectuall, as present in
it self, or to the minde, by memorie, or sus-
pition, particular causes, effects of it. Fear,
Care, Experience, Erudition, Irresoluti-
on, Despaire, Execration, Distempers of
Body.*



THE opposite Passion to this of
Delight, is *Griefe* and *Sorrow*,
which is nothing but a per-
turbation and unquietness,
wrought by the pressure of
some present evill, which the
minde in vaine struggleth with, as finding it self a-
lone too impotent for the conflict. Evill I say
either

either formerly, as in sinne, or paine, present, or feard : or privatively, such as is any good thing which we have lost, or whereof we do despaire, or have been disappointed. And this is in respect of its object as the former Passion, either *Sensitive* or *Intellectuall*. Sensitive is that anguish and distresse of nature which lyeth upon the body. A passion in this sense little conducing to the advancement of Nature, being alwayes joyned with some measure of its decay, but onely as it serve sometimes for the better fortifying it against the same or greater evils, it being the condition as of corporall delights, by custome to grow burden some and distastefull, so of paines to become easie and familiar.

The other and greater Grief is *Intellectuall*, which in *Solomons* phrasis is, *A wounded spirit* ; so much certainly the more quick and piercing, by how much a spirit is more vitall then a body, besides the anguish of the soule, findes alwayes, or works the same sympathy in the body, but outward sorrowes reach not ever so farr, as the spirituall and higher part of the soule. And therefore we see many men out of a mistake, that the distress of their soules hath been wrought by a union to their bodies, have voluntarily spoiled this, to deliver and quit that.

The causes of this Passion, are as in the forme; whatsoever hath in it power to disturbe the minde by its *union* thereunto. There are then two *Conditions* in respect of the *Object*, that it be *Evill* and *Present*. *Evill* first, and that not onely *formally* in it selfe

Self; but *apprehensively* to the understanding. And therefore we see, that many things which are in their Nature *Evil*; yet out of the particular distemper of the Minde, and deceitfulness in them, may prove pleasant thereunto. And this is the chief Corruption of this Passion, I mean the misplacing, or the undue suspending of it: For although strictly in its own property, it be not an advancement of Nature, nor adds any perfection, but rather weakens it; yet in regard of the reference which it bears either to a superior Law, as testifying our Love unto the Obedience, by our grief for the breach thereof: or to our consequent Carriage and Actions, as governing them with greater Wisdom and Providence, It may be said to add much perfection to the minde of Man, because it serves as an inducement to more cautelous living.

The next Condition in respect of the Object, is that it be *Present*, which may fall out either by *Memory*, and then our *Grief* is called *Repentance*: or *Fancy* and *Suspition*, and so it may be called *Anxiety* of Minde: or by *Sence* and present union, which is the principal kinde, and so I call it *Anguish*.

For the first, nothing can properly and truly work *Grief* by ministry of *Memory*, when the Object or Evil is long since past, but those things which do withal stain our Nature, and work impressions of permanent deformity. For as it falleth out, that many things in their exercise pleasant, prove after in their operations offensive and burthensome; so on the other side many things which for the time of their continuance are irksom

Heb. 12. 11.

and heavy, prove yet after occasions of greater joy:
Whether they be means used for the procuring of
further good ;

Aeneid. l. 1.
Iliad. 4.

*Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,
Tendimus in Latium, sedes ubi, &c.*

Through various great mishaps and dangers store,
We hasten to our home and wished shore :
Where fates do promise rest, where Troy revives,
Onely reserve your selves for better lives.

Or whether they be Evils which by our Wis-
dom we have broken through and avoided ;

— *sed & has olim meminisse juvabit.*

When we are arrived at ease,
Remembrance of a storm doth please.

The Objects then of *Repentance* are not our
passive, but our active Evils : not the Evils of suf-
fering, but the Evils of doing ; for the memory of
afflictions past, represents unto us Nature loosed
and delivered, and should so much the more in-
crease our joy, by how much redemption is for
the most part a more felt blessing then Immuni-
ty ; but the memory of *sins* past represents Nature
obliged, guilty, and imprisoned ; And so leaves a
double ground for *Grief*, the stain or pollution,
and the guilt or malediction, a deformity to the
Law,

Law, and a curse from it. It would be improper here to wander into a digression touching *Repentance*, onely in a word, it is then a *Godly Sorrow*, when it proceeds from the memory of Evil not so much in respect of the *punishment* as of the *stain*. When we grieve more because our sin hath made us *unholy*, then because it hath made us *unhappy*; and not onely because we are run into the danger of the Law, but because we are run out of the way of the Law. When it teacheth us to cry, not onely with *Pharaoh*, take away this *Plague*; but with *Israel* in the Prophet, take away *Iniquity*,

Concerning *Grief of Preocupation*, arising out of a suspicious *Fear* and expectation of Evil, I know not what worth it can have in it, unless haply thus, that by fore-accustoming the Minde to Evil, it is the better strengthened to stand under it: for Evils by premeditation, are either prevented or mitigated, the Minde gathering strength and wisdom together to meet it. And therefore it is prudent advice of *Plutarch*, that we should have a prepared Minde, which when any Evil falleth out, might not be surprised by it. To say as *Anaxagoras* did when he heard of the death of his son, *Scio me genuisse mortalem*, I know that I begat a mortal son. I know that my riches had wings, and that my comforts were mutable. Preparedness composeth the Minde to patience. *Ulysses* wept when he saw his Dog, which he did not when he saw his Wife: he came prepared for the one, but was surprised by the other.

Plut. de Aud.
Præcogitavi
mali molis
id. Sen.
Epist. 77. Vid.
Cic. Tul. qu. l. 3.

Plut. de Tranq.

*Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
Et per fere soror posero.*

Had I forseen this Grief, or could but fear it,
I then should have compos'd my self to bear it.

*Consolatio ad
Helviam.*

Rber. 41.

Odiss. 422.

Which is the reason why Philosophers prescribe the whole course of Mans Life, to be onely a meditation upon Death; because that being so great an Evil in it self, and so sure to us, it ought to be expected, as that it may not come sudden, and finde us unprepared to meet the King of Terrour. For it is in the property of custom and acquaintance, not onely to alleviate and assuage evils (to which purpose *Seneca* speaks, *Perdidisti tot mala si nondum miseria esse didicisti*, thou hast lost thy afflictions if they have not yet taught thee to be miserable) but further as *Aristotle* notes, to work some manner of delight in things, at first troublesom and tedious; and therefore he reckoneth mourning amongst pleasant things, and tears are by Nature made the witnesses as well of Joy as of Grief.

Καὶ κύνει ἀπ' ἡμῶν ὡς πατεῖσα, πολλὰ δ' αὖτ' αὐτῇ
 Διέκρουσ' ὀνυχίοις· ἔπειτα σπασσάμενος ἔδωκε γαῖαν.

He kiss the shore, fast tears ran from his eyes,
When he his native Country first espies.

And *Seneca* (whether Philosophically or Rhetorically) observes, that obstinacy and resolute-
ness in

in grief, doth so alter the nature of it, *ut fiat tandem infelicis animi prava voluptas dolor.* That at length it turns into a kinde of pleasant pain, sure I am the Apostle biddeth us count it *Joy*, when we fall into temptations.

Et qualem etiam dolendi volupt.
Plin l 8. ep. c. 6.

The last presence of Grief was *Real*, when some ponderous evil either of affliction or of Sin, the loss of some good wherein we delighted, the disappointment of some hope whereon we relyed, meeting with impotency in our selves to remove what we suffer, to recover what we lose, to supply what we want, doth braise and lie with a heavy weight upon the tenderest part of Man, his Soul and Spirit. And in this I cannot finde considered meerly in it self any worth at all (it being nothing else but the violation and wounding of Nature) but in order to the effects which it produceth it may have sundry denominations, either of a serviceable, or of a corrupt affection. I shall but briefly name them, and pass over to the next.

The profitable effects are principally these : First, as it is an instrument of publick administration and discipline. It is as it were both a School-master and a Physitian, to teach and to cure : so the Philosopher telleth us, that by pleasure and pain, Children are trained up unto Arts and Sciences, the Rod being unto the Minde, as a Rudder unto a Ship : so the Prophet David putteth chastisement and instruction together : *Blessed is the man whom thou chastenest, and teachest out of thy law, and again, It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy Commandments.* Therefore God gave

Clem. Alex.
Pædag. l. i. c. 8.
Ethicl. l. 10. c. 1.
Calamitates
remedia. Sen. de.
Tranq. l. 1. c. 9.
Psal 94. 12.
Psal. 119. 71.
Ier. 22. 21.

Grande doloris
Ingenium mi-
serisque venit
solertia rebus.

Ethic. 1. 2. c. 3.

Sen de otio,
Sapi. c. 4.
Epist. 6. 7.

Ethic. 3. c. 8.

*Οδ' ἐσθλὸς
ἐσθλὸς καὶ
συμφορᾶς ὑπο-
φύειν θεοφθίς,
&c
Eurip. Hec.
Vid. Plut l de
Adu'at. &
Amir. Consol.
ad Apollonium
Plut. de Aud.

gave the Law in the *Wilderness*, where the people were in want and under discipline, to note that *Grief* is a good instrument unto learning; for after in their prosperity they would not be so.

And as it is a means to teach, so it is a means to *cure* too; for therefore pain is usually made the matter of punishment, that as men offend by sinful pleasure, so they may be amended by wholesome sorrow. *ἀλὶ γὰρ ἰατρικαὶ διὰ τῶν ἐν αἰτιῶν*: Cures are usually wrought by contraries.

Again, it doth by *Experience* strengthen and harden, making both wise and able, for enduring further calamities. *Quos Deus amat, indurat & exercet*: God exerciseth and traineth those whom he loves, bringing them up *non in deliciis, sed in castris*, not in Paradise, but in a Wilderness. Now as the Philosopher speaketh *δοκεῖ ἡ μετῴδια τ' ἐν ἐνστάδι Ἀνδρείας εἶναι*. Experience is a kind of fortitude and armour whereby a man contemneth τὰ κένα τῶν κῶνων many things which are indeed but *terrisulamenta*, skar-crowes to ignorant and weak minds. Whereas many pains have wrought patience, and patience experience of an issue and escape, that experience arms the soul unto more patience in new assaults. For if Gold were a rational creature, having past through the fire and kept its own Nature unviolated, it would never after be the lesse afraid of the fire. And as *Plutarch* excellently speaketh, A wise man should be like gold to keep his Nature in the fire. Strangers dislike many things in a place, which those that are home-born, and used unto, do easily digest: thus the Apostle argueth,

argueth, God hath delivered, and doth deliver ;
therefore he will deliver. So *Ulysses* in *Homer*.

2 Cor. 1. 9, 10.

Τλήσομαι ἐν στήθεσιν ἔχοντα λατύνοντα θυμῶν,
Ἦδη γὰρ μάλα πολλὰ ἔπαυον.

Odyss. ε. 222.

*I'll bear with a firm minde, what ere comes more,
Having endured so many griefs before.*

And elsewhere on the same manner he encouraged his companions on the Sea.

Ὀφίλοισι δὲ γὰρ πῶτι κακῶν ἀδαήμενος ἔμην, &c.

Odyss. μ. 208.

*Sirs, w' are not now to learn what sorrows are,
Having felt so many ; and this now by farre
Comes short of that which we endured then,
When the proud Cyclops shut us in his den :
Yet that we scap't, he of his prey did misse,
Hereafter we shall joy to think of this.*

* *Plus de Ad.
de Amic. & de
Sanit. tuenda.
Ut Crudum ad.
huc vulnus me-
dentium manus
reformidat, de-
inde patitur, atq;
ultra requirit ;
Sic Regens ani-
mi Dolor conso-
lationes rejicit
atque refugit,
mox desiderat &
clementer admo-
tu acquiescit.
Plin. Ep. lib. 5
cap. 16.
Vid. Plat. Conf.
ad Apoll.*

* Thus as Iron which hath passed through the fire, being quenched, is harder then it was before : so the Minde having passed through troubles, is the more hardened to endure them again. And therefore it is wise advice which learned Men give, to let Griefs have a time to breath, and not to endeavour the stopping of them, while they are in *Impetu*, and in their first rising. As Physicians suffer humours to ripen, and gather to some head before they apply medicines unto them. When time hath a little concocted Grief, and experience hardened and instructed Nature to stand

stand under it. It doth then willingly admit of those remedies, which being unreasonably applyed it rejecteth and resisteth.

Ovid. de Remed. Amor. l. i.

Ἐστὶ τῆ λίγον-
τος εἰσέλευς λέ-
γει, ὅτ' ἐμὴ
παραινῶς ἐδέειν
ἐσπλέον ποιῶ.
Sophoc Oedip.
Irr.

* Τὸν γρῶνον
τοῖνον πολλῇ
γῶνασιν ἔ-
τὸν ἀνόσῃ ἀπο-
χέσαι πρῶτι-
τον ἀπαρτίσαι
ἢ ἀπανθήσαι
&c.
Alexis.

If this medi-
cine we read
in Homer.

*Quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati.
Flere vetat? non hoc illa monenda loco est.
Cum dederis lachrymas animumq; expleveris a.
Iste dolor verbis emoderandus erit.* (grum,

Who would forbid a Mother then to mourne,
When her Sons ashes are warm in his urne?
But when she's cloyd with tears, and sorrow's rage
Is over, Counsel then may grief assuage.

Whereas before, it doth rather exasperate then allay it. For of all Passions, this of Grief doth least admit of a simple cure from the dictates of Reason, except it have a time given it too, wherein it may like unto new * Wine *deservesce*, slack, and come to its just temper again.

The last profitable effect is *fear* and suspicion, care or sollicitousness to avoid those evils which oppress our Nature; a cautelous discourse and consultation of reason, how it may either escape or prevent the evils which Experience hath taught it to decline, as a burnt childe the fire. For all Passions so long as they collect reason, and set that on work, are of good use in the mindes of Men; and indeed, the counsels and communion of right reason alone, grounded on, and guided by religion, are onely that *Nepenthes* and medicine against Grief, which who so mixeth and

and applyeth aright, shall not spend nor load himself with unusefull sorrow. Thus as Bees do poise themselves with little gravell stones, that they may not bee carried away with the winde, which the Poet hath elegantly expressed.

— — *sape Lapillos,*
Ut Cymbæ instabiles fluctu jactante saburram
Tollunt, his sese per inaniam nubila librant.

As ships with ballast, so the little Bee
With gravel's pois'd, that he may ready flee.

So patience and wisdom in the bearing of one sorrow, doth keep the minde in a stable condition against any other. A man doth never over-grieve that keeps his ears open to counsell, and his reason to judgment above his passion.

The evill effects of grief commonly follow the excess of it, and they respect the *Reason*, the *Will*, and the *Body*. In the *Reason*, it works distractions, irresolution, and weakness, by drawing the main strain of it, rather to a fearfull contemplation of its own misery, than to a fruitfull discourse how to avoid it; for as the motions of a wounded Body, so the discourses of a wounded Minde are faint, uncertain, and tottering.

Secondly, in the *Will*, it worketh first *Despair*, for it being the property of *Grief* to condensate, and as it were on all sides besiege the Mind, the more violent the Passion is, the lesse apparent are the Passages out of it. So that in an extre-

H h

mity

Odyss. § 221.
Plin. l. 21. c. 21.
Plutarch.
Sympos. l. 1 c. 1.
Macrob. l. 7. c. 1.
Clem. Alex. in
Protreps. Na-
zian. *Carmin.* in
nob. patris ad
filium.

Georg. l. 4.
Plutarch. lib.
de solert. Ani-
mal.

Iliad τ 65.

Οὐκ οἶδ' οἷς
ἐπὶ βλέφαρα
κῶν πολλῶν
παρόντων λυγρῶς
ἀσάμας πίνος
τοδ' ἐκ ἑαυτοῦ,
σφαλερὴ δ'
κρίσιν αὐτοῦ
πῶς ἄλλῃ, &c
Eurip. Hecub.

misery of anguish where the passages are in themselves narrow, and the reason also blind and weak to find them out, the Mind is constrained having no Object but its owne paine to reflect upon, to fall into a dark and fearfull contemplation of its owne sad estate, and marvellous high and patheticall aggravations of it, as if it were the greatest which any man felt. Not considering that it feels its owne sorrow, but knows not the weight of other mens. Whereas if all the calamities of mortall men were heaped into one Storehouse, and from thence every man were to take an equall portion, *Socrates* was wont to say that each man would rather chuse to go away with his owne pain.

And from hence it proceedeth to many other effects, fury, sinfull wishes and execrations both against it self and any thing that concurred to its being in misery; as we see in *Israel* in the wilderness, and that mirror of Patience *Iob* himself; and thus *Homer* bringeth in *Ulysses* in despaire, under a sore tempest bewailing himself.

Τῆς μάλιστα Δαναοὶ καὶ τετραπλῆς οἱ πύτ' ἔλοντο, &c.

Numb. 14. 2.
Job. 3. 1. and
Ier. 20. 14.
Isa. 8. 21.

Odis. 4. 306.

Thrice four times happy Grecians who did fall
To gratifie their friends under *Troy* Wall.
Oh that I there had rendred my last breath,
When Trojan Darts made me a mark for death;
Then glorious Rites my Funerall had attended,
But now my life will be ignobly ended.

Another evill effect is to indispose and disable
for

for *Duty*; both because *Grief* doth refrigerate (as the Philosopher telleth us) and; that is the worst temper for *Action*; and also diverts the *Minde* from any thing but that which seeds it, and therefore *David* in his sorrow forgot to eat his bread, because eating and refreshing of Nature is a mitigating of *Grief*, as *Pliny* telleth us. And lastly, because it weakneth, distraeth and discourageth the *Mind*, making it soft and timorous, apt to bode evils unto it self.

Arist. Prob.
Serl. 11.
Queß. 13.
Iliad. ω 130.
Μεμνήμενος δ'
δὲ τε σίτης ἔσ'
ἐννις.

Dolor. Cibo
lenitur. Plin.
l. 12. c. 14.

— *Cruelis ubique luctus; ubique pavor.*

Griefe and fear go usually together.

And therefore when *Aeneas* was to encourage his friends unto *Patience* and *Action*, he was forced to dissemble his own sorrow.

— *Curisque ingentibus ager
Spem vultu simulat premit altum corde dolorem.*

Aenead. 2.

Although with heavy cares and doubts distressed,
His looks feign'd hopes, and his heart griefs sup-
(prest:

And it is an excellent description in *Homer* of the fidelity of *Antilochus* when he was commanded to relate unto *Achilles* the sad news of *Patroclus* death.

Aenead. 1.
Consilium vul-
ta tegit &
spem fronte se-
renat
Aenead. 4.

Ἀντίλοχος δὲ γὰρ τίς τοι μὴδ' ὅν ἀνίστας, &c.

When Menelaus gave him this command,
Antilochus astonished did stand.

H b 2

Smitten

* In Nantragio
 Reſtor laudan-
 dus quem obru-
 it mare Cla-
 vum tenentem
 Sen. ad Pet. c. 6.
 Ariſt. 1^o 2.

Orat: Rhodiaca
 Vide Odyſſ. 8.
 703. 715.

Iliad. x. 460.
 Damascen. de
 Orthodox. fid.
 l. 2. c. 14.

* Ετοιμῆσθω
 δε νῦν δαχνην
 ἐμπνεῖς γαίπερ
 ὄψα δὲ σὺ δακρῶν
 ἔδδεν τὸ τε-
 τε μᾶλλον ἢ

τὸ μὲν οὐδὲ πῶν,
 Sophoc. Ajax.

a Sed videt in-
 gratos intabef-
 citq; videndo

Successus homi-
 num; carpitq;

carpitur
 una, Supplici-
 umq; suum est.

Ovid. Met. 2.

Inſtum eſt
 mortalibus

natura recen-
 tem aliorum

felicitatem a-
 gris oculis in-
 troſpicere. Tac.

Hiſt. l. 2.

Aut tibi ma-
 lum quid aut

alteri Bonum
 Evenit. Bion

quid malevolum
 quidam quem

miſerum aspec-
 tit. Apud Laert.

Smitten with drunkenness through his grief and fears
 His voice was stopt, and his eyes swam in tears.
 Yet none of all this griefe did duty stay,
 He left his Armes whose weight might cause delay,
 And went, and wept, and ran, with dolefull word,
 That great Fa roclus fell by Hector's sword.

* In a tempest saith Seneca, that Pilot is to be commended, whom the shipwrack swalloweth up at the Sterne, with the Rudder in his hand.

And it was the greatest honour of Mary Magdalen, that when above all other, she wept for the loss of Christ, yet then of all other she was most diligent too seek him.

Lastly, in the body there is no other Passion that doth produce stronger, or more lasting inconveniences by pressure of heart, obstruction of spirit, wasting of strength, dryness of bones, exhausting of Nature. Grief in the heart, is like a Moath in a garment, which biteth asunder, as it were the strings and the strength thereof, stoppeth the voice, looseth the joynts, withereth the flesh, shrivelleth the skin, dimmeth the eyes, cloudeth the countenance, deſlowereth the beauty, troubleth the bowels, in one word, disordereth the whole frame.

Now this Passion of grief is distributed into many inferiour kinds, as Griefe of Sympathy for the evils and calamities of other men, * as if they were our owne, considering that they may likewise befall us or ours, which is called mercy; grief of (a) *reptning* at the good of another man, as if his happiness

happinefs were our misery : As that Pillar which was light unto Israel, to guide them, was darkness unto the Egyptians, to trouble and amaze them ; which is called *Envy*: Griefe of (*b*) *Fretfulness* at the prosperity of evill and unworthy men, which is called *Indignation*; grief of *Indigence* when wee finde our selves want those good things which others enjoy, which we envy not unto them, but desire to enjoy them our selves too, which is called *Emulation*; griefe of *Guilt* for evill committed, which is called *Repentance*; and grief of *Fear* for evill expected, which is called *Despaire*; of which to discourse would be over tedious, and many of them are most learnedly handled by *Aristotle* in his Rhetoricks. And therefore I shall here put an end to this Passion.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the affections of Hope, the Object of it, Good Future, Possible, Difficult; of Regular and inordinate Depair.

b Prov. 30. 21.
22.
Psal. 73. 12, 13
Iob. 21. 7.
Ecclef. 10. 5, 6.
7.
Marmoreo Lici-
nus Tumulo
jacet, & Cato
parvo, Pompei-
us nullo.
Patricios omnes
opibus cum pro-
vocet unus Quo
tendente gravis
juveni mihi
barba sonabat,
&c.
Difficile est Sa-
tyram non scri-
bere. Juvenal.
Satyr. 1. Vid.
Aristot.
Ethic 1. 2.
& Mag. Mo-
ral. 1.
Vid. Suidam in
Voc. Ζηλός.



THE next Rank and Series, is of *Irascible Passions*, namely those which respect their Object, as annexed unto some degree of *Difficulty*, in the obtaining, or avoiding of it, the first of which is *Hope*, whereby I understand an earnest and strong in-

Iliad. 2. 704.

μεσοδονία

ἀγαθῶν.

μεσοδονία καὶ

σῶας ἀγαθῶν.

Clem. Alex.

Strom. lib. 2.

Spes quasi pes

animi. Ipsi.

Hispal. Orig.

lib. 7. cap. 2.

Contemplatio
est spei in hoc
spatio per fi-
dem, non re-
presentatio,
nec possessio,
sed expectatio.
Tertul. de re-
sur. cap. 23.
Rom. 8. 24.

Hebr. 11.

clination and expectation of some great good apprehended as *possible* to be obtained, though not by our own strength. nor without some inter-
venient Difficulties. I shall not collect those
praises which are commonly bestowed upon it,
nor examine the contrary extreames of those who
declame against it, making it a means either of
augmenting an unexpected evill, before not suf-
ficiently prevented, or of deflowering a future good
too hastily pre-occupied, but shall only touch that
dignity and corruption which I shall observe to
arise from it, with reference to its Objects, Causes,
and Effects.

Concerning the *Object* or fundamentall cause
of *Hope*, It hath these three condicions in it,
That it be a *Future*, a *Possible*, a *Difficult*
Good.

First, *Future*, for good present is the *Object* of
our sense, but *Hope is of things not seen*; for here-
in is one principal difference between divine
Faith, and divine *Hope*, that *Faith* being *ἡ ἀποδείξις*
τῶν ἐλπιζομένων, The *substance of things hoped for*,
hath ever respect to its Object, as in some man-
ner *present* and *subsisting* in the promises and first
fruits which we have of it, so that the first effect
of *Faith* is a present Interest and Title; but the
operation of *Hope* is waiting and expectation;
but yet it will not from hence follow, that the
more a man hath of the *presence* of an Object, the
lesse hee hath of *Hope* towards it, for though
Hope be swallowed up in the compleat presence
of its Object, yet it is not at all diminished but
encreased

increased rather by a partiall presence; and as in *masse Bodies* though violent motions be in the end weakest, as being furthest from the strength that impelled them, yet naturall are ever swiftest towards the Center, as nearest approaching unto the place that draws them; so in the *Hopes* of men; though such as are violent and groundlesse prove weaker and weaker, and so break out at last into emptinesse and vapour: in which respect Philosophers have called *Hope* the dreames of waking men; like that of the Musician whom *Dionysius* deceived with an empty promise, of which I spake before: yet those that are stayed and naturall, are ever more strong, when they have procured a larger measure of presence and union to their Object, *Quo propius accedimus ad spem fruendi eo impatientius caremus*. The nearer we come to the fruition of a good, the more impatient we are to want it.

And the reason is, because *Goodness* is better knowne, when it is in a nearer view of the understanding, and more united thereunto. And the more we have of the knowledge of goodness, the more we have of the desire of it, if any part bee absent. Besides all greediness is attractive, and therefore the more we know of it, the faster wee hasten to it. And it is the nature of good to increase the sense of the remainders of evill. So that though the number of our defects be lessened by the degrees of that good wee have attained unto, yet the burthen and molestation of them is increased, and therefore the more posses-

Arist. apud Ebertum. l. 5.

Plato apud Cal.

Rhod. l. 12. c. 2.

Arist. Ethic.

lib. 9. & Plu-

arch: de Au-

dit.

Plin. Epist.

lib. 6.

Epist. 1.

ποσειδωνος

εἰς περὶ δὲ τῆς

2 Pet. 3. 12.

sion we have of good, the greater is our wearines of evill, and the more Nature seeleth her defects, the more doth shee desire her restauration.

The next condition in the Object of our *Hope*, is *possibility*; for though the will sometimes being inordinate may bee tickled with a desire of impossibilities, under an implicite Condition if they were not so, yet no hope whether regular or corrupt, can respect its object under that apprehension. It worketh two passions most repugnant to this, Hatred and Despaire, the one being a proud opposition, the other a dreadfull flight from that good in which the minde perceiveth an impossibility of attaining it. Now the apprehension of possibility is nothing else but a conceit of the convenience and proportion, between the true meanes unto an end hoped, and the strength of those powers which are to work or bestow them; or if they bee such ends as are wrought without any such meanes, by the bare and immediate hand of the Worker, it is an apprehension of convenience, betwixt the will and power of him that bestoweth it.

Here then because I finde not any Arguments of large Discourse in the opposite Passion, (unlesse wee would passe from naturall or morall unto Theologicall handling thereof) wee may observe what manner of Despaire is onely regular and allowable; I meane that which in matters of importance drives us

out of our selves, or any presumption and opinion of our own sufficiency. But that despair which riseth out of groundless unbelief of the power, or distrust of the *goodness* of a superior Agent (especially in those things which depend upon the Will and Omnipotency of God) hath a double corruption in it, both in that it defiles, and in that it ruins Nature: *defiles*, in that it conceives basely of God himself; in making our guilt more omnipotent then his Power, and sin more hurtful then he is good: *ruines*, in that the mind is thereby driven to a flight and damnable contempt of all the proper means of recovery.

Of this kind of *Despair*, there are three sorts: The one *Sensual*, arising out of an excessive love of Good, Carnal, and Present; and out of a secure contempt of Good, Spiritual, and Future; like that of the Epicures, *Let us eat and drink while we may, To morrow we shall die*: The other *Sluggish*, which disheartneth and indisposeth for Action, causing men to refuse to make experiments about that wherein they conclude before-hand that they shall not succeed: The third *Sorrowfull*, arising from deep and strong apprehensions of Fear, which betrayeth and hideth the succours upon which Hope should be sustained: as in the great Tempest wherein Saint Paul suffered shipwrack; when the Sun and Stars were hid, and nothing but Terror to be seen; *All Hope that they should be saved was taken away*.

The last condition of the object of *Hope*, was *Difficulty*, I mean in respect of our own abilities,

1 Cor. 15:

Desperatione debilitati, experiri nolunt quod se assequi possent. Cuius in Orat. ad Brui.

AG. 27.20

*Spe perficendi,
si vires pecunia,
consilium, scien-
tia, apparatus.
Cic. de Invent.
ad Heren.*

*Job 31. 24.
Jer. 17. 5.
Psal. 62. 9.
Rom. 3. 4.
Job 6. 15, 16.*

for the procuring of the Good we hoped for; and therefore Hope hath not onely an eye to *Bonum*, the good desired; but to *Auxilium* too, the help which confers it. No man waiteth for that which is absolutely in his own power to bestow on himself; *Omnis expectatio est ab extrinseco*, all Hope is an attendant Passion, and doth ever rely upon the *Will* and *Power* of some superiour causes, by dependence whereupon it hath some good warrant to attain its desires.

And thus in Divine Hope, God is in both respects the object of it, both *per modum Boni*, as the Good desired, & *per modum Auxilii*, as the Aid whereby we enjoy him. So that herein all those Hopes are corrupt and foolish, which are grounded either on an error concerning the *Power* to help in some assistants; or concerning *Will* in others (as indeed generally a blind and mis-led judgement doth nourish Passion;) Of the former sort, are the Hopes of base and degenerate minds in their dependence upon second and subordinate means, without having recourse to the first supreme Cause; which is to trust in lying vanities; for every man is a liar, either by Impotency, whereby he may fail us, or by Imposture, whereby he may delude us.

Of the other sort, are the Hopes of those who presume on the helps and wills of others, without ground and warrant of such a confidence; whence ariseth a sluggish and careless security, blindly relying it self upon such helps, without endeavouring to procure them to themselves.

And

And this is the difference between Despair and Presumption: Hope looketh on a good future, as possible indeed in it self; but withal as difficult to us, and not to be procured but by industry and labour. Now Despair leaveth out the apprehension of possibility, and looketh onely on the hardness: on the other side, Presumption never regardeth the hardness, but buildeth onely upon the possibility. And this is *spes mortua*, that dead Hope, which by the rule of opposition, we may gather from the life of Hope, spoken of by St. Peter: For a lively Hope worketh such a tranquillity of minde, as is grounded on some certainty and knowledge; it is *Pax Luminosa*, a Peace springing out of Light; but dead Hope worketh a rest, grounded only on ignorance, such as is the security of a dreaming prisoner, which is rather sencelessness than peace, and this is *Tenebrosa Pax*, a Peace springing out of Darknes, for a true Peace is *quies ex fide*, a believing rest; but counterfeit is only *quies ex somno*, a sleeping or dreaming rest. The Peace which comes from a living Hope must have these two properties in it, tranquillity and serenity: otherwise it is but like the rest of *mare mortuum*, whose unmoveableness is not Nature but a curse.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the causes of Hope, Want, and Weakness together, Experience and Knowledge. In what sence Ignorance may be said to strengthen, and Knowledge to weaken Hope: Examples quicken more then Precept. Provision of Aids. The uncertainty of outward means, to establish Hope, Goodness of Nature, Faith and Credulity, wise Confidence.



He next things to be considered, are the *causes* of this Passion: the first impulsive cause of *Hope* is our *Want*, and our *Weakness* put together, the one driving us *ad Bonum*, to the Object; the other *ad Auxilium*, to the Aid, (and wheresoever there is *Indigence*, there is *Impotence* likewise.) Now in what man soever we finde these two unsupplied, there is the root and fundamental ground of *Hope*; notwithstanding for the defects of other conditions, the creature may be carried to the quite opposite passion, out of an apprehension of an inevitable subjection unto evil, and utter banishment from the fountain of good. So then of those three estates of man; the estate of *Fruition*, which is their *Sabbath* and rest; the estate of *Travel*, which is the day of work;

work; and the estate of *damnation*, which is the *night* of despair: in the first we have the accomplishment; in the third the final overthrow; in the second the exercise of our Hopes: because in that alone our *Indigence* may by Gods fulness be filled, and our *Impotence* by his Will and Power supplied. In which respect all men have room for hope to enjoy God their last *Good*; though not a hope of *Confidence*, Assurance, and *Expectation*, which is peculiar onely to the godly (who alone have a present interest in his promises;) yet such a general Hope as may well suffice to stop the mouth of any temptation, whereby we are solicited to undervalue the Power, or to conclude the unwillingness of God to help us.

The next cause of Hope is *Experience* and Knowledge, both in the nature of the thing hoped for, and of the means conducting to the attainment thereof. For notwithstanding it may often fall out, that ignorance of things, and the not tryal of our strength, or others opposition, or of the difficulties of the Object, may with hot and eager minds, work presumptions of success, and an empty and ungrounded Hope (which is the reason why young men and drunken men are both observed by *Aristotle* to be *ὀυέλπιδες*, men of strong Hopes) being naturally or by distemper bold and opinionative: even as on the other side, strength and acuteness of understanding, because it sees so far into the Object, works often diffidence, slowness and irresolution in our Hopes: as *Pliny* out of *Thucydides* observes; and the Philosopher like-

Rhet. l. 2. c. 12.
Ethic. l. 3. c. 8.

Lib. 4. c. 7.
Rhet. l. 2. c. 13.

likewise of old men, that they are *δοσιλπίδες*. *διὰ πλὴν ἐμπειρίαν*, men slow in their Hopes; because of great experience; yet for all this, if we do observe it, both the former of these proceeds from some opinion of knowledge, as the later doth from some opinion of ignorance: For of drunken men, and those whom in the same place he compares unto them, *Aristotle* saith, they are therefore confident, *quia se putant superiores*, because they believe much in their own strength. And of a young man he saith in the same place of his Rhetoricks, *πάντα εἶδέναι ἔονται καὶ δικυρίζονται*, they are peremptory in the opinion of their own knowledge; whereas on the other side, as a lame man placed upon some high Tower, can over-view with his eyes more ground, then he hath hope to over-run with his feet in a whole day; so men that have attained unto some good pitch of knowledge, and are withal not insensible of their own weakness, out of the vastness of distance which they discover between themselves and their end, do easily frame unto themselves as narrow hopes, as they do large desires; but then this proceeds not from that knowledge which we have properly; but only it serves to discover unto us, how much knowledge we want.

So then properly *knowledge* and *experience* is the cause of *Hope*; experience, I say, either of the conquerableness of the Object by our own means: or of the sufficiency of the Power, and readiness of the Will of him from whom we expect further assistance: For as there is less casualty, and by consequence more presumption to be had of an

an event of Art then of Fortune (the one proceeding from a govern'd, the other from a blinde, and contingent cause) so consequently there is greater hope and confidence to be given to the success of an enterprize, grounded on experience, then of one ignorantly and rashly adventured on. *Experience*, being as the Philosopher observeth, the Root of Art, as unexperience is of Fortune.

Προπειθεὶς
τὸ ἀπειθεῖν
διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἐλ-
πίσιν ἀγαθῶν.
Chilo apud La-
ert. l. 1.

Met l. i. c. i.

Now this *Experience* may be such, either as our selves have had, or such as we have observed other men to have ; that which we have from our selves is the most forcible to induce this affection, because every man is the best measure of his own abilities ; and it is that which puts forth influence and force into all our actions. Nothing could more assure the hopes of *David* in his encounter with *Goliath*, then an experience formerly had against creatures every way as formidable, a Lion and a Bear, wherein notwithstanding they were the sheep of *Jess*, and not of God, that were endangered. Thus the eye of Faith and Hope looketh both backward upon the memory of actions past, and forward with courage and resolution on second enterprizes : For though in some cases it be requisite with *Saint Paul*, to forget that which is past, when the remembrance of it may be an occasion of sloth, weariness, and distrust ; yet there may a happy use be made of a seasonable memory in matters of difficulty, wherein haply our former successful resolutions and patience may upbraid our present fears, and sharpen our languishing and sluggish Hopes. *O passi graviora*, was the best

best Argument which he could have used to put his fellows in confidence of that which he added:

—— Dabit Deus his quoque finem.

Since that in greater griefs you have found ease, Doubt not, but God will put an end to these.

And in that great battel between *Scipio* and *Hannibal*, *ad amnem Ticinam*, though the victory by reason of the excellency of the General, fell to the adverse part; yet the Roman General could not have used a more effectual perswasion unto *Hope*, then when he told his Souldiers that they were to enter on a war with those men who were as much their slaves as their enemies, as being such whom they had formerly themselves overcome; *Cum iis est vobis pugnandum quos priore bello terrâ mariq; vicistis*: You are to joyn battle with those whom in the former War you conquered both by Land and Sea. A strong inducement; though that in such a case, the fear of a second overthrow would more necessitate the one, then the *hope* of a second victory perswade the other to courage and resolution. As we see in the hot battel between the Greeks and the Trojans, when *Hector* had driven the Grecians into their ships, and set some of them on fire, which is thus elegantly described by *Homer*.

Τοῖσι δὲ μαρναμένοισιν δ' ἰὼ νόοι ἥτορ Ἀχαιοῖς
 Οὐκ ἔφρασαν φυνέσθαι ὑπορὶν ἤκαθ' ἀλλ' ὀλέσθαι
 Τρωσιν δ' ἠλπίο θυμῶς, &c.

*These were the mutual motions did engage
 The minds of Greeks and Trojans on this rage.
 The Grecians all despair'd & escape the blow,
 Deeming themselves neer to an overthrow:
 But former victory in those of Troy,
 Kindled a hope another to enjoy:
 They boldly promis'd to themselves the day,
 The Grecians Ships to burn, and Them to slay.
 Thus Hope of Victory enflam'd the one:
 Th' other were more enflam'd, 'cause they had none.*

Iliad. 9. 704.

Quondam etiam
 victis redit in
 Placordia vir-
 tum, Virosque
 cadant.
 Æneid. 2.

Forsan miseros
 meliora sequen-
 tur. Æneid. 12.
 Etiam si spero
 non subesset, ne-
 cessitas tamen
 stimulare debe-
 ret. Qu. Cur.
 l. 4.

That *Experience* from others, which may en-
 lighten and perfect our *Hope*, in the applying their ex-
 amples and successes to our own encourage-
 ments. For since the nature of most men is like
 that of flocks, to tread in one anothers steps (Pre-
 cedents having the same precedence to Reason
 in vulgar judgements, which a living and accom-
 panying guide hath to a Mercuries finger in a
 Travellers conceit; the one onely pointing to, but
 the other leading in the way.) And as I finde
 it observed, that running Metal will sooner melt
 other of its own kind, than fire alone: so the ex-
 amples of Vertue will sooner allure and prevail
 with the mindes of men, to frame them to the like
 resolutions, then a naked and empty Speculation
 of Precepts. It hath pleased Nature to make man,
 not onely a Morall, but a sociable creature, that

so when his *Hopes* towards good should languish and grow slack by any conceived prejudices against the *reason* of *Precepts*, they may again be strengthened by the common and more obvious sense of *example*.

Horace.

Magnos viros,
non Schola Epi-
curi, sed contu-
bernium fecit.
Sen. Ep. 6.

*Segnius iritant animos demissa per aures,
Quam qua sunt oculis commissa fidelibus —*

Those things more sluggishly our mindes excite,
Which enter at the ears, then at the sight.

Sight, which is the Sense of Example, is oftner employed in the government of our Passions, then *Hearing*, which is the Sense of *Precept*. And therefore when the Poet would fit an advice for the person of *Ascanius*, he doth not bring any tedious, thorny, moral discourse; but he works upon that affection which is most predominant in ingenuous and noble Natures.

— *Te animo repetentem exempla tuorum,
Et Pater Aeneas & Avunculus excitet Hector.*

Recount the brave examples of thy blood,
And what thou hast in them seen great and good,
Let be thy Patern, that the World may see
Father and Uncle both alive in thee.

For though an Argument from Example, to prop a fainting Hope, be weakest in respect of convincing demonstration; yet it is strongest, in respect

respect of moral and perswasive insinuation, as inferring greater discredit upon a sluggish and unnecessary despair. And therefore they were brave instructions which *Agamemnon* gave unto *Menelaus*, when he commanded him to go into the Army of the Grecians, and animate them unto the Battel.

Ἰσχυρὸν δὲ ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν προποδῶν ἀναρχῶν
ἡγεσθῆναι ἐν γένεισι ὀνόματι τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἑκάστον,
Ἰσχυρὸν καὶ αὐτῶν, &c.

*Run thorow the army, cry encourage all,
Minde them of their Progenitors, and call
Each by his Name; praise them, and let us too
What we command to others, our selves do.*

It is true indeed that some men are blessed with a greater excellency of gifts then others; yet we are not to think that any man was ever made, as *Seneca* speaks of *Cato*, *In convivium humani generis*, for a reproach of mens weakness, rather then for an example and encouragement of their actions; or for astonishment rather then emulation unto others: This being one end of Nature, in framing men of great vertues, not onely that we might wonder and beleeve, and know that the same things which for the greatness of them are the objects of our admiration, may as well for their possibility be the objects of our Hope, and the encouragements of our industry.

The third cause of *Hope*, may be large furniture with, or strong dependence upon the *assistant means*

Non convenit
qui illum ad la-
borem impule-
rim, nunc me ip-
sum jugere. Te-
rent Heaut.

Quo major fu-
ero, tanto plus
laborabo.

Maximinus a-
pud Jul. Capito-
linum. ll. x. 67.

Si quid injun-
gere inferiori
velis, id prius
in te ac tuos si
ipse statueris,
facilius omnes
obedientes habe-
as Liv. l. 26.

of what is hoped for. Helps in any enterprife, are in stead of head and hands, to advance a mans designe: which likewise is elegantly exprest by *Dio-medes* and *Saperdon* in *Homer*.

Iliad x. 222;
&c.

μ 410.

Α'λλ' εἴ τις μοι ἀνὴρ ἀμ' ἐπείσομαι ἄλλος
Μέλλον δαλπύρη καὶ δάρσα λεώτορον ἔσται
Συντῶ δ' ἐρχομένῳ, &c.

*If any Second would accompany,
My hopes and courage would the greater be:
For when two joyn, the one may haply note
What th' other over-pass'd: or if he know't,
His counsel would be weak, and his minde slow,
When he should execute what he does know.*

And according as these means which we rely upon, have more or less power or certainty in them, they are foundations of a more regular or corrupt *Hope*; such are wealth, friends, wit, policy, power, or the like: All which can be causes onely of a *hope* of *probability*, but not of *certainty*: because they are all means which are subject to miscarriage, and are also subject to the Providence of God, who onely can establish and give final security to our Hopes, as being such an Assistant in whom there is neither weakness nor mutability, which should move him to disappoint us.

All other aids have two ill qualities in them: they have *wings*, and therefore can easily forsake us; and they have *thorns*, and therefore if we lean too hard on them; they may chance, in stead of helping, to hurt us. The best promises which
earthly,

2 Chron. 28.
20, 21.
Ezek. 29. 6, 7.

earthly aids can make, are bounded by a double condition.

Εἰ δὲναμαι τὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι ἔστι.

Iliad. ζ 391.

*If the thing lye within thy power to do,
And Divine Providence permits it too.*

Here then we may discover Corruption in this Passion, when the minde ready upon every present apprehension to play the Prophet in forecasting future events, shall out of weak grounds, and too high a conceit of those means which it hath, so build unto it self peremptory imaginations for the future, as that thereby it is made in it self light and opinionative, and upon occasion of disappointment, is to seek of that patience to sustain it, which by a wise intermixture of fear and caution, might have been retained.

And as there is an error in the trust and assistance, so there may be in the use of those means: For though Divine *Hope* hath but one Anchor to rest upon, and therefore hath but one manner of being produced; yet those *lower Hopes*, of which I speak, do alwayes depend upon the concurrence of divers means, and those likewise have their reference unto divers circumstances. And therefore those which have not the wisdom of combining their aids, and of fitting them unto casual occurrences, may to no end nourish in themselves imaginary and empty presumptions. And this is that which maketh all worldly hopes so full of lightness.

Horat.

lightness and uncertainties, *Leves spes & certamina*, as the Poet calleth them, because it may fall out, that the neglect of but some one circumstance; the not timing or placing our actions right; the not accommodating our means to the variety of occasions; the miscarrying in some one complement or ceremony; the having of our minds either too light and voluble, or too fixed and constant; or too spread and wandring; or too narrow and contracted; or too credulous and facile; or too diffident and suspicious; or too peremptory, resolute or hasty; or too slow, anxious, and discursive; or too witty and facetious; or too serious and morose, with infinite other the like weaknesses (some whereof there is not any man quite freed from) may often notwithstanding the good store of other aides, endanger and shipwreck the success of our endeavours: so that in the prosecution of a hope, there is something alike industry to be used, as in the trial of Mathematical Conclusions, the Mediums whereunto are so coupled and dependent upon one another, that not diligently to observe every one of them, is to labour in vain, and to have all to do again.

Ἐλπίς ἐν μὲν
τοῖς ἀνθρώποις
Γλεμ. Alex.
Strom 12.

Rhet. 2 c. 12

A fourth cause of *Hope*, may be *goodness and facility of Nature*, whereby we finde a disposition in our selves of readiness to further any mans purposes and desires, and to expect the like from others, for it is the observation of *Aristotle* touching young men, *Sua ipsorum innocentia ceteros metiuntur*. Their own goodness makes them credulous of the like in others. For as every mans prejudice

prejudice loves to finde his own will and opinion : so doth his charity to finde his own goodness in another man. They therefore who are soft and facile to yeeld, are likewise to beleieve ; and dare trust them whom they are willing to pleasure. And this indeed is the rule of Nature which makes a man sell the *Patern* of what it makes his Neighbour the *O ject*.

Now from th's facility of Nature proceeds a further cause of *Hope*, to wit, *Faith* and *Credulity*, in relying on the promises which are made for the furtherance thereof : For promises are obligations, and men use to reckon their obligations in the Inventory of their estate : so that the promises of an able friend, I esteem as part of my substance. And this is an immediate Antecedent of *Hope*, which according as the Authority whereon it relies, is more or less sufficient and constant, is likewise more or less evident and certain.

And in these two, the Corruption chiefly is not to let Judgement come between them and our Hopes.

For as he said of Lovers, we may of Hopes too, that oftentimes *sibi omnia fingunt*, they build more upon Imagination then Reality. And then of what *Tacitus* speaks in another sense, *fingunt, creduntque*, if our faculty feign assistances, and our credulity rely upon them, there will issue no other then *Ixions* Hope, a Cloud for *Juno*. And therefore *Aristotle* out of an easiness to Hope, collects, in young men, an easiness to be deceived : credulity very often meets with Impostures. And he

Ret. lib. 2.

elie-

Rhet. l. i.

elsewhere placeth credulous, modest, quiet and friendly men amongst those that are obnoxious to injuries and abuses. Proud and abusive men making it one of their pleasures to delude and mislead the ingenuity of others : and as once *Apelles*, to deceive the expectation of another with a Curtain for a Picture.

The last cause (which I shall but name) of *Hope*, is *wise Confidence*, or a happy mixture of *Boldness*, *Constancy* and *Prudence* together ; the one to put on upon an enterprize ; the other, to keep on when difficulties unexpected do occur ; and the third, to guide and manage our selves amidst those difficulties : For, as he said in Studies, so we may in Actions likewise (when thus swayed and balanced) *Altius ibunt qui ad summa nituntur* : The further we set our aims, the more ground we shall get ; and then,

— *Possunt quia posse videntur.*

When a man thinks, This he can do,
By thinking, he gets power too.

Quintil. l. i. in
Proem.
Magnæ indolis
signum est spe-
rare semper.
Flor. l. 4.

Liev. l. 19.

* Liev. l. 25.

Τολμᾶν ἀνδρῶν
τύχην καὶ κέρν
μὴ τυχεῖν.
Eurip. Hec.

And unto this doth the Historian attribute all the success of *Alexander's* great Victories, *Nil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere*, his confidence judging them fecible, did by that means get thorow them. And though it was venturous, yet as the case might be, it was wise counsel which we finde in the same Historian ; * *Audeamus quod credi non potest ausuros nos, eo ipso quod difficillimum videtur*,

videtur, facilimum erit. Let us shew our courage in adventuring on some difficult enterprize, which it might have been thought we would not have attempted, and then the very difficulty of it will make it the more easie: For our enemies will conclude that our strength is more then they discover when they see our attempts greater then they could suspect. Thus men teach children to dance in heavy shooes, that they may begin to conquer the difficulty in the learning of the Art. And therefore the Philosopher telleth us, that *θρασύς ἐνέλπιος*, bold men, are men of Hope; for boldness suffers not a man to be wanting to himself: and there are two Principles which encourage such men upon adventures; the one, *audentes fortuna juvat*; That resolution is usually favoured with success; or if it mis of that * *Magnis tamen exidit ausis*; yet the honour of attempting a difficulty, is more then the discredit of miscarriage in it.

Difficiliora debent esse quae exercent, quod si levius ipsum illud in quod exercent. Quint. 11. c. 2.
Arist. Ethic. 1. 3 c. 7.
Ænead. 10.
* Ovid. Met. 1. 2.
Turis certe per plana, sed humilium & depressum itur, frequentior currentibus, quam repantibus lapsus sed his non labentibus nulla lares, illis minnulla lares etiam si labantur.
Plin 19. ep. 26

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Effects of Hope, Stability of Mind, Weariness, arising not out of Weakness, Impatience, Suspicion, Curiosity; but out of Want, Contention, and forth-putting of the Mind. Patience under the Want, Distance, and Difficulty of Good Desires, Waiting upon Aid expected.



THE Effects of *Hope* follow which I will but name: The first is to free the Minde from all such Anxieties as arise out of the Floating, Instability, and Fearfulness thereof: For as the Philosopher telleth us, Fearful men are δυσέλπιδες, hard of *Hope*: and in this property *Hope* is well compared unto an Anchor; because it keeps the Minde in a firm and constant temper, without tottering and instability: for though there be but one *Hope* joyned with certainty, as depending upon an immutable promise, all other having ground of fear in them; yet this should be only a fear of *Caution*, not of *Jealousie* and *Distrust*, because where there is *Distrust* in the means, there is for the most part Weakness in the use of them; and he who suspects the Aid which he relies on, gives it just reason to fail and to neglect him. And therefore

Aristotle

Philosophi quidam erat, qui à spe disti sunt, Elpisti qui nihil esse pronunciant quod vitam magis contineret atq; spes. Vid. Plur. Sympos. l. 4. q. 4

Aristotle hath set *Hope* and *Confidence* together, as was before noted, Ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν καὶ δὲ ἐν ἀλίστοισιν, a good *Hope* is grounded on a *Belief*, and always worketh some measure of *Assurance* in the means unto it.

A second Effect of *Hope*, is to work some kind of distaste and *Weariness*, in our present condition, which according as it is good or evil, doth qualifie the *Hope* from whence it ariseth: for there is a distaste that ariseth out of *Weakness*, like that of *Job*, *My soul is weary of my life; I am a burthen to my self*; Another that ariseth out of *Want*. That which ariseth upon *Weakness* is a fickle and unconstant mutability of the Mind, whereby it desireth a continual change of condition: which affection is wrought either out of *Impatience* of opposition; whence the mind upon the first difficulty which it meets with, is affrighted and discouraged; or out of a *Sharpness of apprehension*, discovering *Insufficiency* in that wherein it desired content; or out of an *Error* and too high *Estimation* fore-conceived, which in the trial disappointing our *Hopes*, and not answering that Opinion, begins to be neglected as weak and deceitful; or lastly out of *Curiosity* and Search, when we suppose that those things which cannot in their nature, may at least in their varieties, or number, yeeld some content: and as Sands which are the smallest things asunder, yet being united, grow great and heavy: so these pleasures, which are alone light and worthless, may by their multitude bring weight and satisfaction with them. Although herein the

Job 10. 1.
& 7. 20.

*Spes inanes quæ
in medio spiritus
franguntur &
corrumpuntur & ante
in ipso cursu
obviantur quantum
portum conspice
cere possunt.
Cic. de Orat.
l. 3.*

Minde is likely most of all to finde *Solomons* Vaniety; the union of things subordinate, and which have no Cognation each to other (which is the property of worldly delights) working rather Distraction then Tranquillity in the Mind; this *Weariness* then which springeth from the Unsteadiness and Impotency of our affections, is not that which I make the effect of a proper *Hope* (as being an opposite rather to true contentment of mind, a vertue established, and not overthrown by Hope) the *Weariness* then which is wrought by the forecast and providence of a mind possessed with Hope, is that which is grounded upon the knowledge and feeling of our emptiness and wants, which therefore we long to have removed, like that of *David*, *Woe is me that I am constrained to dwell in Mesch*; Whereupon followeth,

[Psal. 120. 5.

Ἐλπίς παρ' ἡμᾶς
ἐλπίς ἢ ἐλπίς
σα ἡμᾶς.

Etymolog.

Studium cum

spe sinescit.

Patercul. l. 1.

Acuit industri-

am cum spes in-

jella est, &c.

Cic. ad Her l. 4.

Εἰς δὲ ἀφελούς

τῆ ἐλπίδος, τῆ

μειλόντος

ἀγαθῶν ἀφαι-

ριστοῦς καὶ τῆ αἰ-

ρεσίης τῆς πε-

ρὸντων ὑποκώων

Max. Tyn.

differt. 33.

The third Effect of *Hope* which is an earnest *Contention of the Minde*, in the pursute of that Good which should perfect our Natures, and supply our wants. And this desire *St. Paul* calleth *Gemitus Creatura*, the groaning of the Creature: which is set down as a consequence of the *Earnest Expectation of the Creature*: and indeed there is not any Passion, which doth so much imploy and so little violate Reason, as this of *Hope* doth, it being an exciting Passion, which moveth every Principle to its proper and speedy operation for gaining that perfection which the mind so earnestly breathes after; and the want whereof doth work such weakness in it.

The last Effect of *Hope*, is a *Contented Repose*
and

and Patience of the Mind, resting it self in a quiet Expectation of the things hoped for, and yet not exhibited. And this *Patience* is threefold; a *Patience* under the *Want*; a *Patience* under the *distance*, and a *Patience* under the *difficulties* of our desired Good; which holds especially in these Hopes (and those are almost all) which depend upon the will and disposition of another, whose pleasure it be-
hooveth us in matters which are not of debt and necessity, rather to attend, then by murmuring and discontent to provoke him, and disappoint our selves. Hasty therefore and running Hopes are as improper in their Nature, as they are commonly vain and empty in their success. He that beleeves, and must by Faith depend upon External help, must not make haste, but be content to have his Expectation regulated, not by his own greediness, but by anothers will.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Affection of Boldness. What it is. The Causes of it, strong Desires, strong Hopes, Aids, Supplies, Reall, or in Opinion. Despair and Extremities, Experience, Ignorance, Religion, Innocency, Impudence, Shame, Immunity from danger, dexterity of Wit, strength of Love, Pride, or greatness of Mind and Abilities. The Effects of it, Execution of things advised Temerity, &c.



O little in love have I ever been with this Affection of *Boldness* (as I find it managed by many, who make no other use of it, then children do of straw, with which they stuff empty clothes, that they may look like men) as that when first I writ this Treatise, I passed it over rather as a Vice, then an Affection of the Soul, and said nothing of it; And being no more friends with it now then I was then, I should be contented to have left it out still; but that I would not have the Treatise defective in such a member, whereof there may be so good and so ill use made, as experience sheweth us there is of this. For as *Plutarch* notes of Egypt, that it bringeth

Plut. in Nectia
Πολλὰ μανεῖ-
ται πολλὰ δὲ
λυγρὰ. *Homer.*

bringeth forth *multa venena*, & *multa salubria*, many good things and many bad; like those Creatures, some parts whereof are poison, and others restorative: so may we say of the men in whom this Affection is predominant, that they are usually instruments either of much good, or of much evil to the places that nourish them: as once *Themistocles* his Tutor said of him. The best mixture that I can call to mind of this Passion, was in *Hannibal*, of whom the Historian tells us, that he was marvellous *Bold* to put upon Dangers, and yet marvellous *Wise* in managing of them: His courage not working temerity, nor precipitating his resolutions. And his counsel not working slowness, nor retarding his courage.

Boldness then or *Confidence*, is (as the Philosopher describes it) a Hope joyned with fancy and opinion, that those things which are safe for us, are near at hand; and those which are hurtful, either are not at all, or are a far off, and cannot suddenly reach us: Or it is an Affection whereby we neglect danger for the procuring of some difficult and good thing, which we earnestly desire and hope for, in confidence to overcome and break through that danger: For Confidence of Victory is that which maketh a man boldly to prosecute the Danger which opposeth him in his Hopes of Good. So that two things belong unto the formality of this Passion, *1. Boldness*, or *Cheremency* of Hope, whatsoever strengtheneth that, causeth this, as Power, Experience, Friends, nearness of Ayds, and the like. 2. *Exclusion of Fear*, whatsoever removeth

Plur. in Themistoc. In Hannibale plurimum audere ad capeffenda pericula plurimum c. nihil inter ipsa pericula erat. Liv. l. 21.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 3.

Vid. Aquin. 1. 2. quest. 45. art. 3.

removeth that, increaseth this: As distance from Danger, Freeness from Enemies, Clearness from Injuries, &c.

The *object* of this Passion is two fold. The Primary and Principal Object is some difficult work under the relation of a needful Medium, to the obtaining of a Good vehemently Desired and hoped for. The *secondary* Object, is some Evil and Danger, which standing between our Hope, and the Good for which we Hope, is by the vehemency of our Hope, as it were removed and despised in our eyes. *Good* earnestly desired, and *Evil* confidently despised, are the things about which this Affection is conversant.

The Causes of this Affection are so many the more, because it is apt to be excited by clean contrary Reasons.

The *fundamental* and *principal* Cause of it, is *strength of Desire*, working vehemency of Hope, and impatiency of Resistance, or Restraint from the thing desired: For Lust when it hath once conceived, will at last bring forth and finish, and rush forward to that after which it longeth, which the Philosopher calleth *αὐχόματα*, and Saint Peter, *ἀνάχρησις*, a pouring out of Passion, and the Prophet a *Breaking forth* and violent Eruption, a rash and head-strong præcipitancy, which like a Torrent ventures upon any thing that withstands it. The Philosopher instanceth for this particular in adulterers, οἱ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τέλμαρ' ἀόλλα δρῶσιν, who adventure on many bold Attempts for the satisfaction of their Lust.

Lam. 1. 14, 15.

Arist. Eth. l. 7. c. 8.

1 Pet. 4. 4.

See my Treatise on the sinfulness of sin, p. 167.

Hos. 4. 3.

Jer 6. 7.

8. 6.

Eth. l. 3. c. 11.

But

But because where there are strong Desires, there may be weak Hopes, and great Feares, the one Discouraging, the other Detering from the Prosecution of them, therefore to the emboldening of those Desires, other particular causes doe usually concurr. Some whereof I shall enquire after.

1. Then, *strong Hopes*, and Ready, Present *Aydes*, and supplies proper to the End which we would advance, are Excellent means to generate Boldness. Great Aydes as the Catts *num magnum*, or many Aydes, that if one faile, another may hold. As greatness of wealth, friends, power, strength. And these in a Readiness, and near at hand *τὰ θάρραλέα ἔγγυς*, as the Philosopher expresseth it, as the *Trojans* being besieged when *Aeneas* with his Army drew near, gathered courage above their feares.

Aux. { magna.
illis multa.
vicina.

Rhet. 2. c. 5.

Enrad. 10.

Glamorem ad sydera tollunt
Dardanida è muris; spes addita suscitât Iras;
Telamann jactant.

(joyes,
They all climb'd up the wals, then fill'd with
Shouted as loud, as if they meant the noise
Should wake the Stars; hopes added, stir'd up Ire;
And their Darts flew as swift as any fire.

And in Scriptures we are often quickned unto courage against the Difficulties of our Christian Warfare by the Greatness, and the nearness of the *Aydes*, and the Reward which we Hope

1 Job. 4. 4.
Heb. 10. 36. 37.
1am. 5. 8.
Rev. 22. 12.

Θάρραλοί οὐ
μεθυπόθυτοι.
ἐν ἐλθεσθε 78.
Ethic. 1. 3. c. 11.
Prov. 23. 34.

Ἰσορρογυνομενες
οὐ μεθυνομενες
καὶ αὐαυτοί.
Ethic. 1. 7. c. 10.

Pradam utrius
quam hostem in-
cruentus devi-
cit. Liv. lib. 9.
Iliad. 6. 873.
Plut. lib. de Ho-
merc. Quam
minimum sit in
corpore suo spo-
liorum plures
comparavit. Seneca. Epist. 14.

for. Yea, so strong a power hath hope over the Resolutions of men that even the froth, and dreame and fancy of it in drunken men, maketh them as the Philosopher noteth, marvellous venturous upon dangers, which Reason and sobriety would have taught them to feare. Solomon tells us of a drunkard lying on the top of a Mast; and I have my self seen a Drunk man climb to the top of a Sceptle. Which boldness proceedeth in such men from Weakness and wilfulness of self-conceit, and Opinion; for commonly the strength which a drunken man loseth in his Reason, he gathers in his fancy; and as his judgment weakens, his Opinion increaseth. And we shall never find men more confident in their affirming, then when they know not what they affirm.

Now upon this Ground, that Hope is the great Quickner unto Courage, it was, that Alexander used it as an Argument to his Soldiers against the Persians, when he saw them come into the field clothed so richly, that their arms were much rather a Prey to the Greeks, than a Defence unto themselves, in which resp. & Homer thus derides Amphimachus.

Ὅς κ' χρυσὸν ἔχει πῶλεμον δ' ἰέν' ἥντε καὶ
Νηπιό, ἐδὲ κ' οἱ τὺν ὅπρῳ λυγρὸν ὀλεσθῆν.

Englistering Gold, like a fair Damsell, clad
He came to fight: Vaine man why art so mad

To think that Iron is kept back by Gold?
Thou bring'st the price for which thy self art sold.

And yet upon a contrary Reason. I find one of the greatest and wisest Commanders of the world, *Julius Caesar*, requiring of his Souldiers to carry gold about them, that the fear of losing that, might make them the more constant to their Resolutions.

Contrary unto this we shall often observe, that *Despaire*, and *Extremities* doe put men upon bold adventures. As no men fight more desperately then Cowards when they cannot flie, as the Historian noteth of *Cn. Piso* a Confederate of *Cataline*, that by poverty he became desperate, and thereby emboldned unto that attempt wherein he might either rise by the ruine of others (having neither merit nor hope to rise by their favours) or at least not to be ruined without company. ^b As that which shakes a Tree, doth often serve to settle and fasten it: So many times dangers and extremities doe excite strength, as in the height of a Fever or Frenzie, men shew more strength and agility of body, than in their perfectest Health. And as they say of a Beast, they bite with more venome and indignation when they are wounded and ready to die. And therefore *Homer* expresseth the Dying of wounded Enemies by biting of the Ground; so utmost extremities and miseries make men put out the more boldness either in Revenge or new Attempts because they may be better, but they

Sueton. In Jul.
llo. 97.

a Summa Audacia egens,
fallo, ut quem
ad perturbandam
temp. In.
pis, ac mali
motus stimula-
bant: Salust.
b Plu in Numa
c Sape contemp-
tus hostis eruen-
tum certamen
edidit. Li. lib. 2.
Sape desperati-
one quæstus Pa-
terc. l. 1. Ignavi-
am necessitas
acquir, et spei
sape desperatio
causa est. Q.
C. r. l. 5.
Dant animam
ad loquendum
libere ultima
miseria. Liv.
lib. 29.
d Maxime mor-
tiferi esse solent
morsus morien-
tium. Animanti-
um Florus. Fal-
Capitolin
Maximino.

^a Impunitatis
genus est non
habere pœna
locum. Senec.

cannot be worse. ^a And it is a kind of Impunity
to be so low as that a man hath not a condition to
fall from.

^b Lucan.

^b *Moriensque recepit, Quas nollet victurus aquas.*

In a famine a man will eat and drink t^hat which
in plenty he could not have the courage to looke
on. And this cause of Boldness is thus expressed
by the Poet, when he sheweth how the Youth of
Troy, seeing their City burnt and sacked, grew
unto a Desperate Resolution.

Aeneid. 1.

Cum fortuna mi-
serissima ius est;
Nam timor even-
tus deterribi-
lis abest. Ovid. de
Pont. lib. 2. El. g.

*Sic animis juvenum furor additus: Inde Lupi cen-
Raptores atra in Nebula quos improba ventris
Exegit Cætos rabies, carnisque relictis
Faucibus expectant siccis, per Tela, per hostes
Vadimus haud dubium in mortem*

*Vid. Veget. de re
militar. lib. 3.*

*Thus youth did rage despairing of their lives,
Like Wolves of Prey whom extream hunger drives
From their young thirsty whelps, through darkest storms;
Through darts and foes we rush on our own harms,
And being sure to dye dare that which feare
With Hope of Life would force us to forbear.*

*Διά τὸ πολλὰ
κις πρὸ ἄλλος
ἐκινῆσαι τὰ
πρῶτα.
Ethic. 1. 3. c. 11.*

Another cause of Boldness is *Experience*, when
a man hath often done a thing with successe, often
seen dangers and escaped them, as Mariners at
Sea, found other men, upon as small hopes as he
himself hath, to goe through the like matters
without doubt or hesitation. For Examples doe

put

put Life, Hope, and Emulation into men, as we noted before, and we are encouraged sometimes rather to erre in good company, than to go right alone; and this Argument *Aeneas* used in the Poet.

*Vos & Scyllæum rabiem, penitusque sonantes
Accestis scopulos; Vos & Cyclopea saxa
Expertis; revocate Animos, mæstumque timorem
Mittite.*

*a Vel error honestus est magnos duces sequentibus.
Q. r. l. v. c. 5.*

You by Charibdis, and by Scylla say'd, (vail'd
Where waves through Rocks did sound; nor hath pre-
Gainst you that worser Rock the Cyclops denne;
Then cast off feares, and shew your selves brave men.

And as Experience, so on the contrary side Ignorance is as usuall a cause of Confidence, as we see Children will put their fingers in the fire, and play with Serpents; as not acquainted with any hurt they can doe them. Wee may too often meet with men like waters and Vessels, which the shallower and emptier they be, doe make the lower noise, and make use of other mens Ignorance to gaine Boldness and Credit to their own. To which purpose it is a grave expression of the Poet,

*Ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἴδμεν
ταῦτα καὶ σέβει.
Laert. in Arist.
Et l. 30. 8. &
10. Plin. l. 4.
Ep. 7.
Quo mortuæ
tuæ, majoraque
viribus audes?
Vallit te incan-
tum pieratis tuæ.
Æn. 10.
De Audacia
puerili, vid.
Val. Max.
l. 3. c. 1.
Eurip. Hyppol.*

— Οἱ γὰρ ἐν ποσσὶν οὐκ ἴδμεν
ταῦτα, παρ' ὀφθαλμοσκόποις λέγειν.

Those whom wise men know for Dull,
With vulgar ears are wondrous Musically.

Iliad. p. 638.

Quint.

Rhet. l. 2. c. 5.

Q. Guet. lib. 4.
De imperii Ani-
morum divini-
tas exultat.
vid. Plur. in Cor.
Iudg. 6. 36.

Isa. 7. 11. 12.

2 Reg. 19. 29.

2 Sam. 5. 24.

Psal. 74. 9.

Exod. 17. 14.

1 Sam. 4. 7. 8.

And as Flies are esteemed very bold Creatures, because they often returne to the same place: so the boldnesse of these kinde of Speakers is usually discovered in vaine and emptie Tautologies, which is the reason why (as the O-
rator noteth) they are usually more copious then
far Learned men, *Quia doctis est electio & mo-
dus*, because able speakers use choice and Judg-
ment in what they produce.

Another cause of Boldness in attempts may be Religion, and a confidence of Divine Directi-
on unto what we doe. Iohn his preterence unto
zeale, was that which caused him to walk succi-
ously. And in this case as the Historian speaks,
Melius veribus quam ducibus parent. Men are
apt to be led by their Prophets then by their
Captains. And we finde when God would encour-
age his People in their waies, he gave them
signes and assurances for their faith to rely upon
above their feares; that where Reason saw cause of
Doubting, Faith might see all Defects suppli-
ed in God; so to Gideon, to Ahaz, to Hezekiah, and
others. And the Church complains of the want
of them in their times of Calamity. Wee see not
our signes, neither is there amongst us any Prophet or
any one that knoweth how long. When Joshua did
fight Moses did pray, and Israel was more encou-
raged by the intercession of the one, then by the
valour of the other. And the Philistines were
never more affrighted, then when Israel brought
forth the Ark of God against them; for as Ajax
said in the Poet,

Sua

in M

ei tis

εἰ τις θεῶν

Βλάπτει, φύγῃ δ' ἂν ὁ κακὸς τὸν κρείσσονα.

If god will fight,

He can make weak men put the strong to flight.

Sophocl. Ajax.
vid. Ezek. 51.

And therefore Tolumnius the Soothsayer having received happy *Auguria*, doth thereupon grow to Resolutions of courage:

*Hoc erat, Hoc votis, inquit, quod sæpè petivi,
Accipio, agnoscoq; Deos; me, me duce, ferrum
Corripite o Rutili.*

*Aenead. 12.
— Priscum
de more Latini
Auspicium
tum bella parant
mentesque
teorum Explo-
rant super even-
tus, &c.
Sil. Ital. lib 5.*

This, this, is that which in my chiefeſt thought I ſtill deſir'd, and now find what I ſought:

The Divine Tokens I embrace and ſee; (me Come Soldiers, take your Swords and follow Unto this head of Religion belongeth Innocency, as moſt excellent cauſe of Boldneſſe; for the Righteous is bold as a Lyon, which careth not though a multitude of Shepheards come out againſt him. And the Philoſopher tells us that they who have done no wrong unto others, are confident of ſucceſſe in their attempts, believing that they ſhall find no Enemies, becauſe they have provoked none. A notable Example whereof we have in *M. Publius Furius* the Roman Conſul; who was ſo confident of his owne Integrity in publicke Adminiſtration, that being deputed by lot to governe the Province of Spaine, he choſe the two Interreſt Enemies that

*Prov. 11. 21.
ſe. 31. 4.
Vid. ſibi. 7.
23. Rhet. 1. 2. c.
5.*

*al. Max. 1. 3.
7. vid. hand
ſiſſimile Exem-
plum Catonis.
Plur. de uil. ex
Hoſt. b. capiend.*

that he had in the City to be Coſcutors with him in that Diſpenſation. Whereunto may be added the Answer which *Drusus* gave to him who would have contrived his house for ſecrecie, when he told him that he would wiſh his house were pervious and transparent, that privateſt Actions might bee ſeen in publick.

And as Religion and Innocency, ſo on the other ſide *Deboiſhneſſe* and *Deſperateneneſſe* of living doth implant a marvellous Boldneſſe in the Minds and Faces of men, when they have no Modesty or ſhame to reſtrainethem. As we ſee in Gypſies, Paraſites, Jugglers, *θαυμαστοί, neuropaſta*, and ſuch like. And therefore ſuch kind of men both in Scripture and in other writings, are ſaid to have faces of Braſſe, and necks of Iron, whoriſh and impudent foreheads that cannot bluſh nor be aſhamed; and theſe words *ἀπόνοια, ἀναισχυντία, ἐνελμία*, we ſhall find for Synonymies and of equal ſignification, whereof the former ſignifie Deſpaire, Impudence, and the other Boldneſſe.

Again, as Impudence, ſo *Shame* and fear of Diſgrace is a great Cauſe of *Boldneſſe*, in vertuous and honorable Attempts; for there is no Man of Generous Principles, but with much rather chuſe an honorable danger than a ſordid ſafety, and adventure his *Perſon* before he will ſhipwrecke his honeſty or good Name, chooſing ever to regulate his Behaviour rather by a *moral* than a *naturall* fear, to give an account of himſelf rather to thoſe that love his *vertues*, than to thoſe who love his *fortunes*. In one word ſtand-

ing

Κυνόπτες apud
Homerum
Ier. 33.
Iſa. 48. 4.
Ezek. 16. 3.
Oſ. ferreum.
Cic. in Piſonem.
Iul. Pollux. l. 4.
c. 28. Plut. in
Alcib. vid. The.
ophrast. περὶ
ἀπονοίας.
Ariſt. Ethic.
l. 3. c. 9.

Πολυδαμῆς
μοι περὶ
ἐλευθερίας
ραδιῆς.

ding more in awe of mens *Hearts* then of their *Hands*, and shunning more a *Iust Reprehension* then an *Unjust Injury*. And to this purpose it is gravely observed by the Historian, that the dishonour which the Romans suffered *ad furcas Caudinas*, was that which procured their adversaries a bloody overthrow afterward, *quia Ignominia nec Amicos parat nec Inimicos tollit*. Their saving of the lives of the Romans to bring Ignominy upon them, being esteemed not a benefit but a scorne: a very like example we have hereunto in the servants of *David*, abused and put to shame by *Hannun* the sonne of *Ammon*. And thus the Poet expresseth the courage of *Dares* revived by the fall which he had from *Entillus*.

*At non tradatus casu, nec territus heros,
Acrior ad pugnam redit, & vim suscitatur ira,
Tum pudor incendit vires & conscia Virtus.*

Dares no whit dismay'd, renewes the fight
With a more eager force, wrath doth excite
The stouter courage, Shame with Valour mer,
Inflam'd his mind, and did his weapon whet.

Another cause of Boldness, is *Immunity* from Danger, or at least a *Versatilesness* and *Dexterity* of wit to evade it, or shift through it. And therefore though cunning men dare not alwayes second their contrivances with Execution, nor let their hand goe in equipage with their wit; yet commonly men of vigorous fancies are so far in love

N n

with

2 Sam. 10.
*Mixtus dolor
& pudor ar-
mat in Hostes.*
Ænead. 10.
*Tu ne cede ma-
lis, sed contra
audentior esto.*
Ænead. 1. 5.
Arist Ethic. 3.
ca. 11.

*Qui ad fraudem
callidi sunt, non
tantum audent
quantum excogi-
tant. Cic. pro
Cluentio.*

Plut. Apoph.

Plut in Sylla.
Consilium in
arena. Seneca.
εἰς τοὺς βεβήλους
αὐτὸν ὁ δὲ Σύλλα
τοῦτος.
Seph. Antig.

Audacem facie-
bat Amor:
Ovid Met. 4.

A Gell. l. 3. c. 7.

A Gell. l. 6. c. 8.
Vile est corpus
iis qui magnam
gloriam qua-
runt. Liv. l. 2.

with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards, to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger, which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as *Darius* was wont to say of himself, that in a pinch and extremitie of perill he was ever wisest: and *Sylla* gave the same judgment of himself, that he came off best in those busineses, which he was most suddenly put upon: which also I find observed in the Character of our *Henry* the seventh (who hath had the felicity above all his predecessors, to have his lineaments drawn by the ablest pen that hath imployed it self in our Story) that his wit was ever sharpened by Danger, and that he had a greater *Dexterity* to evade, then *providence* to prevent them.

Another cause of Boldness (as I have formerly noted on that Passion) is *strength of Love*, as we see weak Creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong: and the Tribune in *A. Gellius*, out of love either of his Country, or of glory, did not only advise, but himself undertake the executing of a service wherein he was before hand certain to perish. And the same Author telleth us of *Euclide*, a Disciple of *Socrates*, who ventured in a disguise upon the evident danger of his life, to enjoy the Discourses and counsels of his Master.

Lastly Pride, *greatness of Minde* or parts, and opinion of Merit; especially if it meet with discontentedness and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new attempts:

attempts : For it is a very hard thing when great *Abilities* and vast *Hopes* meet together, to govern them with moderation : Private ends being in that case very apt to engage a mans parts, and to take them off from publick service unto particular advantage. And therefore I take it there is no temper of Minde that will with an evenness and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of success, promote publick and honourable Ends, as *Height of Abilities*, with *moderation of Desires*, because in that case a man can never stand in his own light, nor have any mist or obstacle between his Eye and his End.

Now from this ground I beleve did arise that *Maxime* of some of the States of Greece, noted by *Tully*, and at large debated by the Philosophers, *Nemo de nobis unus excellat*, that they would not to have one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest, and thereupon instituted *Ostracisme*, or an honourable Banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men : or to satisfy and assuage the Envy which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the vertues which they can onely admire : or lastly to prevent the dangers which greatness of parts taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Ephesians expelled *Hermodorus* ; and the Athenians *Aristides*, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one Voice in a Consort, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn,

Cic. Tusc. q. l. 5.
Arist. Polit. l. 3.
c. 13.
Plut. in Alcib.
& Aristid. ex
Necia.
Eandem virtu-
tem & oderant
& mirabantur
Liv. l. 5.

Tacit. vit. Agr.
Ammian. l. 15

Ουσι μὲν
πᾶσι τὸ ὅ
τι αὐτοῖς
παρὲν μαρ
τιῶν ἐπι
τείνοντες μαρ
τυροῦν.

Iliad v. 170.
Φίλει γὰρ ὅκνην
παρὰ γὰρ
σεποῦντες
Liv. l. 22.

Semper in pra
lio iis maximum
est periculum
qui maxime ti
ment. Audacia
promuro est
Salust. cat. Ca
Theoc. Idyl.
15.

a Malo te. sapi
ens hostis me
tuat quam stulti
cives laudent
omniaudentem
contemnet Han
nibal. Liv. l. 22.
Arist. E. l. 3 c. 7.
Novi ego istos
in pace levis,
in praelio Cer
vos Tertul. de
Coron.

but disturb the Harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under *Envy* or *Jealousie*. Mens minds out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto Good, which might be abused unto Evil; which *Tacitus* noted to have been the quity of *Domitian*, & *Ammianus Marcellinus* of *Constantius* towards men of the greatest worth.

Now according to the difference of this Affection in different men, so it worketh two different Effects.

1. There is a *Happy and Discreet boldness*, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the minde, and doth first call out and stirre up it selfe by wisdom, before it proceed unto Action or Execution; like the Boldness of the Lyon, which is *Slow*, but at last *prosper*s in what it undertakes. For after Counsell hath ripened Resolutions, Boldness is then the best Instrument to accomplish them, and in that case, *quominus timoris, minus ferme periculi*, as the Historian speaks. The less fears are, the less also are their dangers, and the greater their Confidence, the surer their success:

— Ές Τροίαν περιέμμενοι ἡλθον Ἀχαιοί.

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy
Their ten yeers wish, and gained Troy.

2. There is a *hasty and rash Boldness*, which beginning too speedily without Counsell, doth usually end too Cowardly; without Courage; for rash men

men whom the Philosopher calls *προσθελτοι* men made-up of confidence and fear, are bold and boasting before a Danger; but in it very timorous, or at least inconstant. *Lyons* in peace, but *Harts* in War, as *Tertullians* proverb hath it. ^a Like those of whom *Livy* and *Florus* tel us, That they were more then men in the onset, and less then women in the issue, melting away from their Resolutions like Snow.

And another ill property of the Rashness of this Passion, is, That it will expose a man to more danger than the success which it aimes at can compensate: as he that fishes for a Gudgeon with a golden hook: or as *Vlysses* who went back to the Cyclops his den to fetch his cap and girdle which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men *Overvalue themselves*, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like ^b *Menelaus* in the Port; who would venture to fight with *Hector*; or *Aristoxenus* in *Tully*, who being a Musician, would needs determine in questions of Philosophy.

Lastly it hath a property as we say, to *break the Ice*, and to give the first onset upon dangerous Attempts, which is a thing of very perillous consequence, not onely to the Author, but many times to the publick peace too, ^c forward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.

^a Liv. l. 30. &
l. 38. Flor.
l. 2. c. 4.
*Temeritas ubi
primum impe-
tum effudit,
velut quadam
animalia amisso
acculeo torpet.*
^Q Curr. l. 4.
*Cum ultimi dy-
criminis tempus
advenit in
solicitudinem
versa fiducia est*
ib. c. 3.

^b Plut in Car
c Iliad. n. 97.
112 Tuic.
q l. 1.

^c *Properè se-
qui quæ piget
inchoare. Tacit.
Magis eis Au-
thor ad seditionem
quam Animi
decerat.*
Liv. l. 26.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Passion of Fear : the Causes of it ; Impotency, Obnoxiousness, Suddenness, Nearness, Newness, Conscience, Ignorance of an Evil.

Vide Laert. in
Zenon. l. 7.



He opposite Passion to this of Hope is *Fear*; which being an Equivocal Passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explaine it. There is a vertuous Fear a Fear of Sin and Shame : an Intellectuall Fear of *Admiration*, when the excellency of the Object dazleth our Eye, a Fear of *Reverence*, an *Astonishing* Fear, by reason of the *Newness* : and an *Oppressing* Fear, by reason of the *Nearness* and Inavoydableness of the Evil feared. It is a Griefe, Trouble, Flight, Averfation of some approaching Evil apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthenfome to our nature, and not easily resistable by our strength : For the qualification of the Object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of Hope (save in the Evil of it) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall onely in brieve consider the Dignities and Defects thereof in its Causes and Effects.

Fear is an humbling and debasing Passion, which
always

alwayes importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth : So then as in the former Passion of *Hope* I noted the fundamentall cause thereof to be *Weakness* and *Want* : so likewise in this of *Fear*, the Root and first Principle is *Wickedness* and *Subjection* ; whereof the one implies a disability in us to rest ; the other a necessity to undergoe an evill.

Hence it is that we fear the displeasure of great men ; or the power of Unjust men ; or the competition of popular and plausible men ; or the cunning of close and malicious men ; or the Revenge of provoked men ; or the guilt of injurious men that have wronged us already : because in all these cases there is some notice of *Weakness* and *Subjection* in us : so that *Fear* is of all other a naked Passion : For as nakedness hath three evill properties ; to disable for defence ; to expose to Injury ; and from both to work shame in the consciousness of our dejected condition : So likewise *Fear* hath three properties to make us *Impotent* and *Obnoxious* ; and from both these to beget *Shame* : For though his speech was true, *Rubor est virtutis color*, that *Shame* and *Virtue* have the same colour (which makes it seeme a companion rather of *Perfection* then of *Weakness*,) yet indeed it is rather a signe of a mind vertuously disposed in testifying the quick apprehensiveness of its own defects, then any Adjunct of *Virtue* it self.

So then the Roots of this Passion are *Weakness* and *Subjection* both together ; so that where either condition

Rhet. l. 2. c. 3.

Diogenes apud
Laert. l. 6.
Πας ἐπιδραῶν
τὸ γεννῆς ἐν
μοῖ δόξῃ.
Menander.

condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of *Fear*, and therefore wee see sundry times strength takes off the yoke of Obedience, not onely in the civill government of men, but in the naturall government of creatures by men, to whom by the law of Creation they are all made subject; yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their originall Subjection and instead of Fearing to terrifie man their Lord; and when ever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our *Dominion*, whereby we awe them as our *Reason*, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholden more therein to the working of our Wit, then to the prerogative of our Nature; and usually every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its own abilities, the more it hath of *Strength*, the less it hath of *Fear*; that which *Solomon* makes the strongest, the Apostle the fittest to expell Fear, to wit, Love.

So likewise on the other side, *Immunity from Subjection* in the midst of Weakness removes *Fear*. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their Weakness, yet when once by the priviledge of their Sanctuary, or mercy of their Iudge they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the Offence, their former Feares do presently turne into Joy and Gratulations: and that is the reason why Good men have such Boldness, Confidence, and Courage, that they can bid defiance unto Death; because though they be not quite delivered from the

the Corruption, yet they are from the Curse and Condemnation of Sin; though by reason of their weakness they are not delivered from the mouth, yet they are from the teeth and stings of Death; though not from the Earth of the Grave, yet from the Hell of the Grave; though not from Sin, yet from the Strength and Malediction of Sin: the Law our Adversary must be strong, as well as our selves weak; if he look for Fear.

The Corruption then of this Passion, as it dependeth upon these Causes, is when it ariseth out of too base a conceit of our own, or too high of anothers strength; the one proceeding from an error of Humility, in undervaluing our selves; the other from an error of judgement or suspicion, in mistaking of others. There are some men who as the Orator speaks of despairing Wits, *De viribus suis pessime merentur*, who are too unfaithfull unto Nature in a slight esteem of the abilities she hath given them, and deserve that Weakness which they unjustly complain of: the sight of whose Judgement is not unlike that of Perspective Glasses, the two ends whereof have a double representation; the one fuller and neerer the truth, the other smaller and at a far greater distance: So it is with men of this temper, they look on themselves and others with a double prejudice; on themselves with a Distrusting and Despairing Judgement, which presents every thing remote and small; on Others with an over-valuing and Admiring Judgment, which contrariwise presents all perfections too perfect. And by this

O o

means

means between a self-dislike, and a too high estimation of others, truth ever fals to the ground, and for revenge of her self, leaves the party thus distempered, alwayes timorous. For as Error hath a property to produce and nourish any Passion, according to the nature of the subject matter which it is conversant about: so principally this present Passion; because Error it self is a kinde of *Formido intellectus*, a Fear of the understanding: and it is no great wonder for one Fear to beget another. And therefore when Christ would take away the Fear of his Disciples, he first removes their prejudice: Fear not those that can kill the body onely, and can do no more. Where the over-flowing of their Fears seems to have been grounded on the over-judging of an adverse power. Thus much for the Root and Essential cause of Fear: these which follow are more casual and upon occasion.

Whereof the first may be the *Suddenness of an Evil*, when it seisseth upon (as it were) in the dark: for all darkness is comfortless: and therefore the last terrible Judgement is described unto us by the Blackness and Unexpectedness of it, by the Darkness of Night, and the suddenness of Lightning. All Unacquaintance then and Ignorance of an approaching Evil, must needs work Amazement and Terrour: as contrarily a foresight thereof worketh Patience to undergo, and Boldness to encounter it: as *Tacitus* speaks of *Cacina*, *Ambiguarum rerum sciens eoq; intrepidus*, that he was acquainted with difficulties, and therefore

*Præceteris
Hostibus timen-
tur Repentini.
Ammian. Marc.
l. 28.*

*Mala pravi-
sa sunt Leviora.
Cic. Tusc. q. l. 3.
Annal. l. 1.*

not fearful of them. And there is good reason for this, because in a sudden daunt and on-set of an unexpected evil, the spirits which were before orderly carried by their several due motions unto their natural works, are upon this strange appearance and constant oppression of danger so disordered, mixed, and stifled, that there is no power left eith in the Soul for counsel, or in the Body for Execution: for as it is in the wars of me, so of Passions, those are more terrible, which are by way of Invasion, then of Batel, which set upon men unarmed and uncomposed, then those which finde them prepared for resistance: and so the Poet describes a lamentable overthrow by the suddenness of the one side, and the ignorance of the other:

Invadunt urbem somno vinoq; sepultam.

They do invade a City all at rest,
Which ryot had with sleep and wine opprest.

And this is one reason why men inclineable to this passion, are commonly more fearfull in the Night then at other times, because then the Imagination is presenting of Objects not formerly thought on, when the spirits which shold strengthen, are more retired, and Reason lesse guarded.

And yet there are Evils too, which on the other side more affraight wick their long expectation and train, then if they were more contracted

*Dum ea parte
qua murus di-
vinitus erat sta-
ones armatas
opponunt,
Quintus noctu
ab ea parte, qua
minime suspe-
cta erat impetu
facto scalis ce-
pit. Liv. l 32.*

Sen. Ep. 14.

and speedy. Some set upon us by stealth, affrighting us like lightening with a sudden blaze: others with a train and pomp like a *Comet* which is ushered in with a stream of fire, and like Thunder, which hurts not onely with his danger, but with its noise: and therefore *Aristotle* rekconeth *σημεία τῆς φοβερῶν* the signes of an approaching evil amongst the Objects of Fear.

Another cause of Fear may be the *Nearness of an Evil*, when we perceive it to be within the reach of us, and now ready to set upon us: For as it is with Objects of Sence, in a distance of place, so it is with the Objects of Passion, in a distance of Time; *Remotion* in either, the greater it is, the less present it makes the Object; and by consequence, the weaker is the impression therefrom upon the faculty: and this reason *Aristotle* gives why Death, which else-where he makes the most terrible evil unto Nature, doth not yet with the conceit thereof, by reason that it is apprehended at an indefinite and remote distance, work such terrour and amazement, nor so stifle Reason and the Spirits, as Objects far less in themselves injurious to Nature, but yet presented with a determined *Nearness*. And the reason is plain, because no Evil hurts us by a simple apprehension of its Nature, but of its *Union*: and all *Proximity* is a degree of *Union*. For although *Futurition* be a necessary condition required in the Object which must infer Fear; yet all Evil, the less it hath *de Futuro*, the more it hath *de Terribili*: which is the reason why that Carnal Security,

curity, which is opposed to the fear of God, is described in the Scripture, by putting the Evil Day far from us, viewing as in a Landskip and at a great distance the terrour of that day. And if here the Atheists Argument be objected, Let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall die; Where the propinquity of Ruine is made an inducement unto Ryot: We must answer, that an Atheist is herein both right and vain, in that he conceiveth Annihilation, or never more to be the best close of a wicked life; and therefore most earnestly (though most vainly) desireth that it may be the issue of his Epicurism and Sensuality. And here briefly the corruption of Fear in this particular is, when it takes advantage by the approach of Evil, to swell so high as to sink Reason, and to grow bigger then the Evil which it is afraid of.

— — *propiusq; periculo*
It Timor, & major Martis jam apparet imago.

There Fear gets closer then the thing it fears,
 Wars Image bigger then it self appears.

For as it is a signe of distemper in the Body, when the unequal distribution of nourishment and humors causeth some parts to exceed their due proportion of greatness: so is it likewise in the Faculties of the Minde, when the Inferiour grow high and strong; if Reason raise not it self to such a proportion, as still to maintain and

Aeneid. 8.
In metu & pe-
riculo plura &
majora videntur
metuentibus cum
creduntur facili-
us tum finguntur
impunius, Cic.
de Divinis. l. 2.

manage its authority and government over them. But this is to be observed onely of the Rising and Stre-gth, not of the Humility and Descent of Reason: For though it be fit for the power of Reason to keep it self up above rebellion; yet it is not necessary that it should stoop and sink according to the lownesse or sordidnesse of any Passion. As in the Body, though we would have parts increase alike; yet if one part by distemper grow weak, we require in the rest a fellow-feeling, not a fellow-languishing; yea indeed in both cases, where the inferiour part is weaker, it is the course of Nature and Art to fortifie the higher; because in a superiour there is required as well a power to quicken and raise that which droopeth, as to suppress and keep under that which rebelleth.

* Ne fama aut rem in majus extolleret aut militum animos rerum novitate terretet.

Justin. l. 14.

* Εμπληξίς

εὐβος ἐκ παν-

τασιας δυνά-

μεις ἢ ἐν ἀ-

ποροδυνάμει

παν αἰα.

Clem. Alex.

Strom. l. 2.

Eth. l. 3. c. 7.

Arrian. Epi. l.

1. 2. c. 1.

Nam veluti

pueri trepidam

atq; omnia

Cacis in tene-

bris metunt:

ita nos in luce

timemus. Lucr.

Another cause of Fear may be * *Newness of Evil*: When it is such, wherewith neither the Minde it self hath had any preceding encounter, whereby to judge of its own strength; nor any example of some other mans prosperous issue to confirm its hopes in the like success: for as before I noted out of the Philosopher, Experience is instead of Armour, and is a kinde of Fortitude, enabling both to judge and to bear troubles: for there are same things which he elegantly calleth them, *τὸ κενὰ κενδύων*, *Empty Dangers*: *Epistetus* calleth them *μορμολύχεια* ἢ *Περσσωπεία*, Scar-crowes, and Vizors, which children fear onely out of ignorance, as soon as they are known, they cease to be terrible. As the log of timber which was cast

cast into the pond, did with the first noise exceedingly affright the Frogs, which afterwards when it lay quietly, they securely swam about. And this Ignorance and Inexperience is the cause that a man can set no bounds to his Fear. I grieve for much Evil as hath befallen me; but I fear so much as may befall me; and the more strong and working my *Fancy*, the greater my *Fear*; because what I cannot measure by *Knowledge*, I measure by *Imagination*; the figments of *Fancy* do usually exceed *Truth*.

And from this *Ignorance* likewise it is, that Timorous men are usually *Inquisitive*, as the Philosopher notes; and so the Prophet expresseth the fear of the Idumeans in war, *Watchman! what of the night? Watchman! What of the Night?* Fear usually doubleth the same questions, as Grief hath the same complaints. Therefore men in an affright and amazement, look one another in the face; one mans countenance, as it were asking counsel of another: and once more from hence grow the Irresolutions of timorous men, because they know not what to do; nor which way to flye the things they fear: in which respect they are said to flye from a *Enemy seven wayes*, as ever suspecting they are in the worst. *Pavidi semper Consilia in incerto*, they never can have fixed and composed Counsels: and it is the usuall voice of Men in their Fears; I know not what to do, I know not which way to turn my self; *Trembling of Heart*, and *Failing of Eyes*, *Blindness* and *Astonishment*, *Ignorance* and

Fear

Plin. l. 8. ep. 18.
Vereor omnia,
imagino omnia
queq; natura
metuentium est,
ea maxime me-
tui que maxime
abomino. fingo.
Plin. l. 6. ep. 4.
Vid. Sen. ep. 13.
Prob. Selt. 14.
9. 15.

Isa. 13. 8. 21. 11
Jer. 51. 31.
Gen. 42. 1.
Μηδὲρ οὐκ ὄντες
λέγει αὐτῷ καὶ
καὶ τὸ φέρονται
πρὸς αὐτὸν
ὡς ἀπορίας.
Schol. in Soph.
Deur. 28. 25.
In Magnis diffi-
cultatibus sem-
per presentia
fugimus tan-
quam maxime
periculosa.
Plut in Mario.
Deu. 28. 28. 95

Laert in Zenor.
lib 7.

Fear, do thus usually accompany each other. And therefore the Stoicks make *δυνος* and *δρεπτος*, a fluggish affection of minde, whereby a man shrinks back, and declineth business, because of difficulty of danger which he observeth in it, and a Tumultuary and distracted frame of Minde, not knowing which way to take, to be amongst the kindes of this Passion of Fear. The Poet speaking of the Sabine Virgins, whom the Roman youth snatched away, and took to them for wives, hath thus elegantly described this distraction of Fear :

Ovid d. Arte
Amandi. l. 1.

*Ut fugiunt aquilas timidissima turba Columba,
Utq; fugit visos agna novella lupos :
Sic illa timere viros sine lege ruentes,
Constitit in nulla qui fuit ante Color.
Nam Timor unus erat, facies non una timoris,
Pars laniat Crines, pars sine mente sedet.
Altera mæsta filet, frustra vocat altera matrem,
Hæc queritur, stupet hæc, hæc fugit, illa manet,*

As weak and fearfull Doves the Eagle flye,
And tender Lambs when they the wooll espie :
So the affrighted Sabine Virgins run
Pale and discolour'd, Roman youth to shun.
Their Fear was One, but Fear had not One look,
Part here sit reav'd of sence, part there doth pluck :
And tear their hairs, One silent mourns, another
With a successles Outcry calls her mother.
One moans, the fright another doth amaze :
One flies for Fear, for Fear another staves.

Now

Now the reasons why *newness* of evil doth thus work *fear*, may be many. For first, all *Admiration* is a kinde of *fear*; it being the property of man, not only to fear that which is *against*, but that also which is *above* our Nature, either in regard of *natural and civill dignity*, which worketh a *fear of Reverence*, as to parents, governours, masters; or in regard of *Moral excellency* and *excesses* above the strength of the faculty, which worketh a *Fear of admiration*. Now then it is the property of every thing that brings novelty with it, to work, more or less, some manner of *admiration*, which (as the Honour of this Ages Learning calls it) is a *broken knowledge*, and commonly the first step which we make in each particular *Science*; and therefore *children* are most given to *wonder*, because every thing appeareth *new* unto them. Now then when any evil shall at once fright our *nature*, and pose our *understanding*, the more our *Ignorance* doth weaken our *reason*, the more doth it *strengthen* our *Passion*.

Again, though such evils may haply be in themselves but slight, yet the very *strangeness* of them will work an opinion of their *greatness*: for as that of *Seneca* is true, *Magnitudinem rerum consuetudo subducit*, that use makes small esteem of great things: so it will follow on the contrary side, that Novelty makes evil appear greater; as the way which a man is least acquainted with, seemes the longest.* And therefore the *Romans* did use themselves unto their gladiatory fights and bloody spectacles, that acquaintanc with *wounds* and *blood* might make them the lesse fear it in the Wars.

P p

And

Advancement
of Learning.

Σοφία ἡδὲν
θαυμάζει τὴν
δοξὴν τῶν παλαιῶν
ἡρώων.

Laert. in
Zenon. l. 7.
Plat. de Aud.
Οὐ θαυμάζει
θαυμάζων, οὐταὶ
ἀγνοοῖεν.
Metap. l. 1. c. 2.

Nat Quest.
l. 7. c. 1.

* Iul. Capitol. in
Maximo &
Balbin. Vide
Lippi Saturn.

And lastly, such is the inbred carelousness of Nature in declining all noxious things, and such is the common suspicion of the Minde, whereby out of a tendering of its own safety, it is willing to know every thing before it make experiment of any, and thereby it is made naturally searefull even of harmless and inoffensive things, (*Omnia tuta timens*) much more then of those which bring with them the noise and face of evill.

Now the corruption of this passion herein is, when it falleth too soon upon the object, and snatcheth it from the Understanding before that it hath duely weighed the nature of it; when as *Aristotle* speaks of *Anger*, that it runs away from reason with an *half message*; so the Object shall be pluckt away from the Understanding with an *halfe judgement*. For when a man hath but an halfe and broken sight, like him in the Gospell, he will be easily apt to judge men as big as Trees, and to pass a false sentence upon any thing which he feares.

Another cause of *Fear*, may be *Conscience* of evill, and guiltiness of minde, which like mud in water, the more it is stirred, doth the more foule and thicken: *For wickedness, when it is condemned of its own witness, is exceeding timorous, and being pressed with Conscience, alwaies forecasteth terrible things*: and as the *Historian* speaketh of Tyrants, so may we of any other wicked men, *Si recludantur mentes, posse aspici laniatus & iterus*; their minds with lust, cruelty, and unclean resolution being no less torn and made raw, then the body

flea'd

Wisd. 17. 11.

*Tacit. Annal.
lib. 6.*

head with scourges. Every vicious man hath a double flight from God, a flight from the Holiness, and a flight from the Justice of his Will. Adam first *eates*, and next he *hides*: as soon as he hath transgressed the Covenant, he expects the Curse: and therefore we shall still observe that men are afraid of those whom they have injured.

* *Alcibiades* having provoked the Athenians, was afraid to trust them, saying, it is a foolish thing for a man when he may flee, to betray himselfe into their hands from whom he cannot flee. And therefore they who would have us feare them, desire nothing more then to be privie to our guilts, and to know such crimes of us, as by detecting of which, they have it in their power to bring either infamie or loss upon us.

Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde Timeri.

Ino our secret crimes they pry, that so
We may feare them, when they our vices know.

And therefore Innocency is the best Armour that any man can put on against other mens malice, or his own feares: for the righteous are bold as a Lion.

Other causes of feare might here be observed, which I shall but intimate. As we feare active and busie men, because if they be provoked, they will stirre and look about to revenge themselves.

We feare likewise Dilators, because they are inquisitive and pry into the secrets of others. *Plutarch* compares them unto Cupping-glasses,

P 2

which

* *Ælian. Var.*
Hist. l. 13. c. 38.

Juven. Satyr.
Charus erit
Verri qui Ver-
rem tempore quo
vult Accusare
potes, &c.

Pro 28. 1.

Minus timebant
Epaminondam
Δία φιλοσφί-
αν ὡς ἀπειγ-
νονα.
Plutarch.

which draw ever the worst humours of the body unto them, and to those gates thorow which none passed but condemned and piacular persons. We may liken them unto flies, which resort onely to the raw and corrupt parts of the body; or if they light on a sound part, never leave blowing on it, till they dispose it to putrifaction. For this is all the comfort of malevolent persons, to make othe s appear worse then they are, that they themselves, though they be the worst of men, may not appear so.

We fear also abusive and Satyirical wits, which make use of other mens names, as of Whetstones to sharpen themselves upon.

Horat. l. 1.
Sat 4.

*Omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas,
Fenum habet in cornu, longe fuge, dummodorifum
Excussat sibi, non hic cuiquam parces amico.
Et, quodcunque semel Charitas ille verit, omnes
Gestiet a furno redeuntes scire, lacque,
Et pueros, & anus —*

These all hate Poets, fear to suffer scorn
From those curst wits, which carry hay in horn.
Shun them; they will not spare their dearest friend
To make themselves sport: then what they have pend
Th'are big with, till old wives and boys that go
From ovens and from washpools, know it too.

"Οι παρτοί κ
ἐρωτες κ πα
ντροί ἀδολοί
S. Arist. Rhet.
l. 2.

Lastly, we fear close, cunning, and suppressed malice, which like a skin'd wound doth rankle inwardly: Crafty, insinulative, plausible men, that

that can shrowd and palliate their revengefull purposes under pretexts of love. I formerly noted of *Tiberius*, and (a) *Alius Spartianus* observeth it of *Antoninus Geta*, that men were more afraid of his kindness then of his anger, because his use was to shew much courtesie there where he intended mischief.

a Fuit ejus
Immanitatis
Antoninus, ut
in principie
blandiretur
quos ad necem
destinabat, ut
ejus magis
blandimentum
timeatur quam
iracundia.
Spart. in Geta.
b Plutarch. in
Caesare.
Ira quae tegitur
nocet. Sen. Med.
Psalm. 62. 4. 55.
21. 10. 8, 9, 10.

And (b) *Caesar* was wont to say, that he was not afraid of *Antony* and *Dolabella*, bold adversaries, but of *Brutus* and *Cassius*, his pale and lean enemies, who were able to smother their passion, till they had fit opportunity to act it. The Italians (they say) have a Proverb wherin they promise to take heed themselves of their Enemy, but pray to God to deliver them from their friend. And this, as it is of all other the most dangerous and the most unchristian, so it is the most unworthy and sordid disposition of minde, (I cannot finde words bad enough to character it (c) by) which at the same time can both flatter and hate, and with the same breath praise a man, and undo him. And therefore the (d) Philosopher telleth us that a Magnanimous man is *φανερῶμος* and *φανερῶφιλος*. such an one as doth boldly profess as well his displeasure as his love, esteeming it timorousness to trifle and conceal his affections.


c Pessimum inimicorum genus
Laudantes, Tac.
Turpe est odisse
quem laudes.
Sen. de. Ira, lib.
3 cap. 29.
d Arist. Ethic.
lib. 4. c. 8.
Τόγας λανθάνειν φοβούμενους

Of all Christs enemies, *Judas* when he kissed him, the *Herodians* when they praised him, and the *Devill* when he confessed him, were the worst and ill-favouredst. A Leprosie was ever uncleanness when it was whitest, and Satan is never more wicked

wicked or more ugly then when he puts on *Samuels* Mantle. Hatred when it flatters, is the most mishapen monster. Like those poysons which kill men with laughing, or like the Philistines Trespasse-offering, Mice and Emeralds made of gold.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of the Effects of Feare, Suspicion, Circumspection, Superstition, Betraying the succours of Reason, Fear generative, Reflecting, Inward weakning the faculties of the Mind, Base Suspicion, Wise Caution.



Proceed to consider some of the *Effects* of this Passion, whereof the first may be *Suspicion* and *Credulity*, which either other mens-
mours, or ower own working Imagination frameth unto it self. Which effect of Fear

the Historian hath wisely observed, *Retinere comes-
tus dum Timet, Credit*; what he feared that he believed. And in another place speaking of the strange relations which had been made of monsters, his Judgement upon the report is, *Visa sive ex meo credita*, It was uncertain whether they had been really

Tacit. lib. 4.

Annal. lib. 2.

really seen or beleev'd out of Feare. For as timorous men are by their own suspicion ready to frame unto themselves new terrors, and to feare where no feare is, which the Poet hath observed,

Quæ finxere Timent.

— they are afraid
Of fancies which themselves have made ;

So are they ready likewise to believe the apparition of their owne braine for reall terrors : For *Tacitus* his speech is here likewise true: *Fingunt Creduntque*, fi rst they feigne, and then they beleve.

Now the Reason hereof may be First, the generall Impression of Nature, which being subject unto Infinite dangers, hath therefore given it a wisdom of providence, and circumspection, to foresee those evils, which cannot by dexterity be so easily shifted off, as they may at a distance be prevented; so that we finde even in the most cleare and undisturbed order of our operations toward any new thing (though not apprehended as noxious and offensive to our Nature) untill it be better understood, a secret drawing back and feare lest it should prove hurtfull unto us, how much more than when it is once preposessed with Passion? For as cloth once dyed from it's naturall white, will take no other but a darker colour: so mindes once steeped in the bitter (a) humours of this melancholique passion, will tel-

don e

Ἡμεῖς δὲ ποτὶς
τὴν ἀνὰ γὰρ
φαντασίαν,
Ἄνθρωποι παρ' αὐ-
τῶν ἑταίρων ποτὶς
αὐτοὺς ἐξοφλοῦν.

*Quorum in al-
terius manu vi-
ta posita est, se-
pius illud cogi-
tant quid possit
is cuius in diri-
one sunt quam
quid debeat fa-
cere. Cic. pro-
Quinto.*

a De timore isto
melancholico,
Vide quædam
apud Gal. Rho-
dig. l. 9. c. 26.

a Quod de constantio observat Ammian: Marcell l. 16, de Artaxarche. Plutarchus de Medea, Euripid. in Medea. De Domitiano Tacitus, quidam nunquam magis quam cum erubuerunt timendi sunt. Senec. Ep. 11.
 b Tacit. An. l. 1. Vide Plutarch. de superstitione; Et lib. contra Epicur. Max. Tyrius differtat.
 4 Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 7. p. 512. Hist. lib. 2.

dom admit of any, but more black and fearefull conceits: (a) And from this suspicion of fear it is, that timorous men are usually cruell, when they gain any advantage: Their jealousie teaching them to do that unto others, which they fear from them.

A second Reason may be, because in feare the minde of man is drawn to a neerer sense of its weaknesse, and to a more prejudicate apprehension of the adverse power: And therefore it is a true observation, (b) *Prona ad Religionem percussa semel mentes, &c.* Minds once possessed with fearefull conceits, are most forward in sacrifices, and Religious Ceremonies, to avert the evils which they expect. So that as Tacitus on another occasion speaks, *Inclinatis ad credendum*, so I may say *Inclinatis ad timendum animis loco omnium, etiam Fortuna*. When the minde is once drooping, things which before passed away as matters of course and casualty, are now drawn within the compass of Presages and Emphatical evils.

But here by the way we are to remember that this credulity of fear is to be understood with respect of its owne suspicion, otherwise in regard of those strengthening helps which are given against it, it is ever incredulous: O thou of little faith! why dost thou fear?

Now this effect of Fear is generally in it selfe a corruption of it: For though I would have a mans dangers make him provident and solicitous in the forecasting future evils out of a sound and sober conjecture, according as are the

the likelihoods of their event, and not have him flatter himself in a carelesse security, nor divert his Minde from such unwelcome and pensive thoughts, like *Vitellius* in *Tacitus*, who in the near approach of his fatall ruine, was *Trepidus*, *dein Temulentus*, one hour Fearfull, and the next Drunken, smothering in himself every thought of ensuing danger, and enduring nothing but *Iucundum & Lasivum*; that which was pleasing, though harmefull to him; yet I would not have the minde tormented with ungrounded Fancies, and pre-occupate Evils to be no further effected than in our braine: because hereby it is made soft and irresolute, tumultuary and confused, and both wayes much indisposed and disabled for Action.

Another ill Effect of Feare, is a *Dislike* of whatever meanes Reason presents for the freeing of us; whence issue Inconstancy and continuall Change of Resolutions, hating all Counsels when they are present, and recalling them when they are too farre past: which Effects is elegantly described by the Author of the Booke of *Wisdom*, who saith, that *Feare is a betraying of the Succours which reason offereth*; a submitting of them to the false interpretations of a crooked and prejudicate suspicion, which overcuriously discovering Weaknesse in all meanes, and making use of none, doth thereby betray Nature into the hands of Danger. * They say of a certaine Fish, that it hath a Sword, but it hath not a Heart: a perfect Embleme of Feare, which though you put into Armor, yet you cannot give it Courage. And

* *Themistocles*
apud *Plut.*
Apophth.

* Chabrias ib.
 & Orat. 2. de
 fortit.
 Alex. Ari.
 Ousēp tēp tēp
 tēp tēp tēp
 tēp tēp tēp
 tēp tēp tēp
 Sop. Oedip Tyr.
 Tac. An. l. 3.
 Q. Cur.
 Omnia tuta ti-
 mens. Non mi-
 nus praesidium
 suum quam
 hostes metue-
 runt discrimi-
 ne tati.
 Liv. 1.
 Aenead. l. 3

* therefore as he said, An army of Lyons led by a Hart, would do less service then an army of Harts led by a Lyon, because in that case Feare would betray her own succours. And this I finde a frequent observation, that *Pavidis consilia in inserto*. Feare ever dazleth the Eye, and blindeth the Mind in all her Counsels: and *Timor etiam auxilia reformidat*. It is afraid of the very succors that are offered. And therefore it is noted as a great mastery of *Ulysses* over his feares, that he could think and wisely advise what to do.

— — *Nec talia passus Ulysses,
 Oblitusq, sui est Ithacus discrimine tanto.*

Although with feares oppress'd; yet he had not The Cares and thoughts of his own peace forgot.

Now the reason of this may be first, because *Feare* is a *Multipling* and *Generative* Passion, ever producing motions of its own Nature. He which feares danger from anothers power, will easily feare Errors or Impotency in his own ayds: and it is * common with men to think themselves *Unwise*, when they feel themselves *Unhappy*; and this very thought that they are so doth I know not by what *Fascination*, make them so. So that as a chased Buck, when he flies from the Dogges, doth many times fly into the Net which was spread for him: so when our feares drive us from one mischief, they often hamper and intangle us in another.

* Πρὸς τὰς τῶν
 καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ
 τῶν κακῶν τῶν
 In quum sed usu
 receptum, quod
 honesta consilia
 vel turpia, prout
 malè aut prof-
 perè cedunt, ita
 vel probantur,
 vel reprehen-
 duntur.
 Plin. l. 5 Ep. 23
 Arrian: Epist
 ll. 2. c. 1.

Again

Again it is the property of *Feare*, to make us ever reflect upon our own Weakness, & (as I said) not only to present it but to worke it: as the Sun when it discloseth unto us the Glorious Lights of the one part, is commonly it selfe hid in the other part of the Heavens: as contrarily, when it shineth on the Earth, it hides the Stars: so it is in those two Offices of Reason; the Transient and Reflexive act; that whereby we look Outward on others, or Inward on our selves; specially where there is Passion to withdraw and pervert it; as the one is stronger, so commonly the other is weaker: which is true most of all in this Passion of Feare, wherein the more we see of dangers from outward oppositions, the less we see of inward strength for resistance. Inſomuch that great minds, when they meet with great dangers, are oftentimes staggered, as the Poet intimates, when *Ajax* came forth to battell:

Τρῶας δὲ πρόμ' αἰνὸς ὑπὸ λυγρῇ γυῖα ἔχασεν.
 Ἐκτρεῖ δ' αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι παύσατο.
Feare had the other Trojans all opprest;
Yea Hectors heart panted within his breast.

Iliad. ii. v. 215.

A third Effect may be a Weakness of the Faculties of the Minde, and the Spirits in the Body; whereby the one is made unfit for Search or Counsell, the other for Service or Execution. And hence (as *Plutarch* noteth) it imports in the Greek, a Binding or shutting up, and so withdrawing and indisposing the Soul for Action.

Plut. de Sup.

And such Actions, as Feare forceth a man upon, are presumed to be so weak and unnaturall, that it is a *Maxime* in the Law, *Per metum gesta pronon ratis habentur* : Those things which we doe in Feare, are void and invalid to binde, when the Feare which forceth them is removed. And as it is in the Civill State, so it is in the Morall Common-wealth of the Soule, there are three principall wayes to inferr Weaknesse, Forreigne Incurfions, intestine Tumults, and an Emptying of the parts, all which are to be seen in the Extremity of Feare. Where first two things are to be granted, one concerning the Body, and the other the minde. The first is, that the Spirits being of the most strong, subtile, and quick motion, are the principall Instruments of Entercourse, either in Negotiation to, or Service from Reason : the other, that the Minde being of a Spirituall and Elevating Nature, retaines then the perfectest power of Operation, when it least of all suffers the Incurfion of grosser Passions, which yet I understand not of all manner of Ministry and Admixture of Appetite with Reason (as if the Regular motions of inferior powers did not serve to sharpen the Counfels of the higher) but only of Invasiō and Tyranny.

Which granted, we may observe all the three former causes of Weakness in an Extremity of Feare. For first there is a Confused and Unserviceable mixture of *Passion & Reason* : The *Passion* with too much outrage and assault breaking in, and distracting the advices of *Reason*, which is

Forreigne

Forreigne Incurston : For though these two are not parts of a different *Regiment* ; yet they are of a different Nation (if I may so speak) the one belonging to the higher, the other to the lower part or Region of the soule. Secondly, there is *Tumult* and Disorder amongst the Spirits, which is *Civill Dissention*. Thirdly there is a Retyring of them to the principall Castle or Fort , the Heart, whereby the Outward Quarters are left Naked and Ungarrison'd ; which though it be a strengthening of the Better, yet it is a Weakening of the Major part, and this answereth unto Emptying or Vacuity. By all which, both Reason is made unfit to Counsell (all the Concepts thereof being choaked and stifled with a disorderly throng of Spirits and Passions) and the Body likewise is so benumbed , that though our discourse were entire, yet it could not be there seconded with any successfull service. And hence are those many ill Effects of Fear upon the Body, whiteness of Haire, Trembling, Silence, Thirst, Paleness, Horrour, Gnashing of Teeth, Emission of Excrements. The Outward parts being overcooled, and the Inward melted by the strength of the Spirit retyring thither. Which *Homer* hath thus described, speaking of a Coward,

*His Colour comes and goes, nor doth he set
Long in one place, he croucheth to his feet ;
His Heart pants strong, and intercepts his breath,
His Teeth do gnash with, but the thoughts of Death*

Q q 3

Brave

Cael. Rhodig.
l. 7. c. 47.
Plut. de Hom.
Arist. Prob.
Sell. 27. 0:
l. 2. 3.

Illad. N. 280.
Colorem mutat
Polypus, quia
Timidum anim.
Plut. l. 9. n. 9
19.

*Brave men are still the same, not much agast,
When the first brunt of their Attempts is past.*

* Arist. Prob.

27. q. 3.

Vid. Sen. de

Ira. l. 2. c. 3.

Plut. in Arato.

* Βαλδύνηδες

τοις, Arist.

Rhet. l. 2.

Vid. Vol. l. 5. c. 8

* Φοβηδύνηδες

ἢ σφοδρὴν ἰσχυ-

μίαν, λαλόν-

τις δὲ.

Latr. in Zenon.

Ælian de An-

im l. 8. c. 18.

l. 4. c. 8.

* Plut. Sympof.

l. 4. q. 5.

Homerus viros

fortissimos sem-

per in pugna

describit arma-

tos. Et Hannibal

in tot pugnis

nunquam vul-

neratur.

Plut. in Pelopio-

da, & in Mar-

cello.

Languescit in-

dustria, intendi-

tur Sordida, si

nullum esse me-

ritus aut spes: Se-

curi omnes alie-

na subsidia ex-

pellabunt, sibi

ignavi, nobis

graves. Annal.

l. 2.

Where by the way we may observe what *Seneca* also tells us, that *Feare* doth usually attend * the beginnings of great enterprizes, even in the worthiest men. Which mindeeth me of one more, (and that a usefull and profitable) Effect of this Passion; I meane * *Care*, *Wisdome*, and *Caution*, which ever proceeds from a Moderate Feare; which is a Dictate of Nature; And therefore the weakest Fishes swim together in shoales, and the weakest Birds build in the smallest and outermost boughes, which are hardest to come unto. And we may observe that Nature hath made the weakest Creatures swiftest: as the Dove, the Hare, the Hart: and they * say that the Hare is very quick at hearing, and sleepeth with his Eyes open, every way fitted to discover danger before it surprise him. For as in Religion, a Feare that is governed by the Word of God; so proportionably in Morality, a Feare grounded by the Word of Reason, is the Principle of Wisdome. As Security and Supineness is the Root of Folly, which *Tiberius* replied to the petition of *Hortulus*, wherein he requested of the Senate a Contribution from the publick Treasury to recover the honour of his Family, which now was sunk and began to wither. Industry, saith he, will languish, Idleness will increase, if no man have Feare, or Hope in himselfe: but all will securely expect a supply from others; in themselves lazy and burthen-
then some

then some unto us : and it is the judgement of *Tacitus* upon one of the wisest Policies, which ever that Emperour practised, I mean his writing to the Legions abroad, *Tanquam adepto principatu*, as if he were already Emperour, when at home in the Senate he used only Modesty and Refusals, That he did it out of *Fear*, so wise a Counsellor was his Passion unto him. And we finde that some great Commanders have caused their Scout-watches to be unarmed, that Feare might make them the more vigilant. And therefore this Passion is the Instrument of Discipline, seasoning the Minde, as bround-Colours do a Table, to receive those beauties and perfections, which are to be super-induced.

Paulus Æmil.
apud Plut.
Apoth. l. 44.

Vid Clem.
Alex. Pedag.
l. 1. c. 9.
Plin. l. 6 ep. 17.



CHAP.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of that particular Affection of Feare, which is called Shame. What it is. Whom we thus feare. The ground of it, Evill of Turpitude, Injustice, Intemperance, Sor-didness, Softness, Pusillanimity, Flattery, Vain-glory, Misfortune, Ignorance, Prag-maticalness, Deformity, Greatness of Minde, Unworthy Correspondencies, &c. Shame, Vicious, and Vertuous.

φόβος ἀδοξίας
Arist. Eth. l. 1.

c. 15.

Αὐτῷ τις καὶ τα-
ραχὴ καὶ τὰ εἰς
ἀδοξίαν &c.

Arist Rhet. l. 2.
c. 6.

φόβος ἐμπροσ-
θεν αἰσχύνῃ.
Damascen.

de Orthod: fid.
l. 2 c. 15.

A Gell. l. 9 c. 6.
Ὁ γὰρ φόβος ἀπὸ
ταπεινότητος καὶ ὀμ-
αρῆς.

Illad, Σ 24.



Esides this Generall Consideration of the Passion of Feare, there is one particular thereof, which cal-leth for some little observation; namely *Shame*, which is a Feare of just Disgrace, and Reproof in the Minds of those, whose good opinion we do or ought to value, as he said in the Poet.

Πολύδαμος μοι ἐμπροσθεν αἰσχύνης ἀνείκελος.

Now those whom we thus feare, are *wise men*, (for so *Polydamas* is said to look behinde and be-fore him.) *Aged men*, and all whose presence we reverence, as Parents, Rulers, Counsellors, Friends. Any whom we our selves *Admire*, or who *Admire* us, We feare disgrace with those whom we *Admire*, because their judgement of us, is in our own Apprehension, a kinde of Touch-stone, which if

we

we cannot suffer the trial of, argues us to be but corrupt and uncurrant Metall. And we fear it with those who admire us: Because as every man is willing to see his face when it is clean, in that Glasse which represents it fairest; so when it is foul, of all other he shunneth that most. In the former case we are in danger to miss what we desired; in the other we are in danger to shipwrack what we before enjoyed.

We are apt to be ashamed with our *Friends*, because their opinion we value; and with our *Enemies*, because theirs we fear; with our *Friends*, because they are grieved; with our *Enemies*, because they are delighted with that which shames us.

Again we fear in this regard, Rigid and *Severe Men*, who are not ready to forgive, nor to put candid and charitable constructions upon what we do. Therefore when *Cato* was present, (who was *vir rigida Innocentia*, a stern and severe Censor of the manners of Men) none durst call for the obscene spectacles of their *Floralia*, being more awed by the Authority of the man, then allured by the pleasures of the plays.

*Lib. 1. 39 Val.
Max. l. 2. c. 10.
Vid. etiam l. 4.
c. 5.*

Likewise busie and *Garrulous men*, because they enquire into our Crimes, and having disclosed, do divulge them. For which cause we fear in this case the *Multitude*, because an ill name is like an ill face, the broader it is drawn, and the more light it hath about it, it appears the more deformed. As a little Gold beaten into thin Leaves; a little Water drawn into a thin steeme and vapor, seems

*Misoporus
non Pompeium
molto sed
terribius & terro-
ribus.
l. Ep. A. l. 7. c. 1.*

Sen. Ep. 11 &
25.

Cylius orator
Atheniensis
aut Aristote-
lem.

Rhet. l. 2 c. 6.

Et Prædicator
in prædicatione
habent quod Cyri-
acum esse.

Plut. Apoph.

Aristic. erat. de
Paratragmat.

wider then it was at first: so even lesser crimes be-
ing multiplyed through the mouths of many, do
grow into a spreading cloud, and obscure a mans
name. For he is presumed to be void either of
wisdom or modesty, that doth not fear many
Eyes. We fear *Innocent* and Vertuous men, their
presence aweth us from liberty of sinning, and
maketh us blush if they deprehend us in it, be-
cause *Examples* have a proportionable Authority
over the heart of man, as *Laws* have, which we
do not trespass without fear. And therefore
the Philosopher adviseth to live alwayes so, as if
some grave, and serious and severe person were
ever before us, to behave our selves *sub Custode*,
& *Padagogo*, as under the eye of a Keeper, be-
cause such a mans conversation will either regu-
late ours, or disgrace it. Vicious men do the less
fear one another, by how much they stand in need
of mutual pardon, as we finde *Stertorius* (if I for-
get not) giving those souldiers of the Enemies Ar-
my their lives, who had but one eye, he being him-
self *Monophthalmos*.

Again we fear *Envious* and malevolent per-
sons, because such look upon our Actions with
prejudice; and as *Momus*, when he could not
finde fault with the face in the picture of *Venus*,
picked a quarrel at her Slipper: so these men will
ever have something either in Substance or Cir-
cumstances of our Actions, to misreport and ex-
pose to scandal.

Lastly, we fear those in this respect, whose
Company we shall most be used unto; because that
leaves

leaves us not time wherein to forget our Errors, or to fortifie our selves against them. It makes a man live ever under the sense of his Guilt. In which respect *Cato major* was wont to say, That a man should most of all reverence himself, because he is ever in his own sight and company.

Plut. Apoph.

Alexia.

The Fundamental ground of this Affection, is any evil that hath either *Guilt*, or any kinde of *Turpitude* in it, or any signes or suspicions thereof, reflecting either on our selves, or any of ours, whose reputation we are tender of. And thus the Apostle telleth us, that all *Sin* is the matter of *Shame*, when it is revived with a right judgement. *What fruit had you then in those things whereof you are now ashamed?* That which hath *Emptiness* in the Beginning, and *Death* in the End, must needs have *Shame* in the middle. But though all sin with respect to Gods Eye and Judgement doth cause Shame, yet in the eye of men, those cause it most which have any notable and more odious *Turpitude* adhering unto them. As either obscene or subdolous, and dishonest actions when they are detected, forging of Deeds, defacing Records, counterfeiting of Names or Seales, suborning of Witnesses, making use of ingenious Professions, as Cloaks to palliate, and Instruments to provoke Abusive and Uliberal practises.

*1 Sueton. in Vesp. c. 23. vid. Quedam apud Casaub. in Theophrast. ΠΟΡΝΕΙΑΣ Vid. Orat. Bundata apud Dion. l. 60. *Αγορεύειν ἀνὰ τὸν δῆμον Vid de ea. Theophrast.*

Such are all kinde of *Sordid Actions* or Behaviours, as gain raised out of despicable commodities, (as *(a)* *Vespasian* set a Vestigal or excise upon Pisse) and the Philosopher tels us of some that made a *(b)* gain of the dead. Such are also the

^a Vid. Desid.
H. rald. digres.
l. 1. c. 21.
^b Vid. Plin.
Paneg. Tacit.
Anal. 4.

^c H. rat. l. 1.
Sat. 1. Vid.
Plaut. Aulul.
Att. 2.
Theophrast.
de Mignolis
p. 15.

Livings which by sordid Ministers, Pandars, Bawdes, Curtezans, (^a) Parasites, Juglers (^b) Delators, Cheaters, Sharks, and shifting Companions make unto themselves, such the Poets miser.

—— *c Populus me sibilat, at mihi plaudo*
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca.

The people hiss me all abroad,
But I at home my self applaud,
When in my Coffer I behold,
That which none hiss at, heaps of Gold.

Many particular Causes there are which are apt to excite this affection, some whereof I shall briefly name; as,

First *Sloth*, and shrinking from such labour, which those that are better, older, weaker, more delicate than our selves do willingly undergo. Thus *Menelaus* in the Poet seeing the Grecians as fearful to undertake a single combat with *Hector*, as they were ashamed to deny it, did thus upbraid their Cowardize.

μαχάρια ἀνὰ
τοια.

Iliad α. 97.
O verè Phrygia
nequiem Phry-
ges. Æneid 9.

Ἵμους ἀμείλιττον, Ἀχαιῶδες οὐκ ἔστιν Ἀχαιοί, &c.

What Grecian souldiers turn'd to Grecian dames?
That can digest so great, so many shames?
What not a man of Greece (O soul disgrace)
Dare meet or look proud Hector in the face?
Well, sit you down inglorious, heartless men,
Turn'd to your first water and earth: yet then

I'll take up Arms, for victory's last end,
Doth not on Our, but Divine will depend.

In like manner *Hector* rebuketh the baseness of
Paris in flying from *Menelaus*.

"Οὐ αὐτοὶ χεῖρας κίχαις, τὰ δὲ δῶρ' Ἀγέσιλῳ, &c.

Trim Warriour, tell me what thy Lute can do,
What Venus Graces, comly hair, sweet hew,
When thou shalt wallow in the dust? Th'art far
Fitter to wear Stone-coat then Coat of War.

Again, any thing which argueth *pusillanimity*
or littleness of minde, is a just ground of shame, as
to recount courtesies and upbraid them; and there-
fore he said in *Seneca*, *Non tanta est vixisse*; That
his life was less worth, then to be so valued to him,
in daily Exprobrations, and that his blood with less
trouble to him might have bin let out at his veins,
then to be every day disordered, and called up in-
to his face; To receive continual gifts and be ever
craving from our inferiours, burthen some to those
who can less bear it.

Hereunto refer all *Light* ludicrous and *ridi-
culous* behaviour, wherein if a grave or serious
man be deprehended, it rendereth him suspected
of a minde that can flag and lessen; and therefore
Agésilas being so taken playing with his childe,
made h's Apology for it, and desired his friend
not to think light of him, till he had children of
his own, for love will teach greatness of minde to
descend.

Also all sordid Arts of *Flattery*, which prai-
seth

Iliad γ 55.

λαγόν χετῶνα
Vocat lapides
quibus Adul-
ter ec Antiquo
more obrui de-
buisse.

Μίξτ τοχία.
Quam iniquè
comparatum est
iis qui minus
habent, ut sem-
per aliquid ad-
dant deterioribus.
Terent Phorm.

Plutarch. A.

Poph. Licon.

κλεαχρία

Vid. Plutarch.

& Theophrast.

Terent. Eunu-

chum Act. 2.

Scen. 2. Act. 1.

Scen. 7.

& Plauti Arto-

rogum in milit.

Glor.

seth, imitateth, creepeth, changeth, complyeth, transformeth it self to all shapes to get a living, and like Crows pulleth out mens eyes with praises, that it may after more securely make a prey of them, *Fadum crimen servitutis*, as the Historian well calls it, A servile and filthy Crime.

Any thing which argueth vanity, and windiness of minde, as (a) Arrogance, and vain-glorious Ostentation, ascribing to our selves things which belong not unto us, intruding into the learning, lands, activements of other men, as he who called all the ships in the Harbour at Athens his own. *Labore alieno magnam partam gloriam verbis sæpe in se transmovet.* Whereunto belong Absurd and unusual Affectations in words or fashions, mimical and fantastical gesticulations, frothy and superficial Complements, Strange and exoticick Habits, which are usually the scum of light and unsetled mindes, and ever expose them to contempt. Inlomuch that *Alexander* himself escaped not the Imputation of Levity, when he followed the fashions of those Countreys which he had subdued.

Misfortune and decay in the outward Ornaments of Life, for it is not in mens fortunes as in their monuments, wherein (b) Ruine doth many times conciliate Reverence.

*Nil habet infelix Paupertas durius in se
Quam quod ridiculos homines facit —*

• *Vid. Theoph.*
ἀντι δὲ αὐτῶν
veias.
Plauti Mili.
Glor. Arist.
Ethic. l. 4. c. 13.
Mal. Vax. l. 9.
c. 15.
Plutarch l. de
Alex. fortuna.
ἀτυχεῖα.

• *Curios jam*
timidos namq;
minorem
Corvini & Gal-
ban auriculis,
rasq; carentem.
Juvenal.

Unhappy Poverty hath nothing worse,
Then that it maketh men ridiculous.

And therefore men of sunke and broken estates
are ashamed to live there, where they have been
formerly in Credit and Estimation, as *Hecuba* com-
plaining in the Tragedy.

Ὁ τὸν δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ δούλου ἔχου' αἰδῶ ἐμ' ἔχθ
Εὐ πῶδε πῶτα τοῦ γ' ἔχου' ἐν εἰμὺ νῦν, &c.

In this my broken and dejected case,
Pardon me, if I shame to shew my face
To Polemnestor; whose Eyes once have seen
Me, a now spoiled Ca, tive, then a Queen.

Again, Ignorance and ineptitude in our own
proper functions, and miscarriage in our own
Arts and professions, is an Exprobration, either
of indiligence, or weakness. As want of pro-
ficiency in a Student, of Elocution in an Orator,
of Military wisdom in a Souldier, &c. And
therefore a Physitian will seldom stay to see
his Patient buried, he usually departs before the
sick man, because Funerals are *Convitia Medi-
corum*. Yet all Ignorance is not matter of dis-
grace; for some things there are below the inqui-
ry, or Studies of some men. And therefore
though *Tully* tells us that when *Themistacles* de-
clined the Lute, he was esteemed more ignorant
then became a person of quality, yet it was a
brave Apology which he made for himself,
That

Enrip. in Hæc:
Magnum dolo-
rem habet unde
cum honore de-
cesseris eodem
cum ignominia
reverti. Cic. pro
I. Muræna.
Ἀ γυμνασίῳ
χρῶντος διηγῶ
το μὲν ἐν νότῳ
βούλῃ περὶ θῆ.
Iliad. β
Artium peccata
artificibus pu-
dori sunt, &c.
- Sen. Ep. 97.

Cic. Tusc. q. 1. 15

Plut. na. Aliter
Iphicrates apud
Plutarch.

Spartian in
Adrian.

Plutarch.

πελαγονικῶν
τῶν.

Dignitas in in-
digno, ornamen-
tum in Luto.
Salv. de Gub.
lib 4.

Si. in. Apol. 3.
Ep. 13
Iliad. β.
Vid Voss. Rhet.
par. 1. §. 78, 79.
Odyss. α.
Senec. de Ira.
l 3. c. 17. 29.

That though he knew not to handle a Lute, yet he knew to conquer a City. And *Gelo* when others after a Feast sang to an instrument, called for his great Horse, and did excellently manage that. And as it was a cautelous Answer which *Favorinus* gave touching *Adrian* the Emperour, who had censured him in his own profession of Grammar; That he durst not be learneded then he who commanded thirty legions; so it was a truer answer which another Artificer gave in the like case unto a Prince: God forbid, Sir, that you should know things of so mean a quality, better then I who owe my subsistence unto them.

And as Ignorance in our own, so *Intrusion* and *Usurpations* of other mens offices, is a ground of shame, especially if they be such as wherein we descend below the dignity of our places or professions, as when men of liberal condition apply themselves unto the business of sordid persons. For every man is intrusted with the dignity of his place, he is to be not onely the possessor, but the Protector of it, which when he betrayes, it doth justly revenge it self upon him with contempt and disgrace.

Again, any notorious external *Deformities*, and *Dehonestamenta corporis*, especially if there be any thing of our own, either guilt or servility in them. The Grecians taking notice of the ill shape and worse conditions of *Thersites*, are said to look on him with derision and laughter, then when they had other occasions of sadness. And when *Ulysses* his companions were by *Circe* trans-

transformed into shape of Swine, they wept and were ashamed of their own deformities. And the Poet describeth *Deiphobus* whom *Menelaus* had dismembred.

— *Pravilitatem & dira regentem
Sapplicia.*

Æneid. 6.

Afraid of being known, carefull to hide
His mangled wounds, that they might not be
(spide.

And we find how careful men were to cover any of these notes and prints of infamy, or servility, which persons either extreemly vicious, or in bondage, were marked withal, for infamous or servile persons were wont so to be branded.

*Vid. Athenæum
l. 6 Val. Max.
l. 6. c. 8. Sæll. 7
Sueton. Galig.
c. 27.
Lipp. lib. 2.
Elect. cap. 15.*

Many times *Greatness of Minde* is a cause of Shame, either for something which such a man suffereth in himself, or in those that are near unto him, such was that of the Romanes, *Adfurcas Caudinas*, of which the Historian gives this observation.

Their obstinate silence, Eyes fastened to the Earth, Ears refusing all comfort, Faces ashamed to behold the light, were certain Evidences of a minde deeply resolved upon Revenge. And of *Maximinus*, of whom the Historian telleth us, that out of a desire to conceal his Ignoble birth, he slew all even the best of his friends, which were Conscious unto it. So poverty meeting with Pride doth often suffer conflicts with this

Silentium obstinatum, fixi in terram oculi, surda ad omnia solatia aures & pudor intuentis lucis, ingentem molem irarum ex alto animo cipientis indicia erant. Liv. l. 9. cap. 10. Max.

Passion of shame, when penury denies that which
Luxury and Pride demands.

Juvenal.

— *Quid enim majore Cachinno
Excipitur vulgi quam pauper Apicius ?*

Who without much irrision can endure,
To see a Begger a proud Epicure ?

et. Vi Hor. in
Artic. Rhet. l. 2.

Plutarch. l. de
capiend. ex
Hostib. utilitate.
Tacit. Annal.
l. 5 c. 6.

Again, Acquaintance and Intimacy with Infamous persons is noted by the Philosopher amongst the grounds of shame, and therefore it was upbraided unto *Plato*, that *Calippus* the Murtherer of his host had been bred in his School; and to *Socrates*, that he was resorted unto by *Alcibiades*, a factious and turbulent Citizen; and to *Themistocles* that he held correspondence and intelligence with *Pausanias* a Traitor; and we finde how fatal the favour of *Sejanus* after his fall, was to many of his friends, that no wonder if every man not onely out of Indignation, but out of fear too cried out,

Juvenal. Sat. 10

— *Nunquam si quid mihi credis amari
Hunc hominem.*

Such being the impotent and immoderate Passions of many men to trample on the same persons in their calamity; whom in their greatness they almost adored; as he said,

Ἀνὸς πρέσβης πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐχλύεται.

When

*When the oak is fallen that stood,
Then every man will gather wood.*

Lastly, not onely things shamefull in themselves, but such as are signes, and intimations of them do usefully beget this affection. As *Æschines* in the Comedian, blushed when he saw his Father knock at the door of an infamous woman, because it was a token of a vicious intention. And therefore *Cæsar* was wont to say, That he would have those that belonged unto him free, as well from *Suspicion*, as from *Crime*; for we shall never finde that a man who is tender of his *Conscience*, will be prodigall of his *Credit*; and he who is truly fearfull of incurring censure from himselfe by the Guilt of a *Crime*, will in some propotion be fearfull of incurring censure from others by the shew and suspicion of it: for as a Good Conscience is a Feast to give a man a cheerful heart; so a good name is an Oyntment to give him a cheerful Countenance.

There is a Twofold shame, The one *Vertuous*, as *Diogenes* was wont to say, That Blushing was the colour of *Virtue*; The other *Vicious*, and that either out of *Cruelty*, as *Tacitus* and *Seneca* observe of *Domitian*, that he was never more to be feared then when he blushed; Or else out of *Cowardize*, when a man hath not strength enough of Countenance, to out-face and withstand a Vicious solicitation, as it was said of the men of *Asia*, that they had out of tenderness of face, exposed them-

Teren. Adelph.

Sueton. in Cæsar.

Τὸ εἶναι ἁπλοῦς καὶ ἀπαμειβόμενος ἡρώδης.

Liect. in Diogene.

Savum ille vultus et rubor quo se contra pudorem muniebat. Tacit. in Agric.

Quidam nunc
quam magis
quam cum eru-
merint Timen-
di sunt, quasi
omnem vere-
cundiam effu-
derint. Sylla
tunc erat vio-
lentissimus cum
faciem ejus
sanguis inva-
serat. Sen.
Epist. 11.
Plut. de vil.
Pudore.

selves to much inconvenience, because they could not pronounce that one Syllable, *No*. It was a better resolution, that of *Zenophanes*, who being provoked unto some vicious practice, confessed himself a Coward at such a Challenge, as not daring to do dishonestly.

I will conclude this matter with that Excellent Similitude wherewith *Plutarch* beginneth it, in that golden book of his touching the same Argument. That as Thistles, though noxious things in themselves, are usually signes of an Excellent Ground wherein they grow: so shamefastness, though many times a weakness, and betrayer of the minde, is yet generally an argument of a soul ingeniously and vertuously disposed.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXX.

Of the affection of Anger. The distinctions of it. The Fundamental Cause thereof, Contempt. Three kinds of Contempt, Dis-estimation, Disappointment, Calumny.



Now proceed to the last of the Passions, *Anger*, whereof in it self a subject of large Discourse, yet being every where obvious, I shall not speak much. I intend not therefore distinctly to handle the several kinds of this Passion, which *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* hath given us, (a) which are a sharp Anger, and an hard or Knotty Anger. And *S. Paul* who likewise gives us Three kinds of it: Whereof the first I may call a (b) close and buried anger, which he names bitterness; the other a violent (c) burning Anger, which he calls *wrath*; and the last a Desiring and pursuing Anger, which seemeth to have its derivation from a word which signifies to desire, and therefore is defined by *Aristotle* to (d) be ὀρέξις, and by the Stoicks ἐπιθυμία, words of prosecution and pursuit. For these differ not Essentially or formally amongst themselves, but onely in diversity of Degrees, and in order to the diverse constitutions of the Subject

a Eth. l. 4. c.
b Ὀργὴ θυμὸς
μῆνις καὶ τὸς.
id. Damasc. de
Orthod. fid. l. 2.
c. 16. Cal. Rhod.
l. 12. c. 57.
Est autem μῆνις
memor. Ira
καὶ τὸς. Ira in-
terata, plum-
bea, alta mente
reposita, vindi-
cta occasione
tacite expectans,
μολομένη ἐξ
καὶ τὸν ὄργα πο-
τὸν παλεῖται,
Iliad a.
c Non vultu
alienatus, non
verbis commo-
tior, adeo iram
considerat.
Tacit. de Tibe.
Annal. l. 2.
d Severus, com-
motive animi
Stomachi Cho-
leram evome-
re solebat. E-
lius Lamprid. in
Severo.

a Iliad. π. 259.
unde Crabrones
irritare apud
Plant. Amphit.
b Nunc in Fer-
mento tota est,
ira turget mihi.
Plant. Caphn.
c Pectoris qui
fremitu plerum
que gementes,
Nec capere ira-
rum fluctus in
pectore possunt.
Lucr. l. 3.
d Iliad. v. 167.

Subject wherein they lodge, and of the habits
wherewith they are joyned.

In which respect we might observe several other
shapes of this Affection. For there is the (a) An-
ger of a Wasp, which is an Hasty, Pettish, and Fer-
full Anger, proceeding from a Nature (b) Leavend
and habituated with Choler, which is presently stir-
red and provoked. And there is the Anger of a (c)
Lion, which is slow, but strong and severe; thus E-
legantly described by (d) Homer,

Ο δὲ πρῶτον ἰδοὺ ἀνέρον
ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ὅτε κ' ἄν τις ἀρνήσων αἰχμῶν,
δ' ἄρ' ἐβόλη ἑάλει, τὴ χαλῶν, πέτ' ἄρ' ὅς ὀδύνας
γίγνεται, &c.

He first walks by with scorn, but when swift youth
Urge him with Darts, then with devouring mouth
He turns again, and at his lips is seen
A boiling foam, while his stout heart within
Rouseth it self with (a) groans: and round about
His Tayl, beating his sides and loines, calls out
And wakeneth proud Revenge: Thus stirr'd he flies
Right on with red and fiery sparkling eyes
To kill, or to be kill'd —

a Dolor Excitatur.
Ennead 2.
immaniꝝ ocu-
los infecerat
ira. Claud.
Vultu in irā
terribilia &
ridicula. Plut.

There is further a Cowardly verbal and ridi-
culous Anger, like that of Whepls, which barke
aloud, but run away from the thing which An-
gers them. Which spendeth it self onely in
storms of empty expressions, rather pleasing then
punishing those whom they light on, and ren-
dering the person that useth it a very μωρολογησόν,

or

or Skar-Crow, formidable to children, but to men ridiculous, like *Geta* in the Comædian,

Ruerem, agerem, raperem, sunderem, proßernerem.

T. rent. Adelpb.
Aß. 3. Scen. 2.

There is a grave and serious Anger, like that of *Agamemnon*. An insolent and boasting Anger, like that of *Achilles*. A sullen and stubborn Anger, like that of the (a) Roman Army disgracefully used by the Samnitians. A cruel and raging Anger, like that of *Scylla*, who in an excess of fury, vomited up blood and died. And thus *san* is said to (b) have breathed out threatnings, and been exceeding mad against the Church. A Revengefull and impatient Anger, as that of (c) *Cambyſes*, who being reprov'd by *Prexaspes* for his Drunkenness, confuted the reproof with this act of Cruelly, he shot the son of his Reprover thorow the heart, to prove the steadiness of his hand. An Anger of Indignation at the honour and prosperity of unworthy persons, as that of the Roman Nobility, who seeing *Cn. Flavius*, a man of mean Condition, advanced to the Pætorship, threw away their golden Rings, (the signes of their honour) to testifie their just Indignation. The Poet thus Elegantly expresseth the like against *Menas*, made of a Salve a Freeman by *Pompey*.

Iliad. 2.

a Lib. lib. 9.
Val. Max. l. 2.
cap. 3.
b 48. 9. 1. 26 11
tra spiras
sanguinem. Se-
nec. Trist.
Dequ d' äva
pivas meos.
c) d' äei de-
meia xolli po'i
eui xg dntai.
Theocrit. Idyl 1.
tra Cadat naso
rugosq; Sanna.
Pers. Satyr 5.
c Herodot.
Thalia
Val. Max l. 9.
c. 3. Scl 2.
Plin. lib. 33.
cap. 1.

*Videsne Sacram metiente te viam
Cum his ter ulnarum togâ,
Ut Ora vertat huc & huc euntium
Liberrima Indignatio?*

Horat. Ephod.
Od. 4.

*Seetus flagellis hic triumphalibus
Praeonis ad fastidium,
Aras Falerni mille fundi jugera
Et Applam Manis terit.*

When thou pacest up and down
In thy long Gown,
Seest thou how the people fret
To see thee Jet?
How with Indignation bold,
They cannot hold
To see a man, so lately plow'd
With scourges low'd,
Until at length the weary Cryer
Began to tyre,
Dressing a thousand Acres now
With Horse and Plow?

Lastly, an Anger of Emulation, or a displeasure against our selves for comming short by our negligence of the perfection of other men, whom haply by industry we might have equalled. As *Themistocles* professed that the Trophie of *Miltiades* would not suffer him to sleep. And *Caesar* wept when he read the atchievements of *Alexander*, as having not at his age done any memorable thing. And *Thucydides* hearing *Herodotus* recite a History which he had written, brake forth into a strange passion of weeping, which the Historian espying, thus comforted his Father, you are a happy man to be the Father of such a Son, Ὁς δαγῶσαν, ἔχεν τὴν ψυχὴν πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα, who is carried with such a vehement affection unto Learning.

Plut. Apotheg.

Plut. in Cesare.

*Suidas in
Thucidide.*

But

But to pass over these particulars, I shall in the generall content my selfe with a brieve Consideration of the Causes and Effects of this Passion.

The Fundamentall and Essentiall Cause of Anger, is Contempt from others meeting with the love of our selves. Whether it be disestimation and undervaluing of a mans person, or disappointment of his purposes, or standing his good name, or any other way of casting injury on him, or any of these particulars being impaired (if by such on whom we may hope to receive revenge) do work not only Anxiety and Griefe (which is a motion of flight) but hope also and desire to ease it selfe, if not in the recovery of its own loss, yet in the comfort of another mans : For Calamity (as the Historian speaks) is ever either querulous or malignant, *Cum suo malo torquetur, quiescit alieno*. When it feels it self wrung and pinched, it quickly proceeds either by justice or revenge to please it selfe in retaliation.

For the former of these, as it is the common property of Man with all other Creatures to love himself : so it is his particular desire also, being *Animal Sociale & Politicum*, to be loved by others, because hereby that love of himself, which proceeds from Judgment and Reason, is confirmed. For every man doth more willingly beleieve that, wherunto he hath farther authority to perswade him. And therefore though Love be not sinisterly suspicious, nor too envious in interpreting a Mans own, or a Friends actions and behaviour ; yet that Love, which is not blind and furi-

*Desectus tibi
sum, nec quis
sim quæris
Alexi.*

*At Ego quæ
Dirum incedo
Regina, Iovisq;
Es Soror &
Conjux, unâ
cum gente tot
annos*

*Bella gero, &
quisquam na-
men Iunonis
adorete Præ-
terea Ænead. 1.
Q. Curt.*

*Καὶ μὴ δοκῶ-
μεν ὀργῆς
ἀν' ἡδωμεθα ἢ
ἀντιῶν αὐτῶς
ἀν' αὐτοῖς ἡδε-
Τοφoc. Ajax.*

*Ἐκτε κακὸν ἑ-
ποῖς τὰ αὐ-
τῶν καὶ τοῦ ἀ-
λῶος. Hesiod.
εργ. 11.*

*Simibi pergit
quæ vult dicere
ea quæ nos vult
audire. Terent
Andr.*

ous, will be ever ready to submit it self unto the opinion of stayed and indifferent judgements, because it is conscious to it selfe, how easily it may miscarry, if it rely upon its own censure, wherein Reason, Affection, and Prejudice are mixed together.

Now then when a man already strongly possessed with a love of his own or his friends person or parts, shall find either of them by other sleighted and despised; from whose joynt-respect he hoped for a confirmation of his judgement; therehence riseth not only a * *Griefe* to see his Expectation deceived, and his Opinion undervalue'd; but withall a * *Desire* to make known unto the persons, who thus contemne him by some manner of face or tongue, or hand, or heart, or head, *Revenge* (for all these may be the instruments of our *Anger*) that there is in him more courage, power and worth than deserves so to be neglected. Which Passion in a word, so long as it submits it selfe to the government of Reason, is then alwaies allowable and right, when it is grounded on the Pride and Insolency of others, who unjustly contemne us. And then Irregular and Corrupt, when it proceeds from the root of Pride and ambition in our selves, which makes us greedy of more honour from others, than their judgements or our owne worth suffers them to afford us.

To this branch of Contempt may be referred *Forgetfulness* of friends and acquaintance, whereby we upbraid them with obscurity and distance, is well from true worth, as from our affection. For

Omnia

* Ignoscunt Ira
durus dolor
sibi ardet.

Aeneas 1. 9

Afflictus nunquam sine tormento sui violentus, quia dolorem cum inferre vult, patitur, &c.

Val. Max.

l. 9 c. 3.

Dolor addidit
Iram. Ovid.

Met. 12.

* Spes addita
suscitat. Iras.

Aeneas. 10.

Omnia quæ curant, meminerunt, saith Tully : and Aristotle to the same purpose. Those things which wee do respect, do not lye hid and out of our sight.

Next, hither may be referred all *Vngratefull* persons, who sleight those favours which they have received from other mens bounties, and out of a swelling and height of stomach, cannot endue to acknowledge any obligations, but desire to receive benefits, as Corrupt men take Bribes in the darke, and behind their backs, that so neither others, nor (if it were possible) their own eyes might be witnesses unto it : For as *Tacitus* speaks, *Gratia oneri habetur*, such is the pride of some men, that they disdain not to be overcome in any thing, though it be in kindness. And therefore *ubi multum beneficia anteverere, pro gratia odium redditur*, saith the same Author, When they find themselves overloaden with Love, the best requi- rall which their high minds can afford, is hatred ; which cannot but worke a double *Anger* ; an Anger against our selves and our own weakness in the choice of so unfit a subject for the placing of our benefits ; and an Anger at that contemptuous Pride, which so basely entertained them.

Hither also we may refer those Locked and Close men, who even to their friends, are so reserved, and keep every thing so secret, as if none were worthy, to whose Judgement or Trust they might commit themselves.

Hitherto likewise are referred Acceptation of persons in equality of merit with unequall re-

*Ejectum, lit-
tore egentem
Except, & reg-
ni demens in
parte locavi :
Amij in clas-
sem, Socios à
morte redxi :
Hæu feru in-
censa feror, &c.
Æneid. 4.*

spect, negligence of outward ceremony and behaviour, and generally whatever else may worke an opinion that we are undervalued.

The second branch of this first Fundamentall Cause was an *Hindring* of the Projects and purposes of another; which is not onely a *Privative* (as the former) but a *Positive* and reall Injury, which includes that other, and addes unto it, as being not only a slighting, but an assault upon us; not an Opinion only, but an Expression of our weakness; a course so much the more likely to increase nature, and make it swell, by how much violence and opposition is more sensible in motion than in rest. So that these two former Injuries, I think I may well compare to a Banke, and to a Bridge, or some other stops to a river in his course: Whereof the former doth *Confine* the river, and not *Oppose* it, as not hindring it in its direct and naturall motion (which it rather helpeth by more uniting the parts) but only in a motion Laterall and indirect, which nature intended not; and therefore herein we see not any manifest fretting and noise, but only a secret swelling and rising of the water, which breaks not into outrage and violence: But the Later resisting the naturall course of the streame in its own Channell, and standing directly crosse, where the Water should pass, makes it not only in time to overswell on all sides, but in the meane time works in it great tumult and noise.

Spumas, & fervens, & ab Obice Savior ibit.

It foames and boyles, and with a raging force,
Fights with all Obstacles that stop its course.

So of these two Degrees of *Contempt* in *Anger*; the former as being only a *Confining* and Limiting Contempt, which shuts up a mans worth within too narrow and strait a judgement, workes indeed a secret swell n^g of the Heart with Indignation at the concept of such disesteeme; but this breaks not out into that clamour (as *S. Paul* calls it) that noise of anger, as the other doth, which arise h out of a direct opposition against our counsels or actions.

Unto which opposition may be reduced all manner of injurious proceedings, which tends to the prejudice and disappointing of any mans end; whether it be by closeness and undermining, as cheats and couzenages in the preventing of lawfull, or by other politick wisdom in hindering unlawfull ends; or whether by open and professed Opposition, as in matters of Emulation, Competition, Commodity, and the like; or lastly whether it be such as takes notice, and discovers ends which desire to be undiscerned. And therefore *Tacitus* reckoning the ambiguous and close speeches of the Emperour *Tiberius*, sayes that it was *Vnicus Patrum metus si intelligere viderentur*; the senate feared nothing more then to discover that they understood him; which is the same with his judgement after: *Eo acrius accepit recludi quae premeret*, dothing did more exasperate him than to

*Quem ego credo
manibus, pedi-
busq; obnixe
omnia facturum
magis id adeo
nisi ut incou-
modet quam, &c
Terent. And.
Alt. 1. Sc. 1.*

Annal. l. 1. .

see those things taken notice of, which he desired to suppress and dissemble. Both which were true in *Scamrus*, one of the Senators, who adventuring to Collect *Tiberius* his willingness of accepting the Empire, in that he did not forbid by his Tribunitiall Authority the relation thereof by the Consuls, did thereby procure his utter and implacable hatred.

But of all Contempts, the last of the three is greatest; that I meane, which immediately violates our *Reputation* and Good name, because it is a derivative and spreading injury, not only dishonouring a Man in private and reserved opinion, but in the eyes and Eares of the Wor'd; nor only making him odious in his life, but in his memory. As there is in a man a double Desire; the one of *Perfecting*, the other of *Perpetuating* himselfe: which two answer to that double honour of our creation, which we lost in our first Father; the honour of *Integrity* in Goodnes, and the honour of *Immunity* from Corruption: so there may be from the violation of these sundry degrees of Anger, or any other burthensome Passion wrought in us. But when in injury we finde them both assaulted, and not only our parts and persons (which belong to our perfection) privily undervalued; but our name and memory (which belong to our preservation) tainted likewise, we cannot but be so much the more incensed, by how much perpetuity accumulates, either to weakness or perfection: But of this Fundamentall cause of Anger enough.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of other Causes of Anger: first in regard of him that suffers wrong; Excellency, Weakness, strong Desires, Suspicion. Next in regard of him who doth it; Baseness, Impudence, Neeriness, Freedom of Speech, Contention, Ability. The Effect of Anger, the Immutation of the Body, impulsion of Reason, Expedition, Precipitance. Rules for the moderating of this Passion.



Hose which follow are more Accidentall: whereof some may be considered *ex parte Patient*, on the part of him that suffers; and some *ex parte Inferentis Injuriam*, on the part of him that doth the Injury.

Touching the patient or subj:ct of an Injury, there are three Qualifications, which may make him more inclinable to *Anger*, upon supposition of the Fundamentall Cause, *Contempt*: and the first of these is *Excellency*, whether Inward from *Nature*, or Accidentall from *Fortune*: For hereby men are made more jealous of their Credit, and impatient of Abuse, as well perceiving that all Injury implies some degree both of *Impotency* in the

Ἀγαλῆς
ἡ δὲ τιμὴ
χρὶ. Arist.
ὅτι μὲν ἡ
δὲ τιμὴ
ἡ δὲ τιμὴ
ἡ δὲ τιμὴ
ἡ δὲ τιμὴ

Rhet. l. 2. c. 2

the Patient, and of Excellency (at least conceited) in the Agent. As Aristotle speaks ὑπερῆχεν σίμλῳ, ὑβελζοῦτες that Injurious men are commonly highly conceited of their own Excellency, which cannot well stand with the height & distance of that mind which is possessed with his own good opinion: and this cause the Poet intimates in those words:

Ænead. 1.

— — — — — *Manet alta mente repostum
Indicium Paridis, Spectæq; injuria formæ.*

A deep and lasting Discontent is bred
To see their Beauties undervalued
By a weak wanton Judgement.

It wrought a deep Indignation in the Minds of Power and Wisedome to see a weake and wanton Judgement give Beauty the precedence in their emulation. Which undervaluing of worth, how much it is able to possess a man with Griefe and Fury, the one example of *Achitophel* alone may discover, who upon the rejection of his counsell, when he was too low to revenge himself on *Abſalon*, excrcuted his Anger on his own neck.

The second Qualification of the subject is *weakness* and Defect, when the mind finds it self assaulted in those things, wherein it is most of all Deficient: which Aristotle hath observed, when he tells us, that * *Sicke* men, *Poor* men and *Lovers* are commonly most subject to this Passion: It being as great a paine, and a greater contempt to rub and prövoke an old wound, than to make a

* Arist Rhet. l. 2:

Plin nat hist. 1,
l. 22 c. 24.Ἐντὶ γὰρ μικρὸς,
καὶ οἱ αἰεὶ δει-
νεία, καὶ πρὸς
τὴν πρὶν καὶ θνητὰ.
De Panæ fess.

Theocr. Idyl. 1.

new. That injury which proceeds against men of high and eminent quality, cannot possibly pierce so deep as that which is exercised upon open and naked weakness: because the former proceeds only from strife and emulation; but the other from insultation and pride; the one is only a disesteeme; but the other a contumely and exprobaton: the one is a conflict of judgments, but the other a conflict of passions; and therefore likely to be the greater. For a neglect of worth and good parts (unless, as sometimes it falleth out, it proceeds from Baseness and Ignorance) is an injury from Worth also: but a Neglect, and despising men already downe, is an injury from stomacke and height of mind; wherein the party offended cannot labour so much to clear it self from the Imputation, as to revenge it self for it.

Another reason why *Weakness* the better disposeth a man to anger, may be, because such men are most *Tender* to feel an injury, most *Suspicious* to fear it, and most *Interpreting* to over judge it. All which being circumstances of aggravation to increase a wrong, are likewise good means to add degrees and hear unto our Passion.

Lastly, to give a reason of both these two former causes together, it may be a Disappointment and Frustrating of Expectation: For men of eminency and worth, expect rather Approbation and Imitation than Contempt. And men weak and defective, expect Compassion to cover, and not Pride to mocke, and so double their wounds: and both these are in some sort debts of Nature,

Omnēs quibus
res sunt minus
secundā, magis
sunt nescio quo-
modo suspitiosi.
ad contumeliam
omnia accipiunt;
magis propter
suam impoten-
tiam se semper
credunt negligi.
Ter. Adelpn.
Act. 4. Sc. 3.
Pueri inter se
quam pro levi-
bus noxiis ita
gerunt? qua-
propter? quia
enim qui eos
gubernat ani-
mus infirmum
gerunt. Ide. He-
cyr. Act. 3. Sc. 1
— Minuti
Semper, & infir-
mi est animi ex-
iguūq; voluptas
Dilio. Juven.
Sat. 13.
Iracundiores
sunt incolumi-
bus languidi.
ferine mari-
bus, &c. Amm.
Mar. l. 27.
Vid. Canlio. de
El. q. l. 8 c. 29.
Plutarch.
Περί ὀργῆς.
Νόστος ἐν
ῥήματι.
Sophoc. Ajax.
Sen. de Ira. l. 2
c. 21.

it being the Law of Reason to honour Merit, as it is the Law of Mercy to cover Nakedness: and for both I am sure it is the Law of Charity, as not to vaunt or be puffed up in our selves; so neither to reioyce or think evill of another: and we may well conceive Anger will be strong, when it thinks it self lawfull.

Unto this particular of *Weakness* we may also reduce that which the Grammarian hath observed on *Virgill*, *Plus Irarum advenit, cum in manus non potest venire, cui irascimur*; Anger is increased when it cannot reach the thing with which it is angry. And therefore the chaining up of Woolves and Mastives enragech them, because it restraineth them, which the Poet hath excellently described.

Aeneid, 9.

*Ac veluti pleno Lupus insidiatus ovili,
Cum fremit ad caules, ventos perpressus & imbres
Nocte super media, tuti sub matribus agni
Balatum exercent; Ille asper & improbus ira
Savit in absentes, collecta fatigat edendi
Ex longo rabies, & sicca sanguine fauces.
Haud aliter Rutilo muros & castra tuenti
Ignescunt Ira, & durus dolor ossibus ardet.*

(whet,

As a fierce Woolf wth winds, storms, midnight,
When in close fold the secure Lambs do blear,
Barks at his absent prey with the more ire,
When rag'd and deceiv'd Hunger doth him tyre.
So *Rutilus* seeing his foes all safe,
Doth vex and boile with the more burning chase.

For

For it is a great torment to an Ene my, when he can find no in-let nor advantage against him whom he hates.

*Vid Plut de
capiend ex host
utilitat.*

Another cause of anger may be *strong Desires*: For alwaies the vaster and exacter our desires are, it is so much the harder for them to be pleased or satisfied. And therefore as the Philosopher notes Luxurious men are usually transported with anger, because men love not to be stopped in their pleasures: and hence as *Plutarch* observes, men are usually most angry there, where their desires are most conversant: as the Country-man with his Bayliff; or an Epicure with his Cook; or a Lover with his Corrivall; because all these crosse men in that which they most Love. Now strength when it is opposed, is collected and gathered into the more excess; as we see in Winds or Rivers when they meet with any thing which crosseth their full passage.

*Ὁς ὅλοι οὐ
ἐργάζεσθαι.
Lucian.*

Rhet. l. 10.

De Ira, lib.

The last qualification of the Subject, whereby he is made more inclinable to this Passion, is a suspicious, apprehensive, and interpreting fancy, ready to pick out i jury where it cannot be justly found; and (that its Anger may be employed) to frame occasions unto it selfe. And therefore tis wise advice of *Seneca*, *Non vis esse Iracundus? ne sis Curiosus*. He which is too wise in his judgement on other mens Errours, will be easily too foolish in the nourishing of his owne Passion: and its commonly seen in matters of censure and suspicion, the more sight and reason goes out, the lesse useth to abide within. Now it is hard for a man,

*Sen. de Ira, l. 3.
c. 11.*

if he be peremp:orily possessed with this opinion; yet he is a common subject of others contempt, to find out, either in defect of Nature, or rudenes of custome, habit, education, temper, humour, or the like, some probable ground or other for exception; which yet when it is further inquired into, will prove rather strangeness than injury.

And this is generally a Corruption of anger: First, because it is hereby oftentimes unjust, either in fastning it selfe there where it was justly neglected: for we may ever observe that Suspition proceeds from Guilt, and none are more jealous of being neglected than those that deserve it, as it is observed of some reproachfull speeches, which a Senatour was accused to have uttered against the honor of *Tiberius*: *Quia vera erant, dicta credebantur*, his suspitious mind was perswaded that they had been spoken, because he was conscious that they had been acted; and therefore (as was before noted) it was the custome under such men to avoid all manner of Curiosities, and search into things done by them, which might easily be subject unto sinister judgements; and rather to affect Ignorance with Security, than to be ruined with wisdom. And next it is corrupt, because it is rash and hasty, being led by a halfe judgement, the worst guide to a headlong and blind Passion.

The next degree of causes is of those which qualifie the *Agent*, or him that worketh the injury; and there may be amongst many other, which cannot be reckoned, these generall ones.

First *Baseness*, which works a double cause of Anger. One for an injury of Omission, in neglecting those respects which are required in men of meane and inferiour ranke towards their superiours. Another for a positive enquiry in the evill exercised against them. And many times the former alone is a cause of Anger, without the latter: For this distance of persons doth quite alter the nature of our Actions, insomuch that those demeanors, which are commendable and plausible toward our equals, are rude and irreverend toward those that are above us: and this is that which makes the wrath of God in the Scripture to be set out so terrible unto us; because of the infinite distance between the Unmeasurable Glory of the Maker of the world, and the baseness of sinners. And therefore the comparison which useth to be made for the defence of Veniall sins, that it is altogether unlikely that God, infinitely more mercifull than men, should yet be offended at that which a mans neighbour would pardon him for, as a foolish angry word, or the stealing of a Farthing, or the like, is without reason: because between man and man there is a Community both in nature and weakness; and therefore,

Hanc veniam petimusq; damusq; vicissim.

Because we Both our Errours have,
We pardon give, and pardon crave.

But it is an Argument of infinite Insolence

in a vile Creature for feeding its own Corruption and self-love in a matter of no value, to neglect one command of him, who by another is able to command him into Hell, or into nothing.

The next Quality in the Injurer, which may raise the Passion, is Impudence, either in words or carriage. And the reasons here of may be.

First, because as *Aristotle* observes, all Impudence is joyned with some Contempt, which is the Fundamental and Essentiall Cause of Anger.

Secondly, because all Impudence is bold, stiff and conteptious, which are all incitements to this Passion. For as shame being a degree of Feare works an acknowledgement of our own weakness, and therefore a submission to the power we have provoked, which (as *Aristotle* observes) procureth from beasts themselves lenity and mercy: So Impudence in all other things being contrary to it, must likewise produce a contrary Effect.

Thirdly, those things which we Impudently do, we do willingly likewise. And therefore we shal observe in the Scripture, how reigning sins, that is, those which are done with greediness of the appetite, and full consent of the will, are set forth by the names of Stubbornness, Rebellion, whorish Fore-head, Brass, and Yron. Now nothing doth more aggravate a wrong then this, that it proceeded from the will of man. And the reasons are.

First, because a mans Power is in his Will: but
Passions

Rhet. l. 2, c. 3:
Corpora magnanimo satis est prostrare Leoni; Pugna suum finem, cum jacer hostis habet. Ovid. Trist lib 3 Eleg 5.

Passions and other blind Agents, when they work ungoverned, are our Imperfections, and not our Power; and therefore the easier born withall.

Secondly, to a Plenary, Spontaneous Action, (such as I take most of Impudence to be) there are required *Antecedenter*, Deliberation, Approbation, and assent; and *Consequenter*, resolution, perseverance, and constancy. All which, as they take away the Two principal conditions required unto Lenity, Confession and Repentance; so likewise do they add much to the weight of an injury, because an action which is thus exercised, is a work of the whole man, and imployes, as a perfect consent thereunto; so a perfect and compleat enmity toward the person offended thereby: Whereas others are but the wrongs of some part, such as are those of the will, led by an ignorant; or those of Passion, led by a traduced understanding; and they too not of a part regular, but of an unjoynted and Paralytick part, which follows not the motion of a stayed reason; and therefore as they proceed from more disorder in our selves, so do they work less in the party offended.

Another thing which may raise and nourish this Passion, is any degree of *neer Relation* between the parties; whether it be Naturall by Consanguinity; or morall, by Society, Liberality, or any other friendship. For as it is prodigious in the Body naturall to see one member wrong and provoke another: so in Unions Civil or Moral, it is strangely offensive to make a divulsion. Therefore we are more angry for the neglect offered us by

Sen de Tra. 1. 2.
c. 31.

*Job. 19. 19.
Zach. 13. 6.
Psal. 41. 9.
55. 12.

by friends, or those of whom we have well deserved, than by enemies or * strangers. No wounds go so deep as those we receive in the house of our friend.

And the reason why this difference between men nearly referring each other should work a greater Anger between them, is: First, because herein we may find that which before I observed as a furtherance to this Passion, Disappointment, and frustrating of expectation: For in this case, we expect Sympathy and not Division. Secondly, because all Anger is a kind of dis-joyning or Divulsion of things before joyned: there therefore, where is the greatest Union, must needs be the strongest and most violent separation: as in the Body, the Divulsion of Soule is more horrible than of an Arme or some other member; because the one is an Essentiall, the other only an Integrall Union; and so it is with those who are by blood or friendship made one; as the dividing of them is more strange and violent, so doth it produce a stronger Passion.

Another cause of this Passion in respect of the Injurer, may be a too great freedom and indiscreet use of speech; especially if it be in way of correction and rebuke: For as *Solomons* speech is true, *Mollis responsio frangit Iram*, a soft answer pacifies wrath: so on the contrary it is true likewise, *Dura Correctio unit Iram*; that an harsh rebuke knits it. Anger is by nothing more nourish'd than by much speaking, though not in the party that speaketh, because Speech is to Anger, like Tears

to Grief, a spending and venting of it, yet always in another, unto whom we minister further matter of offence. To which purpose is that speech of *Syracides*; *Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.*

Another Cause which I shall observe, is Contention and difference, whether it be in Opinions or in inclinations; because this must needs be ever joyned with some undervaluing of another mans choice and judgment; which if it be not seasoned with much sobriety, will easily induce a man to beleeve, that it proceeds not from Zeal to Truth, but from a humour of Opposition; Wherewith many men are so far possessed, that one must hardly dare to speak the truth in their company for fear of endangering it and them. Like *Chrysippus* in *Laertius*, who used to boast that he often wanted Opinions, but those once gotten, he never wanted Arguments and Sophismes to defend them.

The last cause which I shall note of this Passion is in him who offends us, his very Abilities, when we see them neglected: For this provokes to more displeasure, then naked impotency. Weakness, when it miscarries, is the object of Pity: But strength, when it miscarries, is the object of Anger.

ὅτι ἀνέγνω
ἀνδρὶ μαχεστέῳ ὅτι πλεονεξία μεθ' ἑα
λύγῃ ἐών, ὅμῳ δὲ νεμεσώμεναι πρὶ κῆρι

Iliad. 117.

*I should not blame unworthy and base spirits
To slug and shrink from Battel : but for merits
So to forget themselves, for you to be
Unlike the men you are, What man can see
Such weakness, and not wonder, chide, debate,
Till you your selves do your own Errors hate !*

Unto all these we might add some others which the Philosopher toucheth, as neglect of our Calamities, or rejoycing at them, or divulging them, or bringing readily the report of them unto us, receiving the report of them with pleasure. Or lastly, representing the signs which may bring into mind the memory of any injuries done us. As the Levite sent the parts of his abused Concubine up and down unto the Tribes of Israel to move them unto Indignation. So *Antony* in the funeral Oration upon *Julius Caesar* produced his Robe stained with the blood which *Brutus Cassius* had shed, to work a detestation of that fault in the people.

Now concerning all these causes together (because it would be too tedious to gather particular circumstances of dignity and corruption from all of them) we are to conclude that Anger, as it ariseth from any of them, is then onely Regular and Just, when it keeps these conditions.

I. First, That it still observe proportion and conformity to the rules of Love : Otherwise it is not *Ira in Delictum*, but *Ira in fratrem*, not against the Crime but the person of my Brother: For we know

σέπτεi εἰς
ἀγγελον καὶ
ἄλλον.

Vid. que de hac
re habet Nunci-
us apud Sophoc.

Antig.

Dion. lib. 44.

know the nature of this passion is to be Transient, to go out from us on our brother and reform him, not Immanent to work upon our selves and deform us : I mean by soyling the habit of Charity, which ought always to remain inviolate.

2. Secondly, That it keep likewise due proportion unto judgment, and that unto a true judgement, and a whole judgement; otherwise it is not only to be angry with our Brother, but, which is farther, to be angry with him unadvisedly. Judgement then must be true first, that is, clear, settled and untransported; and that likewise in two actions; in the Act of Interpretation, which reacheth unto the injury; and in the act of Direction or Government, which reacheth unto the Passion.

3. And next it must be a whole judgement; and that in both the former. It must judge fully of the nature and circumstances of the injury, which ever receives its degrees of Intention or remission, not from the matter of the act, but from some particular Qualifications and Circumstances joyned thereunto.

Secondly, It must judge fully of the act of Passion, not onely in informing, *quod sit*, that reparation of our selves is lawful; but *quemodo* too, in the manner and form how to undertake it. Because as Passion, being without Reason in it self, wants the tongue of judgment to inform it what to do: So, being blind, it wants the hand of judgment to lead it in the doing of it: And

X x 2

this

*Ira de Causa
est iracundia
de vitio.*

*Μετρίον ὅτι
ἄρως φάρμα-
κον λόγος.*

Dandum Ira
spatium. Liv.
Ita Romani pu-
eros à jurandi
levitate cobi-
bentes, prius
domo exire ju-
bebant, ut esset
deliberandi spa-
tium. Vid. Plut.
qu. Rom. qu. 28.
Vid Plut.
æcè ep. 115.

this I take to be the proper way of governing this Passion. But that which was once prescribed by *Athenodorus* the Philosopher un'o *Augustus*, to repeat over the Alphabet between the Passion and the Revenge, is too boyish and slight, as diverting the mind from the occasion to some other trifle, which is one'y to cozen and not to conquer our distemper: And therefore though it may for a time allay it, yet this is but as the cures of *Empericks*, which give present ease; but search not into the root, nor leave not such a habit within, as shall in after-occasions limit the unruliness of such distempers, like those od'ours which use to raise men out of a fit of the Falling sickness, but do not at all cure them of the disease.

Now to speak a word or two of the Effects of this Passion; They are such as are wrought, either in our selves or others. Concerning the former, they are either outward effects, which reach to our bodies; or inward, which reflect upon Reason.

Those on the Body are clamour (as *Saint Paul* calls it) in Tongue; Tumor and Inflammation in the Heart, Fire in the Eyes, and Fierceness and paleness in the Countenance, and a sensible alteration in the whole man. The use or deformity of all which, depend upon the subordination of Passion unto Reason, or Dominion over it. For if it be governed and obedient, there is an excellent use of those alterations in the body (which will not then be permitted to be excessive) namely the testification of our just displeasure

sure at an offence received, and the enlivening or sharpening of us (if occasion require) to the prosecution of further lawful redress; for though I wou'd not have a man in his passion suffer a Metamorphosis, and turn his face into a torment, punishing himself as much with Deformity, as his adversary with Fear; yet neither can I like that close and dissembled, that politick and stomach Anger, which cunningly shrouds it self under a calme and serene countenance; which being unnatural to this Passion (whose property it is, *Non insidiari sed palam agere*, not to work by way of Ambush and Stratagem, but visibly) will quickly degenerate into Malice and Rancour.

The inward effect of this Passion, is an excitation of Reason, to judge of the wrong and means of redress, which is then Regular, when it is done Ministerially and by way of service to the whole; but most corrupt and dangerous when it is done by prepossession, transporting, confounding, or any other way tainting of Reason; which is to make it a party rather than a Judge.

Ὁ ἐκείνη πολυφροσύνη χαλπίνου.

*Which makes sometimes a Wise man break
Into Distempers wild and weak.*

In which ill Office there is not any Passion more busie and fruitfull then this of Anger by reason of its suddenness, and of its violence; Both which are strong means to smother or divert

*Vid. Senec. de
Ira, l. 2. c. 25.
Vos quoque, fume-
ditæ speculum
sp. R. in ira,
Cognoscat faci-
em vix satis ul-
la suam. Ovid.
de Arte Aman-
di lib 3. Vid.
Plutar. b.
Plumbæ iras
gerunt. Plaut.
Ethic. lib 7.*

divert Reason, as we see in *Tiberius* himself, who though a man of close and sad judgement, and of most reserved Passions (inasmuch as he lived in them, and nourished them a long time before either their working or discovery) yet when he was provoked by *Agrippina*, to a more violent Anger then usual, his Passion we see for the time altered his nature. *Et veram occulti pectoris vocem elicit. Num ideo laderetur, quia non regnaret?* He brake forth into words, strange and unusual from so close a disposition; to wit, Whether she were wronged because she did not Reign: which is *Tacitus* his observation upon the Anger of that man.

The last Effect is Expedition and Dexterity in executing those means which Reason judgeth needful for satisfying our selves against the person that hath offended; wherein its assistance, while it is Regular, is of excellent use in mans actions, because it makes bold and resolute. But here one main corruption is to be avoided, precipitancy and impatience of Delay, or Attendance on the determination of right Reason: which makes it commonly run away with an half or a broken judgment. In which respect *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks* very elegantly compares it to a hasty servant, that goes away posting with half his errand; and to Dogs, which, as soon as ever they hear a noise, bark presently before they know whether it be a stranger at the door or no: so Anger attends Reason thus long, till it receive warrant for the justness of seeking redress, and then suddenly

*Vires injicit ad
pericula subvun-
da. Ethic. lib. 3.
cap. 11.*

*ἡ γὰρ σὺμφε-
ρὸν ὁρᾷ οὐκ ὀφείλει.
Vid. Cael. Rhod.
l. 12. c. 53. l. 7.*

suddenly hastens away without any further listening to the rules of *Decorum* and *Justice*, which it should always observe in the prosecution thereof: Lest while it is too intent on his own right, it fall into that extreme which it pretendeth to revenge, the wronging of another.

There is not any Passion which standeth more in need of *Moderation* then this doth, both because it is one of the frequentest which we are troubled with, and the most unruly, as that which can over bear the rest, and, of all other, hath the least recourse to ^a Reason, being hasty, Impetuous, full of Desires, Grief, Self-love, Impatience, which spareth no ^b persons, Friends or Foes, no things, animate or ^c inanimate, when they fit not our fancy. And therefore ^d Grammarians tell us that it hath its name *Ira* from *Ire*, because a man in his *Anger* usually goeth away from his Reason, and as his *Anger* slackens, he is said, *ad se redire*, to return again unto himself. And therefore those men in whom Reason is most predominant, are least transported by this Affection, and most often displeased with themselves for it. It was a strange Commendation given to ^e *Theodosius* Junior, that never any man saw him Augry; And such a power had ^f *Lycurgus* over himself, that when an insolent young man had done him no less injury then the striking out of one of his Eyes, by lenity and mansuetude he convinced and gained him. ^g And *Pericles* that great States-man and Orator of *Greece*, being all the day reviled by an Impure Companion, com-

^a Οὐ λογισμῷ ἐκδύσσει θεῶν μὲν, θυμῷ δὲ αἰσὶν ὀργὴν καὶ δίκην τῆς θυμῷ. *Plut. in L.*
^b *Plut. in L.*
^c ὁ δὲ ὀργῆς. *Sen. de Ira l. 3.*
^d *c. 28. Epist. 18.*
^e *Ipsū compeditis qui vincerat Ennosigam. Juven. Sat. 10. Plut. de Ira. d. D. nat. c. 22. Cael. Rhod. l. 12. c. 53.*
^f *Socrat. l. 7. c. 22.*
^g *Plut. in Lyr.*

^g *Plut. in Peric.*

com-

* Senec. de Ira,
lib. 3. c. 12. &
Plut. de sera
num. vindicta

Sicut aquila &
leones inter am-
bulandum un-
gues intro a-
vertunt,
Vid Plut decu-
rios Senec. de Ira,
l. 2. c. 28.
Indignatio à ni-
mio sui suspectu.
Senec. de Ira, l. 3
c. 5 Senec. l. 3.
. 12.

Plut. de Aud.
poetm.

commanded his servant at night to light him home unto his house *; nothing more obvious then Examples of this kind.

That we may therefore so manage this passion as to be *angry but not sin*, it will be requisite,

1. To let it have an eye *upward*, as *Moses* did, who never expressed any other anger that we read of but zealous, and Religious, when the injury directly aimed at God and his honour. It is very improbable that any thing will move too fast upward.

2. To convert it *inward* into a self-displicity and severity towards our own Errors; for the more acquainted any man is with himself, the less matter he will finde of Anger with other men, as having so much both *to do*, and *to blame* at home. Anger ever ariseth from the Value which we set upon our selves, which will ever then be most modest, when we take of it the fullest view.

3. Follow it not too *close*, joyn not too soon nor too hastily with it; though it may be *used* sometimes, it must never be encouraged, being over-bold and forward of it self. And therefore as many Drugs must be prepared before we may dare to use them; so we must take heed of dispatching this Affection without its due corrective. It must first be schooled before it be employed, as men bridle their horses before they ride them. It is not good drinking in muddy water so soon as it is stirred, give it time to subside and settle.

4 Keep it not *long*, it is the spawn of Malice, and Contention, and time will hatch it. It is a corroding thing which will fret and stain the Vessel in which it is kept. Let not the Sun go down upon it, 'tis ill being in the dark with so bad a Leader. It may passe through the heart of a wise man, but it *Resteth onely in the bosome of Fools.*

5 Remove the *Occasions* of it, withdraw Fuel from so catching a Flame. They say of Turpentine, and some other like things, That they will draw and suck Fire unto them. Certainly of all Fire there is none so ductile, so sequacious and obsequious, as this of Wrath is. It was not ill done therefore of *Corys* and *Augustus*, To cause those curious Vessels to be broken of purpose, which having been accidentally broken might have made a breach likewise upon the discretion of their owners.

6. Give not an easie Ear to *Reports*, nor an easie entertainment to *Suspensions*, bee not greedy to know who or wherein another hath wronged thee. That which we are desirous to know, or apt to beleeve, we shall be the more ready to revenge. *Curiosity* and *Credulity*, are the Handmaids unto Passion. *Alexander* would not see the woman after whom he might have Lusted: Nor *Cesar* search *Pompeys* Cabinet, lest he should find new matters of Revenge. He chose rather to make a Fire of them on his Hearth, then in his Heart. In-

P'ut. Apoph
Sen. de Ira l. 3.
cap 40. Cœl.
Rhod l. 12.
cap 52.

Sen. de Ira l. 2.
c. 22, 23, 24.

Plut. in Alex:
& l. curiosit.
Dion. Call. l.
12.

juries unknown doe many times the lesse hurt; when I have found them, I then begin to feel them, and suffer more from mine own discovery, then from mine enemies attempt.

Sen. de Ira. l. 8.
cap. 26.

7 Bee *Candid* in Interpreting the things wherein thou sufferest. Many times the glasse through which I look, makes that seem formidable, and the wave, that crooked, which in it self was beautifull and straight. Happly thou art Angry with that which could not intend to hurt thee, Thy Book, thy Penn, the stone at which thou stumblest, the winde or rain that beats upon thee: be Angry again, but with thy self, who art either so *bald*, as to be Angry with *GOD*, or so *foolish* as to be Angry with *nothing*. Thou art displeased at a Childish or an Ignorant miscarriage, Call it not Injury but *Imprudence*, and then pity it. Thou art Angry with Counsell, Reproof, Discipline; why dost thou not as well breake the Glasse in which thy Physitian ministreth a potion unto thee. Bee Angry with thy sinne, and thou wilt love him that takes it from thee. Is he that adviseth thee thy Superiour? Thine Anger is undurifull; is he thy friend, thine Anger is ungratefull.

8 Give Injuries a *New Name*, and that will work a new Affection. In blinde Agents call it Chance; in weak Persons, Infirmitie; in simple, Ignorance; in wise, Counsell; in Superiours, Disci-

Discipline, in equals, familiarity, in inferiours, confidence, where there is no other construction to be made, do as *Joseph* and *David* did, call it *Providence*, and see what God sayes to thee by it. Get a minde conversant with high and noble things, the more heavenly, the lesse Tempestuous.

*Adinimos re-
rum discordia
turbat pacem
(numa tenent.
Lucan. Vid.
Sen. l. 4 c. 33.
Sen. de l. a l. 2
cap. 25, 26.*

9 Bee not *Idle*, *Singgish*, *Luxurious*, we are never more apt to be Angry, then when we are sleepy or greedie: Weak resolutions and strong Desires are sensible of the least exasperation, as an emptie ship of the smallest Tempest.

Again, be not *over busie* neither. That man can hardly be Master of his Passion, that is not Master of his imployments. A minde ever burdened, like a Bow alwaies bent, must needs grow impotent, and weary, the fittest preparations to this distemper. When a mans businesse doth not poise, but presse him, there will ever be something either undone or ill-done, and so still matter of Vexation. And therefore our Mindes as our Vessels must be unloaded, if they would not have a Tempest hurt them.

*P'utarch.
mel. ap'p'.
Senec. l. 3. c. 6.
Sen. de lra l. 3.
cap. 16.*

Lastly, wrastle not with that which pincheth thee. If it be strong it will hurt if cunning, it will hamper and entangle thee. He that strives with his burden makes it heavier. That Tempest breaks not the stalks of Corne, which rends under the arms of an Oak, the one yeelds, the o-

*--χρημαρρὸς
ὅσα δὲ τῶν
ἐπείκει, καὶ
ναὶ ὡς ἐκστα-
ται τὸ δ' ἀν-
ταίνοντ' αὐτὸ
ἀρεμὴν ἀπὸ λλ-
ται.
Soph. Antig.
P. ur. Sympo-
l. 4 q 2.*

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ther withstands it. An humble weakness is safer from injury, then a stubborn strength.

I have now done with the Passions of the Minde. And briefly proceed to those Honours and Dignities of the Soul of Man which belong unto it in a more abstracted Consideration.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII:

Of the Originall of the Reasonable Soule, whether it be immediately Created and Infused, or derived by Seminall Tradition from the Parents. Of the Derivation of Originall sinne.



He dignity of *Man* in respect of his Soule alone, may be gathered from a consideration either of the *whole*, or of the parts thereof. Concerning the whole we shall consider two things; Its *Originall*, and its *Nature*. Concerning the *Originall* of the Soule, divers men have diversly thought; for, to let pass the Opinion of (a) *Seleucus*, who affirmed that it was educed out of the Earth, and that (b) of *Origen* and the *Platonists* who say that the Soules of men were long ago created, and after deduced into the Body as into a Prison: There are three Opinions touching this question. The first of those who affirme the *Traduction* of the Soule by generation, some of which so affirm, because they judged it a *Corporeall* substance, as did (c) *Tertullian*. Others because they beleaved that one spirit might as easily proceed from another, as one fire or light be kindled by another: as d *Apollinarius*, *Nemesius*, and divers in the *Westerne Churches*, as *St. Hierome* witnesseth. The second, of those who deny the naturall traduction, and say that the

A 22

Soule

a Philast. de Hares. Seleuci, &c.

b Justinian.

Trad ad Mediam contra

Orig Hieron.

Epist. ad Mar-

cell. & Ana-

psychiam Theo-

phyl. Alex. Ep.

asc. 2. Ana-

stat. Sinuita

Anagog. con-

temp. lib. 11.

c Aug. de Ha-

res. 86 ep. 157

de Gen. ad lit.

l. 10 c. 25. Ter-

tul. d. Animis,

c 5 6. 7 22, 25.

27.

d Hieron Epist

ad Marcellis

num, Nemesius

de natura homi-

nis, l. 2 Lucife-

rian. apud Aug.

Hares. 81.

c Hieron. p. ad
Pam. contra Io-
an. Hieros.
f Hil. de Trin.
l. 10.
g Ambros. de
Noah & Arca.
c. 4.
h Lactant. de op.
Hom. c. 9.
i Theod. de cu-
rand. agr. af-
fect. ser. 4.
k Aeneas Gaz.
in suo Theo-
phraso.
l. Aug. p. 7. 28.
157. & Retrahit
l. 1. c. 1. de Gen.
ad lit. 13. & de
anima.
m Greg. l. 7.
cp. 53.

Eccles. 11. 5:

Soule is by *Creation* infused into Bodies, orga-
niz'd and prædisposed to receive them; of which
Opinion amongst the Ancients were ^c S. Hierom,
^f Hilarie, ^g Ambrose, ^h Lactantius, ⁱ Theodoret, ^k Æ-
neas Gazens, and of the moderne Writers the Ma-
jor part. The third is of those who do *hæstare*,
stick between both, and dare affirme nothing
certaine on either side, which is the moderation
of ^l S. Augustine and Gregory ^m the Great, who af-
firme that this is a question incomprehensible,
and unsolvable in this life. Now the onely rea-
son which caused S. Austin herein to hæstare,
seemeth to have been the difficulty of traducing
Originall sinne from the Parents to the Children.
For saith he (writing unto S. Hierome touching
the Creation of the Soule) If this Opinion do
not oppugne that most fundamentall faith of *Ori-
ginall sinne*, let it then be mine; but if it do op-
pugne it, let it not be thine.

Now since that Opinion which denieth the
Traduction, seemeth most agreeable to the spiritu-
all substance of the Soule, I shall here produce
some few reasons for the *Creation*, and solve an
argument or two alledg'd for the *Traduction* of
the Soule, reserving notwithstanding unto my
selfe, and others, the liberty and modesty of S.
Austins hæstitation, which also I finde allowed by
the Holy Ghost himself.

Two things there are of certainty in this
point. 1. That the soule is not any corporeall
Mass or substance measurable by quantity, or
capable of substantial augmentation. 2. That
the

the *Traduction* of one thing out of another, doth connote these two things; That the thing traduced doth derive Being from the other, as from its original principle, and that this derivation be not any other manner of way, but *Ratione seminali*, & *per modum decisionis*, by a seminall way, and the decision, separation, or effluxion of substance from the other: which things being laid, The Arguments against *Traduction* are these.

First, the testimonies of Holy Scripture, calling God the *Father of Spirits*, as our naturall Parent the *Father of our bodies*, *Iob. 33. 4. Eccles. 12. 7. Esa. 57. 16. Num. 16. 22. 27. 16. Heb. 12. 9. Zac. 12. 1.* which though they do not according to the judgement of *St. Aug.* conclude the point by infallible consequence, yet do they much favour the probability of this Opinion.

2. To have Being by *Traduction*, is, when the soule of the Childe is derived from the soule of the Parent, by the meanes of seed: but the seed of the Parent cannot reach the Generation of the soule, both because the one is a Corporeall, the other a spirituall substance, incapable of Augmentation or Detriment. Now that which is *spirituall*, cannot be produced out of that which is corporeall, neither can any seed be discinded or issue out from the soule, being *substantia simplex*, & *impartibilis*, a substance simple, and indivisible.

3. That which is *separable* from the body, and can subsist and work without it, doth not depend in its being or making upon it; for if by the Gene-

ration of the Body the soule be generated, by the corruption of the Body it would be corrupted; for every thing that is generable, is corruptible; But the Soule can subsist and work without the Body, therefore it doth not from corporeall generation derive its Being.

4. If the Soule be seminally traduced, it must be either from the Body, or from the soule of the Parents; not from the Body, for it is impossible for that which is not a body, to be made out of that which is a Body, no cause being able to produce an effect out of its own sphere, and more noble then it selfe; not from the soule, because that being a spirituall and impartible substance, can therefore have nothing severed from it by way of substantiall seed unto the constitution of another soule.

5. If there be nothing taken from the Parents, of which the Soule is formed, then it is not traduced by naturall generation: but there is nothing taken from the Parents, by which the soule is formed: for then in all Abortions and miscarrying Conceptions, the seed of the Soule would perish, and by consequence the soule it selfe would be corruptible, as having its Originall from corruptible seed. These and divers other the like arguments are used to confirme the doctrine touching the Creation of the Reasonable Soule. Unto which may be added the judgement and testimony of some of the fore-cited Fathers. *S. Hierome* telleth us that the Originall of the soule in mankind is not as in other living

*Hier. ad Pam-
mach. & in l.
32. Ecclef. 12.
Contr. Ruffinum
l. 2. c. 12 &
dialog. de Orig.
Anim. inter
opera ejus.
Tom. 8.*

living creatures ; Since as our Saviour speaketh, *The Father worketh hitherto.* And the Prophet *Esa* yelleth, That *he formeth the Spirit of man within him, and frameth the hearts of all men;* as it is in the Psalmes. And so *Lactantius* (whom I do wonder to finde numbred amongst the Authors that affirme the Traduccion of the soule, by *Ruffinus*, and the Author of the Dialogue amongst the workes of *Hierome*) It may be questioned (saith he) whether the soule be generated out of the Father, Mother, or both. Neither of all three is true, Because the seed of the Soule is not put into the Body by either, or both of these. A body may be borne out of their Bodies, because something may be out of both contributed ; but a Soule cannot be borne out of their Soules, in as much as from so spirituall and incomprehensible a substance nothing can issue forth or be severed for that use. So also *St. Hilary.* The Soule of man is the work of God ; the generation of the flesh is alwaies of the flesh. And again, it is inbred and an impress'd Beliefe in all, that our Soules have a divine Originall : And in like manner *Theodoret;* God (saith he) frameth the Bodies of living creatures out of the Bodies subsisting before, but the soule, not of all creatures, but of Men onely hee worketh *ἐκ μὴ ὄντων* out of nothing that had been before.

Against this Doctrine of the Soules Original, The principal argument is drawn from the consideration of *Original sinne*, and the propagation thereof, which alone was that which troubled

A a a 2

and

Hilar. de Trin.
lib. 10. & in
p. 62.

Athenag. de
Resur. Gernad.
de Eccles. dog.
c: 13.

Aug. ep. 28.

and staggerd S. *Augustine* in this point. For if the Soule be not naturally traduced, how should Originall sinne be derived from *Adam* unto it? And if it were not in the loynes of *Adam*, then neither did it sinne in his loynes; whereas the Apostle expressly telleth us, that by one Man sinne came into the World, and that in one all have sinned; and that not only by imputative participation, but by naturall Propagation, deriving an inherent habituall pollution, which cleaveth inseparably to the soule of every man that entereth into the world, and is the fruit of *Adams* loynes.

Unto which Argument to omit the different resolutions of other men touching the pollution of the Soule by the immediate contract of the flesh, and the Parents attinging the ultimate disposition of the Body: upon which naturally followeth the Union of the soule, (God being pleased to work ordinarily according to the exigence of second causes, and not suffering any of them to be in vain for want of that concurrence which he in the vertue of a *first and supreme cause* is to contribute unto them,) I shall set down what I conceive to be the Truth in this point.

Aug. de Civit.
Dei, l. 13. c. 14.

Macar. Ho. 12.

First then, it is most certain that God did not implant *Originall sinne*, nor take away *Originall righteousness* from Man, but man by his *Prævarication* and Fall did cast it away, and contract sin, and so derive a *defiled nature* to his posterity. For as *Macarius* excellently speaketh, *Adam* having transgressed, did lose the pure possession of his Nature.

Secondly,

Secondly, Originall injustice as it is a sinne, by the default and contraction of Man, so it is also a punishment by the ordination and disposition of Divine Justice. It was mans iane to cast away the Image of God ; but it is Gods just judgement (as he hath that free dispensation of his own Gifts) not to restore it again in such manner as first he gave it unto that nature which had so rejected and trampled on it.

Thirdly, In this *Original sinne*, there are two things considerable ; The *Privation* of that Righteousness which ought to be in us ; and the *lust* or *Habituall concupiscence*, which carrieth Nature unto inordinate motions. The *Privation* and want of Originall justice is meritoriously from *Adam*, who did voluntarily deprave, and reject that Originall rectitude which was put into him, which therefore God out of his most righteous and free disposition is pleased not to restore unto his Nature in his posterity again. In the *habitual lust* are considerable these two things, *ἀταξία* the sinfull disorder of it, and *Ἀνεμωβία* the punishment of sinne by it. Consider it as a punishment of *Adams* first prævarication; and so, though it be not efficiently from God, yet it falls under the Order of his Justice, who did most righteously forsake *Adam*, after his wilfull fall, and leave him in the hand of his own Counsell, to transmit unto us that Seminary of sinne which himselfe had contracted.

But if we consider it as a sinne, we then say that the immediate & proper cause of it, is lapsed nature whole

Aug. contr.
Jul. l. 5. c. 3.

whole and entire by Generation and Seminall Transduction derived upon us. But the *Remoter cause* is that, from which we receive and derive this Nature. Nature I say first *fallen*; for unto Nature Innocent belonged Originall Righteousness, and not Originall sinne.

2. *Nature derived* by ordinary generation as the fruit of the loynes, and of the womb. For though Christ had our Nature, yet he had not our sinne.

3. *Nature whole and entire.* For neither part (as some conceive) is the Totall spring and fountain of this sinne. For it is improbable that any staine should be transfused from the Body to the Soul, as from the foule vessell to the cleane water put into it: The Body it selfe being not Soly and alone in it selfe corrupt and sinfull; else, all Abortions and miscarrying conceptions should be subject to damnation. Nothing is the seat of sin which cannot be the seat of Death the wages of sinne.

Originall sinne therefore most probably seemeth to rise by *Emanation*, partiall in the parts, totall in the whole; from Mans Nature as *guilty, forsaken*, and *accursed* by God for the sinne of Adam. And from the parts not considered absolutely in themselves, but by vertue of their concurrence and *Vnion*, whereby both make up one compounded Nature. Though then the Soule be a partiall subject or seat of Originall sinne; yet we have not our sinne and our soule from one Author; because sinne follows not the

the part, but the *Nature* whole and entire. And though we have not from our Parents *Totum Naturam*, yet we have *totam Naturam*, we have our whole Nature, though not every part of our Nature. Even as *whole Christ* was the Son of *Mary*, who therefore by vertue of the Communication of Properties in Christ, is justly called *θεοτοκος*, the *Mother of God*, against the Nestorians in the Council of *Chalcedon*; though in regard of his divine Nature, he was without beginning; and the reason is, because the integrity of Nature ariseth from the *Union* of the two parts together, which is perfected by *Generation*; so then we say that *Adam* is the Original, and *meritorious* cause; our next *Parents*, the instrumental and *immediate* cause of this sin in us, not by way of physical Emission or Transmigration of sin from them to us, but by secret contagion, as Saint *Augustine* speaks. For having in the manner aforesaid from *Adam* by our parents received a nature, most justly forsaken by God, and lying under the Guile and cause of the first prevarication, from this *Nature* thus derived, as *guilty* and *accursed*, doth immediately and intimately flow Habitual pollution. So then Habitual concupiscence is from *Adam* alone *meritoriously* by reason of his first prevarication. From *Adam* by the mediation of our *Parents* *seminally* by natural *generation*. And from *Nature* generated not as Nature, but as in *Adam* *guilty*, *forsaken* and *accursed*, by secret and ineffable *Resulsancy* and *Emanation*. This is that which I conceive of this great difficulty, not

Contra Julian,
l. 5. c. 14.

*Nihil peccato
originali ad
prædicandum
notius, nihil ad
intelligendum
secretius, Aug.
de morib. Eccles.
cap. 22.*

unmindful in the mean time of that speech of St. *Augustine*, That there is nothing more *certain* to be known, and yet nothing more *secret* to be understood then *Original sin*. For other Arguments to prove the Traduction of the Soul, they are not of such moment; and therefore I pass them by, and proceed to the consideration of the Soul in its Nature:

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Image of God in the Reasonable Soul, in regard of its simplicity and spirituality.

*Macrobi. de som-
nio Scip. p. 1. c.
14. divina par-
ticula aura.
ἀνθρώπου
Sæ. Phil.*



**Vid: contra
hanc impia-
tem decretum
concil. Bracar.
cap. 5. μετὰ
τὴν Σέβας ἐλ-
λάμ. Sæ. Da.
maj. de orb. fid.
l. 2. c. 12.
Ignem est omnis
vigor & cele-
stis Origo.*

Concerning the dignity of the Soul in its nature and essence, Reason hath adventured thus far, to confess that the soul of man is in some sort a spark and beam of divine brightness. And a greater and more infallible Oracle hath warranted that it was *breathed* into him by God himself, and was made after his *Image and likeness*, not substantially, as if there were a Real Emanation and Traduction of the Soul out of God; which were blasphemous and impious to conceive: but only by way of Resemblance, and imitation of Gods Properties in mans Original created Nature, which is more notable in him then in the other parts of the world; there is in-
deed

deed in all Gods works some kind of Image, and lineaments, and footsteps of his glory.

*Deum namque ire per omnes
Terraq; Tractusq; maris, Cælumq; profundum, &c.*

For all the tracts of Earth, of Sea, and Sky
Are filled with divine immensity.

The whole world is a great * book, wherein we read the praise, glory, power, and infiniteness of him that made it; but man is after a more peculiar manner called *Εἰκών*, and *ὁῶσα*, the image and glory of God; the greater world is only Gods workmanship, wherein is represented the wisdom and power of God, as in a building the Art and cunning of the Workman; but man (in the original purity of nature) is besides that, as wax, wherein was more notably impressed by that divine Spirit (whose work it is to seal) a spiritual resemblance of his own goodness and sanctity. Again, the greater world was never other then an *Orator* to set forth the power and praises of God; but he made the soul of man, in the beginning, as it were his *Oracle*, wherein he fastned a perfect knowledge of his Law and Will, from the very glimpses and corrupted reliques of which Knowledge of his Law, some have been bold to call men *Συγγενεὶς θεῶν*, the Kindred of God. And *Seneca, Liber Animus & Divi cognatus*; which is the same with that of *Abrams* cited by *St. Paul*, τῷ γὰρ καὶ θεοῦ ἐσμεν, for we are his offspring; yea, *Euripides* (as *Tully* in his

* *Πῶσα Θεῶν*
Orig. apud Euseb. de prepar. Evan. l. 6. c. 11.
Finxit in effigiem moderantem cuncta Deum, Ov. Met. 1.
In alii creaturis est similitudo Dei tantum per modum Vestigii; in Sala Rationali Creatura per modum imaginis.
Vid. Aquin. par. 1. q. 93. art. 5.
Συγγενεὶς καὶ τυποδὲν ὁμοιωσὶς Θεῶν. Philo apud Euseb. de prepar. Evan. l. 7. c. 18.
Πόινκα Θεῶν λογικὸν καὶ εἰκόνα γένου του τοῦ κτιστοῦ.
Greg. Nyssen. Ser. 1. In verba illa faciamus hominem &c.
Θεῶν ὁ εἶς.
Arist. Ethic. l. 10. c. 7.
Deorum cognitione tenetur.
Cic. de Div. l. 1. c. 1. de Amicis.
Porphy. apud Euseb. de prepar. Evan. l. 11. c. 28.

* Lib. 1. Clem.
Alex. in fine l. 4.
Stromat. ipse
etiam Cic. in
Somnio Scipio.
Sen. ep. 31. &
41.

Vid. Aug. de
Gen. ad lit. l. 6.
c. 12.

Ambr. Hexam.
l. 6. c. 8.

Tertul. lib. 2.
contra Marcio.
cap. 5, 9, 16.

Clem. Alex. in
Protrep. p. 30.

Basil. Hexam.

Homil. 110.

* Vid. Theodor.

Serm. 5. de ma-

tura Hom. &

Nemes. c. 2.

Seu Nyssen. lib.

de Anim. Plu-

tarch. de placi-

to Philos. l. 4.

c. 2. Tertul. de

Anim. Sen. Nat.

94. l. 7. c. 24.

* *Tusculans* observes) was bold to call the soul of man by the name of God; and *Seneca* will venture so far too. *Quid aliud vocas animum quam Deum in humano corpore hospitantem*; But to forbear such boldness, as (it may be) one of the Originals of heathen Idolatry: Certain it is, that there are (as *Tully* many times divinely observes) sundry similitudes between God and the mind of man. There are indeed some Attributes of God, not onely incommunicable, but absolutely inimitable, and unshadowable by any excellency in mans soul, as immensity, infiniteness, omnipotency, omniscience, immutability, impassibility, and the like; but whatsoever spiritual, and rational perfections the power and bounty of God conferred upon the soul in its first Creation, are all of them so many shadows and representations of the like, but most infinite perfections in him.

The Properties then and Attributes of God, wherein this Image chiefly consists, are first these three: *spirituality* with the two immediate consequents thereof, *Simplicity* and *Immortality*, in which the soul hath partaken without any after-corruption or depravation. Concerning the former, it were vifit, and needless, to confute those * sundry opinions of ancient Philosophers, concerning the substance of the soul; many whereof *Tully* in the first of his *Tusculans* hath reported; And *Aristotle* confuted in his first *de Anima*. Some conceived it to be blood, others the brain, some fire, others air; some that it consists in Harmony and number, and the Philosopher *Dicæarchus*, that it was no

thing

thing at all but the body disposed and fitted for the works of life. But to let these pass as unworthy of refutation, and to proceed to the truth of the first property.

There are sundry natural reasons to prove the * *Spirituality* of the Soul, as first, the manner of its working, which is *immaterial*, by conceiving objects, as *universal*, or otherwise purified from all grossness of matter, by the Abstraction of the *Active Understanding*, whereby they are made in some sort proportional to the nature of the Intellect: passive, into which the species are impressed.

Secondly, Its *independence* on the body, in that manner of working; for though the operations of the soul require the concurrence of the *Common sense and imagination*, yet that is by way only of conveyance from the *object*, not by way of assistance to the elicit and immediate *act*. They only present the *species*, they do not qualify the *perception*. *Phantasmata* are only *objecta operationis*; the objects they are, not *instrumenta operandi*, the instruments of the soul's working. The *Act of Understanding* is immediately from the soul, without any the least concurrences of the body thereunto, although the things whereon that act is fixed and conversant, require, in this estate, bodily Organs to represent them unto the soul; as light doth not at all concur to the act of seeing, which solely and totally floweth from the vivive faculty, but only serves as an extrinsecal assistance for qualification of the *Medium* and ob-

* Vid. Nemes.
de Anim. c. 2.
Claudian. Ma-
mercum de sta-
tu Animæ, l. 1.
Plotin. apud,
Euseb. de pra-
parat. Evang.
l. 15. c. 21.
Damas de Or-
thoi fide, l. 2.
c. 12.
Plutarch. l. de
placitis Philo-
soph. l. 4. c. 2, 3.
Aul. lib de
quantitate
Animæ.

Lib. 3. de Ani-
ma cap. 5.

Ibid cap. 6.

ject that must be seen. And this reason *Aristotle* hath used to prove, that the understanding, which is principally true of the whole soul, is not mixt with any body, but hath a nature altogether diverse there-from, because it hath no bodily Organ, as all-bodily powers have, by which it is enabled to the proper acts that belong unto it. And hereon is grounded another reason of his, to prove the *Soul immaterial*, because it depends not on the body in its operations, but educeth them immediately from within it self, as is more manifest in the *Reflection* of the soul upon its own nature, being an operation (as he expressly speaketh) *separable there-from*, the soul being not only *actus informans*, a form informing, for the actuating of a body, and constitution of a compound substance, but *actus subsistens* too, a form subsisting; And that *per se*, without any necessary dependance upon matter. It is an act, which worketh as well in the body, as whereby the body worketh.

Another reason of *Aristotle* in the same place, is, the difference between *Material* and *Immaterial power*. For (saith he) all bodily cognoscitive Faculties do suffer offence and dammage from the too great excellency of their objects, as the eye from the brightness of the Sun, the ear from the violence of a sound, the touch from extremity of heat or cold, and the like. But the *understanding* on the contrary side is perfected by the worthiest contemplations, and the better enabled for lower enquiries. And therefore

fore *Aristotle* in his *Ethicks*, placeth the most compleat happiness of man in those heavenly intuitions of the mind, which are fastned on the divinest and most remote objects; which in Religion is nothing else, but a fruition of that beatifical vision (which, as far as nature goes, is called the *contemplation of the first cause*) and an eternal satiating the soul with beholding the Nature, Essence, and glory of God.

Another reason may be drawn from the condition of the *Understandings Objects*, which have so much the greater conformity to the soul, by how much the more they are divine and abstracted. *Hoc habet animus argumentum suae divinitatis, (saith Seneca) quod illum divina delectant.* This argument of its divineness hath the mind of man, that it is delighted with divine things; for if the soul were corporeal, it could not possibly reach to the knowledge of any, but material substances, and those that were of its own Nature; Otherwise we might as well see Angels with our eyes, as understand any thing of them in our minds. And the ground of this reason is, that axiom in Philosophy, that all reception is *admodum recipientis*, according to the proportion and capacity of the receiver. And that the objects which are spiri ual and divine, have greatest proportion to the soul of man, is evident in his Understanding and his Will, both which are in regard of truth or good unsatisfiable by any material or worldly objects, the one never resting in enquiry, till it attain the perfect knowledge,

Aristot. de Ani-
ma, l. 3 c. 6.

Tuscul. q. 1. l. 1.
c. 1. de Senect.

ledge, the other never replenished in desire till it be admitted unto the perfect possession of the most divine and spiritual good; to wit, of him who is the first of Causes, and the last of Ends.

From this attribute of *Spirituality* flows immediately the next of *Simplicity, Unity, or Actuality*; for matter is the root of all perfect composition, every Compound consisting of two Essential parts, *matter* and *form*. I exclude not from the Soul all manner of composition, for it is proper to *God* onely to be absolutely and perfectly simple: But I exclude all *Essential composition*, in respect whereof the Soul is *meerly Actual*; And so I understand that of *Tully*, *Nihil est Animis admixtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil congmentatum, nihil duplex*.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Souls Immortality, proved by its simplicity, independence, agreement of Nations in acknowledging God & duties due unto him, dignity above other Creatures, power of understanding things immortal, unsatiableness by objects Mortal, freeness from all causes of corruption.

AND from this *Simplicity* follows by a necessary and unavoidable consequence, the third property spoken of, * *Immortality*, it being absolute. ly impossible (as *Tully* excellently observes, and it is the argument of *Ful. Scaliger* on this very occasion) for any simple and uncompounded Nature to be subject to death and corruption; For (saith *Tully*) *Interitus est discessus & secretio ac direptus earum partium quæ conjunctione aliqua tenebantur*. It is a separation (and as it were) a divulsion of parts, before united each to other, so that where there is * no Union, there can be no separation, and by consequence no death nor mortality.

Another reason may be the same which was alleged for the (*spirituality* of the Soul, namely, *independence in operation*, and therefore conse-

* *Vid. Plur. lib. de placit. Philosoph 4. c. 9. quæ ex Seneca in unum collegit, Dionys. Gothfrid. in locis ex ipso Theologicis. Tertul. de Anim. Cic. Tuscul. lib. 1. Casomajor, sive de senect. & de Amicit. Istam materiam fuse tractarunt. Aug. tom. 1. Euse. de prepar. Evang. l. 11. ex Platone Porphyrt &c. Nemes Aëneas Gargens in Bed. Contaren. Alii*

* *Nihil potest perdere esse quod non perdit actum per quem est: Ista autem forma [viz. Simples] non possunt perdere actum per quem sunt, quia sibi ipsis sunt Actus. Nihil autem potest seipsum perdere. Contarenus lib. 1. de Immort. Anima.*

quently in *Being* upon the body. And that Independence is manifest. First, because the acts of the soul are educed immediately in it self, without the intercedence of any organ whereby sensitive faculties work. Secondly, because the soul can perceive and have the knowledge of truth of *universals*, of *it self*, of *Angels*, of *God*, can assent, discourse, abstract, censure, invent, contrive, and the like; none of which actions could any wayes be produced by the Intrinsical concurrence of any material faculty. Thirdly, because in *Raptures* and *Extasies*, the soul is (as it were) drawn up above and from the body, though not from *informing* it, yet certainly from borrowing from it any assistance to the producing of its operation. All which prove, that the soul is separable from the body in its Nature, and therefore that it is not corrupt and mortal as the body.

Another reason may be taken from the Universal agreement of all nations in the Earth in *Religion* and the worship of some Diety, which cannot but be raised out of a hope and secret Resolution, that that God whom they worshipped, would reward their piety, if not here, yet in another life. *Nulla gens adeo extra leges est projecta ut non aliquos deos credat*, saith *Seneca*; whence those fictions of the Poets touching *Elixium* and fields of happiness, for men of honest and well-ordered lives; and places of Torment for those that do any way neglect the bonds of their Religion.

*Ergo exercentur pœnis, veterumq; malorum
Supplicia expendunt.*

Cum de Animorum eternitate differimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timendum inferos aut colentium Seneca. ep. 117.

There-

Therefore they exercised are with pain,
And punishment of former crimes sustain.

For in this life it is many times in all places seen, that those which have given themselves most liberty in contempt of Gods Laws, and have suffered themselves to be carried by the swinge of their own rebellious Passions, unto all injurious, ambitious unruly practices, have commonly raised themselves and their fortunes more then others, who out of tenderness and fear have followed no courses but those which are allowed them. And yet these men who suffer so many indignities out of regard to Religion, do still observe their duties, and in the midst of all contemp and reproach, fly into the bosom of their God: and as *Lucretius* himself that Arch Atheist confesseth of them,

*Multo in rebus acerbis
Acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.*

Their hearts in greatness bitterness of minde,
Unto Religion are the more inclinde.

Their very terrours and troubles make them more zealous in acknowledging some Diety and in the worship of it. *Hic Pietatis honos*: would not this easily have melted their Religion into nothing, and quite diverted their mindes from so fruitless a severity, had they not had a strong and indelible perswasion fastned in their souls, that a state would come, wherein both their Patience should be rewarded, and the insolence of
C c c 2 their

their adversaries repayed with the just Vengeance they had deserved?

As for that Atheistical conceit, that Religion is onely grounded on Policy, and maintained by Princes for the better Tranquillity and Setledness of their States, making it to be onely *Impericum Vinculum*, a Bond of Government, that the Common-weale might not suffer from the fury of mindes secure from all Religion, it is a fancy no less absurd, then it is impious. For that which hath not onely been observed and honoured by those who have scarce had any form of a civil Regiment amongst them, but even generally assented unto by the opinions and practices of the whole world, is not a Law of Policy and Civil Institution, but an inbred and secret Law of Nature dictated by the consciences of men, and assented unto, without and above any humane impositions. Nor else is it possible for Legal institutions, and the closest and most intricate conveyances of Humane Policy so much to entangle the hearts of men (of themselves inclinable to liberty) nor to fetter their consciences, as thereby onely to bring them to a regular conformity unto all government for fear of such a God, to whose Infiniteness, Power, and Majesty they Assent by none but a civil Tradition. It must be a visible character of a Deity acknowledged in the Soul, an irresistible Principle in Nature, and the secret witness of the heart of man, that must constrain it unto those sundry religious ceremonies (observed among all Nations) wherein even
in

in places of Idolatry, were some so irksom and repugnant to Nature, and others so void of Reason, as that nothing but a firm and deep Assurance of a Divine Judgement, and of their own Immortality, could ever have imposed them upon their consciences. And besides this consent of men unto Religion in general, we finde it also unto this one part hereof touching the Souls immortality. All the wisest and best reputed Philosophers for Learning and stayedness of life, and besides them, even Barbarians, Infidels, and savage people have discerned it. *Adeo nescio quomodo inhaeret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium futurorum*, saith Tully. The Soul hath a kinde of presage of a future world; And therefore he saith, that it is in Mans Body a Tenant, *tanquam in domo aliena*, as in anothers house: And is onely in Heaven as a Lord, *tanquam in domo sua*, as in its own.

Tusc. qu. l. 1.

Though in the former of these, the ignorance of the *resurrection* made him erre touching the future condition of the Body, wherein indeed consists a main dignity of Man above other creatures. And this Opinion it is which he saith was the ground of all that care men had for posterity, to sow and plant Common-wealths, to ordain Laws, to establish forms of Government, to erect Foundations and Societies, to hazard their blood for the good of their Countrey; all which could not have been done with such freedom of Spirit, and prodigality of life, unless there were withall a conceit that the good therefore

therefore would some way or other redound to the contentment of the Authors themselves after this life : for it was a speech favouring of infinite Atheism,

Εὐαὖτε θανάσιος, γὰρ ἂν μὴ θῆται πύλη.

*When I am dead, and in mine Urn,
What care I though the world burn !*

Tul. Tus. qu. I. 3.
Sen. ep. 117.

Now although against this present Reason drawn from the *consent of men* (which yet Heathens themselves have used) It may be alledged, that there hath been a consent likewise of some, That the soul is nothing else but the Eucrasie or good Temperature of the body, and that it is therefore subject to those Maladies, Distempers, Age, Sicknes, and at last Death, which the Body is ; as among the rest *Lucretius* takes much pains to prove ; yet the truth is, that is *Votum magis quàm judicium*, never any firm opinion grounded on Judgement and Reason, but rather a desire of the heart, and a perswasion of the Will inticing the Understanding so to determine. For the conscience of lewd Epicures and sensual minds, being sometimes frighted with the flashes and apprehensions of immortality, which often times pursues them, and obtrudes it self upon them against their wills, shining like lightning through the chinks and crevices (as I may so speak) of their souls, which are of set purpose closed against all such light, set the Reason on work to invent arguments for the contrary side, that so their staggering and fearfull impiety may
be

be something emboldened, and the Eye of their conscience blinded, and the Mouth muffled from breathing forth those secret clamors and shrieks of fear. The Denial then of the Immortality of the Soul is rather a *Wish* than an *opinion*, a corruption of the Heart and Will, than any Natural Assertion of the Understanding, which cannot but out of the footsteps and reliques of those first sacred Impressions, acknowledge a spiritual resemblance in the Soul of Man unto some supreme Deity, whom the conscience in all its Enormities doth displease: And therefore it is observed that the Minde of an Atheist is continually wavering and unsatisfied, never able so to fix other the imbred consciousness of its immortality, as not to have continual suggestious of fear and scruple. Wheresoever there is an impious Heart, there is alwayes a shivering judgement.

Another Reason of the Souls Immortality may be drawn from the dignity and preeminence of Man above other Creatures: for he is made Lord over them, and they were ordained to be serviceable to him, and Ministers for his contentments: which dignity cannot possibly stand with the Mortality of the Soul. For should not many other Creatures far exceed Man in the Durance of their Being? And even in their time of living together, how subject to weaknesses, sickness, languishing, cares, fears, jealousies, discontents, and all other miseries of Minde and Body, is the whole Nature of man, of all which, other creatures feel the least disturbance?

Are

Bacon Essay of
Atheism.

Ὁδὸν μὲν γὰρ
ζῶον ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔ-
χοντα πόνον ἀνθρώ-
πῳ. *Ilad. p. 445.*

Diogenes voca-
re solebat
τελευτηδόνους
ἀπὸ τῆς τελευ-
τῆς.

Laert. l. 6.

Πᾶς ἀνθρώπος

ἐστὶ συμφορῆς.

S. Ion ad Cræ-

sum, vid Theod.

ser. 5 de natura

Hom. & Clem.

Alex. Str. l. 3.

p. 316, 317.

Edit. Hiens.

Are not men here, beyond the rest, the very proper subjects and receptacles of misery? Is not our heart made the Natural center of fears and sorrows? and our Mindes, as it were, Hives to entertain numberless swarms of stinging and thorny Cares? Are we not Vassals and Slaves to many distempered passions? Have not our very Contents their terrour, and our Peace disturbance? Are not all our comforts, wherewith we strive to glut and stuff our selves here, the glorious vanities, and golden delusions and cozenages of the world? And how miserable must their miseries be, whose very happiness is unhappy? And for Reason, what comfort could we finde in it, when it would alwayes be presenting unto us the consideration of an eternal loss of all our contentments, and still affright us with the dark and hideous conceit of Annihilation? Mortality and Corruption makes Unreasonableness a Priviledge; And in this case the Beasts would be so much the more happy then Man, by how much the less they know their own wretchedness. An Atheist would be in this life far happier then he is, if he could bring himself to have as little Reason as he hath Religion.

Another Reason may be taken from the Nature of Mans reasonable Faculties. To every power in Man, as God hath assigned a peculiar operation, so likewise hath he given it Objects of equal extent thereunto, which are therefore able to accomplish his natural desires, whereby

it fasteneth on them. And for this cause from the Nature of the Objects, we easily rise to know the Nature both of the Faculties and Essence; for from the Essence flowes naturally the Faculty, from the Faculty is naturally educed the Operation, which requires naturally Objects proportionall, convenient, satisfactory, and of equall extent. Where therefore no mortall Object beares full convenience, nor is able to satiate and quiet the Faculty, there it and the Essence, from which it flowes, are both immortall. Now we see sensitive Powers finde in this life full satisfaction, as the Sight from all the variety of Colours, the Eare of Sounds, and the like: only the Reasonable Parts, the Understanding, and the Will can never be replenished in this estate of Mortality. Have they as great and wide contentments, as the whole Frame of Nature can here afford them; still their pursuities are restless, still they find an absence and want of something which they cannot find. *Orbis Alexandro angustus*; In this case every man is like Alexander. This world wherein wee now converse, is too straight and empty to fill the vastness, and limit the desires of the Soule of man. Only the sight and possession of God, the most infinite good, can satisfie our Understandings and our Wills. For both these Faculties (as all others in *suo Genere*) ayme at *summum*. The understanding is carried *ad summam Causam*, to the first of Truths; the Will *ad summum Bonum*, to the last of Ends; and therefore he only which is the First and the Last,

D d d

can

Fecisti nos ad
te, & inquietum
est cor
nostrum donec
requiescat
in te. Aug.
Confes. l. 1. c. 1
vid. ib. l. 4. c. 10.
12. de Trinit.
l. 13. c. 8.
Omnis mihi
Copia quæ
Deus meus
non est, Ege-
stas est, Confes.
l. 13. c. 8. Vide
etiam de Civ.
Dei, l. 8. c. 18. l.
11. c. 13. l. 12.
c. 1.

can satisfie these two searching and unquiet Faculties.

Hi motus Animorum atq; hac certamina.

These are the Motions, this the strife
Of Souls aspiring unto life.

All the knowledge we heap up here, serves only as a Mirrour wherein to view our Ignorance, and we have only light enough to discover that we are in the darke. And indeed, were there no Estate wherein Knowledge should receive a Perfection, and be thoroughly proportioned to the Heart of man, the labour of getting the Knowledge we have, and the vexation for the want of what we have not, and the griefe of parting so soon with it, would render the vexation of it far greater than the content.

Hoc est quod palles? cur quis non prandeat hoc est?

Is this the fruit, for which we fast,
And by pale studies sooner waste?

Doe we toyle and sweat, and even melt our selves away for that which we sooner forsake than find? Doe we deny our selves the contentments and satisfactions most agreeable to our corporeall condition, being without hope of accomplishing our wishes in another estate? Is it naturall for gaining of Knowledge to hasten unto that whereby we lose both

both it and our selves? and to labour for such a purchase, which like lightning is at once begun and ended, yea indeed sooner lost than gotten? Certainly were man not conscious of his owne Immortalitie, there could be no stronger inducement to sottishness, luxury, riot, sensuality, and all other unbridled practises. It is registred for the impiety of Atheists, *Let us eat and drinke, for too morrow we shall dye.*

Another Reason may be framed after the same manner, as was that to prove the *Spirituality* of the Soul from the manner of its operation. And it is grounded on those two ordinary Axiomes in Philosophy, That *every thing is received according to the quality of the receiver; & that every thing hath the same manner of Essence, as it hath of operation.* Now the Soule of Man can easily receive impressions and conceits of Immortality, and discourse thereupon: therefore also it is in its owne Essence and Nature Immortall. We see even between things meerly corporeall, as the *Object* and the sensitive *Organ*, how small a disproportion works incapacity. Much more must it be found in so great a difference as would be between immortality of Objects and corruption of the Soule that worketh on them. We cannot picture an Angel or Spirit, nor make any immateriall stamp in a piece of wax, since a *corporeall* substance is capable of none but corporeall impressions. And therefore we see that even amongst Bodies, the more pure and subtile they are, the more are they exempted from the perception of the quickest and most spirituall

sense; the sight. Now the mind of man in Understanding, is but as Wax to the Seale, or as a Table and Picture to an Object which it represents : which is the ground of that Paradox in *Aristotle*, that in Understanding the Soul is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax after it is stamped, is in some sort the very Seale it selfe that stamp'd it, namely *Representative*, by way of Image and resemblance; so the Soule, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the Picture and Image of the thing it selfe. Now the Understanding being able to apprehend Immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall substance, as if it were immortall, I meane by purging it from all grosse materiall and corruptible qualities) must therefore needs of it selfe be of an immortall Nature. And from the latter of those two Principles, which I speake of, namely, that the quality of the *Being* may be gathered from the Nature of the *Operation*, *Aristotle* inferres the *separability* and *independence* of the Understanding on the Body, in the third *de Anima* aforementioned : For the Soule being able to worke without the concurrence of any bodily Organ to the very act it selfe (as was before shewed) must needs also be able to subsist by its own nature, without the concurrence of any matter to sustain it. And therefore he saith in the same place, that *the understanding is separable, uncompounded, impassible*; all arguments of *immortality*. Other reasons are produced for the prooffe hereof, taken from the causes of corruption, which

which is wrought either by Contraries working and eating out Nature; or by Defect of the Preserving cause, as light is decayed by absence of the Sunne; or thirdly by corruption of the subject whercon it depends. None whereof can be verified in the Soule. For first, how can any thing be contrary to the Soule, which receiveth perfection from all things? for *Intellectus omnia intelligit*, saith *Aristotle*, yea wherein all Contraries are reconciled and put off their Opposition. For (as a great man excellently speaketh) those things which destroy one another in the *World*, maintaine and perfect one another in the *Mind*; one being a meanes for the clearer apprehension of the other. Secondly, God, who is the only Efficient of the Soule (being else in it selfe simple and indivisible, and therefore not capable of death, but only of Annihilation) doth never faile, and hath himself promised never to bring it unto nothing. And lastly, the Soule depends not, as do other Formes, either in Operation or Being, on the Body, being not only *Actus informans*, but *subsistens* too, by its own absolute vertue.

Mornay of
Christian
Religion.
Chap. 14.

CHAP. XXXV.

Of the Honour of humane Bodies by Creation, by Resurrection; of the Endowments of glorified Bodies.

Vid. Coel.
Rhodig. l. 2. c.
9, 10, 11. Aug.
de Gen. ad lit.
l. 6. c. 12, &c.
Platonica sen-
tentia Carcer,
Apostolica
Templum.
Tert. de Anim.
Tert. de Car-
ne Christi.
Vid. Aug. l. 7,
de Trin. c. 6.



AND now, that this particular of *Immortality* may further redound both to the honour & comfort of Man, I must fall upon a short digression touching Mans *Body*; wherein I intend not to meddle with the Question, How mans *Body* may be said to be made after the *Image of God*, which sure is not any otherwise then as it is a sanctified & shall be a blessed Vessel, but not as some have conceited, as if it were in Creation, *Imago Christi futuri, nec Dei opus tantum, sed & Pignus*; As if Christ had been the pattern of our Honour, and not we of his Infirmitie, since the Scripture saith, He was made like unto us in all things, & that he assumed our Nature, but never that we were, but that we shall be like unto him; not, I say, to meddle with this, I will only briefly consider the Dignity thereof in the particular of *Immortality*, both in the first *structure*, and in the last Resurrection of it. The Creation of our Bodies, and the Redemption of our Bodies, as the Apostle calls it. What Immunity was at first given, and what Honour shall at last be restored to it. In which latter sense it shall certainly be *Secundum Imaginem*, after

after his Image, who was *Primitive*, the first fruits of them that rise; That as in his Humility his Glory was hid in our Mortality, so in our Exaltation our Mortality shall be swallowed up of his Glory. And for the first estate of Mans Body, we conclude in a word, that it was partly Mortall, and partly Immortall: *Mortall* in regard of possibility of Dying, because it was affected with the mutuall Action and Passion of corruptible Elements: for which reason it stood in need of reparation and recovery of it selfe by food, as being still *Corpus Animale*, and not *Spirituale*, as *S. Paul* distinguisheth, a Naturall, but not a Spirituall Body. But it was *Immortall*, that is, Exempted from the Law of death and Dissolution of the Elements, in vertue of Gods Covenant with man, upon condition of his Obedience. It was Mortall *Conditione Corporis*, by the condition of a Body; but Immortall *Beneficio Conditoris*, by the Benefit of its Creation; else God had planted in the Soule such naturall desires of a Body wherein to worke as could not be naturally attained; For the Soule did naturally desire to remaine still in the Body. In the naturall Body of *Adam* there was no sinne, and therefore no death, which is the wages of sinne.

I come now to the Redemption of our Bodies already performed in *Pignore* & in *Primitiis*, in our Head, and in some few of his Members, *Enoch*, *Elias*, and (as is probable) in those dead Bodies which arose to testifie the Divine power of our crucified Saviour; and shall be totally accomplished

Aug. de Gen.
ad lit. l. 6. c. 25.
de Civ. Dei. li.
13. c. 19. Vide
quæ fufe &
erudite differt
Geor. Zeeman
tract. de Imag.
Dei. c. 8. sect.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Ephes. 4. 30

Luke 21. 28.

Luke 1. 68.

Heb. 9. 12

Luke 21. 28.

Rom. 8. 23.

Ephes. 1. 7.

John 1. 12.

Ephes. 1. 14.

plished at that *day of Redemption*, as the same Apostle calls the Last day; that day of a full and final Redemption, *when death, the last enemy, shall be overcome*. And well may it be called a *day of Redemption*, not only in regard of the *Creature*, which yet groaneth under the *Malediction* and *Tyranny* of sinfull Man: nor yet only in respect of *Mans Soule*, which, though it be before admitted unto the purchased Possession of the *Glorifying Vision*, and lives no more by Faith alone, but by sight, shall yet then receive a more abundant fulness thereof, as being the day of the *Manifestation* and plenary discovery both of the *Punishing Glory* of God in the *Wicked*, and of his *Mercifull* and *admirable Glory* in the *Saints*: but also, and (as I think) most especially in respect of the *Body*. For there is, by vertue of that *Omnipotent Sacrifice*, a double kind of *Redemption* wrought for us: the one *Vindicative*, giving us *Immunity* from all spirituall dangers, delivering us from the *Tyranny* of our *Enemies*, from the *Severity*, *Justice*, and *Curse* of the *Law*; which is commonly in the *New Testament* called simply ἀπαγωγῆς, and ἀπολύτρωσις, a *Deliverance* from evill; The other *Purchasing*, or *Munificent*, by not only freeing us from our own wretchedness, but farther conferring upon us a *Positive* and a *Glorious Honour*, which *Saint Iohn* calls ἐξουσία, a *Power*, *Priviledge*, *Prerogative*, and *Title* unto all the *Glorious Promises* of *Immortality*: which likewise *St Paul* calls ἀπολύτρωσις τῆς παρὰ πώσεως the *Redemption* of a *purchased possession* and

and a *Redemption unto the Adoption of Sons*. Now then the Last day is not Totally and Perfectly a *day of Redemption* unto our souls in either of these senses, since they are in this life delivered from the Malediction of the Law, from the Wrath of the Judge, from the Tyranny of the Enemy, from the Reign of Sin; and by Death freed not onely from the Dominion, but from the Possession, or Assault of the Enemy; not onely from the Kingdom, but from the Body of Sin; and is withal in good part possessed of that Bliss, which it shall more fully enjoy at last. But our *Bodies*, though before that Great day they partake much of the benefits of Redemption, as being here sanctified vessels, freed from the Authority and Power of the Devil, World, Flesh, and from the Curse of Death too, wherein they part not onely with life, but with sin; yet after all this do they want some part of either Redemption; as namely to be raised and delivered from that dishonour and corruption which the last Enemy hath brought upon them, and to be admitted into those Mansions, and invested with that Glory, whereby they shall be Totally possessed of their Redemption. In a word, the Soul is in its separation fully delivered from all Enemies, which is the first; and in a great measure enjoyeth the Vision of God, which is the second part or degree of Mans Redemption. But the Body is not till its Resurrection either quite freed from its Enemy, or at all possessed of its Glory. I mean in its self, though it be in its

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Head,

Head, who is *Primitie & Pignus Resurrectionis*, the first fruits and earnest of our Conquest over Death.

Touching the Dignity of our Bodies, though there be more comfort to be had in the Expectation, then Curiosity in the enquiry after it; yet what is usually granted, I shall briefly set down. And first, it shall be Raised a whole entire and perfect Body, with all the parts best fitted to be receptacles of Glory; freed from all either the Usherers in, or Attendants and followers on the Grave, Age, Infirmary, Sickness, Corruption, Ignominie, and Dishonour: And shall rise a true, whole, strong, and honourable Body. For though every part of the Body shall not have those peculiar uses which here they have, since they *neither eat, nor drink, marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the Angels of God*: yet shall not any part be lost: *Licet enim officiis liberentur, judiciis retinentur*; Though they are freed from their Temporal service, for which they were here ordained, yet must they be reserved for receiving their judgement, whether it be unto Glory, or unto Dishonour.

Tertull.

Vid Aug. de
Civ. Dei l. 13.
c. 20 & 23. &
& Epist. 145.

The second Dignity is that Change and Alteration of our Body from a *Natural* to a *Spiritual Body*, whereby is not meant any Transubstantiation from a Corporal to a Spiritual substance: for our Bodies shall, after the Resurrection, be conformable unto Christ Body, which, though glorious, *was not yet a Spirit, but had flesh and bone, as we have*. Nor is it to be understood of

a thin, Aerial Invisible Body (as some have collected) since Christ saith of his Body, after he was risen, *Videte, Palpate*. Wheresoever it is, it hath both its quantity, and all sensible qualities of a Body Glorified with it. It is a strong Argument, that is not there, where it is not sensible; And therefore the Doctrines of *Ubiquity*, and Transubstantiation, as they give Christ more than he is pleased to own, an immortality of Body, so do they spoil him of that, which he hath been pleased for our sakes to assume; Extension, Compacture, Massiness, Visibility, and other the like sensible properties, which cannot stand with that pretended miracle whereby they make Christ Body (even now a Creature, and like unto ours in substance, though not in qualities of Corruptibility, Infirmitie, Ignominy, Animality) to be truly invested with the very immediate properties of the Deity. True indeed it is, that the Body of Christ hath an efficacy and operation in all parts of the world; it worketh in Heaven with God the Father by *Intercession*; amongst the blessed Angels by *Confirmation*; in Earth, and that in all ages, and in all places among Men, by Justification, and Comfort; in Hell amongst the Devils and Damned, by the Trembling and Fears of a condemning and convicting Faith. But Operation requirerh onely a presence of Vertue, not of Substance. For doth not the Sun work wonderfull effects in the bowels of the Earth, it self notwithstanding being a fixed Planet in the Heaven? And why should not the

Sun of Righteousness work as much at the like distance, as the Sun of Nature? Why should he not be as Powerfull Absent, as he was Hoped? Or why should the Not presence of his Body make that uneffectual now, which the Not existing could not before his Incarnation? Why should we mistrust the Eyes of *Stephen*, that saw him in Heaven, at such a Distance of place, when *Abraham* could see him in his own bowels through so great a Distance of Time?

That Speech then, that the Body shall be a Spiritual Body, is not to be understood in either of those former senses: but it is to be understood first of the more immediate Union and full *Inhabitation* of the vertue and vigour of Gods Spirit in our Bodies, quickning and for ever sustaining them without any Assistance of Natural or Animal qualities, for the repairing and augmenting of them in recompence of that, which by labour and infirmity, and the natural opposition of the Elements, is daily diminished. Secondly, it shall be so called in regard of its *Obedience* and Total subjection to the Spirit of God, without any manner of Reluctance and dislike. Thirdly, in respect of those *Spiritual qualities*, those *Privileges of the flesh*, with which it shall be adorned; which are,

First, a *Shining* and Glorious *Light*, wherewithall it shall be clothed as with a Garment: for *the Just shall shine as the Sun in the Firmament*. Now, this shall be wrought first by vertue of that *Communion*, which we have with Christ our Head,

Head, whose Body, even in its Morality, did shine like the Sun, and had his clothes white as light. And secondly, by diffusion and Redundancy from our Soul upon our Body, which by the Beatifical Vision, filled with a spiritual and unconceivable brightness, shall work upon the Body, as on a subject made throughly Obedient to its Power unto the Production of alike qualities.

The second Spiritual Property shall be *Impassibility*, not in respect of *Perfective*, but in respect of annoying, disquieting, or *destructive Passion*. There shall not be any War in the members, and fighting and mutual languishing of the Elements; but they shall be sustained in their full strength by vertue of Christs Communion, of the Inhabitation of the Spirit, of the Dominion of the Glorified Soul. There shall be no need of rest, or sleep, or meat, all which are here requisite for the supply of our infirmities and daily defects, and are onely the Comforts of Pilgrimage, not the Blessedness of Possession. For although Christ after his Resurrection did eat before his Disciples, yet this was none otherwise done, then that other, the Retaining of his wounds, which was onely for our sakes; that our Faith touching the Truth of his Body, might not be without these visible and inferiour Witnesses, by which he was pleased to make his very Glorified flesh a proportioned Object to our fraile sense and faith, that so we might thence learn confidently to rely for our selves as well on the Benefit of his Exaltation, as of his Humility. Or
it

De mirâ vi Animæ in Corpore,
vide Cœl. Rho-
dig. l. 11, c. 15,
16.

De Civit. Dei.
lib. 15.

Ita nihil peritum
rum de Corpore
ut nihil de-
formis maneat in
Corpore.
Vid Aug. En-
chirid. c. 91. &
de Civ. Dei. l.
22. cap. 19. 20.
Tertul. de resur.
Vitia detraben-
tur, Natura
servabitur.
Aug. de Civ.
Dei l. 22. c. 27.

it was done (as *St. Augustines* speaks) *Non ex Necessitate, sed ex Potestate* : as the Sun is said to draw and suck up standing waters : *Non Pabuli Egestate, sed Virtutis Magnitudine*, Not to Nourish, but to Manifest its vertue.

Thirdly, the Body shall be a *strong and beautiful* Body, thoroughly able to minister unto the Soul any service, wherein it shall impoly it, and shall be no longer, as it is now, the clogge and luggage thereof. It shall likewise be free from all blemish and deformity (which ever ariseth out of the distemper and discord of the Elements) (as it is by good probability conjectured) reduced unto a full, comely and convenient stature, even in those, who were in their death contemptible, Infants, lame, dismembered, or any other way dishonoured with the miseries of corruption; *Natura, non injuria reddimur*, we shall be restored to our *Nature*, but not to our *shame*; the Dust shall still retain and bury our dishonour, and it shall be one part of our Glory to be made fit for it.

The last quality of our Bodies which I shall observe is a perfect *subtily* and *agility*, best besitting their service for the Soul in all speedy motion; which surely shall be there so much the more requisite, then here on earth, by how much Heaven is a more ample and spacious Countrey. And thus while the Body is made an attendant on the Souls glory, it is likewise a partaker of it. Unto these, add the sweet Harmony of the Affections, the exact and exquisite Operation of the senses,

senses, the Bodily communion and fellowship of the Saints, and above all, the Eternal Corporeal vision of that most sacred, body whence all ours derive their degrees of Honour, whose presence were truly and without any Hyperbole able to make Hell it self a Place of Glory: how much more that Country, and those Mansions, where the soul likewise shall be swallowed up with the immediate vision and fruition of Divine Glory. Our souls are not here noble enough to conceive what our bodies shall be there.

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of that part of Gods Image in the Soul, which answereth to his Power, Wisdom, Knowledge, Holiness. Of Mans dominion over other Creatures. Of his love to Knowledge. What remainders we retain of Original Justice.

THe other Properties or Attributes of God, of which Mans Soul beareth an Image and dark resemblance, are those, which according to our Apprehension seem not so Intrinsical and Essential as the former. And they are such as may be either generally collected from the manifestation of his Works, or more particularly from his Word. These, which refer unto his Works, are his Power in Making and Ruling them; his Wisdom in Ordering
and

and Preserving them ; his knowledge in the Contemplation of them : and of these it pleaseth him at the first to bestow some few degrees upon mans Soul.

Concerning the Attribute of *Power*, most certain it is, that those great parts of Gods workmanship, *Creation*, and *Redemption*, are incommunicably belonging unto him as his own Prerogative Royal ; insomuch that it were desperate blasphemy to assume unto our selves the least resemblance of them. Yet in many other proceedings of Gods works there is some Analogy and Resemblance in the Works of men. For first, what are all the motions and courses of *Nature*, but the Ordinary works of God ? All forms and intrinsecal Motive Principles are indeed but his Instruments ; *for by him we live, and move, and have our being*. And of all other works, Mans onely imitate *Nature* : as *Aristotle* observes of the Works of *Art*, which peculiarly belong unto Man (all other Creatures being carried by that natural instinct, which is Intrinsically belonging to their condition, without any manner of Art or variety.) The Resemblances of Nature in the Works of Art are chiefly seen in these two Proportions : first, as Nature doth nothing in Vain, but in all her Works aims at some End, the *Perfection*, or the *Ornament*, or the *Conservation* of the Universe (for those are the three ends of Nature subordinate to the Main, which is the *Glory of the Maker*) so likewise are the works of Art all directed by the understanding to some

one of those ends; either to the perfection of Men; such are all those, which enform the Understanding, and govern the life; or to his Conversation, as those directed to the furthering of his welfare, and repairing the decays, or sheltering the weakneses of Natures; or lastly to his Ornament, such as are those Elegancies of Art, and Curiosities of Inventions, which, though not necessary to his being, yet are special instruments of his delight, either Sensitive or Intellectual.

The second Resemblance, is between the Manner and Progress of their Works: For as the Method of nature is to proceed *ab imperfectioribus ad Perfectiora*, and *per determinata Media ad suum Finem*. So Art likewise (as is plain in those which are Manual) by certain fixed rules, which alter not, proceeds to the producing of a more perfect effect, from more rough and unformed beginnings, by the help of Instruments appropriated to particular services. But this, because it limits Mans dignity, as well as commends it, I forbear to speak of. Though even herein also we do seem to imitate God, who in his great work of Creation did proceed both by succession of Time, and degrees of Perfection; only it is *Necessity* in us which was in him his *Will*.

To come therefore nearer, it is observable, That in the first Act of Gods power, in the Making and Framing of the World, there was nothing here below created properly, immediately, and totally, but the Chaos and Mass, or the

Earth without form, and void, out of the Obedience whereof, his power did further educe and extract those Wonderful, Various, and Beautiful Forms, which do evidently set forth unto the Soul of Man, the Glory and Majesty of him that made them. By a smal Resemblance of this manner of Working, man also in those Works of Art, peculiar to him from other Creatures, doth *ex potentia Obedientiali* (as the Schools call it) out of the Obedience and Subjection of any proposed Mass produce, *Non per Naturam, sed per imperium*, Not out of the Nature of the Subject, but by the command of Reason sundry forms of Art full of Decency and Beauty.

And for *Government*, I mean Subordinate, and by Derivation or Indulgence, it is manifest that all Creatures inhabiting the World with him were subdv'd unto Man; and, next unto the glory of the great Maker, were ordained for his service and benefit*; And therefore, when ever we finde any of them hurtful and Rebellious, we cannot but remember that the occasion thereof was our own disloyalty; they do but revenge their great Masters wrong, and, out of a faithful care and jealousy to preserve his Honour, renounce their Fidelity and Obedience to a Traitor. * And indeed how can we look to have our Dominion intire over Beasts and inferiour Creatures, when by continual Enormities we make our selves as one of them?

* Vid. Tertul.
de Resurrex. c.
26. Ambros.
Hexam. l. 6. c. 6.
Nyssen. Orat. 1.
In faciamus ho-
minem, &c.
Aug. de Gen. ad
lit lib. 3. c. 20.
Damas. de Or-
thod. lib. 2.
cap 20.
Sanctus his
animal, men-
tisque capacius
altera, deerat ad
h. c. & quod
dominari in coe-
tera pisset Na-
tus Homo est.
Ovid Met. l. 1.
Quia per pec-
catum Homo
deservit enim
sub quo esse de-
buit, subditus
est ei supra quae
esse debuit.
Aug. Tract. 8.
in Joban.

This *Dominion* of Man over the Creatures, sheweth it self in several things. In the admirable *skill* that man hath to *use* the Creatures, unto Rational and Artificial Ends, which no other Creature can do. As the Fire is an Instrument to the Smith, the Founder, the Chymist, to every Artificer. The Wind and Water ordered to grind Corn, to carry up and down Vessels: Stones and Timber to make goodly Frames of building. There is not the meanest of Creatures whereof the Reason of man hath not found out some needful use tending either unto life, or health, or pleasure, or ease, or facility of operation, or some one or other end for the service of man.

In the *fear* that even now God hath placed in many great and strong Creatures towards Man, so that one Childe is able to drive a whole Herd of them before him. In the *skill* which Man hath to *tame* and subdue fierce Creatures, which otherwise might annoy him; and to make use even of Vipers, and poysonous Creatures unto wholesom ends. In the power which he hath to *instruct* docile Creatures, as the Elephant, the Dog, the Horse, the Bird, to obey the Dictates, and to imitate the expressions of humane reason. In the strange Instinct that God hath put into some hurtful Creatures to fear man, as the Serpent; into others to come abroad at such times only when man staeth in, and *when the Sun ariseth for man to go forth unto his work, then they lye down in their dens.*

*Vid Plin. lib. 8.
c. 8, 9 &c.
Iam, 3. 7.*

Plin. l. 8. c. 3.

Ps. 104 20, 23.

Gen. 1. 28 9. 2

The grounds of this *Dominion* are, 1. The Original Grant and deed of Gift made by God unto man, both in the Creation of the world, unto *Adam*, and in the Reparation of it, unto *Noah*. Unto both whom God brought the Creatures, and delivered them into their custody and disposition.

2. The Order of Nature, which debateth this Law unto the Creatures, that the more imperfect and ignorant should be regulated by those which are most wise and perfect; else power let loose from wisdom, would presently fill the face of Nature with confusion and disorder.

3. The Providence of God, implanting a notable instinct of awfulness, obedience, docility, serviceableness in the Creatures towards man; and of wisdom and sagacity in man for the use of them.

4. The general end of Gods glory: For the other Creatures cannot actively and intentionally direct their Faculties or Vertues unto God, as having no Knowledge of him; But man having Gods glory for his own end, is able in the Use of all the Creatures (which God made for himself) to contemplate the various wisdom, power, goodness providence of God, and to direct them all to the setting forth of his Glory.

This *Dominion* standeth first in a *solemn Delivery*, and Seisin, and possession given by God unto Man, when the Creatures were either by the Ministry of Angels, or some other act of Manuduction brought unto *Adam*, and put in-

to

to his hands, and *received names* from him in * token of his special authority over them, to command them by their names. As the Subjects of a Prince do in a more solemn manner present their Homage and Fealties before him at his Inauguration.

* *Dominantis enim est nomina imponere, vid. A. Gel. l. 17. c. ult. Cic. ad Att. l. 4. ep. 14. l. 7. ep. 8. Suet. in Octav. c. 101. Vid. Casaub. in Baron. exercit. 13. sect. 13. Brij. de Form. lib. 7.*

Secondly, In a *plenary power* over them, and that Two-fold; a *power to awe*, and subdue them to his Government: *Let the fear of you and the dread of you be upon all living Creatures on the earth &c.* And a *power to use* them. Their *Natures* for Contemplation, and Delight. Their *Abilities*, Sagacities, Strength, Swiftness, Sympathies, Antipathies, unto such ends whereunto they should be serviceable. Their *Lives* and *Substance* to Aliment, Indument, Ornament, or any other use, when Mans Necessity should require it.

And this Power of Man over the Creatures, was most *General*, reaching to those with whom he had least society; the Fishes of the Sea, and the Fowls of Heaven. Most *easy* both by reason of the *Instinct* which God put into the Creatures to fear and serve Man, and of the *Wisdom* which he put into Man to discern the natures and fitness of several Creatures for several services, and accordingly to apply them. Most *Equal* and *Just*, without sin, tyranny, oppression. violence, under which the Creature now groaneth, and is made *subject unto Vanity*, as the Apostle speaketh.

This part of Gods Image in Man, is by his fall

Observatum.
Perer. ex Hu-
gone in Gen. 1.
26.

fall much weakened, as we may observe by the Rebellion and Insurrection of the Creatures against him : So that though by wisdom he tame many Creatures, yet he cannot with his brow and countenance awe them as he could at first. We find the Stars fighting against one, the Sun and Moon against another; the Earth against *Corah*, the Sea against *Pharoah*, the Fire against *Ahaziah*, the Lions against *Samaria*; the Quails against *Israel*, the Asis refusing the service, and rebuking the madness of *Balaam*. The loss and diminution of this Power is notably seen in this, that mans Authority is perished, or much abated over the *great*, *est*, and over the *smallest* of Creatures. The one with power and strength affright him, the other with nimbleness, or with number escape him. The one an exprobration of his weakness, the other of his vileness. And therefore when God plagued Egypt, he did it not by Lions and Tygers, but by Locusts, and Frogs, and Lice, the weakest and basest Creatures : So he resisted the pride of *Pharaoh*, so he consumed the pride of *Herod*, making base things to vindicate his Glory, and weak things to execute his Justice upon the pride of those who thought themselves great enough to rob him of his Glory, and to out-face his Justice.

But though this Dominion be by sin diminished, yet it is not *extinguished*, but in part Continued, and in part Renewed unto us ;

Continued

Continued by the General Providence of God, whereby he is pleased to preserve things in that course of Subordination wherein first he made them, and like a gracious Prince, to continue unto Man the use of his Creatures, even then when he is a prisoner unto his Justice. *Renewed*, by the *Promise* and Grant made again unto *Noah*. And there is a Double Promise under which we may enjoy the Creatures; the one a *Moral Promise* made unto *Industry*; as, *The Diligent hand maketh rich*; and *he that Ploweth his Land, shall have plenty of Corn*: The other an *Evangelical Promise* made unto *Piety*, and Faith in Christ, whereby is given unto Christian men both a *freer use* of the Creatures then the *Jews* had, and a *purser use* then the *wicked* have. For, *unto the Clean all things are clean*.

And this Grant of God doth sometimes shew it self extraordinarily, as in the Obedience of the Crowes to *Elijah*, the Viper to *Paul*, the Lions to *Daniel*, the Whale to *Jonah*, the Fire to the Three Children, and the trembling and feare of wilde Beasts towards many of the Martyrs: Alwayes *Ordinarily*, in ordering and dispensing the course of Nature so, as that Humane Society may bee preserved, both by power in subduing the Creatures which he must use, and by *Wisdom* in escaping the Creatures which hee doth fear.

Now for the second Attribute, * *Wisdom*, there

Euseb. lib. 8. c. 7
Ignis Polycarpum non tetigit.
Euseb. l. 4. c. 14.

* *Gen. 1. v. ult.*
Eccles. 7. 30.

Col. 3. 10.
Gen. 2. 19. 23.

* Joh. 1. 5. 7.
Eph 4. 17, 18.
Rom 3. 13.
Col. 1. 21.
Prov. 22. 15.

there is also a remainder of the Image thereof in Man : For albeit, the fall and corruption * of Nature hath darkned his eyes, so that he is inclined to work Confusedly, or to walk as in a Maze, without Method or Order (as in a Storm the Guider of a Vessell is oftentimes to seek of his Art, and forced to yeeld to the Windes and Waves) yet certain it is that in the minde of Man there still remains a Pilot, or Light of Nature, many principles of Practical Prudence, whereby (though for their faintings a man does often miscarry, and walke awry) the course of our Actions may be directed with success and issue unto Civil and Honest ends. And this is evident not only by the continual practice of Grave and Wise men in all States, Times, and Nations; but also by those sundry learned and judicious Precepts, which Historians, Politicians, and Philosophers have by their natural Reason and Observation framed for the compassing of a mans just ends, and also for Prevention and disappointment of such inconveniences as may hinder them.

Lastly, For the Attribute of *Knowledge*, It was doublelesse after a most eminent manner at first infused into the Heart of Man, when hee was able by Intuition of the Creatures to give unto them all Names, according to their severall Properties and Nature; and in them to shew himself, as well a Philosopher, as a Lord. *He filled them, saith Siracides, with the*

the Knowledge of Understanding. And herein, if we will beleve *Aristotle*, the Soul is most neerly like unto *God*, whose infinite Delight is the Eternal Knowledge and Contemplation of himselfe, and his Works. Hereby, saith he, the Soul of Man is made most Beloved of *God*, and his Mind, which is allied unto *God*, is it self Divine, and, of all other parts of Man, most Divine. And this made the Serpent use that Insinuation onely, as most likely to prevaile, for compassing that cursed and miserable project of Mans ruine. By means of which Fall, though Man blinded his Understanding, and robb'd himselfe of this, as of all other blessed habits, I mean of those excellent Degrees thereof, which he then enjoyed: yet still the Desire remains vast and impatient, and the pursuit so violent, that it proves often pæjudiciall to the estate both of the Body and Mind. So that it is as true now, as ever, that man is by Nature a curious and inquiring Creature, of an Active and restless Spirit, which is never quiet, except in Motion, winding it selfe into all the paths of Nature; and continually traversing the World of Knowledge. There are two maine Desires naturally stamped in each Creature; a Desire of *Perfecting*, and a Desire of *Perpetuating* himselfe. Of these *Aristotle* attributeih in the highest degree, the latter unto each living Creature, when he saith, that of all the Works of living Creatures, the most naturall is to Generate the like: and his Reason is *ἵνα ὅτι καὶ ὁ θεὸς ποιεῖται ὡς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ*.

Ethic. l. 10.

Lib. 2. de Anim.
cap 4.

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Because

Because hereby that Immortality (the principall End (as he there supposeth) of all natural Agents) which in their owne Individuals they cannot obtain, they procure by deriving their Nature unto a continued off-spring and succession. But (though in regard of life it hold true of all) Man notwithstanding is to be exempted from the universality of this Assertion. And of himselfe that other desire of *Perfection*, which is principally the desire of Knowledge (for that is one of the principall advancements of the Soule) should not onely in a positive sence, as *Aristotle* hath determined in the Entrance to his Metaphysicks, but in a Superlative degree be verified, that He is by nature desirous of Knowledge. This being the Principall thing (to use *Aristotle* his owne reason) whereby Man doth τὸ Οὐκ ἐπὶ τέλος, Partake of *Divinity*, as I observed before out of *Aristotle* himself. And the reason of the difference between Man and other Creatures in this particular is: First, Because man hath not such necessary use of that former desire, as others have, in regard of his owne Immortality, which takes away the Necessity of Propagation to sustaine his Nature. And secondly, Because Knowledge, the Perfection of this Soule, is to Man (as I may so speake) a kinde of *Generation*, being of sufficiencie to exempt the Person, endued therewith, from all injury of Time, and making him to survive and out-live his owne Mortality. So that when the Body hath surrendered unto each Region of the World those Elements and Principles,

ciples whereof it was composed, and hath not so much as Dust and Cinders left to testifie that Being, which once it had, then doth the Name lie wrapped in the Monuments of Knowledg beyond the reach of Fate and corruption.

The Attributes of God, which are manifested more especially in his Word, though sundry, yet (as faire forth as they had ever any Image in Man) may be comprized in this more general one of *Holinesse*. Whereby I understand that Absolute and Infinite Goodnesse of his Nature, which is in him most Pefect, Pure, and Eternall. Of which, though man according to that measure, as it was unto him communicated, was in his great Fall utterly robb'd and spoyl'd, as not being able in any thing to resemble it, or to retaine any the least Prints of those pure and Divine Impressions of Originall Righteousnesse; yet still there remaines, even in depraved and polluted Nature, some shadowes thereof: There is still the *opus operatum* in many actions of Morality, though the Obliquity of the Heart, and Ignorance of the true End, whither it should be directed, take away the Goodnesse and the Sanctity thereof. The top and highest pitch of Nature toucheth the hemme and lowest of Grace. We have in us the Testimonies, though not the Goodnesse of our first Estate: the Ruines of a Temple to be lamented, though not the holy Places thereof to be inhabited. It is true indeed those great endowments of the most severe and illightned Heathen, were indeed but glorious

miseries and withered Vertues, in that they proceeded from a depraved Nature, and aymed at sinister and false ends: yet withall both the corruption of them proves their precedent loss (which also the Heathen themselves espied in their distinction of Ages into Golden and Iron times :) And likewise the pursuit and practice of them (though weak, imperfect, corrupt) imply manifestly that there was much more an Original aspiring of Nature in her perfection to be like her Maker in an absolute and universal Purity. Now in this Rectitude and perfect Regularity of the Soul in this Divine Habit of Original Justice did Man most eminently bear the Image and Signature of God on him. And therefore notwithstanding we continue still Immortal, Spiritual, Reasonable; yet we are said to have defaced that Image in us by our hereditary pollution. And he alwayes recovereth most part thereof, who in the greatest measure repaireth the ruines, and vindicareth the Lapses of his decayed estate, unto that prime Original Purity, wherein he was created.

These are the Dignities of the Soul considered wholly in it self. In all which it far surmounts the greatest perfections, which the Body or any Faculty thereof are endowed withal. And yet such is the preposterous and unnatural baseness of many men, that they are content to make their souls vassals to their own servant. How do they force their Understandings, which in their own worthiest objects, those deep and divine Contem-
plations,

plations, are as drowfie as *Endymion*, to spend and waſt themſelves in proud, luxurious vaniſhing Inventions? How do they enthral that Supream and Architectonicall Power in Mans little world, his Will to the Tyranny of ſlavish appetite, and ſenſual deſires, as if they ſerved here but as Cooks to dreſſ their own bodies for the worms? Strange is it that Man, conſcious to himſelf of Immortality, and of an Heroical and Heavenly Complexion, that hath received ſuch immediate Impreſſions of God, and is the very Modell of all Natures Perfections, ſhould ſo much degrade himſelf, as to doat onely on that part, which is the vaſſal and ſlave of Death. If there were no other miſchief which ſin did the Soul but to debaſe it, even that were argument ſufficient for noble ſpirits to have it in deteſtation. For man being in honour, and which underſtandeth not, is like the beaſts that periſh.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the Faculty of Understanding. Its operations outward upon the Object. Inward upon the Will. Of Knowledge, What it is. The naturall Desire and Love of it. Apprehension, Judgement, Retention requisite unto right Knowledge. Several kinds of Knowledge. The Originall Knowledge given unto man in his Creation. The benefits of Knowledge. Of Ignorance Natural, Voluntary, Penal. Of Curiosity. Of Opinion; the Causes of it, Disproportion between the Object and the Faculty, and an Acute Versatiousness of Conceits. The benefit of Modest Hesitancy.



Now it follows to speak of the parts or principal powers of the Soul, which are the *Understanding*, and the *Will*. Concerning the Understanding, the Dignity thereof, though it may partly be perceived in the *Latitude* and excellent Variety of its *Objects*, being the whole world of things (for *Ens & Intelligibile* are reciprocal

cal, & omnia intelligit, saith Aristotle of the Understanding) yet principally it proceeds from the Operations of it both *ad extra* in respect of the Objects, and *ad intra* in respect of the Will. The one is a *Contemplative*, the other a more *Practique* Office, whereby the speculations of the former are accommodated unto any either Morall or Civill Actions. Those which respect the Objects, are either Passive, or Act ve Operations. *Passive* I call those first perceptions and apprehensions of the Soul, whereby it receiveth the *simple* species of some Object from immediate Impression thereof by the Ministry of the Soul; as when I understand one Object to be a man, another a Tree, by Administration and Assistance of the Eye, which presents the Species of either.

Another sort of Passive Operations (that is of such as are grounded on Impressions received from Objects) are *mixed Operations* of Compounding, Dividing, Collecting, Concluding, which we call *Discourse*. Of all which to speak according to their Logickall Nature, would be impertinent. Their Excellency chiefly stands in the End whereunto they move and serve; which is *Knowledge*; of the which I shall therefore here speak a few things.

Knowledge is the Assimilation of the Understanding unto the things which it understandeth, by those Intelligible Species which doe irradiate it, and put the power of it into Act: For as the beams of the Sunne shining on a glasse

Aristot. de Animal 3.

Aquin. par. 1.
4. 14 4. 2.

Arist. de Anim
l. 3. c. 4. & 5.

glasse, do there work the Image of the Sun: so the species and resemblances of things being conveighed on the Understanding, do there work their own Image. In which respect the Philosopher saith, That the Intellect becometh All things by being capable of proper impressions from them: As in a Painters Table, we call that a face, a hand, a foot, a tree, which is the lively Image and Representation of such things unto the Eye.

There is not any Desire more Noble, nor more Natural unto a Man (who hath not like *saul* hid himself amongst the stuff, and lost himself in the Low and perishing provisions for Lust) then is this *Desire of knowledge*: Nature dictating to every Creature to be more intent upon its Specificall then upon its Generical perfection. And hence it is that though *Man* be the perfectest of all Creatures, yet many do excell him in Sensitive Perfection. Some in exquisiteness of Sight; others of Hearing; others of Taste, Touch, and Smell; others of Swiftnes and of Strength; Nature thereby teaching us to imitate her in perfecting, and supplying of our Desires, not to terminate them there, where when we have made the best Provision wee can, many Beasts will surpass us: but to direct our Diligence most to the improving of our own specificall and rationally Perfection, to wit, our Understandings. Other Faculties are tyred, and will be apt to nauseate, and surfeit on their Objects.

But

Vid. Plin. lib 7.
in Proem.
Et Laëtant. de
Opist Dei. c. 2. 3
Et Cæli Rhodig.
lib. 2. cap 9.

But Knowledge as knowledge, doth never either burthen or cloy the Minde, no more than a Covetous man is wearied with growing Rich: And therefore the Philosopher telleth us that Knowledge is the *Rest of the Understanding*, wherein it taketh delight as a thing in its naturall place.

And so great is this Delight, that Men have ventured on much trouble to procure it. * As *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Democritus*, travelled into remote Countries to gather Knowledge, as *Solomon* sent to *Ophir* for Gold. And as it makes adventurous to undertake Troubles, so it helps men to beare them. A true Lover of Knowledge will hardly be over-borne with any Ordinary distresse, if it doe not violate, and restrain their particular appetite. If he may enjoy the Delights of Learning, hee will be very moderately affected with his other restraints. *Archimedes* was not sensible of the losse of *Syracuse*, being holy intent upon a Mathematicall Demonstration. And *Demetrius Phalerius* deceived the Calamity of his Banishment by the sweetness of his Studies. A Man is never afflicted to the quick, but when he is punished in his most delightfull affections, of all which the most predominant in Rationall men is this of Knowledge.

And therefore as the first Creature God formed was *Light* (to shew that all his Works were made in Wisedome, that they might

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* Τὸ δὲ ἡγεῖν
οὐ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ
διδοῦναι, ὅτι
καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν-
νοεῖν ἀπομένει
Arist. Physic.

l. 7, c. 2, Text 20.
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἡγεῖν
καὶ ἐννοεῖν
Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 2.

Τὸ μὲν καὶ
ἐννοεῖν καὶ ἐν-
νοεῖν
Clem. Alex. prae-
l. 1, c. 6.

* Vid. Valer.
Max. l. 8, c. 7.
Theodor. Ser. de
fide Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 1,
p. 222, 223.

Cicero de fin-
ibus, lib. 5.

set forth and manifest his Glory) to the first motion of *Adam* after his Creation was towards *Knowledge*. By his Exercise of Knowledge hee shewed Gods Image in him, and by the Ambition after more hee lost it: As no man sinnes easier than in the Thing which hee best loves. And for this cause we may observe, that Christs frequentest Miracles we see shewed in opening the eyes of the blind, and the eares of the deafe and dumb. His Mercies being perfect, extended themselves on those Faculties which are the chiefe Instruments of *Knowledge* in Men which they most love.

And this love of *Knowledge* is seen evidently in this, that men had rather have sober Calamities, than mad pleasures; and more freely choose cleare Intellectuals with miserie, than disturb'd with mirth. Many Men better content themselves with but a crazie body, for the fruition of their studies, than to purchase a better Health at so great a Price as the loss of Learning.

But the Principal Excellency of *Knowledge* is this, That it guideth the Soule to God: and so doth all kinde of Right Knowledge in divers respects. For first, there is scarce any Science properly so called, which hath not its *Arcana* to pose and amaze the Understanding, as well as its more easie Conclusions to satisfie it Such as are in Philosophy, those

Malunt homines mente lamentari quam letari in Amicitia. Aug. Civ. Dei, l. 11. cap. 27.

those *Occult Sympathies and Antipathies*, of which naturall Reason can render no Account at all : which overcoming the utmost Vigour of humane Disquisition, must needs enforce us to believe that there is an admirable Wisedome that disposeth, and an infinite Knowledge that comprehendeth those secrets which we are not able to fathom.

Again, since the *Knowledge of Things* is either of their *beings*, or of their *properties and operations* : And Nature abhorreth the motion of proceeding (*a*, in *Infinitem*; in either of these necessary it is, that the mind of man (*b*), tracing the too steps of naturall things, must by the Act of *Logicall Resolution* at last arise to him who is the fountaine of all being, the first of all *Causes*, the Supream over all *Movers*, in whom all the rest have their beings and Motions founded. And this the Lord in the Prophet hath delivered unto us; (*c*) *I will heare the Heavens, and the Heavens shall hear the earth, and the earth the corne, & wine, and they Iezreel*. Iezreel cannot subsist without *Corn and wine*, she cries to them to help it; these cannot help without the *Earth* to produce them, they cry to that to be fruitfull. The *Earth* can bring forth nothing of it selfe without influence, benignity, and comfortable showers from the *Heavens*; it cries to them for aide. (*d*) The *Heavens* cannot give Raine nor Warmth of them-

α' Η φύσις φέρει
τὸ ἀντιπερ,
Arist. de Gene-
rat. Animal lib
1 cap. 1.
Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀντι-
περ φέρεισιν,
ἀλλὰ σπέρμα
τῆς, ὅτι ἔσται τὸ
ὁ ἀντιπερ αὐτῶν
ὅτι ἔσται τὸ κα-
τασκευα.
Arist. Physic.
lib 7. cap. 1.
Text 2.
b Vid. Justin.
Martyr. quod.
Græc. qu. 3. Ter-
tull. Apol. cap.
17 18. De Re-
surrect. carnis.
cap 10. Contra
Marcion. lib. 1.
cap 17, 18.
Basil. Hexam.
Homil. 1 Aug.
Confess. lib. 10
cap. 6.

venens. lib. 2. cap. 9. Theophil. ad Antel. lib. 1. c. Hys. 2. 21, 22. d Jerem. 14. 22.
Job 38. 24. 37.

a Vid Plutarch.
lib: de El.

Exod. 3: 14:

Isai. 40. 17.

A^c. 17. 28.

Rom. 11. 36.

1 Cor. 8. 6.

Col. 1. 16. 17.

H-b. 1. 2.

b Nch. 9. 6:

Job. 12. 10.

Psal. 104. 29.

Isa. 40. 24.

c Mar. 10. 29.

Prov. 16. 4.

Gen. 48. 28.

A^c. 4. 27. 28.

d A^c. 17. 28.

Isa. 26. 12.

Job. 10. 8.

Isa. 39. 15. 1.

1 Cor. 12. 6.

Isa. 10. 5.

selves, without him who is the Father of rain, and the Fountain of Motion. So that here are three notable Things to be observed, The *Con-nexion* and concatenation of all second Causes to one another: The *Co-operation* of them together for the good of the Church: and the *Sub-ordination* of them all to God, unto whom at length the more accurate inquiry into them doth man-*duct* us. And this Subordination standeth in foure things. 1. All things are subordinate unto God in (*a*) *Being*. He only hath being *per Essen-tiam*, By Absolute and Originall Essence; all other things *per participationem*, by derivation and dependance on him. 2. (*b*) *in Conversation*. For God doth not make his Creatures as a Car-penter doth his house, which can after stand by it selfe alone: but having our very *Being* from him, that *Being* cannot be or continue with-out his supporance, as light in the house de-pendeth both in *being* and in *continuance* upon the Sunne. 3. In regard (*c*) of *Gubernation* and providence; for all things are by his Wisdome guided unto the Ends of his Glory. And even those Creatures which fall out of the order of his Precepts, doe fall into the order of his Pro-vidence. Lastly, in regard of (*d*) *Operation*. For in him we live and move, hee worketh our workes for us; Second Causes cannot put forth any causality till he be pleased to concurr with them.

Again, since we finde that all other Crea-
tures

tures have, answerable to the Instincts and Appetitions which nature hath Grafted in them, proportionable Objects of equall latitude in goodness to the faculties which are carried unto them; It must needs be reasonable that that be not wanting to the Excellentest of Creatures, which all the rest do enjoy. Since then the supreme Appetite of the Reasonable Soule is Knowledge, and amongst all the Creatures there never was yet any found able to fill and satisfie this Desire. But that still there is both roome for more Knowledge and Inquiry after it: And besides, all the Knowledge of them is accompanied with Unquietness, and labour (as the Beast first stirs the mudd in the water with his feet, before he drinks it with his mouth) from hence it infallibly followeth that from these lesser Objects, the Soule be carried at the last to God, The Adequate and * Ultimate end and Object of all our Desires, as *Noahs* Dove was carried back to the Ark, when she found no place for the foal of her foot to rest on.

Againe, when wee see things which have no knowledge, work so regularly towards an End, as if they knew all the way they were to goe, we must needs conclude they are guided by a mighty Wisdome and Knowledge without them, as when an Arrow flyeth directly to the Mark, I am sure it was the Hand of a skillfull Archer that directed it.

*Vid Aug. Confess. l. 1. cap. 1,
 & lib. 4. cap. 10
 12 & lib. 13.
 cap. 8 de Trin,
 lib. 8. cap. 3,
 D. Field of the
 Church, lib. 1,
 cap. 1 Hooker
 Ecclesiasticall
 pol. l. 1. sect. 11

Representatio
rerum, Judici-
um de Rebus
Representatis.
Aquín. 22. 2.
qu. 173. Art. 21.

Unto the Perfection of *Knowledge*, after due and proper Representation of *Objects* in themselves, or in their Causes, Effects, Principles, unto the Minde; There are in the *Subject* three things requisite.

First, Clearness of *Apprehension*, to receive the right and distinct Notion of the things represented, as the clearness of a Glass serveth for the Admission of a more exact Image of the face that looks upon it, whereas if it bee soild'd or dimm'd, it rendreth either none, or an imperfect shape.

Secondly, Solidity of *Judgment* to try and weigh the particulars, which wee apprehend; That out of them we may sever for our use the precious from the vile; for Knowledge lies in Things as Gold in a Mine, or as Corne in the Straw; when by diligent enquiry after it, we have digged it up, and threshed it out, we must then bring it to the fire, and frame, to give it us purified from drosse and levity. And this inspeculation answereth unto the generall vertue of *practicall prudence* in Morality, whereby we weigh the severall Mediums unto the true Ends of life, and accordingly select and prosecute the Best.

Thirdly, Fidelity of *Retention*: for he is not likely to grow Rich, who puts up his Treasure as the Prophet speaks, into a * *bag with holes*. For as nature hath given to the Bodies of men for the furtherance of corporall strength, and nutriment,

Muse itaque
dicta lovis &
Mnemosynes fi-
lia. Cael. Rhod.
l. 11 c. 10.
* Hag. 2. 6:

time, it, a *Retentive power* to clasp and hold fast that which preserveth it, untill a through concoction be wrought; so proportionably is the Faculty of *Memory* given to Reason, as a means to consolidate and enrich it. And *fluxes*, as in the body, so in the Minde too, are ever Arguments and Authors of Weakness: Whence it comes to passe that in matter of learning many of us are faine to be Day-labourers, and to live from hand to mouth, being not able to lay up any thing. And therefore in the choice of fit persons to breed up unto Learning, wee should take a like course as wise Architects doe in choyce of fit Timber for Building. They choose first the straitest, and that which hath fewest knots and flawes in it; which in the mind answereth unto clearness and evenness of Apprehension. For a cleare minde, like streight and smooth Timber, will worke easiest. Next, they take the heart and strongest substance, and cut out the sap; because that is best able to beare the weight that shall be laid upon it: And this answeres unto maturity and firmness of Judgment. Lastly, they do not take Sally, or Willow, or Birch, and such other materials as are quickly apt to putrifie and wear away, but such Timber as is lasting and Retentive of its Nature, as Oake and Elme, which may make the Superstruction of the nature of the Foundation, strong and lasting: and this answereth to that excellent Faculty of the mind, a *Rationall memory*

Senec. Ep. 27.
Vid. etiam Cxl.
Rhod. l. 11. c. 10

U^t Grammaticos haberet
Analektas.

Cicero in Bruto.
& in Oatore

Plin. l. 7. c. 24
a M. Senec. Controvers. lib. 1 in
Prolog.

b Plin. l. 7. c. 24
Quint. lib. 11.
cap. 2.

Val. Max. lib. 8.
cap. 7. sect. 15.

c Alex. ab Alex.
lib. 6 cap. 18.

d Eli. Spartian in Adriano
c Ammian.

Marcell. lib. 16.
Plin. Euphr.

Suidas in Apoll.
Voss. Instit.

Orat. l. 6. c. 6
est 2.

g De quibus
memor apud

Plinium & M.
Senecam &

Quintil. ut supra.

memory: from which one particular (I thinke more than any other) doe arise those vast differences of felicity and infelicity in the mindes of men addicted to the search of Knowledge. Strange was the unhappines of *Calvisius Sabinus* in *Seneca*, who being at vast charges in matter of learning, was not yet able to retaine fast the names of *Achilles* or *Vlysses*. But, as his Parasite was wont deridingly to advise him, wanted a Gramaticall Attendant to gather up the fragments which his memory let fall. And *Curio* the Orator in *Tully*, was wont when he had proposed three things in an Oration, to forget some one or other of them, or to adde a fourth; yea *Messala Corvinus* forgot his owne name, as *Pliny* telleth us. And as wonderfull on the other side hath been the felicity of some others. (a) *Seneca* the Father could repeat two thousand words together in their order. (b) *Cyrus* and *Themistocles* could call all their Soldiers by their Names, (by which one Art of courtesie (c) *Otho* aspired unto the Empire) (d) *Adrian* could read a booke which he never saw before, and after recite it by memory, and of the Emperour (e) *Julian* it is said, that he had drunk *Totum memoria dolium*, the whole Vessell of memory. To say nothing of (f) *Simonides*, and *Apollonius Tyaneus*, who in their old age, the one at 80, the other at a 100 years old, were very famous for the exquisitenesse of their memories, nor of *Cyneas*, *Chermidas* *Portius Latro*, and divers others, who have been admired

mired for this happy Quality. Now unto this Felicity doth conduce, a Methodical and orderly Disposition of Minde, to digest and lay up things in their proper places. It was easier for *Cyrus* to remember men in an *Army* than in a *Throng*. And hence hath proceeded the *Art of Memory*, invented as *Pliny* tells us by *Simonides*, and perfected by *Metrodorus Sceptius*, consisting in the committing of severall Heads of matter unto distinct places, whereof *Quintillian* discourseth in his Oratory Institutions.

Of Knowledge there are severall sorts, according to severall Considerations with respect to the *Ends* of it. Some is *Speculative* for the improving of the Minde, as Physical, Metaphysical and Mathematical Knowledge: Others *Practical* for fashioning, and guiding of the manners and conditions of men, as Ethical, Political, Historical, Militarie Knowledge. Some *mixt* of both, as *Theological* Knowledge, consisting in the speculation of Divine *Vertues*, and in the direction of Divine *Duties*. Some *Instrumental*, being only subservient unto others, as Grammatical, Rhetorical, Dialectical learning. In regard of *Order*, some *Superiour*, others *Subalternate*, as Musick to Arithmetick, Opicks to Geometry, In regard of their *Original*, some *Ingraffed*, as the Supreme Principles of Veritie, and implanted Notions of Morallitie, which is called the *Law of Nature* and written in the *Heart of all men*. Romans 2. 14, 15. Other *Acquired*,

quired, and by Search and Industry laboured out of those Principle, and the others which are taught us. Other *Revealed* and Divinely manifested to the Faith of men, whereof the supreme *Principles* are these two. 1. That God in his Authority is *infallible*, who neither can be deceived, nor can deceive. 2. That the things delivered in Holy Scriptures, are the Dictates, and Truths, which that infallible Authority hath delivered unto the Church to be beleaved, and therefore that every supernaturall Truth there plainly set downe *in terminis*, is an unquestionable Principle, and every thing by evident consequence and deduction from thence derived, is therefore an undoubted Conclusion in Theological and Divine Knowledge. In regard of the *manner* of Acquiring, some is *Experimental*, A Knowledge of Particulars; and some *Habitual*, a general Knowledge growing out of the reason of Particulars. And those Acquired either by *Invention* from a Mans Industry, or by *Auscultation* and Attendance unto those that teach us. In regard of *Objects*, some *Supreme*, as the Knowledge of *Principles* and Prime Verities, which have their light in themselves, and are knowne by evidence of their owne Termes. Others *derived* and deduced by argumentation from those Principles, which is the Knowledge of *Conclusions*. In regard of *Perfection*, *Intuitive* Knowledge, as that of Angels whereby they know

know things by the View; and *Discursive*, as that of Men, whereby we know things by Ratiocination. In regard of *Order* and Method, *Synthetical*, when wee proceed in Knowledge by a way of Composition from the Causes to the Effects; and *Analytical*, when wee rise up from Effects unto their Causes, in a way of Resolution.

With this noble Endowment of Knowledge, was the Humane Nature greatly adorned in its first Creation: so farre forth as the Necessity of a Happy and Honourable Life, of the Worship and Communion with God, of the Dominion and Government over the Creatures, of the Acquaintance with himselfe, and of the Instruction of his Posterity, did require Knowledge in him. For wee may not think that God, who made Man in a perfect stature of Body, did give him but an Infant stature of Mind. God made all things *exceeding Good*, and Perfect; and therefore the perfection naturally belonging unto the Soul of Man, was doubtless given unto it, in its first Creation. Hee made man *right* and straight; and the Rectitude of the Mind is in *Knowledge* and Light; and therefore the Apostle telleth us, that Our Renovation in Knowledge is *after the Image of him that Created us*, Colossians 3. 10. Without Knowledge hee could not have given fit Names, and suitable to the Natures of all the Creatures which for that purpose were

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*De ista Materia
sufius disputant
Scholastici ad l. 2. diff.
23. & ad part.
1. Tho. Aquin.
94. & Peter in
Gen. 2. 19. 20.
l. 5. disput. 1. de
Amplitud. &
Excellent. Scient.
Adami.*

brought unto him. He could not have awed and governed so various, and so strong Creatures, to preserve Peace, Order, and Beauty amongst them. Hee could not have given such an Account of the Substance and Originall of *Eve*. Of the end of her Creation, to be the Mother of all living men, as hee did. *Experimental Knowledge* he had not but by the Exercise of his Original Light upon Particular Objects, as they should occur. Knowledge of *future Events* hee had not, it being not Natural, nor Investigable by imbred Light, but Prophetical, and therefore not seene till Revealed. *Secret Knowledge* of the Thoughts of Men, or of the Counsels of God, he could not have, because *secret things belong unto the Lord*. But so much light of *Divine Knowledge* as should fit him to have Communion with God, and to serve him, and obtaine a blessed Life; so much of *Moral Knowledge* as should fit him to converse in Love as a Neighbour, in Wisedome as a Father, with other men; so much of *Natural Knowledge* as should dispose him for the Admiring of Gods Glory, and for the Governing of other Creatures over which hee had received Dominion; so much wee may not without notable Injurie to the perfection of Gods Workmanship, and to the Beauty and Rectitude of our first Parent, deny to have been conferred upon our Nature in him. The Benefits

ness of which singular Ornament of Knowledge are exceeding Great. Hereby wee recover a largeness of Heart, for which Solomon is commended, 1 Kings 4. 29. Able to dispatch many businesses, to digest and order Multitudes of Motions, to have Mindes seasoned with generous and Noble Resolutions; for that disposition is by the Philosopher called μεγαλοψυχία, Greatnesse of Minde. Hereby wee are brought to a just Contempt of sordid and wormie affections. It is Darknesse which makes men grope, and pore, and looke onely on the things before them, as the Apostle intimates, 2 Peter 1. 9. Illightned Mindes see a greater lustre in Knowledge than in the fine Gold, Proverbs 3. 14, 15. The Excellency of Evangelical Knowledge made Saint Paul esteeme every thing in the World besides as Dung, Philippians 3. 8. As the Light of the Sunne swallowes up all the petty Light of the Starres: so the more Noble and spacious the Knowledge of Mens Mindes is, the more doth it dictate unto them the Contempt of those various and vulgar Delights which bewitch the fancies of ignorant Men. It disposeth Men for mutual Communion, and helpfull Societie: for without Knowledge every Man is fera Natura, like Birds of prey, that flye alwayes alone. Neither is it possible for a man to bee sociable, or a member of any publicke Body, any further than he hath a propor-

Quod Plinio
et aliis obser-
vatum de Ca-
sare, et Aelio
Spartano de
Adriano.

Vide Aqu. 226.
qu. 188. Art. 6.
in C.

tion and measure of Knowledge : Since Humane Society standeth in the communicating of mutuall notions unto one another. Two men that are Deafe, and Dumbe, and Blinde, destitute of all the Faculties of gaining or deriving Knowledge, may be together, but they cannot be said to have society one with another. To conclude, hereby we are brought *nearer unto God*, to admire him for his Wisdome, and Power; to adore him for his Greatness, and Majesty; to desire him, and worke towards the fruition of him, for his Light and Glory; because in the Vision of him consisteth the Beatitude of Man.

This Knowledge is corrupted foure manner of wayes. First, By the Contempt of it in *Ignorance*. Secondly, By the Luxuriousness and Wantonness of it in *Curiosity*. Thirdly, By the Defect and Uncertainty of it in *Opinion*. Fourthly, By Contradiction and Opposition unto it in *Error*.

There is a threefold Ignorance wherewith the Minde of man may be blinded and defaced. The one is a *Natural Ignorance*, which of Divine Things, so far forth as those things are *Spiritual*, is in all men by Nature; for the *Natural Man* neither Receiveth with Acceptation, nor with Demonstration *discerneth* the things of the

Deum scire nemo potest nisi Deo docente.
Uid. Iren. l. 4. c. 14. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1. c. 5.
In tantum videmus, in

quantum similes erimus. Aug. Ep. 6. Ubi ad profunditatem sacramentorum pervenimus est, omnis Platoniorum caligavit subtilitas Cypr. Sp. Sanct. Aug. de Prædest. c. 8. & de Doctr. Christiana, lib. 2. cap. 6.

Spirit of God ; And the Reason the Apostle gives, because they are *spiritually discerned*. For as the Eye is fitted to discern light by the Innate property of light and Cognation which it hath thereunto, without which the Eye could no more perceive Objects of light than it can of sounds : so the Minde cannot otherwise receive Spirituall Objects, than as it hath a similitude to those Objects in a spiritual disposition it selfe ; whence that Expression of Saint *John*, *We shall be likened to him, for we shall see him as he is*. Spiritual Things do exceed the weakness of Reason, because they are *above it*, and so cannot be *discerned* ; And they doe oppose the corruption of Reason, because they are *against it*, and so cannot be *Received*.

There is likewise in many Men much Natural Ignorance, even in Morall and Naturall things. For as in the Fall of Man our Spirituall were lost, so were our Naturals weakned too, as we find in the great Dulness of many men in matters of Learning, insomuch that some have not been able to learne the Names of the first Letters or Elements.

Againc, there is a *Voluntary* Ignorance (of which wee have before spoken) whereby Men doe wilfully close their Eyes against Knowledge, and refuse it ; and of this there may be a double ground. The one *Guile*, in Knowledge that

*Vid Hieron. ad
vers. Jovin. l. 2.*

*Cæl Rhod. l. 11.
cap. 10.*

that pertaineth to the Conscience, when a man chuseth rather not to know his duty, than by the Knowledge of it, to have his Conscience disquieted with Exprobations of contemning it. The other out of *Sluggishness* and Apprehensions of Difficulty in the obtaining of Knowledge; when of two Evils, Undergoing of labour, or forfeiting of Learning, a man esteemeth this the lesser.

Thirdly, there is a * *Penal Ignorance*; of which I shall not speake, because it differeth not from the Voluntary Ignorance of Spiritual things, save onely in the relation that it hath to the Justice of God thereby provoked, who sometimes leaveth such men to their Blindnesse, that the thing which with respect to their owne choice of it, is a pleasure, with respect unto Gods Justice, may be a plague, and punishment unto them. Thus the Intellectual Faculty is corrupted in many men by Ignorance.

* Mar. 13. 13.
Act. 28. 26, 27.
Rom. 1. 28.
2 The. 2. 10,
11.
Ne intellige-
rent merum,
sunt delictorum.
Tertul. Apol.
cap. 21. contr.
Marc. 1. 3. c. 6:
Cyprian. lib. 1
Ep. 3.
Percussus sunt
Cecitate ut nec
intelligent De-
liſſa nec plan-
gant. Indignatio Dei major hæc ira. Cyp. de lapsis. Vid. Aug. qu. 14. ex Matth. & sunt
contra Julian. lib. 5.

In others it is abused by *Curiosity*, which may well be called the *Pride*, and the *Wantonness* of Knowledge, because it looketh after *high things* that are above us, and after *hidden things* that

Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 1.
statim ab initio.
Irenæus lib. 5.
cap. 28.
Vid. quadam
contr. hunc scie-
tia pruritus apud Tertul. de Anima. cap. 1. contra Marcion. lib. 1. cap. 1.
Aug. Ep. 29. 56. 78. & 157. Confess. lib. 21. cap. 12. de Gen. ad lit. lib. 2. cap. 9. & lib.
10. cap. 23. Hieron.

are

are denied us. And I may well put these two together, *Pride* and *Luxurie* of Learning. For I beleeve wee shall seldome finde the *Pride* of Knowledge more prædominant than there where it ariseth out of the curious and conjectorall enquiries of Wit; and not out of scientificall and demonstrative Grounds. And I finde the Apostle joyning them together, when hee telleth us of some, who *intruded themselves into things which they had not seen, and were Vainely puffed up by a fleshly Minde.* And hee himselve complaineth of Others, who were *Proud*, and languished about needlesse Questions; as it is ever a signe of a sick and ill-affected Stomack to quarrell with usuall and wholsome meat, and to long for and linger after Delicacies which we cannot reach too. When Manna will not goe downe without Quailes, you may be sure the Stomack is cloyed, and wants Physick to purge it. I will not here adde more of this point, having lately touched it on a fitter occasion.

A third Corruption of this Faculty in regard of Knowledge, is in the Fluctuation, wavering, and uncertainty of assents, when the Understanding is left floating, and as it were in *Equilibrio*, that it cannot tell which way to encline, or what Resolutions to grow unto; and this is that which in Opposition to Science, is called *Opinion*: For Science is ever *cum certitudine*, with Evidence and Unquestionable

In my Sermon
of the peace
of the Church,
pag. 24. - 26.

Aquin. 222
qu. 1. Art. 4 C.

Consequence of Conclusions from necessarie Principles: but *Opinion* is *cum Formidine Oppositi*, with a feare least the contrarie of what wee assent unto should be true: And so it importeth a Tender, Doubtfull, and Infirme Conclusion.

The Causes of Opinion, I conceive to be principally two: The first is a Disproportion between the Understanding and the Object, when the Object is either too bright and excellent, or too darke and base: the one dazles the power, the other Affects it not. Things too Divine and Abstracted, are to the Understanding *Tanquam lumen ad Vespertilionem*, as light unto a Batt; which rather astonish than informe; and things too Materiall and Immeist, are like a mist unto the Eyes, which rather hinder, than affect it. And therefore, though whatsoever hath truth in it, bee the Object of the Understanding; yet the Coexistence of the Soule with the Bodie, in this present Estate, restraines and Limits the Latitude of the Object, and requires in it, not onely the bare Nature and Truth, but such a Qualification thereof, as may make it fit for representation and Impression by the conveyance of the Sense. So that as in the True perception of the Eye (especially of those *Vespertilliones*, to which *Aristotle* hath compared the Understanding in this State of subsistence

sistence with the Body) there is required a mixture of contraries in the Ayre; it must not bee too light, lest it weaken and too much disgregate or spread the sense; nor yet too dark, lest it contract and lock it up: But there must bee a kinde of Middle Temper, cleerenesse of the Medium for conveyance, and yet some degree of Darknesse for qualification of the Object. Even so also the Objects of mans Understanding must participate of the Two contraries, *Abstraction and Materiality*. Abstraction first, in proportion to the Nature of the Understanding, which is Spirituall. And Materialitie too, in respect of the Sense, on which the Understanding depends in this estate, as on the Medium of Conveyance, and that is Corporall. So that where ever there is difficultie and Uncertainty of Operation in the Understanding, there is a double defect and disproportion: first to the Power, whose Operations are restrained and limited for the most, by the Body: and then in the Object, which hath not a sufficient mixture of those two qualities, which should proportion it to the Power. This is plaine by a familiar similitude; an Aged man is not able to read a small Print, without the Assistance of Spectacles to make the Letters by a refraction seeme greater. Where first wee may descry an Imperfection in the Organ; for if his Eyes were as cleare

and well-disposed as a young mans, hee would be able by his Natural power, without *Art*, to receive the Species of small Letters. And next, there is an Imperfection and deficiencie in the Letters, for if they had the same Magnitude and fineness in themselves, which they seem to have by Refraction through the Glass, the weakness of his power might haply have sufficient strength to receive them without those Helps. So that alwaies the Uncertainty of Opinion is grounded on the Insufficiencie of the Understanding to receive an Object, and on the *Disproportion* of the Object to the Nature of the Understanding.

The next Cause of *Opinion* and Uncertainty in Assents, may be Acuteness and Subtily of wit, when Men out of Ability, like * *Carneades*, do discourse probably on either side, and poizing their Judgements between an equall weight of Arguments, are forced to suspend their assents, and so either to continue unresolved and equally inclineable unto either part, or else, if to avoyd Neutrality, they make choice of some thing to averr (and that is properly *Opinion*) yet it is rather an Inclination, than an Assertion; as being accompanied with feare, floating, and Inconstancie.

* Nullam unquam in disputationibus rem defendit quam non probaret, nullam oppugnavit quam non everterit. Cic. de Orat. lib. 2. Non minoribus viribus contra Justitiam dicitur discessisse, quam pridie pro Justitia dixerat. Quintil. de Carnead.

lib. 12, cap: 1. Plin. lib. 7. cap: 30.

And

And this indeed, although it be in it self a defect of Learning; yet considering the state of man, and strict conditions of perfecting the Understanding by continual Inquiry (man being bound in this also to recover that measure of his first fulness which is attainable in this Corrupted Estate by sweat of Brain, by labour and degrees *Paulatim extundere artes*) I say in these considerations, Irresolution in Judgement (so it be not *Universal* in all conclusions; for that argues more weakness, then choise of conceit; not *Particular* in things of *Faith* and Salvation, which is not Modesty but Infidelity) is both Commendable, and Usefull. Commendable, because it prevents all temper of heresie (whose nature is to * be peremptory.) And both argues Learning and Modesty in the softness of Iudgement, which will not suffer it self to be captivated, either to its own conceits, or unto such unforcible reasons, in the which it is able to discern weakness. And this is that which *Pliny* commends in his friend *Titus Ariston*, whose hesitancy and slowness of resolution in matter of Learning proceeded not from any emptiness or unfurniture, but *ex diversitate Rationum quas acrimagnoq. Iudicio ab origine Causisq. primis repetit, discernit, expendit*, out of a learned cautiousness of judgment, which made him so long suspend his Assent, till he had weighed the several repugnances of reasons, and by that means found out some truth whereon to settle his conceit. For (as the same *Pliny* elsewhere out of *Thucydides* observes) it is rawnes and deficiency of learning that

Vide quæ ad-
versus Scepticos
disputat Aristo-
cles apud Euse-
bium de præpar.
Evangel. l. 14.
c. 18.
" Ad quamcun-
que sunt disci-
plinam quasi
tempestate de-
lapsi, ad eam
tinquam ad
Saxum ad-
hærescunt, &c.
Acad. q. 14.
Plin. l. 1. ep. 22.

Lib. 4. Ep 7.

makes bold and peremptory : λογισμὸς ὁκνον φέρει. Demurs and fearfulness of Resolution, are commonly the companions of moreable wits. And for the use of Doubtings : First, they lessen the number of heresies which are (as I said) alwayes obstinate, and next it gives occasion of further enquiry after the truth, to those who shall finde themselves best qualified for that service. But Heresie coming under the shape of Science, with shews of Certainty, Evidence and Resolution (especially if the inducements be quick and subtle) doth rather settle the Understanding, and possess it with false Assents, then yeeld occasion of deeper search, unless it meet with a more piercing Judgement, which can through confidence descry weakness. For questionless the errors of great men generally honoured for their Learning, when they are once wrapped up in the boldness of Assertions, do either by possessing the judgment with prejudice of the Author, make it also subscribe to the Error; or if a more impartial eye see insufficiency in the ground, the Authority of the man frights and deters from the opposing of his concept. Whereas when mens assents are proposed with a modest confession of distrust and uncertainty, the Understanding is incired both to enquire after the reasons of Diffidence, as also to finde out means for a more settled Confirmation and clearing of the Truth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of Errours: the Causes thereof: the Abuses of Principles, Falsifying them, or Transferring the Truth of them out of their own bounds. Affectations of Singularity, and Novel courses. Credulity and Thralldom of Judgement unto others. How Antiquity is to be honoured. Affection to particular Objects corrupteth Judgement. Curiosity in searching things Secret.

THe other main Corruption of Knowledge was *Error*, whereby I understand a peremptory and habitual assent, firmly and without wavering fixed upon some falshood under the shew of truth. It is *Aristotles* assertion in his *Ethicks*, that one man may conceive himself as certain of his *Errour*, as another man of his Knowledge; and this indeed is so much the more dangerous Aberration from Knowledge, by how much it seems most neerly to resemble it.

If we enquire after the prime Fundamental Cause, the Gate by which *Errour* came first into the World, *Syracides* will tell us in a word, that *Errour* and *Darkness* had their beginning together with *Sinners*: and the reason is, because sin

being a partition-wall, and a separation of man from God, who is *Pater Luminum*, the Father and fountain of all knowledge; and whose perfections man did at first one principal way by Knowledge resemble, cannot chuse but bring with it darkness and confusion into the Soul. But I shall enquire rather after the more Immediate and Secondary Causes; some whereof, amongst sundry others, I take to be these:

1. A first and most special one is the Abuse of Principles: For the Understanding must have ever something to rest itself upon: and from the conformity of other things therunto, to gather the certainty and evidence of its Assents. For it is the nature of mans minde, since it had at first itself a beginning, to abhor all manner of Infinity, *à Parte-Ante* (I mean in Ascending and Resolution) as well of Sciences and Conclusions, as of Entities and Natures, as I before noted. And therefore as the Understanding is not quieted in Philosophical inquiries about created things, till it have according to their several differences ranged them severally within the compass of some Finite Line, and subordinated the inferiors of every kinde, *Sub uno Summo Genere*, under one chief, and rests not in the Resolution of Effects into their Causes, till it come to *Aliquid primum* in Time, in Motion, in Place, in Causality, and Essential Dependence: so likewise it is in Knowledge and Truth, notwithstanding a *Parte Post* downward, our pursues of them seem Infinite and Unlimited, by reason of our own infirmities, and

and Æternity that way: yet upward in the resolving of Truth into its Causes and Originals, the Understanding is altogether Impatient of proceeding in *Infinitum*, and never rests till it findes a *Non ultra*, an utmost linke in the chain of any Science, and such a *Prime*, Universal, Unquestionable, Unprovable *Truth*, from whence all Inferiour Collections are fundamentally raised, and this is the Truth of *Principles*: which if it be traduced and made crooked by the wrestings of any private concept, mishapes all Conclusions that are derived from it: for if the foundation be weak, the whole edifice totters; if the root and fountain be bitter, all the branches and streams have their proportionable corruptions.

Now the Abuses of Principles, is either by *Falsifying* and casting absurd Glosses upon them within their own limits; as when Philosophical Errours are falsely grounded upon Philosophical Axioms, which is *Error Consequentia*, or *Illationis*, an Errour in the Consequence of one from the other: or else by transferring the Truth of them beyond their own bounds, into the Territories (as I may speak) of another Science, making them to encroach and to uphold Conclusions contrary to the nature of their Subject, which is *Error Dependētia*, or *Subordinationis*, an Errour in the Dependence of one on the other. For the former, it hath been alwayes either the Subtilty or modesty of errour to shrowd it self under truth, and that it might make its fancies the more plausible, to fasten them upon undeniable grounds, and by a
strange

Liv. l. 28.

* Ex his eam
impugnari ex
quibus constat.
Tertul. de
Baptis. c. 2.
Vid. de præscr.
c. 36. 39.
Sententias per
primas com-
munibus Argu-
mentis minuunt.
de Animal. c. 2.
Inde sumentes
præfidia, quod
pugnant. c. 50.
Omnia adversus
Veritatem, de ip-
sa Veritate con-
structa sunt.
Apolog. c. 47.

* Clem. Alex. in
Protreptic.

* Cic. Orat. l. 1.
In Irridendis
Oratoribus Ora-
tor Summus.
Liv. l. 26:
Nec aliter Nu-
ma simulans
sibi cum dea
Ægeria no-
n's congressus
esse apud eun-
dem l. 3. Vid:
Val. Max. l. 1.
c. 2. Plut. in
Numa.

strange kinde of Chymistry, to extract darkness out of light. *Fraus sibi ex parvis* (said *Fabius Maximus* in *Livy* upon another occasion) I will alter it thus, *Error sibi ex principiis fidem præstuit, ut cum magnâ mercede fallat.* * Unreasonable and groundless fancies alwayes shelter themselves under a plausible pretence of truth and ostentation of Reason. As * *Praxitiles* the Painter drew the Picture of *Venus* by the face of his Minion *Cratina*, that so by an honorable pretext he might procure adoration to a Harlot. * Thus as *Plato* is said, when he enveighed chiefly against Orators, most of all to have played the Orator (making a Sword of Eloquence to wound it self) so they on the contrary, never more wrong Knowledge, then when they promise to promote it most. It was the custom of that *Scipio*, honoured afterward by the name of his Punick Conquest, alwayes before he set upon any business, (as *Livy* reports of him) to enter the Capitol alone, pretending thereby a consultation with the gods about the justness, issue, and successe of his intended designes; and then, *Apud multitudinem, plerumq, velut mente divinitus monitâ agebat*, he bore the multitude in hand, that whatsoever exploits he perswaded them to attempt, had all the approbation and Unerring Judgement of their Deities. What were the ends of this man, whether an Ambitious hope of fastning an Opinion of his own Divineness in the midst of the people, or an happy and Politick imposture, the better to perswade those people (alwayes more inclinable to the per-
swasions

swasion of Superstitions then Reason) to a free Execution of his designes, it is not here necessary to enquire. Sure I am, even in matters of greatest consequence, there have never been wanting the like Impostors, who boldly pretend unto Truth, when they cunningly oppose it: as *Jacob* in *Esau's* Cloathes, robbed *Esau* of the blessing: or as the Ivy, which when it embraceth the Oake, doth withall weaken and consume it. And this is a very preposterous and perverse method, first to entertain Corrupt Conceits, and then to * wrest and hale Principles to the countenancing and protecting of them. It being in the errours of the minde, as in the distempers of the palate, usual with men to finde their own relish in every thing they read.

Concerning the other Abuse, it is an often observation of *Aristotle*, that Principles and Conclusions must be within the Sphere of the same Science; and that a man of Learning ought alwayes to be faithfull unto his own Subject, and make no Excursions from it into another Science. And therefore he saith that it is an equal absurdity for a Mathematician (whose conclusions ought to be peremptory, and grounded on principles of infallible evidence) onely to ground them on Rhetorical probabilities, as it were for a Rhetorician, whose Arguments should be more plausible and insinuating, to leave all unsaid that might reasonably be spoken, except it may be proved by demonstrative principles. This leaping *à Genere ad Genus*, and confounding the dependen-

* *Scripturarum esse volumus quæ nostra sunt. Aug. vid. quæ adversus hanc Curiositatis Lasciviam passim occurrunt apud Tertul. Apol. c. 46. 47. contr. Hermog. c. 1. de preser. c. 17. 38. 39. 40. De resurrex. c. 40. De jug. in perfec. c. 6. De Pudic. c. 25. Simplicitatem sermonis Ecclesiastici id volunt significare, quod ipsi sentiunt. Epiph. ad. Joan. Hierosol. Justin. Martyr. ad Zenam. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. 7. p. 5. 45. D. Aug. contr. Pelag. & Cælest. l. 1. c. 46. De Gratia Christi.*

Πάντος πλάνης
 καὶ ψευδοδείξας
 αἰπορ τὸ μὴ
 δύνασθαι δια-
 κρίνειν, &c.
 Clem. Alex.
 Strom. 6.

* *Viderint qui*
Stoicum, &
Platonicum, &
dialecticum
Christianissi-
mum protule-
runt Tertul. de
prescrip. cap. 7.
 * *Cic. lib. de*
Universo.
Plat. in Timao.
Eus. de prepar.
Evan. l. 11. c. 29
The d. Jer. 4.
Clem. Alex.
Strom. lib. 5.
Quin. & Resur-
rectionem Phi-
losophis notam
(sed ex Hebra-
orum doctrinâ)
affirmat Eus. l.
11. c. 33. 35.
Ter. de Resur-
rect. car. c. 1
Nescio an huc
etiam pertin-
ant illa. Senat.
qu. lib. 3. ca. 30.

cies of Truth, by transferring Principles unto Sciences, which they belong not unto, hath been ever prejudicial to Knowledge; an Error hath easily thereby crept upon the weakest apprehensions, while men have examined the conclusions of one Science by the Principles of another. As when Religion which should subdue and captivate, is made to stoop and bow to Reason; and when those Assents which should be grounded upon Faith, and not on meer humane disquisition, shall be admitted according to the conformity which they have with * Nature, and no further. And hence it is that so many of the Philosophers denied those two main Doctrines, of the Creation and Resurrection (* although in some of them the very sight of Nature reacheth to the acknowledgement of the former of those) because they repugned those main Principles of Nature (which are indeed naturally true, and no farther) that *ex nihilo nihil fit*; nothing can be made of nothing. And, *a privatione ad habitum non datur regressus*; That there is no regress from a Total privation to the Habit lost. And this reason was evidently implied in that answer, which was given by him, who knew the root of all Error, unto the obstinate Opposers of the Resurrection: *Erratis nescientes Scripturas atque Potentiam Dei*. Where are intimated two main Principles of that Myserie of the Resurrection; the *Word*, and the *Power of God*. This latter commanding our Assent that it may be: that other, our Assurance that it will be. So that wherever there is an Ignorance

Ignorance of these two, and we go about to examine this or any other mystery, rather by a disputing, then an Obeying reason: the immediate consequent of such peremptory and preposterous course, is Error and Depravation of the Understanding. *Pythagoras* and his Scholars, out of a strong conceit that they had of the Efficacy of Musick, or Numbers, examining all the passages of Nature by the Principles thereof, fell into that monstrous Error, that Number was the first and most Essentiall Element in the Constitution of all Creatures. Thus as men which see through a coloured Glasse, have all Objects, how different soever, represented in the same colour: so they examining all Conclusions by principles forestalled for that purpose, think every thing of what nature so ever to be dyed in the colour of their own conceits, and to cary some proportion unto those Principles. Like *Antipharon*, *Orises* and others in *Aristotle*, who did confidently affirm every thing for Reall, which their imagination fancied to it self. But *Tully* hath prettily reprehended this abuse in that Satyricall reprehension which he gives to *Aristoxenus* the Musician, who needs out of the Principles of his Art, would conceit the Soule of man to consist of Harmony, *Hac magistro concedat Aristoteli, canere ipse doceat*; Let him leave these things to *Aristotle*, and content himselfe with teaching men how to sing; intimating thereby the absurdity of drawing any Science beyond its own bounds.

2. Another cause of Errour may be Affecta-

M m m

tion

Plut. de placit.
Philos. l. 1. c. 3.
Laert. in Pyth.
Quintil. Instit.
l. 10. c. 10.

Lib. de Memor
de Reminis. c. 1
Τὰ τὰντα
αὐτὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ
ὡς γινώσκοντα καὶ
ὡς μνησκο
νέουσιν.

tion of Singularity, and a Disdaine of being but an accession unto other mens Inventions, or of Tracing their steps: when men shall rather desire to walke in waies of their owne making, then in the beaten paths which have been trodden before them; to be guilty of their own invented Errors, then content with a derived and impured Learning; and had rather be accounted the purchasers o' Hæresie, then the Heires of truth; *Quasi nihil fuisset rectum, quod primum est, melius existimant quicquid est aliud*, as Quintilian spake elegantly on another occasion: As if nothing had been right, which had been said before; they esteem every thing therefore better, because new.

3. Another cause may be the other Extreame (for a man may lose his way, as well by inclining too much to the right hand, as to the left) I mean a too credulous prejudice and opinion of Authority; when we bow our judgements not so much to the nature of things, as to the learning of men. *Es credere, quam scire, videtur reverentius*, we rather beleever, then know what we assent unto. 'Tis indeed a wrong to the labours of learned men to read them alwaies with a Cavilling and Sceptical mind; and to doubt of every thing, is to get resolution in nothing: But yet withall, our Credulity must not be peremptory, but with reservation. We may not captivate and resigne our judgements into another mans hand. Beliefe, without evidence of Reason, must be onely there absolute, where the Authority is Unquestionable, and where it is impossible to erre; there onely

Non tam Authoritas in disputando, quam rationis momenta querenda sunt, &c.
Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 1.

it is Impious to Distrust. As for mens Assertions *Quibus possibile est subesse falsum*, what he said of Friendship, *Sic ama tanquam Osurus*, Love with that Wisdome as to remember you may be provoked to the contrary, is more warrantable and advantageous in Knowledge: *Sic crede tanquam dissensurus*, so to beleieve, as to be ready, when cause requires, to dissent. It is a too much streightning of a mans owne Understanding, to intrall it unto any: or to esteem the dissent from some particular Authorities, presumption and Selfe-conceit. Nor indeed is there any thing which hath bred more Distempers in the Body of Learning, then Factions and Sidings; when as *Seneca* said of *Cato*, that he would rather esteem Drunkenness a Vertue, then *Cato* Vicious: So Peripatericks and Platonists, Scotists and Thomists, and the rest (if I may adventure so to call them, of those learned Idolaters, in deifying the Notions of Mortall men) shall rather count Errour Truth, then their great Masters Erroneous. But yet I would not be so understood, as if I left every man to the unbridled reines of his owne fancy: or to a presumptuous dependance only on his owne judgement, with contempt or neglect of others. But I consider a double Esteem of the Learned, Inchoation and Progress. And though in this latter there be requisite a Discerning Judgement, and Liberty of Dissent; yet for the other, *Aristotles* speech is true, *Oportet discitem credere*, Beginners must beleieve. For as in the Generation of man, he receiveth his first life and nourishment

*Vid. Aug. ep. 6.
Lib. de Unitat.
Ecclesi. ac. 19.
Contra Crescon.
Grammat. l. 2.
c. 32 & ep. 111.
Cypr. l. 2. ep. 3.
ad Caelitum.*

*Vid. Theodor.
serm. 1. de fide
& Platon.
apud Euseb.
l. 12 c. 1.*

Plut. lib. de
Audiend. Poetis
Vid. Sen. ep. 64.

Hooker l. 1.
sect. 6.

ἡ Ἀπαντίας μὲν
ἐν ἴσως τὰς
παλαιὰς αἰδέ-
σται μὲν δὲ
οὐκ ἄξιον.
Arist. Orat. I.
de Rhet.

from one Wombe, and after takes onely those things which are by the Nurse or Mother given to him; but when he is grown unto strength and yeares, he then receiveth nourishment not from Milke onely, but from all variety of meats, and with the freedom of his own choise or dislike: so in the generation of Knowledge, the first knitting of the Joynts and Members of it into one body is best affected by the Authority and Learning of some able Teacher (though even of his Tutors, *Cato* being a child, was wont to require a reason) but being growne thereby to some stature and maturity, not to give it the liberty of its owne Judgement, were to confine it still to its Nurse or Cradle. I speake not this therefore to the dishonour of *Aristotle*, or any other, from whose Learning, much of ours, as from Fountains, hath been derived: Antiquity is ever venerable, and justly chal'engeth Honour, Reverence, and Admiration, And I shall ever acknowledge the worthy commendation which hath been given *Aristotle* by a learned man, that he hath almost discovered more of Natures Mysteries in the whole Body of Philosophy, then the whole Series of Ages since hath in any particular member thereof. And therefore he, and all the rest of those worthy Founders of Learning doe well deserve some credit, as well to their authority, as to their matter. But yet notwithstanding there is difference between Reverence and Superstition; we may assent unto them as Antients, but not as Oracles: they may have our minds easie and inclinable, they may not have them

them captivated and fettered to their opinions : As I will not distrust all which without manifest proof they deliver, where I cannot convince them of Errour, so likewise will I suspend my believe upon probability of their mistakes : and where I finde expresse Reason of Dissenting, I will rather speak Truth with my Mistress Nature, then maintaine an Error with my Master *Aristotle*. As there may be friendship, so there may the Honour with diversity of Opinions, nor are wee bound therefore to despise men, because we reverence them. *Plura saepe peccantur dum demiremur, quam dum offendimus*; We wrong our Ancestors more by admiring then opposing them in their Errors; and our opinion of them is foule and without Honour, if we thinke they had rather have us followers of them, then of Truth. And we may in this case justly answer them as the young man in *Plutarch* did his Father when he commanded him to do an unjust thing; I wil do that which you would have me, though not that which you bid me. For good men are ever willing to have truth preferred above them. *Aristotle* his Commendation of his middle-Aged men, should be a rule of our Assent to him, and all the rest of those first Planters of Knowledge : We ought neither to over-prize all their Writings by an absolute credulity, because they being *Men*, and subject to Errour, may make us thereby liable to *Delusion*; neither ought we rudely to undervalue them, because being *great men*, and so well deserving of all Posterity, they may challenge from us an Esteem

Ἀριστοῦ οὐλοῦν
φίλων ὅστιν
σεσημαῖν ἢ ἀ-
λιδεῖαν.
Arist. Ethic.
l. 1 c. 4.
Tacit.
Veritas quæ
mea est, nec illi-
us, aut i. *His*.
Aug. Confess.
l. 12. c. 25.

Rhet. l. 2.

of Assent unto their Authority alone (if it be only without and not against Reason) as *Tully* professed in a matter so agreeable to the Nature of Mans Soul, as Immortality: *Vt rationem nullam Plato afferret, ipsa Autoritate me frangeret*: Though *Plato* had given no reason for it, yet his Authority should have swayed assent: I say, not slavish, but with reservation, and with a purpose always to be swayed by Truth, more then by the thousand years of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

4. Another Cause of Error may be a Fastning too great an Affection on some particular Objects, which maketh the minde conceive in them some Excellencies, which Nature never bestowed on them: as if truth were the hand-maid to Passion: or Camelion-like could alter it selfe to the temper of our desires. Every thing must be Unquestionable and Authentically, when we have once affected it. And from this Root, it is probable did spring those various Opinions about the utmost Good of mans Nature (which amounted to the number of two hundred eighty eight, as was long ago observed by *Varro*) which could not but be out of every particular Philosophers conceit, carrying him to the Approbation of some particular Object, most pleasing and satisfactory to the Corruption of his owne crooked Nature: so that every man sought Happiness, not where it was to be found, but in himself, measuring it by the Rule of his owne distempered and intangled Judgement; whence could not possibly but issue many monstrous Errors, according as the Minds

As ἀποδοσὶς
κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη
ἐπιβαίνον.
Arist. Met. i.
Immoderata est
omnis susceptio
ἡ ἐμψυχὴ νηπιὸν
pertinacia &c.
Vid. Hil. init.
l. 16. de Trinit.

Vid. Aug. de
Civ. Dei. l. 19.
c. 1.

of men we e any way transported with the false Delight, either of Pleasure, Profit, Pompe, Promotion, Fame, Liberty, or any other worldly and sensuall Objects. In which particular of theirs, I observe a p.e.posterous and un-naturall course, like that of the Atheist in his Opinion of the Soule and Deity : For whereas in Nature and right Method, the Determinations of the Understanding concerning Happiness should precede the pursuit of the Will, they on the contrary side, first love their Errour, and then they prove it; as the Affection of an Atheist leads him first to a Desire, and wish that there were no God (because he conceiveth it would go farr better with him in the end, then otherwise it is like to do:) and then this Desire allures the Understanding to dictate Reasons and Inducements, that may perswade to the Beliefe thereof; and so what was at first but a wish, is at last become an Opinion: *Quod nimis volumus facile credimus*, we easily beleeeve what we willingly desire. And the reason is, because every man (though by nature he love Sin) yet he is altogeter impatient of any check or conviction thereon, either from others, or himselfe; and therefore he his Errours never so palpable, his Affections never so distempered, his Minde never so depraved and averse from the Rules of Reason, he will notwithstanding easily perswade himselfe to thinke he is in the right course, and make his Judgement as absurd in defending, as his Will and Affections are in embracing vicious Suggestions; *Vitia nostra, quia amamus, defendimus*. When
once

once our Minds are by the violence and insinuation of Affection transported into any crooked course, Reason will freely resigne it selfe to be perverted, and the discourse of the Understanding will quickly bee drawne to the maintaining of either: So easie it is for men to dispute, when they have once made themselves obey.

And another reason hereof is, because as a Body distempered and affected in any part, especially those vitall ones, which diffuse their vertue into the whole, the weakness spreads, and over-runnes all the other, though remotest from it: so likewise the violent motion of partiall and unruly Appetites, which do any ways miscarry by the delusion of Objects, which they fasten upon, immediately derive themselves upon the higher parts of mans soule, out of the naturall Harmony and consent which they desire to have amongst themselves; but especially do they labour to win over the Judgement unto their side, and there-hence to get unto themselves Warrant and Approbation. For as where the Understanding is regular, the chiefe Dominion thereof is over Affection. And therefore we see alwaies that men of the most stayed and even judgement, have the most unresisted power in the government of Passions: so on the other side, when the Affections are strongly enclined to any, either enormous motion in Morality, or object in Nature; the first faculty whereon they strive to transferr their prejudice is the Reason, since without the Assent and

Appro-

Approbation thereof, they cannot enjoy it with such freedome from distractions and feare, as if they were warranted thereto by the Sophistry and Disputes of that Power. Thus as it is usual with men of deceitful palates (as before I touched) to receive in every thing they taste the same disagreeing relish, wherewith their mouth is at that time distempered: So it is with mens Mindes prepossessed with any particular Fancy: *Intus Existens prohibet alienum*. They cannot see it in its own proper colours, but according as their Concepts are any way distempered and transported by the violence of their Affection. And hence in natural Philosophy sprang that Opinion of *Aristoxenus* the Musitian (which I spake of before) that the Soule of *Man* consisted in Harmony, and in an apt Concord, *Velut in Cantu & Fidibus*, be ween the parts; and *Tully* intimates that Reason I spake of very prettily: *Hic ab artificio suo non recessit*: this man knew not how to leave his own Art; and more expressly of the same in another place: *Ita delectatur suis Cantibus, ut etiam ad animum transferre conetur*. Hee was so affected with Musike, that hee transferred it upon the Soule.

5. Another Reason, which I conceive of Corruption of the understanding by Error, is, do Curiosity and Pushing it forward to the Search of things clasped up and reserved from its inquiry. Tis the naturall disease of mankind to desire the knowledge of nothing more than what is least attainable. *Ita natura comparatum est* (saith *Pliny*) ut

proximorum incuriosi Longinqua sectemur; adeo nimirum rerum Cupido languescit, cum facilis cecasiso est. It is the vanity of man, as well in Knowledge as in other things, to esteem that which is far fetched (as we say) and deare bought most precious, as if Danger and Rarity were the only Argument of worth. The iniquity after the estates of Spirits and separated Soules, the Hierarchies of Angels, and (which is more) the secret Counsels of God, with other the like hidden Mysteries, do so wholly possess the minds of some men, that they disappoint themselves of more profitable Inquiries, and so become not onely hurtfull, in regard of their owne vanity and fruitlesness, but also in that they hinder more wholsom and usefull Learnings. And yet Ignorance is of so opposite a nature unto mans Soule, that though it be Holy, it pleaseth not, if there be but Evill (the worst of all Objects) unknowne; the Devill perswades Adam rather to make it by sinning, than not to know it.

But wee are to remember that in many things our searching and bold speculations must be content with the Silencing, more than Satisfying Reason; *Sic Natura jubet, sic opus est mundo*: Thus God will have it, thus Nature requires. We owe unto Natures works, as well our wonder as our inquiry; and in many things it behooves us more to magnifie than to search. There are as in the Countries of the World, so in the Travels of mens wits, as well *Præcipitia*, as *Via*; as well Gulfes and Quick sands, as common Seas. He that will be climbing

climbing too high, or sayling too farre, is likely in the end to gaine no other Knowledge, but one'y what it is to have a shipwrack, and to suffer ruine. Man is of a mixed Nature; partly Heavenly; partly *Morall* and Earthly; and therefore as to be of a creeping and wormy disposition, to crawl on the ground, to raise the Soule unto no higher Contemplations than Base and Worldly, is an Argument of a degenerous Nature: So to spurne and disdain these Lower Inquiries as unworthy our thoughts. To soare after Inscrutable Secrets; to unlock and breake open the closet of Nature, and to measure by our shallow apprehensions the deepe and impenetrable Counsels of Heaven, which we should with a holy, fearful, and astonished Ignorance onely adore, is too bold and arrogant sacrilege, and hath much of that Pride in it, by which the Angels fell: For *Ero similis Altissimo*, I will be like the most high, was (as is beleev'd) the Devils first sinne: *Eritis tanquam Dei*, ye shall be like unto God, was I am sure his first Temptation, justly punished both in the Author and Obeyer with Darknesse; in the one, with the Darknes of Tophet, in the other, with the Darknesse of Errour.

*Aug. de gen. ad
lit. l. 11. c. 14.
Et. lib. de vera
Relig. c. 13.
De Civ. Dei.
l. 12. c. 6.
Hier. Ep. 44. ad
Anton. de Mo
destia, 37 in
c. 14. Ijaie.
Greg. Moral.
l. 14. c. 17.
Damasc. de Or
thod. l. 1. l. 2
c. 4.*

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Actions of the Vnderstanding, Invention, Wit, Judgement : of Invention, Distrust, Prejudice, Immaturity : of Tradition, by Speech, Writing : of the Dignities and Corruption of Speech



hitherto of the more Passive Operation of the Vnderstanding which I called reception or Knowledge of Objects. Now follow the more active, which consist more in the Action of Reason, than in it's Apprehension : And they are the Actions or *Invention*, of *wit*, and of *judgement*. The former of these hath two principal parts ; the *Discovering* of Truth ; and the *Communicating* of it. The former only is properly *Invention* ; the other a consequent thereof, *Tradition* : but both much making to the Honour of the Faculty. For the former, I shall forbear any large Discourse touching the particular Dignities thereof, as being a thing so manifestly seen in Contemplations, Practises, Dispatches in the maintaining of Societies, erecting of Lawes, Government of Life ; and generally, whatsoever enterprize a man fastens upon, this one Faculty it is, that hath been the Mother of so many Arts, so great Beauty and Ornament

Ornament amongst men, which out of one world of things have raised another of Learning.

The Corruptions then which I conceive of this part of Invention, are,

First, a Despaire and Distrust of a mans owne Abilities: For as Corruption and Selfe-Opinion is a maine Cause of Errour: so Diffidence and Feare is on the other side a wrong to Nature, in abusing those Faculties which she gave for enquiry, with Sloath and Dulness. *Multis rebus inest Magnitudo* (says Seneca) *non ex natura sua, sed ex debilitate nostra*: & so likewise, *Multis rebus inest difficultas, non ex natura sua sed ex opinione nostra*. Many things seem hard & involved, not because they are so; but because our suspicion so misconceives them. Thus as in an affected and ill-disposed Body every light Weaknes is more felt than a more violent distemper, where the Constitution is stronger. So with fearful and despairing wits, every Inquiry is estimated, not according to the nature of the Object, but according to the Disopinion and slender conceit which they have of their own Abilities. *Non calcant spinas sed habent*. It were but ridiculous for a blind man to complain of dark weather, when the fault is not in the aire, but in the eye.

Another prejudice to this Faculty, is that which I observed before on another Occasion, an Over-Reverend Opinion of those who have gone before us: For when men shall so magnifie the Gifts of others, that they slight and neglect their owne; when out of a prejudicate Concept that the Ancients have sufficiently perfected the

Body of more serious Learnings, they shall exercise their wits (capable of greater employments) in degenerate and unusefull Studies; Knowledge must needs be hindered from attaining that Maturity, to which by their own Inventions it might be raised. Thus as it falls out among men of thirstless mindes in their Fortunes; *Divitiarum abundantia inter Causas paupertatis est*, Their profuseness out of their present store, with a negligence to recover and new make their Estates, draws them quickly beyond their Fortunes: or as it was in the like case amongst the Romans in those times of Publike Luxury, and Effeminatenesse, the valour of their Ancestors procuring unto them large wealth, and securing them from forreigne hostility, did also by the meanes of that Wealth and Ease soften and melt their valour, so that their Weaknesse was principally occasioned by the invincible spirit of their Predecessors: So it is in the matter of learning; when we spend our time onely in the Legacies that our Fathers have left us, and never seek to improve it by our owne Inventions, the large measures of Knowledge which we receive from them, is by our preposterous use made an occasion of a Large measure of Ignorance in other inquiries, wherein their Labours offer greater assistance than discouragement. There was not I perswade my selfe among the Ancients themselves, a greater means of disclosing so large a measure of Truth, than the Freedome of their owne Opinions. For notwithstanding this Liberty was often the occasion of

many

many prodigious Births; yet this disadvantage was countervailed with many fruitfull and goodly issues; all which might haply have been undiscovered, had men laboured onely in Traditions and contented themselves with Learning upon Trust. And those more Errors being still examined, were lesse pernicious than fewer beleaved. And even of them I make no question but there hath been good use made by those that have enquired into Truth. For first, there are very few Errours that have not some way or other, Truth annexed unto them, which haply might not otherwise have been observed. It is an Error in that man which shall presume of Gold hid in his Land, to dig and turne it up for no other end, but to finde his Imaginary treasure; yet that stirring and softning of the Ground is a meane to make it the more fertile. Lastly, this use may bee made even of Errours when discovered in the Inquiry after Truth; that they let us know what it is not: and it is speedier to come to a Positive Conclusion by a negative Knowledge, than a naked Ignorance: as he is sooner likely to finde out a place who knowes which is not the way, than hee that only knowes not the way.

The last Cause of Disability in the Invention may be Immaturity and Unfurniture for want of acquainting a mans selfe with the Body of Learning: For Learning is a Tree or Body, which in one continued frame brancheth it selfe into sundry members: So that there is not onely in the Object of the *Will*, which is the *Good* of things; but

Tusq. q. 1. 2.

but in the Object of the *Vnderstanding* also which is their truth, a certain mutual Concatenation, whereby every part hath some reference unto the other; insomuch that in the handling of particular Sciences, there are often such occurrences, as do necessarily require an insight into other Learnings: So that of *Tully* is generally true, *Difficile est pauca esse ei nota Cui non sint aut pleraq; aut omnia*. All that addresse themselves either to the invention of Arts not knowne, or to the polishing of such as are already found out, must ground their endeavours on the Experiments and Knowledge of sundry kinds of Learning.

For the other part of Invention, which I call Tradition, Communication, or Diffusion, I comprehend it within that perfection peculiar to man from all other Creatures, Oration, or Speech: Wherein I consider a double ministerial reference, the one to the eye, the other to the ear, that is *Vox scripta*, a Visible Voice; this *Vox viva* an Audible Voice. To which purpose *Scaliger* acutely: *Est quidem recitator Liber Loquens, Liber recitator Mutus*. The Dignities which this particular confers on man, and wherein it gives him a preheminance above other Creatures, are taken from the Ends or Offices thereof; for the worth of every serviceable or Ministerial Instrument is to be gathered from the Regularity of its function, whereunto it is naturally instituted.

Arist. Polit.
l. 1 c. 2.

The end whereunto Living and Organical Speech was principally ordained, is to maintaine mutual

mutuall Society amongst men incorporated into one Body. And therefore Tully wells calls it, *Humana Societatis Vinculum*, the Ligament and Sinew, whereby the Body of Humane Conversation is compacted and knit into One.

It would be a long and large labour to speak of the Honour which God hath bestowed upon our Nature in this Noble Gift of Speech, making our Tongue *ἄγγελος λόγων*, as the Poet calleth it, The Messenger of Reason, and as it were the Pen of the Minde which cloatheth our conceits with characters, and makes them obviou unto others. I shall not engage my selfe on so great an Argument, which hath already filled the Volumes of so many learned men, who have written some Rhetoricall, others Morall Institutions and Precepts touching Speech. I shall therefore content my selfe with but naming some few particulars, by Consideration whereof we may acknowledge the Bounty of God, and Excellency of our Nature, which is attended on by so noble a servant.

1. For the Dignity hereof it appears in this, That whereas in other less Considerable Perfections, other Creatures have an Exquisite nesse above man, yet in this man excelleth all other Inferior Creatures, in that he is able to communicate the Notions of Reason cloathed in sensible Characters unto others of his own kinde. For though some melancholy men have beleeved that Elephants and Birds, and other creatures have a Language whereby they discourse with one another; yet we know that those narrow and poore

Eurip.

*vid. Aug. lib.
Quaest. ex Ver.
Testam. q. 3.*

Voices which Nature hath bestowed on them proceed only from the Impression of Fancy, and sensitive appetite to serve themselves, but not to improve one another. And therefore Speech is called λόγος, by the Name of Reason, because it attendeth onely upon Reason. And as by this the Soule of man differeth in Excellency from all other Creatures: so in two things amongst many others (both subservient unto Reason) doth his Body excell them too. First, in the Uprightness of his Stature, whereby he is made to look up to Heaven, and from his Countenance to let shine forth the Impression of that Light which dwelleth within him; For the Face is the window of the Soul.

*Ορτυν ἢ ἀρ-
δῆτι μόνον ἔστι
ζῶον, διὰ τὸ
ἔχειν αὐτῷ
καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ
ῥητικῇ.

Arist. de part.
Anim. l. 4. c. 10.
Vid. Laurent.
Anatom. l. 1,
c. 2. 4.
Perer. in Gen.
2. 7. disp. de
presentia
Hum. Corp. q. 1.

*Pronaq; cum spectent Animalia cetera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit; Calumq; tueri
Insit; & erectos ad Sydera tollere Vultus.*

Whilst other creatures downward fix their sight,
Bending to Earth an Earthly Appetite:

To man he gave a lofty Face might look
Up to the Heavens; and in that spacious Book,
So full of shining Characters, descry
Why he was made, and whether he should fly.

Quint. Instit.
l. 2. c. 16.
Cael. Rhodig.
l. 1. c. 13.
Σύμβολα τῶν
ταῦτα τῶν.
ἱστ. de lape-
rēt. c. 1.
Ist. Nys. de
rom. officio.
ap. 26.

Next in the Faculty of Speech, which is the
Gate of the Soule, through which she passeth,
and the Interpreter of the Conceits and Cogita-
tions of the mind, as the Philosopher speaks; The
uses whereof are to convey and communicate the
Conceptions

Conceptions of the mind (and by that meanes to preserve humane society) to derive knowledge to maintain mutuall love and supplies ; to multiply our Delights, to mitigate and unload our sorrowes: but above all, to Honor God. and to edifie one another, in which respect our *Tongue* is called our *Glory*, *Psal. 16. 2. Acts. 2. 26.*

The force and power of Speech upon the minds of men, is almost beyond its power to express, How suddenly it can inflame, excite, allay, comfort, mollify, transport, and carry Captive the Affections of men. *Cesar* with one word quiets the Commotion of an Army. *Menenius Agrippa* with one Apologue, the sedition of a people. *Flavianus* the Bishop of Antioch with one Oration, the fury of an Emperour. *Anaximenes* with one Artifice, the indignation of *Alexander*. *Abigail* with one Supplication, the Revenge of *David*. *Pericles* and *Pisistratus* even then when they spake against the peoples liberty, over-ruled them by their Eloquence, to believe and embrace what they spake, and by their Tongue effected that willingly, which their Sword could hardly have extorted. *Pericles* and *Nicias* are said to have still pursued the same Ends, and yet with cleane different success. The one in advancing the same business, pleased; the other exasperated the people; and that upon no other Reason but this, the one had the Art of perswasion which the other wanted:

Περὶ τὴν πρῶ-
την ἀνδραγαθί-
αν.

Euripid. Hec.

Sueto. in Cas.

cap. 73.

Luc. lib. 1.

Πολλὰ τοὶ
συνέχθη λόγῳ
ἐπὶ τὴν ἡδὴ καὶ
καταρτισθῶσαν
βουλήν.

Sophoc. Elec.

Chrysost.

ἀνδραγαθίαν καὶ κ.

Vide Caufin. de

El. q. 11 c. 4.

Val. Max. 1. 8 c.

9.

Plutarc. lib. de

Præcept. ge-

rend. Reip.

Ἀγλωσσία δ' ἐπὶ πολλὰ κ' αὖτις ἀνὴρ
 Δίγμαι λέξαι, ἥσων ἔνγλωστος φέροι.
 Νῦν δ' ἐνέροισι σόμασι τ' ἀληθέστατα
 Κλέπιδουσιν, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἄλλῃ δοκεῖν.

One spake the Right with a slow Tongue,
 Another fluently spake wrong.
 He lost, this stole the Cause, and got
 To make you think, what you think not:

And this power of Speech over the Minds of
 men is by the Poet, in that knowne passage of his
 thus elegantly described:

Virg. *Æneid.* 1.

— *Magno in populo cum sapè coorta est*
Seditio, servitq; Animis Ignobile vulgus,
Iamq; faces et Saxa volant, furor arma ministrat;
Tam pietate gravè ac meritis si fortè virum quem
Conspexere, silent, arreptisq; auribus astant:
Ille regis dictis Animos & pectora mulcet.

When in a Multitude Seditions grow,
 And u'ccrated Minds do ove: flow
 With swelling Ire; when Stones & firebrands fly,
 (As Rage doth every where weapons supply)
 Then if some Aged man, in Honour held
 For Piety, and Prudence, stand to wield,
 And Moderate this Tumult: straightways all
 Rise up with silent Reverence, and let fall
 Their Angry Clamors; His grave words do sway
 Their Minds, and all their Discontents allay.

The

The Vertues or Speec (whereby it worketh with such force upon the Mind) are many, which therefore I will but Name ; some *Grammatical*, as Property, and Fitnels, and Congruity, without So'acismes and Barbarousness ; some *Rhetoricall*, as Choice, Purity, Brevity, Perspicuity, Gravity, Pleasantness, Vigor, Moderate Acrimony and Vehemency ; some *Logicall*, as Method, Order, Distribution, Demonstration, Invention, Definition, Argumentation, Refutation. A right digesting of all the Aydes of Speech ; as Wit, Learning, Proverbs, Apologues, Emblemes, Histories, Lawes, Causes, and Effects, and all the Heads or Places which assist us in Invention. Some *Morall*, as Gravity, Truth, Seriousness, Integrity, Authority. When words receive weight from manners, and a mans Speech is better beleaved for his Life than for his Learning. When it appeares, That they arise *ex sulco pectoris*, & have their foundation in Vertue, and not in Fancy. For as a man receiveth the selfe same Wine with pleasure in a pure and cleane Vessell, which he loaths to put unto his mouth from one that is foule and soiled : so the selfe same Speech adorned with the Piety of one man, and disgraced with the Pravity of another, will be very apt accordingly to be received, either with delight or loathing.

Vid. Voss. Crat.
Institut. l. 4.
Causin. de Elog.
lib. 2.
Quint. l. 1. c. 3.
Et passim alibi.
Σαφλῶστα
Πρωτοπρία πρὸς
τὴν ἁγίασιν,
Lact. in Zen. l. 7

Vid. A. GeD.
l. 1. c. 13.

Eurip. Hecub.

Λόγος ἐν ἀδόξουσιν ἴσως,
Καὶν τῷ δόκοντων, αὐτὸς δὲ ταύτ' ἐν δέξει.

A Speech from Base men, and men of Respect,
Though't be the same, works not the same Effect.

Plut. lib. de
Audit.

A. GeR. l. 18.
c. 13.

Quint. l. 12. c. 1.

---'Ου δεῖς
ἰσχυρὸν σοφὸν δ' ἐγ-
εῖν ἱπποδῶρος
δεῖς ὅμως τὴν
τιμωρίαν. So-
phoc. Ajax.

And therefore the Spartan Princes when they heard from a man of a disallowed and suspected Life and Opinion what they approved, they required another man of reputation to propose it : That the prejudice of the person might not procure a rejection of his Judgement. For we are apt to nauseate at very good meat, when we know that an ill Cooke did dress it. And therefore it is a very true Character which *Tully* and *Quintilian* give of a right Oratour ; That he must be *vir bonus dicendi Peritus*, as well a Good man as a Good speaker ; Otherwise though he may speake with admirable wit, to the fancy of his hearers, he will have but little power over their *Affections*. Like a fire made of greene wood, which is fed with it as it is sewell, but quenched as it is greene.

Lastly, some are *Civill* in Causes Deliberative or Iudicial, as Wisdom, pertinency and fitness to the Nature and Exigence of the end or Matter whereupon we speake. For in that case we are to ponder & measure what we say, by the end whereunto we say it, and to fit it to all the Circumstances incident thereunto. *Paul* amongst the Philosophers disputed with them from the Inscription of their Altar, from the Authority of their *Poets*, & from confessed Maximes of *Reason*, by these degrees convincing them of Idolatry, and leading them to Repentance. But amongst the Jewes he disputed out of *Scripture*. With *Felix* that looked for money, he disputed of Righteousness and Judgement to come ; but amongst the

the Pharisees and Sadduces, of the Resurrection, that a Dissention amongst themselves might procure a party for him. It is not wisdom for a man in misery to speak with a high stile: or a man in Dignity with a Creeping. The same speech may be Excellent in an umbratile Exercitation which would be too pedantical, and smelling of the Lampe in a matter of serious and weighty debate; and that may be dainty meat in one place for the fancy, which in another would be too thinne for the Conscience. Nature hath guarded and compassed in the Tongue with the lips, like a folding Gate, and with the Teeth, like a double Hedge, that wee might be admonished to weigh and ponder our words before wee produce them.

These are the principall Vertues. And in Opposition unto these, wee may easily collect the principall Corruptions of this Faculty, which I will content my self with but the naming.

The Vices in Grammer, are Solœcismes, Barbarismes, Obsolescences, Impropriety, Incongruity of Speech. In Rhetoricke, Sordidness, Tediuousness, Obscurity, Flatness of Conceit, Arguteness, and *Minutie*, Cawdiness, Wordiness, and Empty Ostentation. In Morals, the Vices may be comprised under these two Generals, *Multiloquium* and *Turpilouquium*, Garrulous and Rotten Communion. Lastly, in Civil Respects, Levity and Impertinency; like the advices of *Thersites*, *Ἀκόσμησε πολλὰτε*. Many and to little purpose.

But

*Μηδὲν ἄγαν
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
ἔχειν.*

*Petulantia verborum coercenda
ut nullum esse
oppositum dentium,
etc.
A Gel. l. 1. c. 17.*

*Vid Plur. de
Garrul. & Theophrast. Clem.
Alex. Pedag.
l. 2. c. 7.
Stuck, Conviv.
l. 4. c. 17. & 19.
Cal. Rhodig.
l. 7. cap. 26.*

De Turpiloquio.
Clem. Alex.
Pedag. l. 2. c. 9.
Ejus species
quam plurima
extra Institutum
nostrum.
Ut blasphemia,
perjuria, male-
dicta, scommata,
Difteria,
Obscenita,
ies, &c.

But besides all these, there is one thing which seemeth to be the most proper Corrupter of this Ornament of Speech, and that is a *Lye*. For as every thing is then most Regular when it retains the purity of its first office and institution: So on the other side it is most depraved, when it deviates from that service whereunto it was principally ordained. Thus a Picture, though it be never so much in the frame abused, crackt, spotted, or made any other way unvaluable; yet if the resemblance which it beares, be express and lively, we still call it a true Picture: whereas if that be a false and deceitfull resemblance (be all other adventitious Ornaments never so exquisite) we still accompt it False and Corrupt: So it is with the Speech of man, which though of never so great Weakness and Insufficiency in other respects; yet if it retain that one property of shaping it selfe to the Concepts of the mind, and make levell and proportionable the words with the thoughts, it may still be said to be (though not good) yet in some respect a Regular Speech, in that it is conformable to the first institution: But be all other Excellencies never so great; yet if it be a false Image of our Intentions, Nature is diverted from her prime End, and the Faculty quite depraved, as forsaking its originall Office: and indeed, other Morall Duties of the Tongue do necessarily presuppose this adequation and conformity to the thoughts, which I spake of, without which they are but Hypocrisie, and come within the compass of the noted Corruption, a Lie: for every Hypocrite is a Lye,

Lye. I confesse there are Sins of Speech greater then a Lye, in the intension and degrees of their own guilt: But herein is the difference, the tongue may in it (whether Morally, or religiously, considered) beare a double Irregularity (wherein it differs from other powers.)

First, it may be Unconformable to the Law of right Reason, as in all manner of vicious and unsavory Speeches. And the Corruption which hereby it incurreth, is common to it with other Faculties, as the disproportion betwene Evill Thoughts and Reason dictating the contrary, worketh Corruption in the Thoughts.

And then secondly, it may be disproportioned to the Conceits of the mind in proposing them otherwise then they are inwardly meant, and this is properly a *Lye*; Which I therefore call the principall Corruption of Speech, not (as I said) because I conceive in it a greater measure of heinousness and Guilt, then in any other Speeches; (because all Guilt followes the Inconformity and Remotion from the Law of God and Reason; and therein other Speeches, as Blasphemy, and Seditious, may have a greater measure of wickedness) but because in a *Lye* I finde both the forenamed Irregularities, it being a Speech not only uneven to the Conceits of the Mind, but repugnant also to the Will of God, and the Law of Nature.

The next kind of Active Operations were those of *Wit*. The use whereof is so much the more Excellent, by how much the Wrestling and

Abuse of it is the more dangerous. I shall sufficiently declare the worth of it, by shewing what it is: For I take not Wit in that common acceptation, whereby men understand some sudden flashes of Concept, whether in Stile or Conference, which like rotten wood in the darke, have more Shine then Substance; whose Use and Ornament are like themselves, Swift and Vanishing; at once both admired and Forgotten: but I understand a sealed, constant, and habituall sufficiency of the Understanding, whereby it is enabled in any kind of Learning, Theory, or Practice, both to sharpness in Search, subtilty in Expression, and dispatch in Execution. As for that other kind seen in Panegyricks, declamatory Discourses, Epigrams, and other the like sudden issues of the brain, they are feats only and sleights, not Duties and Ministries of the Wit, which serve rather for Ostentation than Use, and are only the Remission of the Mind and Unbending of the thoughts for more severe Knowledge: as walking for Recreation is rather Exercise then Travell, although by the violence of the Motion, or length of the Way, there may ensue Sweat and Weariness.

Now for the Corrupters of the Wit, though there be divers; yet none so immediate and certaine as it selfe, if alone: For Wit, though it be Swift, yet is often Blinde. And therefore the faster it hastens in Errour, the more dangerous it is to it selfe. And hence it is, that as Learning was never more bound to any, than those men who have been eminent in this Faculty, if they swayed

swayed it by Moderation and Prudence : So none have been more pernicious and violent Oppugners of truth, then men best furnished with Acuteness, when they turned the use of it to the strengthening of their own Fancies, and not submitted it to Judgement and Examination : As the fattest Soiles in Greece caused the greaceft troubles ; and the beauty of *Helena*, the ruine of Troy. Wit like Wine is a good remedy against the poyson of the Mind ; but being it self poysoned, it doth kill the sooner. There ought to be for the right disposing of our inventions, a mutuall reference and service between Wit and Judgement. It is a vexation of Mind, to discern what is right and profitable, and have no enablement to attain it ; and that is Judgement without Wit. And to have a felicity of compassing an End, and a working and restless fancy without direction to fasten it on a fit Object, is the only course to multiply Errour, and to be still in Motion, not as in a path, but as in a Maze or Circle, where is continuall toyle, without any proficience or gain of Way ; and this is Wit without Judgement. They ought therefore, I say, to be mutuall Coadjutors each to other. Wit is the Spurre to stirre up and quicken the Understanding : and Judgement is the Bridle to sway and moderate Wit : Wit is t' e Hand and Foot for Execution and Motion ; but Judgement is the Eye for Examination and Direction. Last y, Wit is the Sayle and Oare to further the progress in any Inquiry, but Judgement is the Ballast to

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Poise, and the Steere to guide the course to its intended End.

Now the manner of the Judgements Operation in directing either our Practice or Contemplation is by a discourse of the Mind, whereby it reduceth them to certain Grounds and Principles, whereunto they ought chiefly to be conformable. And from hence is that Reason which *Quintilian* observes, why shallow and floating Wits seeme oftentimes more fluent then men of greater sufficiencies: For, saith he, those other admit of every sudden flash or conceit, without any examination; but *apud Sa, ientes est Electio & Modus*. They first weigh things before they utter them.

The maine Corruption of Judgement in this Office, is Prejudice and Prepossession. The Duty of Judgement is to discern between Obliquities and right Actions, and to reduce all to the Law of Reason. And therefore is true in this, as in the course of publick Judgements; That respect of persons, or things, blinds the eyes, and maketh the Understanding to determine according to Affection, and not according to Truth: Though indeed some Passions there are, which rather hood-winke then distemper or hurt the Judgement; so that the false determination thereof cannot be well called a Mistake, but a Lye; Of which kind flattery is the principal, when the Affections of Hope and Fear debase a man, and cause him to dissemble his own opinion.

CHAP. XL.

Of the Actions of the Understanding upon the Will, with respect to the End and Means. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, not Commanding, but directing the Object of the Will to be good and convenient. Corrupt Will looks only at Good present. Two Acts of the Understanding, Knowledge and Consideration. It must also be possible, and with respect to happiness Immortal. Ignorance and Weakness in the Understanding, in proposing the right means to the last End.

Hitherto of the Actions of the Understanding, *ad extra*, in regard of an Object. Those *ad intra*, in regard of the Will, wherein the Understanding is a Minister or Counsellor to it, are either to furnish it with an End, whereon to fasten its desires; or to direct it in the means conducive to that End: For the Will alone is a blind Faculty; and therefore as it cannot see the right Good it ought to affect without the assistance of an *Informing* power: So neither can it see the right way it ought to take for procuring that Good without the direction

rection of a *Conducting* power. As it hath not Judgment to discover an *End* : so neither hath it Discourse to judge of the right *Meanes*, whereby that may be attained : So that all the *Acts* of the Will necessarily presuppose some precedent guiding *Acts* in the Understanding, whereby they are proportioned to the Rules of right Reason. This Operation of the Understanding is usually by the Schoole-men call'd *Imperium*, or *Mandatum*, a Mandate or Command ; because it is a *Precept*, to which the Will ought to be obedient. For the Rules of Living and Doing well are the Statutes (as it were) and Dictates of right Reason. But yet it may not hence be concluded that the Understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Dominion over the Will, though it have Priority in regard of Operation. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, is only a Regulating and Directing; it is no Constraining or Compulsive Power. For the Will always is *Domina suorum actuum*, The Mistress of her own Operation : For *Intellectus non imperat, sed solummodo significat voluntatem imperantis*. It doth only intimate unto the Will, the Pleasure and Law of God, some seeds whereof remain in the Nature of man. The Precepts then of right Reason are not therefore Commands, because they are proposed by way of *Mandate*, but therefore they are in that manner proposed, because they are by Reason apprehended to be the Commands of a Divine Superior power. And therefore in the breach of any such Dictates we are not said properly to offend our Understanding.

ing, but to sin against our Law-giver. As in Civil Policy, the offences of men are not against inferior Officers, but against the Sovereign power, which is the Fountaine of Law, and under whose authority all subordinate Magistrates have their proportion of Government. Besides, *Ejus est imperare cuius est punire*. For Law and Punishment being Relatives, and mutually connotating each the other, it must necessarily follow, that from that power only can be an imposition of Law from which may be an infliction of punishment.

Now the Conditions under which the Understanding is both to apprehend and propose any either end, or means convenient to the Nature of the Will, and of Sufficiency to move it, are that they have in them, *Goodness*, *Possibility*, and in the end (if we speak of an utmost one) *immortality* too. Every true Object of any power, is that which bears such a perfect Relation of convenience and fitness thereto, that it is able to accomplish all its desires. Now since *Malum* is *Destructivum*, all Evil is Destructive; It is impossible that by it selfe, without a counterfeite and adulterate face, it should ever have any attractive power over the Desires of the Will. And on the other side, since *Omne bonum*, is *Perfectivum*; since Good is perfective and apt to bring reall satisfaction along with it, most certainly would it be desired by the Will, were it not that our Understandings are clouded and carried away with some crooked misapprehensions, and the Will it selfe corrupted in its own Inclinations.

But

But yet though all mans Faculties are so depraved, that he is not able as he ought to will any Divine and Perfect Good ; yet so much he retains of his Perfection, as that he cannot possibly desire any thing, which he apprehends as absolutely disagreeable and destructive to his Nature ; since all Naturall Agents aime still at their own Perfection. And therefore impossible it is, that either Good should be refused, without any apprehension of Disconvenience, or evill pursued without any appearance of Congruity or Satisfaction. That it may appeare therefore how the Understanding doth alwaies propose those Objects, as Good to the Will, which are notwithstanding, not only in their own Nature, but in the Apprehension of the Understanding it selfe, known to be evill ; And on the contrary, why it doth propose good Objects, contrary to its own Knowledge, as Evill ; We may distinguish two opposite conditions in *Good* and *Evill* : For first, all evill of Sin, though it have Disconvenience to mans Nature, as it is *Destructive* ; yet on the other side, it hath agreement thereunto, as it is crooked and *corrupt* ; As continuall drinking is most convenient to the distemper of an Hydropick Body, though most disconvenient to its present welfare. Now then as no man possessed with that disease, desires drink for this end, because he would dye, though he know that this is the next way to bring him to his Death, but only to give satisfaction to his present Appetite : So neither doth man follow exorbitant and crooked counsels, only that he may thereby

thereby come to Destruction (though he is not Ignorant of that issue) but only to give way to the propension of his depraved Nature. In the same manner likewise *Goodness*, though it have the most absolute *Convenience* to man, as it is *Perfective* and in respect of his final advancement thereby; yet it hath as great a *disconvenience* towards mans corrupt Faculties, as it is a strait rule to square them by, and in respect of its *Rectitude*. As light, though it be in its own property, the perfection of the Eyes, yet to distempered Eyes it works more trouble then delight, because as in Philosophy, *Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*: so, *Quicquid appetitur, appetitur ad modum appetentis*. So that if the Appetite it self be by inherent pollution depraved and evil, it cannot but desire every thing that bears proportion and conformity to its own distempers. And this I take to be the main reason, why men of corrupt and irregular desires, oftentimes fasten delight on those Objects which they know to be Evil, and are quite averse from those which yet they assent unto as Good.

To which I may adde another, namely, the Resolution of a corrupt Will to yield unto it self all *Present Satisfaction*, and not suffer it self to be swayed with the Preoccupation of a *Future Estate*: Insomuch that the small content which mans Nature receiveth from the Actuell fruition of some instant conceited Good, prevails more to draw on Appetite, then the fearful Expectation of ensuing Misery can to deterre from it. And the present insomnesse of pious Duties, hath

Ὁ πῶς πῶς
ἐκείνους ἐστὶν πῶς
ἔστιν ὅτι τὸ τέλος
ἐκείνους αὐτῶν.
Arist. Ethic.
lib. 3. cap. 7.

more power to divert the corrupt Minde from them, then the Fore-conceit of Eternall blisse can have to allure the mind unto a Delight in them. Hence then it appears, what I understand by that first condition, wherewith Reason is to propose any End or Meanes to the Will, that it may be desired; namely, *Sub Ratione Boni*, under the Condition of Good, not always true and Moral, but sometimes as it is so apprehended by a depraved understanding, *Sub conceptu Convenientia*, as it bears conformity to the present crooked Estate of mans Will: a *Depraved Understanding* I say, and not always properly and precisely a *Darkned Understanding*; *Depraved* by neglect and *Inconsiderableness*; not darkned by Ignorance and *Blindness*. For there may be an Irregular Will with a Judgment rightly informed by Truth: Otherwise there could not be any offence of Presumption and Knowledge. We are therefore to consider, that there is in a well stayed Reason, a double Act in the directing of the Will, The one respecteth the Nature and Quality of the *Object*; the other more peculiarly the Circumstance of *Time*; the one is properly *Knowledge*; the other *Circumspection*, arising out of Meditation, and more close pressing of the *Object*, which is known as Good to the Will, against insinuations of Sensitive Desires, which aime onely at the Fruition of pleasure *present*. First, the Understanding proposeth to the Will *Felicity*, as an Absolute and eternall Good, which cannot but be desired. Next, it proposeth *meanes* for the attaining of

of it; namely, the practice of these Precepts, which are revealed unto us as necessary for purchasing the End desired. The *Will* being, besides its own corruption, transporting by the Sensitive Appetite, findes great Irksomness in those *meanes*; A restraint of all those present joys, delights, satisfactions, which it instantly pursues: it perceiveth that great trouble is to be expected, many prejudices and difficulties to be grappled with; a severe hand to be held over Passions; a narrow Restraining to be observed towards Mutinous and Rebellious Eruptions of the Minde, fewer inablenents for advancing our Fortunes, and infinite other the like bars of present contentment, which withdraw the Will, and make it renounce courses so severe and disagreeable to the liberty it desires. Hereupon comes the second Act of Understanding, *Efficacy* and weight of *Consideration*, whereby it compares the Circumstances of that Difficulty of Good to the Will in regard of the small time they shall continue with the consequent and unspeakable Good, that will in the end ensue therefrom, and also with the unsufferable torments that follow the violence of present pleasures; Whence the Will is made more inclinable (by the assistance of greater power than its own) to go along rather through Thorns with Vertue, then with adulterate and painted pleasure to dance towards ruine.

Now of these two, the defect of the former works properly a *Blinded Understanding*; but the Defect of the Latter, namely, an Insufficiency

and Inefficacy of pondering the Circumstances, and pressing the endless consequence of Good or Evil, works properly a *Depraved* Understanding, in regard of Practicall or Applicative Direction. As a man walking in some deep Contemplation by a Ditch, though his eyes be open to see a present danger before him, yet may haply fall into it, not out of *Blindness*, but out of *Inconsideratnesse*, as not fixing his own conceit thereon, but being wholly possessed with other thoughts. In like manner, the Understanding being taken up by the imposture of these Affections, with the conceit of *present Good*, or *present Ill* in any Object, and thereby being diverted from a serious Inquiry after the true Rectitude and Obliquity thereof, suffers the Will fearfully to plunge it self in danger and misery.

Another Condition, under which an *End* or *Meanes* are to be proposed by the Will, is *Subtractione Possibilis*, as a good *Possible*. For if once the Understanding discover Impossibility in any Object, the Will cannot fasten any desire upon it: Since all Appetite is only terminated by that which can replenish and satiate the power. Now all Satisfaction is by fruition; all fruition necessarily presupposeth a possibility of acquiring: So that where this is taken away, the Will is left Hopelesse, and therefore Desiresse, and therefore we see that the nearer any thing comes to Impossibility, the more adverse is the Will of most men from it: as is plaine in those things that are perplexed and difficult to attaine. And if
here

here the wish of him in the Poet be objected :

O mihi prateritos referat si Jupiter annos !

O that *Love* would me restore,
The years that I have liv'd before !

It may be answered that this was a Wish only and not a Will; Since that which a man willeth he doth really endeavour to obtaine.

The last Condition (which is restrained only to the utmost end of mans desire) is that it be proposed *Sub ratione Immortalis*, as an *Immortall Good*. The endlessnesse of Happiness is that only which maketh it a perfect End. For the mind of man naturally is carryed to an *Immortality of Being*; and therefore also consequently to an *Immortality of Happiness*; it being a necessary desire of all Naturall Agents, to attaine a perfection proportionate to the measure of their Continuance. So then mans End must not be only *Good*, but *for ever good*, *Totally* and *Eternally*: not only a Fulnesse of *Ioy* in the nature of it; But a Fulness of *Perpetuity* in the Continuance. Most perfect in proportion in the *Spirituality*; most infinite in proportion to the *Immortality* of mans Soul. The Frailty and Languishing of any Good, and a Fore-sight of the losse thereof, with the ablest Minds doth much weaken the Desire of it. And the reason is, because Providence and Forecast is a certain companion of the humane Nature; and he which is most a man, is most carefull to con-

Ethic. lib. 1.

trive the advancement of his *Future Estate*. It is beaſtiall to faſten only upon *Preſent Good*; this being a maine difference between the Underſtanding and the Senſual Appetite, that this reſpecteth only the preſent Joy that is at hand; but that being ſecretly conſcious of iſ own immortality, faſtens it ſelf upon the remotest times; yea out-runs all time, and ſuffers it ſelf to be ever ſwallowed up with the Meditation and Providence of an endleſſe Happineſſe. And therefore the reaſon that *Ariſtotele* brings againſt his Maſter's *Ideas*, argues an Underſtanding leſſe Divine in this particular then *Plato's* was, when he ſaith that Eternity doth no more perfect the Nature of Good, then Continuance doth the Nature of White. For though it be true, that it is not any Eſſentiall part of *Goodneſſe* in it ſelf; yet it is a neceſſary and principall condition to make *Goodneſſe Happineſſe*; that is an Adequate Object to mans Deſires; there is not then the ſame proportion between Eternity and Good, as there is between Continuance and White: For Continuance is altogether Extrinſicall and Irrelative in reſpect of White; but the Happineſſe of man hath an Intrinſicall Connection with Immortality; becauſe mans Utmoſt and Adequate Good muſt be proportioned to the Nature of his Mind. (for that is no perfect Good that doth not every way replenish, and leave nothing behind it that may be deſired) ſo that man himſelf being Endleſſe, can have no End able to limit his Deſires, but an Infinite and Immortall Good; which he may

may enjoy without any anxiety for After-Provision. I dare say there is not an Atheist in the world who hath in his life bebeasted himself by setting his desires only on Transitory and Perishable goods, that would not on his death-bed count it the best bargain he ever made, to change souls with one of those whose diligence in providing for a future happiness, he hath often in his Beastly Sensuality impudently derided.

Now of these two directions of the Understanding to the Will, in desiring the End or Means, the Corruption is for the most part more grosse and palpable in Assistance to the *Meanes*, then in the Discovery of the *End*, and far oftner failes the Will h^{ere}in then in proposing an Object to fix its Desires upon. For we may continually observe, how a world of men agree all in opinions and wishes about the same supreme and Immortall Happiness, the Beatificall Vision; Every *Balaam* fastens on that; and yet their meanes unto it are so jarring and opposite, that a looker on would conceive it impossible that there should be any agreement in an end where is such notable Discord in the ways to it. The reason which I conceive of this difference, is, the severall proportion which the true End and the true Means thereunto bear unto the Will of man. For it is observable, that there is but one general Hindrance or Errour about the right End, namely the Ignorance thereof. For being once truly delivered to the Understanding, it carries such a proportion to the nature of the Will (being a most perfect
fulfilling

Ignorantia &
Difficultas.
Aug.

fulfilling of all its wishes) that it is impossible not to desire it; but the disproportion between man and the right means of a true End is far Greater. For there is not only Error in the Speculation of them, but reluctance in other practical Faculties, proceeding from their Generall Corruption in this Estate, and nayling the affection on the present Delight of Sensuall Objects. First, for the Understanding, I observe therein a double Hindrance concerning these *Meanes*: *Ignorance* and *Weaknesse*; the one respects the Examination of them; the other, their Presentation or Inforcement upon the *Will*. For the former of these, there seems to be an equall difficulty between the End and the *Meanes*, as proceeding in both from the same Root. But in this very convenience there is a great difference; for the Ignorance of the End is far more preventable (considering the Helps we have to know it) then of the *Meanes*. Not but that there are as powerfull Directions for the Knowledge of the *Meanes*, as of the *End*; but because they are in their *Number* many, and in their *Nature* repugnant to mans corrupt Mind; There is therefore more Weariness, and by consequence, more Difficulty in the Inquiry after them, then after the *End*; because that is in it self but *One*; and besides, bears with it (under the General Notion of *Happiness*) such an absolute Conformity to Mans nature, as admits of no refusal or opposition: Insomuch that many that know Heaven to be the End of their Desires, know yet scarce one foot of the way thither.

Now

Now besides this Ignorance, when the knowledge of the *meanes* is gotten, there are many prejudices to be expected before a free Exercise of them. For (as *Aristotle* observes) amongst all the Conditions required to Morall Practice, Knowledge hath the least say. It hath the lowest place in Vertue; though the highest in Learning.

There is secondly, in the Understanding *Weakness*, whereby it oftentimes connives at the Irregular motion of the Will, and withdraws it from Examining with a piercing and fixed Eye, with an Impartiall and Bribelesse Judgment, with Efficacy and weight of Meditation, the severall Passages of all our Actions, with all the present and consequent inconveniences of crooked courses. It were a vast Labour to run over all the oppositions, which vertuous meanes, leading to an Happy End, doe always finde in the severall Faculties of man: How the Will it self is stubborn and froward; the Passions Rebelious, and Impatient of Suppression; the Sences and Sensitive Appetite thwart and wayward, creeping always like those under-Coelestiall Orbs into another Motion, quite contrary to that which the *Primum Mobile*, Illightned Reason, should confer upon them. Sufficient it is, that there is a Disproportion between the meanes of Happiness, and the generall Nature of Corrupt man. For all Goodness is necessarily adjoynd with Rectitude and Straightness (in that it is a Rule to direct our Life) and therefore a *Good* man is

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called

called an *Upright* man; one that is everywhere Even and Strait. To which *Aristotle* perhaps had one Eye, when he called his Happy man a *Four-square* man, which is everywhere smooth, stable, and like himself. But now on the other side, mans Nature in this Estate of Corruption, is a distorted and crooked Nature; and therefore altogether uncomformable to the Goodness which should as a Canon, direct it to the true and principall end it aymeth at. And this is the reason, why so many men are impatient of the close and narrow passage of Honesty. For crooked and reeling movers necessarily require more liberty of way, more broad courses to exercise themselves in: as we see in natural Bodies, a crooked thing will not be held within so narrow Bounds, as that which is Strait.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLI.

Of the Conscience; its offices of Direction, Conviction, Comfort, Watchfulness, Memory, Impartiality. Of consciences Ignorant, Superstitious, Licentious, Sleeping, Frightfull, Tempestuous.

Here remains yet one higher and diviner Act of the Practicall Understanding, of most absolute power in man, and that is *Conscience*. Which is not any distinct Faculty of the Soul, but only a compounded Act of Reason, consisting in Argumentation; or a *practique Syllogisme*, inferring always some Applicative and Personall Conclusion, Accusing or Excusing.

The Dignities whereof are to be gathered from the Offices of it, and from the Properties of it.

The maine Offices are three; *Direction, Conviction, Consolation*, whereof the two last always presuppose the first with a contrary Qualification of Breach and Observance.

The *Direction* of Conscience consists in a Simple Discourse: or (as I may so speak) in a *Direct Way* of Understanding, gathering morall or divine Conclusions from a presupposed habit

of Principles, either from the reliques of our Originall Knowledge naturally imprest; or by concurrence of Religion and Theologicall Precepts, spiritually inspired into the Practique Judgment or hearts of men. The observance of which Conclusions it imposeth upon all those Executive powers, which each particular Conclusion doth most immediately concerne upon paine of hazarding our own inward peace, with that sweet repose and security of Minde which followes it; and also (as the Heathens themselves have observed) upon fear of incurring the displeasure of that God, concerning whom the very light of Nature hath revealed thus much, that as his penetrating and searching Eye is able to read our most retired Thoughts: so his Impartiall and unpreventable Justice hath thunder and fire in store for the Rebellions against this Faculty, which he hath made to be, as it were, his Officer and Herauld in all mens hearts.

The two latter of those Offices consist in a *Reflexion* of that former discourse upon mens Actions, and according as is discovered in them, either an observance or neglect of those imposed Duties: the heat of that reflexion is either Comfortable or Scorching. Now of these two, that of Conviction is nothing else but a performance of that Equivocall killing promise made by the Serpent to our seduced Parents; I mean, an opening of their Eyes, to know with desperate Sorrow the Good they had irrecoverably foregon; and with fear, shame and horreur, the Evill

Evill which they plunged themselves and their whole posterity into. This one Act it is which hath so often confuted that Opinion of *Aristotle* touching Death, That it is of all things most terrible, in that it hath persued many so farre, as that it hath forced them to leape out of themselves, and to preferre the terrour of Death and Darkness of the Grave, before the grisly Face of a convicting Conscience.

The chiefe Dignity hereof consisteth in *Consolation*, wherby it diffuseth it into the whole man, from a secret assurance of divine favour (for nothing can thoroughly calme the Conscience, but hat a sweet Tranquillity, silent Peace, settled Stayedness, and which is highest of all, a Raviſhing contemplation, and (as it were) Pre-ſuition of Blisse and Immortality.

The Properties of the Conscience (whereby I understand the Ministries, which it never failes to execute in man) are as I conceive, principally three; *Watchfulness*, *Memory*, *Impartiallity*. It keeps always; Sentinel in a mans Soul; and like a Register, records all our good and ill actions. Though the Darkness of the Night may hide us from others, and the Darkness of the Mind seem to hide us from our selves; yet still hath Conscience an Eye to look in secret on whatsoever we doe, whether in regard of Ignorance or Hardnesse. Though in many men it sleep in regard of Motion; yet it never sleeps in regard of Observation and Notice: it may be Hard and Seared, it can never be Blind. That writing in it which seems

Invisible and Illegible, like letters written with the juice of Lemmon, when it is brought to the fire of Gods judgment, will be most clear. And for the next (if we observe it) there is nothing so much fastned in the Memory, as that which Conscience writes: all her Censures are written with Indelible Characters, never to be blotted out, all or most of our knowledge forsakes us in our Death; Wit, Acuteness, variety of Language, habits of Sciences; our Arts, Policies, Inventions, all have their period and fate: only those things which Conscience imprinteth, shall be so far from finding any thing in death to obliterate and raze them out, that they shall be thereby much more manifest, whether they be impressions of Peace or Horrour. The Testimonies of Comfort (if true) are fastned in the heart with such an Hand as will never suffer them finally to be taken out: and if they be Accusatory and Condemning, the Heart is so hard, and they so deep, that there is no way to get them out, but by breaking or melting the Table they are written in; that only course can be taken to make Conscience forget.

Then thirdly, it is a most Bribelesse Worker, it never knows how to make a false report of any of our wayes. It is (if I may so speak) Gods Historian, that writes not Annals, but Journals; the Words, Deeds, Cogitations of Hours and Moments: never was there so absolute a Compiler of Lives, as Conscience. It never comes with any prejudice or acception of persons, but dares
speake

Speak true as well of a Monarch, as of a Slave. Nero the Emperor shall feel as great a fire burning in his breast, as he dare wrap the poor Christians in to light him to his lust. There is scarce one part in man, but may be seduced, save his conscience. Sense oftentimes conceives things which are not; Appetite and Imagination can transport the Will, and themselves both may be drawn by persuasion contrary to their own propensions; this only deals faithfully with him, whose witness it is, though it be to the confusion of it self and him in whom it lodgeth. It may I know erre sometimes and mistake, but it can never by any Insinuation be bribed to contradict its own Judgment, and Register White for Black.

The corruption of Conscience arises principally for two extreams; the one occasioned by *Ignorance*; the other by *Sin* (for I oppose these two here, as concurring to the Corruption of Conscience after a different manner.) The one is when the want of due knowledge draws the Conscience to sinister determinations either in Practice or forbearance; The other when evil Habits and Actions defile the Conscience. Now both these containe under them sundry Degrees of Corruption.

From Ignorance, first comes a Fettered and Restrained Conscience, fearfully binding it selfe to some particular Acts, without sufficient grounds. Next a Licentious and Indulging Conscience, giving Freedom to its selfe in such courses,

course, as whereunto it hath no warrant upon unacquainting it self from either.

Then from the other Root there comes : First, a *Dead, Secure and Sleeping* Conscience by common and Customary Sins. A *Pale, Sweating, and Affrighted* Conscience by Atheisticall and Un-naturall Sins,

— *Tum frigida mens est
Criminibus; tacitâ sudant præcordia culpâ.*

The Guilt which from unseen pollution springs,
Cold-sweating Horror on their Bosom brings.

A *Desperate, Tempestuous and Ravening* Conscience from blasphemous and open Sins. Not but that any of these may come from any Sinne; but that the Quality of some sinnes doth for the most part carry with it some particular dispositions and kinds of a distempered Conscience; but because all these; as also this whole discourse pertaines to a higher Science, I shall here forbear to speak more of it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XLII.

Of the Will: it's Appetite: with the proper and chiefe Objects thereof, God. Of Superstition and Idolatry. Of its Liberty in the Eleſting of Meanes to an End. Of its Dominion Coactive and Perſwaſive. Of Fate, Aſtrologie, Satanicall Suggeſtions. Of the manner of the Wills Operation. Motives to it. Acts of it. The Concluſion.



Proceed to the laſt Faculty of mans Soul, his Will. Which doth alone governe, moderate and over-rule all his Actions. The Dignity whereof conſiſteth in three peculiar Perfections; *Appetite, Liberty, Domination*: The former re-

ſpecteth an *End*; the two latter, the *Means* thereunto conducing. The *Deſires* are fixed on ſome *Good* thoroughly proportionate to the wideneſſe of the Heart: then the *Liberty* of the Will grounded on the Direction of the Judgement, makes choiſe of ſuch *Means* as are moſt proper for attaining of that *Good*: and laſtly, the *Domination* imployes all inferiour Faculties for the ſpeedy Execution of thoſe *Mean*s.

Sff

Sundry

*Ariſt. Ethic.
l. 1. c. 1.
Lib. 8. c. 5.*

Ethic. I. 1. c. 2.

Sundry Ends there are, which may be desired upon particular and conditionall occasions: but the true *Ultimate*, utmost, and *Absolute* Good is God. All other Ends are *Ministring* & *Subordinate*; hee only is *Κυριώτατον* & *Ἀρχιτέκνονον*, as *Aristotle* calls his Felicity, the *Supreme* and over-ruling End; the Fountaine of all other Goods: from the remote participation of whose perfections all other receive that scantling of satisfaction and proportion, which they bear unto mans will. And therefore some Philosophers have simply called him *Bonum*, & *Bonum Superessentiale*, the only Self-sustaining, and Self-depending Good, that is only able thoroughly to satiate and replenish the unlimited Desires of the Soul of man.

The Corruptions of the Desires fastened on him, are the two extremes of Excesse and Defect. The extremes of Excesse are *Superstition* and *Idolatry*; a worshipping of false Gods, or a false worshipping of the True. Both proceed from the confused mixture of Originall Blindnesse with the reliques of naturall Knowledge. This latter giveth us a sight in the Thesis and Generall, that a God there is to be desired: but touching the Hypothesis, who that God is, with the circumstances and manner of his Worship, Nature leaveth the Soule by occasion of the latter in a maze of Darkness and unavoydable Doubting and Uncertainty. So that Nature gives light enough to discover the *Necessity* of a Duty; but not to cleere the *Meanes* of Execution. Light enough to enjoin a waking; but the way being a narrow

way,

way, is on every side hedged up from her view. The other Extreme of Defect is either *Atheisme* in not acknowledging, or *Ignorance* in not seeing, that God whom we ought to serve and desire. Both which (if *Affected* and Voluntary, as usually they are) proceed either from Guilt, or a *Consciousness* of fearful Crimes, which make men study to flatter their distracted spirits in the persuasion that no Judge sees them; or else from a Sensuality and a *Desire* and purpose to give *Indulgence* to themselves in their evil courses; thinking like that foolish Bird, that there is no Fowler to catch, no snare to intrap them, if their Eyes be but sealed up, and their heads thrust in. o the hedge of their own darkness: I hough here in both the Atheist discovers Divinity, and the Ignorant person Knowledge enough to convince their own Consciences, and condemne themselves.

The Dignity of mans Will in regard of *Liberty*, consisteth in the Freedom which it hath to chuse or reject Means ordained for the Compassing some proposed End, according as the Understanding shall find them more or less conducive for the attainment of it. It is, I say, a chusing of the Meanes: For Election (as *Aristotle* determines) is never of the End. We do not chuse, but necessarily *Desire* to be happy. The matter of our Happiness being proposed without appearance of present inconveniencie: because every thing is naturally prone to its owne perfection, where there are no intervenient discommodities

Exod. Decet Eſt
dia omni reg-
ias.

Zeno apud La-
ert. l. 6. Unde
Stoici Sapien-
tes, Reges ap-
pellabant.

Ibid.

Ethic. l. 3. c. 1.

to affright it. And yet neither is the Freedome of the Will any whit impaired by such a necessity. For as we say in Divine Attributes, that God hath perfect Power, though he cannot sin: So we may conclude of the Will, it shall in the State of Glory (for then only shall our utmost Good be chosen without any shadow of inconvenience) have perfect Liberty: Notwithstanding it shall never be able to Will an Absence from the Vision of God; since the Liberty of such a Desire would be no Liberty, but Imperfection and unnaturalness. Now of all other Perfections, this hath, in respect of the utmost End, bin quite depraved, being now in Corruption; without the Assistance of Spirituall or new Infused Grace, thoroughly disenabled from seeking meanes which may truly lead to the fruition of God, and utterly captivated and intralled to the Tyranny of Sin. So that this Liberty is left inviolate only in Naturall, Morall, and in Civill Actions; Concerning which, there is a Law in Nature, even the reliques and indeble Foot-prints of mans first Innocency, which moderates the Elections of the Will for its own and others Temporall Good.

The *Dominion* and Supreme Command of the Will is only over those Powers, to the production of whose Operations it doth by its immediate Authority concur as an *Absolute Efficient*, or at least, as a *Moving Agent*. It reacheth not therefore so farre as to the command of the *Vegetative* Power: For we cannot command our Stomacks to digest, or our Bodies to grow, because the
vege-

vegetative faculties, which were instituted not for the proper service of Reason, but of Nature; neither reacheth it to an universall Command of the *Senses*, but only by the Mediation of another Faculty, over which it hath more Sovereigne Power: As it can hinder Seeing not immediately, but by the *Locomotive Power*, by closing the Eyes. And the same is true of the Inward Senses; for the Memory and Imagination often fasten upon Objects, which the Desire of the Will is, should not be any way represented unto those Powers: So likewise in the *Sensitive Appetite*, when once Objects belonging thereunto, creep upon the Fancy, irregular motions oftentimes violently resist the Will, and the Law of the Members carrieth men captive from the Law of the Mind. Lastly, the Will hath no Dominion Absolute and Sovereigne over those Apprehensions of the *Understanding*, which depend on necessary and demonstrative Principles: It can require it, not to discourse about such Objects and divert it; but it cannot make it assent unto them contrary to the evidence of Truth demonstrated. Briefly then, the Dominion of the Will is partly Mandatory, and partly Perswasive; The one is Absolute, working on meere Passive and Obedient Faculties; the other more Conditional, and upon Supposition of Regularity or Subjection in the Inferior Powers. For the Will hath both an *Oeconomical Government* in respect of the body, and the Moving Organs thereof, as over *Servants*: and it hath a *Politique* or Civill Government

Arist. Polit.
l. i. c. 5.

towards the *Understanding, Affection, & Sensitive Appetite*. as *subjects*, with which by reason of their often Rebellions, it hapneth to have sundry conflicts and troubles: as Princes from their seditious and rebellious Subjects. So that the corruption of this Power in the Will, is either *Tyranny* in it selfe, or *Usurpation* in another; An abuse of it, and a Restraint of it. The *Abuse*, when the Will absolutely gainesayes the Counsels, Lawes, and Directions of the Understanding, which is wrought by the Allection, Inticing, and Insinuation of the *Sensitive Appetite*, secretly winning over the Will to the Approbation of these courses which are most delightfull to sense: for since the Fall, the sweet Harmony and Subordination of Sense to Reason, and of Reason to God, is broken; and the highest Faculties of the Soul become themselves Sensuall and Carnall. And the Restraint when the Will is desirous to obey the Dictates of Reason, or of Grace; and Lust by her tyranny over-beares the Soule, and leads it captive to the Law of Sinne, so that a man cannot do the things which he would. As a Bird whose wings are besmeared and intangled with some viscous slime, though he offer to flie, yet falleth down again.

Now touching the Corruption of the Will in regard of Desire, Liberty and Dominion, there have been heretofore some who ascribed them to Naturall and Divine Causes, and so make the Will to be corrupted only *ab extrinseco*, and that Necessarily. The Stoicks, they framed a supreme swaying

swaying Power, inevitably binding it, as all other Agents to such particular Actions by an eternall secret connexion and flux of causes, which they call *Fate*. Astrologers understanding by *Fate* nothing but the Uniforme and Unchangingable working of those beautiful Bodies, the heavealy Orbs and their Influences upon inferiours, annexed unto them a binding Power Necessarily, though Secretly over-ruling the Practices of men. Enquire the reason why one man lives conformably to the Law of God and Nature, another breaks out into Exorbitant courses;

*Anne aliud quam ———
Sydus, & occulti miranda potentia Fati?*

What is it else, but Stars Malignity,
And wondrous power of secret Destiny?

It is not to be denyed, but that the Heavens having strong and powerfull Operations on all sublunary Corporall Substances, may in altering the humours of the Body, have by the mediation thereof, some kinde of Influence (if it may be so called) upon the manners; but to ascribe unto them any Dominion, is as much repugnant to Philosophy, as it is to Piety. For by Binding the Actions of mans Will to such a Law of Destiny, and making them inevitably to depend upon Planets, Houses, Constellations, Conjunctions, &c. wee doe not only impiously take away the *Guilt* of Sinne, in that we make all mans Lapses

*Laert in Zen.
Plut. de placit.
Philos. lib. 1.
c. 27. 28.
Sen. Ep. 96.
A. Gel. l. 5. c. 2.*

*Vid. Euseb. Ca-
sariens. de præ-
parat. Evang.
lib. 6. c. 4. Max-
Tyrus differ. 3
Plut. advers.
Stoicos.
Tertul. Apol.
c. 1. & ibi nota-
Heracl. Aug. d.
Civ. Dei l. 5. c. 1
7, 8.*

Lapses to be wrought without a free Principle in himself (and so derogate from the Justice of God, in punishing that, whereunto we were by order of his Creatures unavoydably determined) not only rob God of his Mercy, in Ascribing those vertuous dispositions of the Mind (which are his immediate Breathing into man) unto the happy Aspect of the Heavens ; but withall we deny to the Soule both Natural Motion and Spirituality. *Naturall Motion* first ; since that alwayes flowes from an *Inward Principle*, that is Essentially to the Mover (which in the Will must needs be free and voluntary) and not from violence or impression made by some Extrinsicall Worker. And then *Spirituality* likewise ; since the Heavens bring Corporal Agents, can therefore extend the Dominion of their Influence no farther then our Bodily Substances.

Ἐξ οὐρανὸν
πασιχέμενα,
ὡς ὅτι αὐτοὶ
τηνσιν ἀταδὰ
λὴ ἦσαν ὡς μὴ
εὖν ἀλλ' ἔχου-
σιν. Homer.
Odyss. α.

Others there have been yet more Impious, which seek to fatten all the Corruptions of their Wilson something above the Heavens, even the Eternal Foreknowledge and the Providence of God: As if my Foreknowledge, that on the morrow the Sunne will rise, or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a severe Doom, were the Cause-working Necessity of the next Day, or the last Judgement: It is true indeed, Gods prescience implyes a Necessity of our working after that manner, as he foreknows : but this is *Necessitas* only *Infallibilitas*, in regard of his undeceivable Knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to pass by the free

free or naturall workings of the Agents, whence they proceed. It is not *Necessitas Coactionis*, or *Determinationis*, whereby the Will of man is without any other disposition or propension in it self, enforced or unspontaneously determined to the producing of such Effects. The Actions of our Will are not therefore necessarily executed, because they were foreknown; but therefore they were foreknown, because our will would certainly execute them, though not without Freedom and Election. And for Providence, notwithstanding there be *Providentia Permissiva*, whereby God hath determined to suffer and permit men to sin; and moreover a *Disposing Providence* in Ordering all things in the World unto his owne Glorious Ends, yet we may not presume to think that God doth determine, or aduate, impell, and overrule the wils of men to Evill. It is true indeed that nothing is done which God in all respects doth will shall not be done with the secret Will of his good pleasure (for who can withstand his Will?) and that his purposes are advanced by all the operations of the Creature: but yet he doth not so worke his Will out of mens, as thereby to constrain and take away theirs (for indeed the contraint of a liberall and Free Faculty, is (as it were) the extinction thereof.) This were an Argument of Weakness, as if he were not able to bring his own Ends about, but by chaining and fettering his oppugners from exercising the Freedom which he first gave them; nor do his own Will, but by taking away his own Gifts. But

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Aug. de Civ.
Dei. l. 11. c. 17.
13. l. 14. c. 26.
Lib. de Contin.
c. 6. de Corrupt.
& Grat. c. 10.
Epist. 120.
Cap. 2. de Gen.
Contr. Manich.
l. 2. c. 28.
De Gen. ad lit.
l. 11. c. 4.
De Trin. l. 3. c. 4.
Ost. ginta tri-
umque. q. 21.

Vid. Euseb. de
Preparat.
Evang. l. 6. c. 6.

Cyrril. Alex.
contra Jul. l. 4.

Hinc etiam
quod faciunt
contra volun-
tatem Dei, non
impletur nisi
voluntas Dei.
Aug. de grad.
Sancti. l. 1. c. 16.

herein is rather magnified the Power of his Providence, and the great Wisdome of his Power, that notwithstanding every man worketh according to the inclination of his own heart, and that even Rebellionously against him; yet out of so many different, so repugnant, so contrary intents, he is able to raise his own Glory (the End whet her we will or no, of all our Actions) and even when his Will is most resisted, most powerfull to fulfill it. For as sundry times Gods *Revealed Will* is broken, even by those whose greatest desires and endeavors are to keep it: so alwaies his *Secret Will* is performed, Even by the free and Selfe-moving Operations of those who set themselves stubbornly to oppose it. There is not then any Supreme Destiny Extrinsically moving, or Necessarily binding any Inferiours to particu'ar Actions; but there is only a Divine Providence, which can, as out of the Concurrence of differing and casual Causes (which we call Fortune) so likewise out of the Intrinsical Operation of all Inferiour Agents (which we call Nature) produce one main and Supreme End, without straining or violating the proper Motions of any.

Lastly, many men are apt in this case to father their finnes upon the motions of Satan, as if he brought the necessity of sinning upon them; and as Saint Paul said in Faith, *Not I but sin in me*: So they in Hypocrisie, *Not I but evil motions cast into me*; and because the Devill is in a speciall manner called the Tempter, such men therefore thinke to perswade themselves, that their Evill cometh

Rom. 7. 17.

Matth. 4. 3.

not from any willingness in themselves, but from the violence of the Enemies Power, Malice, and Policy. It is true indeed, that the Devill hath a strong Operation on the Wills of Corrupt men ;

1 First, because of the *Subtily* of his *Substance* whereby he can wind himself and his suggestions most inwardly on the Affections and Understanding.

2 Secondly, because of the *Height* of his *Naturall Understanding* and policy, whereby he is able to transfigure himself into an *Angel of light*, and so to method and contrive his devices, that they shall not misse of the best advantage to make them speed.

3 Thirdly, because of the *virtuosity* of his *Experience*, whereby he is the better enabled to use such ploys as have formerly had the best success.

4 Fourthly, because of his manner of Working, grounded on all these, which is *Violent* and *Furious* for the strength, and therefore he is called a *Strong Man*, a *Roaring Lyon*, a *Red Dragon*; & *Deep* for the subtily of it, and therefore his working is called a *Mystery of Iniquity*, and *Deceivableness of Iniquity*. Which is seen, First in his *Accommodating* himself to our particular Humours and *Natures*, and so following the tyde of our own Affections. Secondly, by fitting his Temptations according to our *Vocations* and Personall Employments, by changing, or mixing, or suspending, or pressing ; or any other the like qualifying of his Suggestions, according as he shall find agreeable to all other Circumstances. But yet wee do not

Luke 11. 21.
1 Pet. 5. 8.
Rev. 12. 3.
2 Thes. 2. 7.
Heb. 3. 13.
Rom. 7. 11.

Eph 6. 11.
Ephes. 7. 2
2 Cor. 2. 11.
2 Tim. 2. 26.

* James 1. 14.
Vitiū Author
Diaboli decipi-
entis Calliditas,
et Hominis
Consentientis
voluntas.
Aug. de peccat.
Orig. 1. 2. c. 37.

Lib. de Scra
numinis vin-
dici.

find in any of these any violation of mans Will, nor restraint of his Obedience; but rather the arts that are used to the inveigling of it. The workings then of Evill *Angels*, are all by Imposture and Deceit towards Good men; and in respect of Evill men, they are but as those of a Prince over his Subjects, or of a Lord over his Slaves and Captives; which may well stand with the Freedome of mans Will. And therefore his temptations are in some places called the *methods*, in others, the *Devices*; in others the *Snares* of Satan: All words of Circumvention, and presuppose the working of our own Wills: Though then Satan have in a not ble manner the name of Tempter belonging unto him, yet we are told in another place, that * *Every man is tempted, when he is drawne away of his own Concupiscence, and inticed.* So that the Devill hath never an effectuall Temptation (such an one as carries and overcomes the Will) but it is alwaies joyned with an Inward Temptation of our owne, proceeding from the deceitfulness of our owne lusts. So that in this case eve y man may say to himself, as *Apollodorus* in *Plutarch* dreamed of himselfe, when he thought he was boyled alive in a vessell, and his heart cried out unto him, I am the cause of all this misery to my selfe.

Many more things might be here added touching this Faculty, which I will but name. As first for the *manner* of its Operations. In some cases it worketh *Naturally* and *Necessarily*, as in its Inclination unto *Good* in the whole latitude, and general

all apprehension hereof. For it cannot will any thing under the generall and formall notion of Evil. In others *Voluntarily* from it self, and with a distinct view and knowledge of an End wherunto it worketh. In others *freely*, with a *Liberty* to one thing or another, with a power to elsse, or to suspend and suppress it's owne Operation. In all *Spontaneously*, without violence or compulsion: For though in some respects the Will be not free from *Necessity*, yet it is in all free from *Coaction*; And therefore though *Ignorance* & *Fear* may take away the complete *Voluntariness* of an Action proceeding from the Will (because without such *Fear* or *Ignorance* it would not have been done; As when a man casteth his goods into the Sea to escape a shipwrack; and when *Oedipus* slew *Laius* his Father, not knowing him so to be) yet they can never force the Will to do that out of violence, which is not represented under some notion of *Good* thereunto.

Ethic. l. 3 c. 1.

Secondly for the *Motives* of the *Will*; They are first Natural and *Internal*. Amongst which, the *Understanding* is the principall, which doth pass Judgement upon the *Goodness* and Convenience of the Object of the Will, and according to the greater and lesser excellency thereof, represents it to the Will, with either a *Mandatory*, or a *Monitory*, or a *permissive* Sentence. The Will likewise doth move it self. For by an *Antecedent* willing of the End, it setteth it self on work to will the *Means* requisite unto the obtaining of that End.

And the *Sensitive Appetite* doth *Indirectly* move

it

it too, by suppressing or bewitching and enticing the Judgement to put some colour and appearance of Good upon sensuall things. And then, as the Sunne seemeth red through a red glasse : so such as a mans own Affection is, such will the End seeme unto him to be, as the Philosopher speaks.

Next *Supernaturally* God moveth the *Wills* of men, Not only in regard of the *Master* of the Motion : For *in him we live, and move, and have our being* ; but in regard of the *Rectitude* and Goodness of it in *Actions* Supernaturall, both by the *Manifestation* of Heavenly Light, *They shall be all taught of God* ; and by the *Infusion* and Impression of Spirituall Grace, preventing, assisting, enabling us both to *Will* and to *Do* of his own pleasure.

Lastly, for the *Acts* of the *Will*, They are such as respect either the *End*, or the *Meanes* for attaining of it. The *Acts* respecting the *End* are these three. 1. A *Loving* and Desiring of it in regard of its beauty and goodness. 2. A serious *Intention* and purpose to prosecute it in regard of its *distance* from us. 3. A *Fruition* or Enjoying of it, which standeth in two things. In *Affection* or possession, whereby we are actually joyned unto it : and in *Delectation* or Rest, whereby we take speciall pleasure in it.

The *Acts* of the *Will* respecting the *Meanes*, are these. 1. an *Act* of *Using* or Employing the Practicall Iudgement, an application and Exercising of it to consult and debate the proper meanes conducible unto the End. Which Consultation having passed, and by the practicall Iudgement, a
Repe-

Representation being made of the Means discovered, there next followeth an embracing of those meanes, and inclining towards them with a double Act; The one an Act of *Consent*, whereby wee approve the means dictated, as *proper* and *possible*: the other an Act of *Election*, whereby, according to the different weight of Reasons, we adhere unto one *Medium* more then unto another, either as more proper, or as more feasible. Thirdly, because the means do not bring us unto the End by being *Chosen*, but by being *Executed*; Hereupon followeth another Act of *Mandate* to all the Faculties interested in the Execution of those means, to apply and put forth their Forces with vigor and constancy, till the End be at the last by due Execution of those meanes attained and enjoyed:

Now whereas the Philosopher doth often distribute the things belonging unto the Soule, into *Affections*, *Faculties* and *Habits*; For the *Faculties* are moved by the *Passions*, and the *Passions* are regulated and managed by the *Habits*; The *Habits* procured for Facility and constancy of *Action*, and the *Actions* directed to the obtaining of an *End*: This Method of the Philosopher would now lead us to speak further;

First of the the *Habits* of the Reasonable Soule, and they are either *Rationall* only, and in the *Mind*, as the *Habits* of *Wisedome*, of *Principles*, of *Conclusions*, of *Art* and *Prudence*; or besides that *Vertuous* and *Vicious*, conversant about *Good* or *Evill Morall*. Which are first the *Habits* of *Practicall Principles*, called *Synteresis*, and next the *Habits*.

Ethic. I. 2. c. 6.
Idem I. 2. c. 2.

bits of *particular Vertues*, whereby the Will is inclined and facilitated unto well doing. Unto the felicity of all which are required these four conditions.

1 *Justice and Rectitude*, disposing the Will to render unto God, unto our selves, and unto all others that which is theirs, and which of right we owe unto them.

2 *Prudence*, discovering that which is in this manner *Right*, Iudging of it, and directing unto it.

3. *Fortitude*, enabling the Will firmly to persist in her vertuous purposes, according to the Instructions of *Practical Prudence*, notwithstanding the labour it must undergoe, the delays it must sustaine before it can obtaine the End, and the difficulties, impediments, discouragements it shall meet withall.

4 *Temperance*, suppressing and subduing those sensuall Appetites, which would stagger, interrupt, divers us from these constant Resolutions.

Next, because all *Habits*, as I said, are directed to the facility and determining of *Actions*, wee should thereby be led on to the consideration of *Humane Actions*, *Fortuitous*, *Violent*, *Natural*, *Voluntary*, *Involuntary*, *Mixed*; As also to the grounds of the *Goodness* or *Illness* of *Actions*, taken first from the *Rule* of them unto which they are to conforme. Secondly, from the *Principles* of them, from whence they are to proceed, to wit, *Knowledge* and *Faith* to see, *Will* to purpose, *Love* to do, *Subjection*

subjection, to obey strength, to finish and fulfill what Vertue leads us unto. Thirdly, from the manner and measure of their perfection. And lastly, from the ends unto which they should be directed; by which consideration we should be led to take a view of the right end, and *ultimate felicity*, unto which all these actions should leade and carrie us; not as the causes of it, but as the way, and Antecedents unto it.

But these pertaining to a nobler Science, and being without the limits of the *Subject* which I proposed to speak of, I shall follow *Pliny's* counsell, and look back to the Title of my Book; which having (as well as my weakness was able) endeavoured to go thorow, it now calls upon me to go no further.

FINIS.
